



THE UNIVERSITY OF  
**AUCKLAND**  
Te Whare Wānanga o Tāmaki Makaurau  
NEW ZEALAND

NO. 1, OCT 2021

# NOMAD

WELCOME TO GLOBAL STUDIES

## MEET THE DIRECTOR OF GLOBAL STUDIES

Interview with Dr. Jamie  
Gillen on his research & on  
Global Studies

## GLOBAL 300 PROJECTS

Five diverse works from the  
Global Studies Faculty

## ALUMNI SPEAK

Interviews with our first  
Global Studies alumni

# Publication Information

Faculty of Global Studies,  
The University of Auckland, 2021.

Essays submitted in Nomad Journal have been submitted to the Faculty of Global Studies by undergraduate students.

All published essays have been verified by Turnitin plagiarism software.

All work included has been published under the consent of the authors.

All copyright belongs to each author.

Publication date: 15 October 2021

## Team

### **Editor-in-Chief**

Kimberly Thio

### **Executive Editors**

Eli Pettersen

Jade Cross

Samantha Fei

Victor Wei

### **Graphic & Cover design**

Samantha Fei

*Tribute*

# WISH YOU WERE HERE

*Letter*

*To Dr Hilary Chung:*

We would not be at this point, even more, as the kind of people we are now, without Hilary. Yes, she is the founder of the first Global Studies programme in New Zealand. And yes, it has given us an inspiring whānau filled with global and open-minded people. But even more, Hilary supported and guided many of us with her enthusiastic spark. She was our mentor, our greatest supporter, and friend. She believed in us, in all of us, to carry on Global Studies.

This is for your mahi that we aspire to further develop.

Aroha nui,  
Nomad Journal

To see more of others' words for Hilary:  
<https://www.auckland.ac.nz/en/study/study-options/global-studies/about-us0/our-founder.html>

# EDITOR'S NOTE

It started with a thought. At the end of our undergraduate degree we have to write a research project on a topic of our interest, but who reads it at the end? Students are often interested in our faculty because it interlinks phenomena around the world. We are encouraged to see how a local event ties intricately to the global. So, we thought, why don't we spread the local work of students to the global public too?

In this edition, we present five very unique Global Studies undergraduate research projects. Each of these essays were selected to represent the four different majors, as well as the different area studies studied in Global Studies. It should be noted that each work reflects the author's personal interest, whether they derive from their majors and area studies in Global Studies, or their Conjoint degree. All the work has been peer-reviewed by our editorial team and consulted with Global Studies staff members that marked or taught the course.

Besides presenting the academic work of our students, we also wanted to further the sense of academic community in our faculty. For this, we have interviewed a few of our Global Studies alumni and staff with the aim to inspire students for their future with Global Studies, whether in research or more.

Without the support and insight from our Global Studies Faculty we would not be here. We would like to thank all the Global Studies staff, with special thanks to Svetlana Kostyikina for advising us throughout Nomad Journal's creation. We would also like to thank all the authors and interviewees for their contribution.

And finally, we are incredibly excited to present you with this first edition that has thoroughly inspired us! The rest we leave for the authors and contributors.

**-Nomad Journal Editorial Team**

# CONTENTS

## SOCIAL

### 6 REFLECTIONS ON 2021

*Reflection of the current global environment*

- Victor Wei

### 8 INTERVIEW WITH DR JAMIE GILLEN

*Interview with the Director and Senior Lecturer for Global Studies*

- Victor Wei

### 11 INTERVIEWS WITH OUR ALUMNI

*Interview with Callum Tokorangi and Pratibha Singh, our recent graduates*

- Victor Wei

## GLOBAL 300

### 14 THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF LAND OCCUPATION: A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF THE 2018 PROTESTS AT IHUMĀTAO, NEW ZEALAND AND MARIELLE VIVE OF THE LANDLESS WORKERS' MOVEMENT, BRAZIL

- Rose Fitzgerald

### 32 IN SIGHT, OUT OF MIND: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PRACTICES AND POLICIES CONCERNING SEX TRAFFICKING IN NORTH KOREAN WOMEN AND GIRLS IN THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF CHINA

- Eli M. Pettersen

### 43 'FROM TÚPAC TO TUPAC' PERCEIVING HIP HOP MUSIC AS A FACET OF SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN BOLIVIA.

- Alexander King

### 55 WHAT HAS INCREASED DE-GLOBALISED FRENCH SENTIMENT IN THE LAST DECADE AND WHAT IMPACT WILL THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC HAVE ON IT?

- Gemma Deftereos

### 69 FIRST STEPS TOWARDS ALLEVIATING URBAN TRAFFIC CONGESTION – LESSONS FROM TOYAMA AND CURITIBA

- Jerald Yutaka Chan



# A REFLECTION ON 2021

## REFLECTION ON THE CURRENT GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

BY VICTOR WEI

Many of us were looking forward and would have wished for 2021 to be a year of recovery, a year for all of us to return to civilisation and continue living. We just can't have good things, can we? As of writing, Auckland has been in lockdown for 52 days, with Waikato and Northland recently joining ranks.

Perhaps, our initial lockdown in March, just as the year was getting started, was a precursor, a tentative warning sign of what was to come. Maybe in hindsight, we were always flirting with the danger of an outbreak. We certainly took our freedoms for granted.

This was supposed to be a year of new beginnings, a year to put the disrupted past behind us, a year to learn from mistakes. Instead, COVID has gotten more dangerous, lockdown has gotten longer, and the world has gotten no better.

You don't have to look far to see the marginalisation of certain groups, especially as the land rights of our indigenous people are stripped. Human rights are constantly trampled on, sex trafficking still happens, and everyone hates urban traffic congestion. It seems that global institutions have also begun to falter under the effect of the pandemic. For all that is damned in the world, social revolution might come from places you would least expect through unconventional means. More on this later in the journal.

2021 began with all the drama from the US elections as a new (but old) president took office. This was a significant and historical moment for many reasons, but it signalled the coming of a new era. Divisions became apparent more than ever before. Dichotomies have become the new normal. One group *against* another. Never in harmony, never *with* or *together*.



With the direction we're going in and with everyone set out to destroy each other, there is no winner. Granted, the winners are the rich and powerful men that sit on thrones of power. But otherwise, we're all losers living on a doomed planet.

Rather appropriately, there has been huge developments for space exploration in the last year with successful efforts in sending some rich, but otherwise unskilled, folk into space. With the prospect of having space travel as a viable option for us in the 'near' future, two thoughts come to mind. One is that of marvel towards human ingenuity and scientific advances to realise how far we've come in such a short amount of time. The other is a moral consideration - while some people leisurely fling themselves into space, others will be rubbing sticks together to survive. Whatever the argument, just as it seemed that Global Studies was gaining popularity, when space travel does become the norm, "Global" will quickly become inadequate as the all-encompassing field of study.

On the other great issue of the environment, the US re-joined the Paris Climate Accord, and other nations that have been historically slow on the uptake have made policies and promises. Clearly, everyone except for Shell and those politicians who have a vested interest against, have begun to take this issue seriously. China, for one, has announced that it will cease funding to coal power plants outside of China and will step up its support for developing countries.

There were many significant events in 2021, too many to detail in one article, Myanmar underwent a coup, the Brexit saga concluded with great implications within Europe and globally to a lesser extent, China continues to assert its

power and do China things that the Western world disapproves of. It appears the world has also reached a point where nations have become so insecure that any form of criticism or rational reasoning is met with aggressive defensiveness and denial.

In other news, the 2020 Tokyo Olympics went ahead with empty stadiums after being delayed one year. Not long after that, the US withdrew their troops from Afghanistan ending a 20 year stint in the region, with terrible ramifications.

In spite of all these developments, we should remember that the majority of us, not least to say those who are being hunted down by their own government, don't actually want to go extinct. The vaccine rollout is ramping up globally at varying degrees and supporting local businesses is the new global trend.

Whatever the case, one thing is for certain, our global environment has changed drastically in the last two years with all of us having to reimagine our futures and how we live. Adaptability, collectivity, and positivity are three lessons for us to remember during this time and take into the future.

"Next year", is something we say with resolute hope that 2022 will finally be *the year, our year.*



# Interview with Dr. Jamie Gillen

Written and Interviewed by Victor Wei |

**Director & senior lecturer for Global Studies, Dr Jamie Gillen, talks about his research, the greater collective, and the importance of individual agency.**

**Q: What do you specialise in/What is your area of research?**

A: My research is fairly eclectic, I wouldn't say that I have one particular set of themes or concepts that I like to read and write about. My specialisation if I were to pin it down, would be the human geographies of South East Asia with a focus on Vietnam. My research is in tourism, urbanisation, classic issues and problems in Global Studies, and what I and some co-authors call "ruralisation". I publish and write about urban stuff, rural stuff, tourism stuff, and a couple of other things related to that and agrarian change in South East Asia.

**Q: How do you see your expertise tie into Global Studies?**

A: I think geography is important in the same way Global Studies is, that people imagine themselves tied to certain places and not to others.

One of the things that is interesting about Global Studies is that it's a boundaryless field of study. I also think that people need to construct meaning out of their lives by categorising and prioritising things, people, and places that matter. That tension between seeing the world as a very exciting and dynamic place but also having to approach it in smaller chunks is what I think is interesting about geography and Global Studies.

**Q: How do you hope your research field develops in the next 10 years?**

A: It's difficult to say and answer this question just because we're all on pause with research at this point. We can still do a lot of work in secondary research but actually talking to people outside of our homes is impossible.

If things resume in some form that I'm familiar with, I would like to continue research and doing work in South-East Asia and Vietnam specifically around tourism and the geopolitics of tourism as it relates to technologies, climate change, sea level rise. I'd also like to explore the Pacific more and think about what the relationship between tourism, development, and sustainability looks like in the region.

If that isn't possible, and it may not, I might think about the geopolitics of tourism in Aotearoa. What does a country like Aotearoa look like without international tourists? That might be a question I pursue in the next 10 years.

**Q: And what about the Global Studies field more generally?**

A: I really don't know. Global Studies had generated so much momentum before COVID hit and everybody has had to push pause on everything. I would imagine that because Global Studies is a field that focuses so much on the present, that whatever the most pressing issues of







I think I live Global Studies. So many of us in Global Studies as students and educators live this sense of “Who am I?” and “Where do I belong?”

Dr Jamie Gillen

Director and Senior Lecturer of Global Studies

the day are will be tended to by Global Studies. I would imagine that Global Studies will have a lot to say about pandemic societies in the world and public health, and the ways public health is filtered through border crossings and geopolitical decisions.

The embodied geographies might be something interesting for Global Studies in the next few years. Because we're all forced to reckon with this pandemic, and the longer it goes on, the more consequential it will be for research. So I imagine the next 10 years will be very much attuned to how COVID 19 has shaped our ways of life and our engagements with people.

**Q: Given COVID 19 has changed the entire global environment and changed the way we think about globalisation, do you think that Global Studies will become more localised in some regards?**

A: Well, yes, absolutely. I think that in some ways we're in a great moment to be in Global Studies because we're forced to localise or nationalise our thinking about Global Studies, and to really look at how globalisation is rooted and grounded at a granular level.

When you read Global Studies works, some of the problems I have with it is that it casts a very wide net. It uses globalisation as if it's a phenomenon that's fairly singular, and the

unevenness of globalisation is something we're seeing a lot of these days with different responses to the virus, different public health initiatives, the different ways people become very provincialised and defensive, scared, anxious. That unevenness of globalisation is much more interesting to me as a broader trend, so we're in an exciting moment to be thinking about globalisation's grounded effects.

**Q: What is your personal opinion on the value of Global Studies?**

A: My personal opinion of its value is that it's much more reflective of the way in which society and people interact and engage with one another. I would take this from Hilary Chung who used to always say, the value of Global Studies is what people make of it - not just students, but people who are interested in the field as observers or whoever. For all that it is, it's a little bit amorphous because it's really how you define it. For me, it's a way to make connections between the local and the global, between who I am as a person and who I want to be in my identity, but also how that connects to other ways of thinking and doing. I think I live Global Studies, so many of us in Global Studies as students and educators live this sense of “Who am I?” and “Where do I belong?” The thing I find really exciting about all of our community is that we're trying to find these answers together.

---

**Q: What is your vision for the world in the next 10 years?**

A: I'll give you the optimistic and the pessimistic answer. With those two extremes, the likelihood is that it will be somewhere down the middle.

An optimistic response to what the world looks like is that the world will be more just, more equitable, and that we will use this time to recognise the vulnerability of the planet. Society will recognise their incredibly important impacts on the planet at a personal level through their consumption, through their decisions, through how they interact with environments and people. So the next 10 years would be a correction to some of the more dramatic inequalities and divisions that exist.

The more pessimistic side of things would see that we just move on from the pandemic as if it never happened and we continue to pay no heed to our impacts on the world. We don't stop to smell the roses or treasure the engagements that we are now afforded as a result of the reductions in border control. We just live in the moment without thinking about what has happened and will happen. Historians would say that people never look in the past the way that they should, and I hope that's not the case.

**Q: What are the small action steps that you would implore us all to take, if we want to achieve your optimistic vision?**

A: Well, just being empathetic, it's very simple. This is something that very few people have capacity for, especially when they feel threatened, and all of us are threatened in some way, shape, or form. But one of the things that draws me so closely to Global Studies is this sense of being able to put yourself in other people's shoes and trying to see the world from a place outside of your own. That's what I think attracts many students to Global Studies is that they've been able to do that, because they've lived in different places, and they have multiple identities that they're juggling and thinking

through. It's a natural fit for students who have been able to do that, but a lot of people in the world are simply incapable of that because it's scary and takes work and effort. So the small action would be: stop what you're doing, stop being selfish, and put yourself in somebody else's shoes for a moment, and spending some time doing this simple gesture is something that I think would do a lot of good for people. As far as bigger actions, you don't need to be just empathetic toward your fellow humans, but be empathetic towards animals, towards the environment, towards machinery, towards technology. Self discipline is an underappreciated skill in this day and age - putting down the phone, or picking up the phone and making a call instead of texting. Simple things that we don't do anymore can actually change things in really positive ways.

**Q: Most memorable moment/empowering moment?**

A: I'll say my most memorable moment more recently was actually the week we got back from our lockdown in March [2021]. If you remember the first two weeks of Semester 1, we were locked down so we had virtual class remotely. When we went back to the classroom in Week 3, the class was in the library, Global 100, there was not an empty seat and you have this feeling that we're all really happy to be there. So that hour and a half, hour and forty-five minutes, whatever it was, was spectacular. It really cemented in me how passionate our community is on a whole, and how different everyone is, how everyone looks different, speaks differently - and that difference is why I chose this career. That moment was also quite empowering for me as an educator and as the director of Global Studies.

Seeing our first batch of graduates was also quite empowering to me and the Global Studies community because you could see the smiles of students moving onto their jobs and becoming people who will surpass all of us and make Global Studies their own. Seeing this moment was very satisfying.

# Meeting our Alumni



Interviewer: Victor Wei / Alumni: Callum Tokorangi & Pratibha Singh



**Callum Tokorangi**

## **What did you graduate with? (major, language, and area specialisation for GS)**

C: Bachelor of Global Studies, major in Global Politics and Human Rights, studied the French language and my area of specialization was Europe.

P: Bachelor of Global Studies, major in Global Environment and Sustainable Development, Spanish, and Latin American studies.

## **Where has your degree taken you now?**

C: Currently I am working for a fast growing tech startup called Joyous as a Marketing Communications Coordinator. We are an employee feedback software for large organisations, turning feedback into two way conversations that enable change to happen at all edges of an organisation.

P: I am currently studying a Masters of Indigenous studies under the Kupe Leadership Scholarship at the University of Auckland. I also work part-time as the Partnerships Lead at the Human Rights Measurement Initiative, based out of Motu Economic and Public Policy Research Institute.



**Pratibha Singh**

## **Tracing back to your past, what were your small beginnings and how did that lead you to Global Studies?**

C: I had actually studied a Law/Arts conjoint in my first year, realised quickly it wasn't really for me. Friends of mine had been talking about the new degree that was coming out that really focussed on world change etc. I arranged a meeting with Hilary with a few friends and was instantly inspired. Her energy and love for this new degree lit a spark in me. I think if it wasn't for those first meetings to discuss what this would look like for me then I don't think I would have taken the gamble on Global.

P: If we go right back to the beginning, I suppose my story starts with my grandparents. My grandparents on my dad's side were sugarcane farmers during the time the Green Revolution was causing a wave of farmer suicides across India. My grandparents on my mum's side had to cross the border during the partition period, which resulted in one of the biggest and bloodiest mass migration movements in history. Having grown up in both India and Aotearoa, both social and environmental issues, particularly related to justice and colonisation, were ones I cared deeply about. I wanted to undertake a degree that would let me explore these issues in a meaningful way. Global Studies, being 'problem-centred' and transdisciplinary, was the perfect fit!



“

It has opened my perspective on things, intersectionality is core to my thinking.



**What were some memorable/inspiring moments in your undergraduate degree?**

C: I think all my time with Hilary are the moments I cherish most. Especially the time she created a paper for me so I could complete my area studies. I remember the work of the Global Studies society, the lengthy process of setting up something so people could take over and so wonders with it, and seeing what they've done has been amazing to see.

P: I am so grateful to have been able to undertake two semester exchanges, one to Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey, Guadalajara, Mexico and the other to the University of Oslo, Norway. Both were highly memorable experiences, and it was actually on my travels in Oaxaca (where I visited Cooperativa Autónoma de Convivencia y Aprendizaje de Oaxaca) that gave me the idea for my Bachelor's thesis! In Norway, I had the opportunity to delve into a field I'd never heard of before - Green Criminology. It was inspiring to hear from professors who were key to the discipline and if I had the opportunity to continue pursuing it at UoA, I would have!

**How has Global Studies shaped you as a person now?**

C: It has opened my perspective on things, intersectionality is core to my thinking. I feel like when I look at a lot of issues in the world I am critically assessing them from multiple angles, having a greater awareness of my own biases and how that could be misleading me in my views. I think global also really fanned the flame in me to try and make a difference in this world and I continue to be inspired by what members of my cohorts and younger cohorts are doing in the world.

P: One of the main ways that Global Studies has impacted me is probably in the way I think about things now - for example, being able to see the complex relationships between local and global issues and processes. Certainly, learning Spanish and undertaking Latin American studies has opened a new world of knowledge and experience! On less of an academic note and more of a personal one, Hilary was a true source of inspiration and strength. Her dedication, passion, and commitment to the programme and her students has shaped how I approach my life work today. I still remember all our in-between lecture catch-ups and office hours; she is greatly missed!

**What is the impact you hope to have on the world? (what you wish to contribute to, make a difference towards)**

C: Disparity and inequality are issues close to my heart. I've had experience in my youth with people who were dismissed by society due to a couple of unfortunate choices, we believed in them and made them feel worth something and that led to an enormous change inside them. I would like to try and empower these people on a larger scale. Unsure what that looks like yet. The company I'm a part of has a similar goal so I am hoping to learn from what they do to maybe start something myself later down the line.

P: My life's vision is to work towards a thriving, just, and sustainable world. I am passionate about decolonisation, respecting other ways of being and knowing in the world, and working in community and in collaboration.

NOMAD

---

# GLOBAL 300 PROJECTS

The collection of work here were made in Semester 2, 2020 and Semester 1, 2021 for the Global 300 course. This course is a compulsory course for students in the Global Studies Faculty to conduct a research project of their chosen topic.

# THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF LAND OCCUPATION: A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF THE 2018 PROTESTS AT IHUMĀTAO, NEW ZEALAND AND MARIELLE VIVE OF THE LANDLESS WORKERS' MOVEMENT, BRAZIL

BY ROSE FITZGERALD

BSC/BGLOBALST: PSYCHOLOGY, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, LATIN AMERICA, SPANISH

## Abstract:

A political ecology understanding of land and protest at Ihumātao and Marielle Vive explores human and non-human actors, scalar processes, and power. This comparative case study exposes transnational parallels in stories of marginalisation, positioning the land struggles within a global transdisciplinary framework. Utilising a global case study methodology, the subject of this research is the political ecology of land occupation. The objects are land as an actor, occupation as a scalar process, and power with nuances between private, public and people spheres. A broad application of Foucauldian Discourse Analysis on news media and Facebook accounts of the Ihumātao and Marielle Vive land occupations during 2018 allows an analysis of environment-society representations through the intersecting theories of poststructuralism, counterhegemonic globalisation, and decolonisation. This knowledge production draws on plural perspectives and worldviews that exist within and despite the systemic inequalities, disproportionate opportunities, and inequitable distributions of costs and benefits relating to land use, highlighting the importance of community solidarity in advocating for representation and equity for marginalised actors.

## Research Question:

*How does political ecology explore important environment-society relations in the land occupation of the 2018 protests at Ihumātao, New Zealand and Marielle Vive, Brazil?*

## Introduction:

The overall aim of this research is to gain a deeper understanding of how stories of land use, occupation, and protest are told and understood at Ihumātao and Marielle Vive. The protests over land at Ihumātao and Marielle Vive are localised examples of inequities in land use, access, and decision-making. Looking at how people's lived experiences are relayed (or not) in media accounts of protests enables an analysis of the experiences of global processes with local intersects in social, cultural, and ecological contexts across time and space (Darian-Smith & McCarty, 2017). The positioning of this comparative case study on the local-global continuum exposes the complex and interacting levels of the issues of power, scale, and resilience processes that are co-occurring (Darian-Smith & McCarty, 2017). A political ecology framework allows the exploration of the inextricably related themes of disparity among politicised actors, varied scales of land-use practices, and occupation and macro- and micro-scale power devolved among environment-society actors. This framework will rely on the intersecting theories of poststructuralism (Escobar, 1996; Foucault, 1979; McMorrow, 2017), counterhegemonic globalisation (Bryant & Bailey, 1997; Gramsci, 1971; Santos, 2003), and decolonisation through community action projects (Bryant & Bailey, 1997; Smith, 2012). Poststructuralism will explore the political-ecological actors, counterhegemonic globalisation will demonstrate the scalar processes, and decolonisation will expose the inequitable power relations. These theories inherently critique the dominant social, political, legal, and economic structures that have shaped local

---

experiences in land use, which de-centres the production of knowledge and opens up considerations of pluralist perspectives from populations that have historically been marginalised (Darian-Smith & McCarty, 2017). The knowledge produced draws attention to the agency of human and non-human actors participating in and being transformed by political processes (Robbins, 2012). Furthermore, the contemporary acts of resilience situated in both localities and the alternative means of documenting these accounts, such as through local information outlets and social media, integrates interdisciplinary knowledge while also including values, knowledge, and expertise from non-academic sources such as the alternative recorded histories and experiences of marginalised peoples (Polk, 2014). The prioritisation of knowledge production from plural perspectives, often neglected from mainstream media, is imperative to the global transdisciplinary framework and consequently to this research (Darian-Smith & McCarty, 2017).

Ihumātao is a site of critical cultural, social, geographical, and historical significance both to Māori and, more broadly, to New Zealand. Around 1300 to 1400, the first migration of Māori to New Zealand occurred as the Tainui waka arrived in Manukau Harbour (MacKintosh, 2019). The Ihumātao landscape attests to the first papakāinga (villages) in New Zealand and the development of sophisticated agricultural practices (van Berkel, 2018). Auckland was purchased by the Crown in 1840, yet the Māori inhabitants of Ihumātao remained on the land with no interference until confiscation occurred during the Waikato War of 1863 (MacKintosh, 2019). The land was transferred to the Wallace family and farmed for 150 years prior to being sold for housing development to Fletcher Building in 2016. Save Our Unique Landscape (SOUL) was established in collective protest at the injustice of development on stolen land. People began occupying the land on November 5, 2016, in opposition to the zoning and real estate development (van Berkel, 2018). In 2018, Pania Newton, the founder of SOUL, received recommendations from the United Nations and took

Fletcher Building to the Environment Court. The legal interventions led to increased media representation, social participation, and public awareness of the land occupation at Ihumātao.

Marielle Vive is part of the wider social organisation, the Landless Workers' Movement (MST). On April 14, 2018, the community was established on the São João das Pedras farm in São Paulo. The acampamento (encampment) was named in honour of Marielle Franco, a politician who used her platform to advocate for the rights of minorities such as Afro-Brazilians, women, and members of the LGBTQ+ community. At large, MST is a dynamic, organised, and counter-hegemonic project that seeks to transform non-productive land through agrarian reform, reinstating a social function in providing livelihoods for the landless (Meszaros, 2000). Undeniable challenges to democracy under the 2018 Temer government were evident given the successive coups of the military dictatorship, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, and Dilma Rouseff governments (Costa, 2019). With 46% of Brazilian land owned by less than 1% of the population and 29% of households in Brazil defined as landless, there was and continues to be an urgent need for political action in restructuring the power in environment-society relations (Bauluz et al., 2020). Importantly, occupation of the land at Marielle Vive engages with the rhetoric and instruments of legality (Meszaros, 2000). The 1964 Brazilian Land Statute and the 1988 Brazilian Constitution state that the government can expropriate land if it is unproductive and does not fulfil a social function (Schwendler & Thompson, 2017). However, the legal conversion of non-productive private landholdings to formal peasant territories is a slow and often unsuccessful process. Land protest poses a life-threatening risk to already marginalised populations that attempt to reinstate connection to the land after economic regulations and agricultural modernisation decreased the need for human labour in rural spaces (Burns, 1993).

The expected outcome of this project is to contribute to a

better understanding of the plural narratives of human-environment relations in protest through land occupation at Ihumātao and Marielle Vive. This project will be the first to compare the case studies of Ihumātao and Marielle Vive, allowing novel insight into how land use and resilience can exemplify local experiences of global-scale relevance to environment-society injustices.

### Methods:

The research focused on two study sites: Ihumātao and the Ōtuataua Stonefields, Auckland, New Zealand and Camp Marielle Vive, Valinhos, São Paulo, Brazil.

In 2018, there were 35 online news articles and 106 Facebook posts on the respective social organisation pages, relevant to the land protests of Ihumātao and Marielle Vive (see Appendix A). Of the news articles, 32 related to Ihumātao and three related to Marielle Vive. For Facebook posts, 103 were on the Protect Ihumātao page and three were associated with Marielle Vive on the Friends of the MST page. These findings were the result of using the critical search terms 'Ihumātao' or 'Marielle Vive.' The qualitative discourse analysis of these articles was undertaken using NVivo 12 software. These media posts were assessed and coded based on a framework of the key domains of political ecology, including references to human and environmental actors, scalar processes, and power relations. The organisation websites and local newsletters for the Marielle Vive community during 2018 were also analysed to compensate for the lack of national media attention on the struggle for land.

This research used a Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA) to analyse the production of, or specific omission of, power maintained through media representations of actors, processes, and power in the systematic construction of narratives related to land and protest (Bryant, 2015; Darian-Smith & McCarty, 2017; Foucault, 1980). When analysing narratives in the media, FDA looks at what is already said, not said, and said in silent discourse (Sam, 2019). FDA is suited to this research as the analysis is at a macro-level on the collective social production of stories,

behaviour, and human-environment interactions (Sam, 2019). The stories of contemporary resilience and protest for land are documented to an extent for both sites. Yet, there is a lack of explanation for the power-knowledge nexus that has shaped these lived experiences and resulted in the genealogy of contextual narratives of protest (Foucault, 1980).

### Results:

This research examined the key domains of political ecology as human and environmental actors, scalar processes, and power in the context of online news media platforms in New Zealand and Brazil. The results showed significant variation in the quantity and quality of content coded as references to political-ecological domains of land occupation at Ihumātao and Marielle Vive. Interestingly, MST, a globally renowned social movement, with national political traction and extensive history in land occupation, produced only three references to Marielle Vive, a large-scale occupation of the 1000ha São João das Pedras farm in Brazil. Whereas the smaller scale 33ha occupation of Ihumātao by the recently established SOUL organisation had 32 articles reference the land dispute during 2018.

### Ihumātao Online News Media




Fig. 1: The number of online articles from New Zealand online media that featured Ihumātao in the context of land disputes during 2018.

Articles in the online media that referenced Ihumātao included references of actors such as the SOUL organisation, its leader Pania Newton, and lawyer



Cameron Hockly (Dewes, 2018b, 2018c; Fuatai, 2018b; Gibson, 2018b; Koti, 2018). Further actors on one side of the dispute were the United Nations (UN), United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), United Nations International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), Māngere-Ōtāhuhu local board, politicians of the Green Party and Māori Party, archaeologist Dave Veart, the communities of students, families, unions, activist groups, kaumatua, kuia, and other Māori leaders and whānau (Dewes 2018a, 2018b, 2018c; Fuatai, 2018a; Hancock, 2018; Koti, 2018; SOUL, 2018; Tyson, 2018). Portrayed as actors on the opposing side of the land dispute are Fletcher Building, CEO Residential and Land Development Steve Evans, Chief Executive Ross Taylor, vendor Gavin H Wallace, New Zealand Overseas Investment Office, Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, Heritage New Zealand, the Environment Court Judge David Kirkpatrick, and the two commissioners (Anthony, 2018a, 2018b; Fuatai, 2018a; Gibson, 2018a; Hancock & McCreanor, 2018; Koti, 2018).

Environment-society processes occurring across socio-spatial and time scales were referenced in terms of occupation at Ihumātao (Anthony, 2018b; Black, 2018; Dewes, 2018c; Gibson, 2018b). Gardening was one process that was referenced in association with Ihumātao and land occupation. Positive connotations were linked to the project of food sovereignty, utilising the land at Ihumātao to improve human health in mental, spiritual, physical, and social domains through connectivity with the whenua and whānau (Fuatai, 2018b; Harrowell, 2018d; Mulligan, 2018; Slinger, 2018; Watkin, 2016). Political advocacy was also recognised as an essential process linked to land occupation. Articles referenced political advocacy processes not only in terms of representing the indigenous people that were displaced from the land and continuously marginalised by the structural power of the colonial state, but also the land itself as an actor able to be transformed in developmental processes to become unrecognisable and disconnected from historical context

(Singh, 2018). Looking at the critical history of this land, the transformational processes of migration, colonisation, land wars, agriculture, industrialisation, urbanisation, and neoliberal development are also vital to understanding the political ecology scale of the land protests (Harrowell, 2018a; Mulligan, 2018; Singh, 2018; Theunissen, 2018; van Berkel, 2018; Watkin, 2016).

Power was referenced in terms of public, private, and people spheres. Public governance was evident in the statements from Auckland Council regarding the Special Housing Areas, Heritage New Zealand, Environment Court, and CERD (Dewes, 2018c; Fuatai, 2018a; Hancock, 2018; Harrowell, 2018c, 2018d; Koti, 2018). Te Tiriti o Waitangi and the legislation that allowed for Māori land confiscation are mentioned as land and human rights issues, whereby the inequitable distribution of power becomes exacerbated through intergenerational experiences (Delahunty, 2018; Mulligan, 2018). However, power was also represented as a social force, emphasising sovereignty and people power through collective occupation (Clarke Mamanu, 2018; Theunissen, 2018). Similarly, social power was evident in the reports of food sovereignty in the involvement and empowerment of wider communities in traditional gardening practices and social enterprise (Dewes, 2018a; Slinger 2018).

#### Marielle Vive Online News Media




Fig. 2: The number of online articles from Brazilian online media that featured the Marielle Vive land dispute during 2018.

In reference to Marielle Vive, the actors represented in the news articles primarily included the 700 families of MST and the farm located in Estrada dos Jequitibás, Valinhos, Campinas, São Paulo (Pitasse, 2018a, 2018b; Sartorato, 2018). However, community solidarity was also highlighted as an essential component to elevating the local cause to a national and even transnational counterhegemonic project of land occupation. This was made clear with the acknowledged support of the Workers Party, the Communist Party of Brazil, the Brazilian Communist Party, the Labour Union, the Movement of Homeless Workers, the Popular Youth Movement, the Unemployed Workers Movement, the Pastoral Theology Movement, and the primary environment-society process associated with Marielle Vive represented in the online media was occupation. Occupation as a process was described as an obligation of anyone committed to politically representing marginalised people (Pitasse, 2018a). The organisational structure of the occupation communities was defined as relating to ecclesiastical base communities, where small subgroups are formed to undertake functional roles of cooking, cleaning, gardening, education, health, and political representation within the acampamento (Pitasse, 2018b). In contrast, the environment-society processes as influenced under the neoliberal structure of hegemonic power exerted by real estate corporations were depicted as privatising nature through advancing into rural areas to establish closed condominiums with insufficient social housing functions (Pitasse, 2018a).

Of the articles that referenced Marielle Vive, power was narrated in public and private governance and collective social resilience. Public governance is represented in the violent oppression that the landless experienced, with 21 MST victims of murder by the military police due to occupying land as protest (Sartorato, 2018). Private governance is evident in the reference to the economic power of the real estate companies that form alliances with local and judiciary governments to prevent expropriation of land and prolong the legal processes that would allow for agrarian reform and a transfer of landholdings (Pitasse,

2018a). Power in terms of solidarity for a social movement is depicted as "essential for families to be able to resist" (Pitasse, 2018a, p. 1).

### **Discussion:**

#### **Poststructuralism and political ecology**

Poststructuralism allows for deconstructive thinking that inherently challenges dominantly accepted truths and universal knowledges (McMorrow, 2017). The narratives presented in research, media and everyday experiences are inevitably interpreted subjectively (McMorrow, 2017). Interpretations of these narratives are influenced by those that hold power to shape the way stories are told and which accounts are never heard in the first place.

Furthermore, language can place environmental and societal actors and concepts in binary opposition, with a hierarchical structure so that meaning is created through power relations (McMorrow, 2017). Foucault (1979) emphasises that power produces reality, constructs knowledge and silences alternative epistemologies. Silencing can occur through knowing (Gramsci, 1971). The mainstream media is a system of forged knowledge that silences subaltern perspectives, those perspectives of precarious actors on the margins that live socially dependent on, yet exposed to the systemic inequities in power structures (Butler, 2016). The mainstream media creates a regime of truth within society, producing and reproducing dominant discourse controlled by actors with power and shaping the interpretation and reaction of the audience in favour of the elitist political stance (Foucault, 1979). Poststructuralism should be applied to political ecology to understand how environment and society are un- or misrepresented in discourse (Escobar, 1996). Land, understood as an actor through a political-ecological lens, can be problematised with poststructuralism to draw attention to how the landscape has been transformed and how this is represented. Land is a foundation to explore the complex nuances of inequitable power relations, oppressive colonial histories, and neoliberal economic agendas at Ihumātao, New Zealand and Marielle Vive, Brazil.

---

In 2018, the articles in New Zealand online media about Ihumātao predominantly discussed the land in contested ownership. In the context of a contemporary settler-colonial state, knowledge is produced and reinstated by the coloniser at the detriment of indigenous ways of knowing and doing. The power-knowledge nexus perpetuated by the mainstream media is limited in the imaginings of land as a commodity that can be privately held. The explicit fiscal view of land is evident in the language that states, “[the] ownership of the land, which has been home to both Māori and European settlers – has been contested over the years” (Fuatai, 2018a, p.1). Knowledge of land as something that can be owned is a way of understanding and therefore doing, informed by an imperial influence of power. The occupied land was described as having been privately owned and farmed by the Wallace family for the past 150 years, covered in a Treaty of Waitangi compensatory settlement and not being public space such as the adjacent Ōtuataua Stonefields heritage site (Dewes, 2018b, 2018c; Koti, 2018). The history of owning this land did not begin until the Wallace family were granted ownership in 1863 (Hancock, 2018). Before this time and largely still in a contemporary context, ownership and privatisation of nature were not compatible with a Māori epistemology. Environment-society relations were produced through the specific neoliberal development agenda of the state, which ultimately transformed nature itself and the social perceptions regarding the land (Escobar, 1996). But land cannot be in a condition of ownership in te ao Māori, only the right of use and occupancy can be transferred (Roberts et al., 1995). Land is foundational to Māori identity. Whenua holds the duplicate meanings of land and placenta, alluding to the protective, nurturing relationship between a mother and foetus representing that of Papatūānuku (Earth Mother) and all life forms (Ka’ai et al., 2003). The land ties the past, present and future through the interconnectedness of environment-society relationships established through whakapapa (genealogy) (Ka’ai et al., 2003). The environment itself is family and those that inhabit the land are therefore inextricably

related to the landscape with tangata whenua (people of the land) as kaitiaki (guardians) of the whenua for future generations. As described in a historical account of Māori introductory pepeha, it is unclear whether the tribes own their mountain and river or whether the landscape owns the tribe (Roberts et al., 1995). As understood in a Māori knowledge system, environment-society relations cannot fit in an owner-illegal occupant binary and must be problematised within poststructural political ecology. Continuous occupation is considered necessary to maintain connections with ancestors, histories, cosmologies, and tradition (Roberts et al., 1995). The media presents a regime of truth in which Ihumātao is under scrutiny because of contested ownership when the kaitiaki responsibilities of land occupants are not mentioned and knowledge about the land issue reproduces the power of a land issue settler-colonial narrative.

For Marielle Vive, there is a gap in online media reporting about the land. However, a poststructural analysis of data on MST shows land is mainly depicted in terms of the binary of developed and undeveloped. Development is a normative and arbitrary term (Rist, 2007). Yet political ecology is a critique of mainstream development through analysing how the environment has been transformed under the influence of ideologies of modernity, progress and economic growth. These ideologies construct a regime of truth that development can deliver social and environmental justice through the undeveloped being developed (Rist, 2007). In this dichotomy, developed corresponds to the settler-colonial state, modern, industrialised, urban and civilised whereas, ‘undeveloped’ represents displaced indigenous populations, primitive, rural agrarian, pre-capitalist, and uncivilised notions (Rist, 2007). The São João das Pedras farmland is discussed in terms of non-productivity, potential development, and real estate speculation (Pitasse, 2018a). Also evident is the policy rhetoric in media accounts of the legality of MST land occupation. The INCRA survey report identified the land as unproductive yet remained unacted upon, reinforcing the

---

binary of development in which the production of modernity in transforming environment-society relations is the golden standard of neoliberal states (Pitasse, 2018a). There is no accountability for not adhering to the legal obligations to create socially productive spaces from the non-productive, concentrated land (Bauluz et al., 2020). Only the controversially extreme liberal news platform, *Brasil de Fato*, represented Marielle Vive in the media. The lack of representation gives enough context into the capitalist ideals and motivations of the government and state-influenced mainstream media of settler-colonial Brazil. The social movement and land protest for agrarian reform and social productivity are put forward as an opposing force to the development project that the real estate companies set out, equating undeveloped with protecting nature from being privatised and urban infrastructure advancing into rural areas, pushing nature and humans to the periphery (Pitasse, 2018b). Escobar (1996) argues that social movements are the only way to elevate local discourse and as such, redefine, reimagine, and reconnect the environment and society in a collective effort that fosters life in a plural poststructural political ecology of knowledge. The lands at Ihumātao and Marielle Vive are much more complex than the regime of truth presented in the media, in binaries of ownership – illegal occupants and developed – undeveloped. The nuances presented in a poststructuralist political ecology elevate local ways of knowing and doing, to understand the land as reminiscent of a specific historical, political, social and economic agenda.

### **Counterhegemonic globalisation and political ecology**

A cultural hegemony maintains neoliberal power within a capitalist state through politics, civil society and the relationship between the state and citizens (Gramsci, 1971). Hegemony extends beyond the imposition of direct force also to be reinforced in the ideological discourses that facilitate coercion and consent (Gramsci, 1971). A counter-hegemonic globalisation analysis gives insight into the scale of land occupation as a domain of political ecology (Bryant & Bailey, 1997; Santos, 2003). A

discourse analysis of the news media accounts of occupation at Ihumātao and Marielle Vive exposes a specific version of storytelling, or intentional exclusion of representation, that of common sense. Common sense is where hegemony is exercised and counter-hegemonic projects begin (Gramsci, 1971). Through the sustained critique of common sense, an alternative hegemony can be realised. Ongoing counterhegemonic projects of land occupation and protest result from the transition from common sense to popular common sense. The popular common sense, held by those on the margins, is most documented in information outlets controlled by the local communities such as Facebook, websites, and newsletters. The popular common sense that SOUL and MST practice through occupation empowers the marginalised actors to challenge hegemonic constructions of common sense and the neoliberal production of nature (Karriem, 2009). Social organisation and mobilisation against the oppressive forces of common sense are evident in the protests at Ihumātao and Marielle Vive. An ideological shift occurs within this collective critique of the common sense that forces a transition to popular common sense and allows plural and diverse reimagined environment-society relations to be reproduced through collective action.

In the online news accounts of Ihumātao in New Zealand, there is a widespread notion that the scale of the occupation process is situated on private property. Common sense is that Ihumātao is private land, that land is not returned as part of Waitangi Tribunal claims for compensation based on confiscation. The CEO of Residential and Land Development, Steve Evans, is represented with quotes about the legality of developing the land into a Special Housing Area. Common sense is reproduced in these statements asserting that the occupation is occurring illegally, on private land and that the development is legal and approved by the Special Housing Application hearing, the Heritage New Zealand applications and in the Māori Land Court (Fuatai, 2018a). Furthermore, Fletcher Building is referenced as having

---

engaged in consultation with local iwi and received approval through this systematic process that is ultimately tokenistic participation and does not imply consent, thus the media representations fit with the neoliberal production of environment-society relations within common sense (Fuatai, 2018a; Gibson, 2018a; Hancock, 2018; Theunissen, 2018). The narratives the community relay on their own behalf is more clearly seen on the Facebook page Protect Ihumātao with a popular common sense that critiques the neoliberal representation of occupation as illegal in terms of the land dispute and puts forward the abuse of human rights and the violation to socially and culturally significant land in allowing the housing development to go ahead, ultimately continuing the devastations of colonisation. The popular common sense is established in the published recommendations of the CESCRC available in summarised form on the Facebook page, which includes concern around the lack of legal enforcement of the obligations in the Treaty of Waitangi, the non-binding recommendations of the Waitangi Tribunal and the limited meaningful participation and consent obtained from Māori about land that was traditionally used and inhabited by Māori (Protect Ihumātao, 2018c). The scale of land occupation and use by Māori at Ihumātao is not an issue of contemporary scale legality of ownership titles. Historical continuity and the cultural and social significance that the environment-society relations hold within the ties between the people and the land points to the nuances in understanding contemporary occupation.

In the mainstream online Brazilian media, the representations of MST in terms of the scalar process of land occupation were largely in line with common sense except for the extreme liberal platform Brasil de Fato. As a nationally recognised social movement, MST was documented throughout 2018 with the participants in protests described as militants, violent, terrorist and hostile in interactions with the police and the military (Rodrigues, 2018; Soares, 2018; State Content, 2018b). Ironically, there is also an article specifically about the education

module that is taught in MST acampamentos that addresses “right-wing fake news” and “the conservative hegemony” (State Content, 2018a). The common sense is perpetuated in the Brazilian mainstream media, but popular common sense was also revealed. Although polarising, the representation of possibility for alternative hegemony emphasises that within the critique of common sense, there are challenges to colonisation, patriarchal structures, agricultural modernisation, the formation of monopolies and the dominant role of the media (State Content, 2018a). Furthermore, this conservative online news platform, *Gazeta do Povo*, which is predominantly authored as ‘State Content’, reports that the MST professor and head of Journalism at PUC-SP found 90% of news about social movements in Brazil to be incomplete, false or wrong and biased with preconceived ideas about the violent nature of protesting (State Content, 2018a). Popular common sense that MST applies in scalar processes of territorialisation and occupation processes draws on the popular religious view that land is a social good and a human right, as well as a gift from God (Karriem, 2009). This popular common sense inherently challenges the neoliberal common sense of private property land ownership (Karriem, 2009). Although the popular common sense view is not published in mainstream media in Brazil due to the state control over-reporting, this lack of local and national media representation produces knowledge on the precise political stance of the press (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, 2011). To circumvent the lack of representation of *Marielle Vive* in the mainstream media, the *Marielle Vive* newsletter documents the popular common sense motivations and challenges for the community and wider social movement of MST in terms of the occupation. The sustained critique of the political environment by the MST involved the explicit realisation that the impeachments of the Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rouseff governments, which were being accepted by the general public within a common sense framework, were ultimately dismantling citizens’ social rights through the implementation of an authoritarian and

---

neoliberal project (Análise de Conjuntura: “Marchar novamente é preciso”, 2018). In the newsletters, the judicial system, major media and the vast majority of National Congress itself are criticised and said to be “unified to guarantee the permanence of the bourgeoisie in power” (Análise de Conjuntura: “Marchar novamente é preciso”, 2018, p. 3). This popular common sense exemplifies a different view than the one that is excluded or misrepresented in mainstream media, such that occupation is a method of resistance to survive in an anti-democratic, neoliberal and elitist nation.

### **Decolonisation and political ecology**

Decolonisation engages with the ongoing critique of the power imposed by imperialism and colonialism (Smith, 2012). Decolonisation theory can be applied through community-based projects that advance indigenous research agendas via local, national and transnational claims, particularly associated with land (Smith, 2012). Communities can be conceptualised as physical, political, social, cultural, spiritual, economic, linguistic, or historical spaces (Smith, 2012). Power is a key domain in political ecology that is important at both Ihumātao and Marielle Vive as sites of land protest. The varying amounts of power possessed by diverse actors determine how much control the actor has over their own environment and other actors’ environments (Bryant & Bailey, 1997). Brazil and New Zealand are colonial states that have sought to exert control over the environment and marginalised actors to pursue neoliberal development and a maintained cultural hegemony. In political ecology, power plays an essential role in determining which actors benefit and which stand to lose within processes of environmental transformation (Bryant & Bailey, 1997). A political ecological understanding of power recognises that inequalities between actors are central to understanding the environment-society relations of land protest as a result of complex historical and political tensions that have marginalised actors to the point of necessitating collective action. Through decolonising community-based projects of land protest, people can dismantle public and private

power through asserted self-defined identity, practice, and action.

The online media depictions of Ihumātao during 2018 provide valuable insight into how power is distributed inequitably among actors and how this can be reinforced through decision making and reproduced through creating a subjective public awareness in media accounts. Political ecology allows the view that powerful actors can dictate societal priority in decisions of environmental governance (Green, 2016). Fletcher was mentioned more times than Ihumātao was mentioned across all the articles that referenced the land protest in 2018, with 157 counts for Fletcher and 107 counts for Ihumātao. Quantitative data on the naming of actors adds depth to this analysis in emphasising power in the dominance of private corporations over the environment and marginalised populations. The land protest appeal to Heritage New Zealand and the Environment Court against Fletcher’s housing estate failed in 2018. The decision regarding granting Ihumātao an archaeological heritage status was rejected with a statement that was recorded in the New Zealand Herald, “the archaeological sites which are known to be affected do not present such historical and cultural heritage value as to prevent or further restrict the reasonable future use of the site” (Gibson, 2018a, p.1). This statement imposes a settler-colonial perception of the environment and the associated historical and cultural significance of the land. The political ecology view asserts the power of the public sector in regulating and subjectively acting upon and controlling the environment to serve a purpose that reinforces the power of the state (Bailey & Bryant, 1997). However, decolonisation intersects with political ecology, allowing the realisation that collective action can forge counterhegemonic action that protects marginalised peoples and environments despite reproduced private, public and media instated power. With all of the historical, political and legal evidence presenting the injustices of the Ihumātao case, the SOUL claim was rejected. Contemporary power relations in settler-colonial states continue to serve

---

objectives that involve the subjugation of indigenous populations and the environment (Smith, 2012). The project of occupation demands accountability through collective presence. SOUL and associated allies acted as guardians over a sacred environment at Ihumātao, which was the self-defined motivation and process of caregiving that the occupants shared as a collective. This community solidarity and decolonial community-action ultimately led to the 2020 resolution that transformed history, restoring an element of justice through the government purchase and protection of Ihumātao for future generations.

For Marielle Vive, the media depicts power in the land dispute by not reporting on the marginalised actors. The state has massive influence over the media in Brazil and a counter-hegemonic agenda that establishes community action through decolonisation methods is not a narrative that the state wants to reproduce or validate (Costa, 2019). However, the political ecology decolonisation analysis of the local newsletter *Vozes do Marielle* (Voices of Marielle) demonstrates a robust political agenda that creates social power through mobilisation and occupation of the land by a large number of marginalised people. The newsletter states that it takes mass social mobilisation, constant struggle, and continued criticism of the cultural hegemony to challenge the dominant anti-democratic power that pushed the agricultural workers, indigenous people, and quilombo communities off the land in the first place (Análise de Conjuntura: “Marchar novamente é preciso”, 2018). As described by the director of MST, the ideology underlying the territorialisation and occupation undertaken by the communities is to respect and defend the environment and the rights of the people by advocating for democracy and challenging the bourgeoisie (Esse é o nosso País, essa é a nossa Banderia, 2018). Decolonisation is part of the MST ideology integrated in a popular common sense and ultimately led to the establishment of an ongoing counterhegemonic project of territorialisation and occupation that transcends the community at Marielle Vive. Decolonisation critiques the economic expansion, subjugation of others, and reproduction of power through

discourse that imperialism allows. At the same time, political ecology adds the importance of how power and the media shape environment-society relations through the production and reproduction of inequalities in instrumental, structural, and discursive structures that serve to benefit the elite at the detriment of all human and environmental others.

### **Limitations and Contingencies**

There is a lack of policy analysis within this research, which could be useful given the comparative case study presenting two different national contexts. The political landscapes in Brazil and New Zealand are valuable contexts to unpack varying access to spaces of resilience for particular groups in society. The clear motivations for the protests in each place vary due to the different histories and contemporary policies allowing access to land, education, healthcare, food and other taken-for-granted resources. To map out national policies would require a much greater scope for the research. Whereas, this qualitative analysis of the political ecology of environment-society relations utilises FDA to critique socially constructed means of accessibility or barriers that impinge upon marginalised people in places that are encroached by the influence of global imperialism.

### **Implications and Future Recommendations**

In future research, it would be interesting to analyse the policy processes behind government decisions on land access, use and ownership. Despite the different political positions of the Jacinda Ardern-led Labour government in New Zealand and the Michel Temer-led Brazilian Democratic Movement government, there was and continues to be minimal international action in implementing more equitable land use, particularly for indigenous communities. Policy inertia in the land ownership space is a very complex and contentious issue that is inherently tied to the current state of neoliberalism through the continued effects of imperialism and colonisation. Land occupation and ownership histories have played out very differently in New Zealand and

---

Brazil, despite the parallels in contemporary protest objectives. There are different timelines, actors, and power dynamics to consider. A qualitative analysis of the policy processes behind the legislation that allows for monetary compensation for land loss in New Zealand and the expropriation of unproductive land under the Brazilian constitution will provide deeper insights into the realities faced in these land protest issues. How land matters are talked about, or not, could also be analysed through linking policy processes with the motivations and priorities of the respective governments. Policy analysis techniques could contribute to understanding how the discourse surrounding people and land are influenced by history, politics, economics, and environmental conditions (Darian-Smith & McCarty, 2017).

This research extends the current body of literature by demonstrating a tangible global reality of political and ecological oppression of grassroots actors through linking narratives from the disparate localities of Ihumātao, New Zealand and Marielle Vive, Brazil. Previous research has shown that local and indigenous knowledge reflects a complex understanding and appreciation of the environment, which serves as a basis for effective environmental management, improved livelihoods, human and environmental health (Bryant & Bailey, 1997). However this comparative case study expands on a growing body of research that suggests historical evidence of injustice, monetary compensation, and tokenistic attempts, through colonial legislation and policy for the state to appear to be protective of marginalised actors, is not enough (Smith, 2012). Collective action is needed to increase the visibility, representation, perspectives and solutions that come from actors that have been historically and continue to be marginalised. Decolonisation of the plurality of systems that perpetuate intersectional forms of marginalisation for already oppressed actors needs to involve the centring of these alternative concerns and worldviews. Collective social action frames political-ecological problems in a counter-hegemonic way and should lead to the establishment of constructive,

collaborative, participatory engagements with dialogue that transcends boundaries of oppositions (Smith, 2012).

### **Conclusion**

Political ecology together with poststructuralism, counterhegemonic globalisation and decolonisation, allowed an exploration of the actors, scalar processes and power involved in environment-society relations at the land occupations of Ihumātao and Marielle Vive during 2018. Through an FDA analysis of online news media, Facebook, websites and local newsletters, the ability of power to produce hegemonic discourse was exposed and deconstructed. The failings of the protective systems supposedly in place in New Zealand to prevent the further devastation of indigenous culture and the environment were highlighted in the media and social media accounts of the Ihumātao land dispute. Marielle Vive was largely missing from the online Brazilian news media, with only one well-known liberal platform discussing the land occupation. Combined with the inertia of unproductive land conversions as required under the Brazilian Constitution, the media discourse and inaction of the government is reminiscent of a precise political stance and that is the perpetuation of a conservative, neoliberal, and anti-democratic agenda to maintain the inequitable distribution of costs and benefits that favour the elite. Ultimately, despite the vastly disparate localities of the Ihumātao and Marielle Vive land occupations, there is an underlying parallel in the sometimes-unheard narrative of community solidarity and resilience in a contemporary settler-colonial state context. Drawing on a sustained critique of the cultural hegemony and establishing popular common sense to undertake mass counterhegemonic community action projects facilitates the redistribution of power among environment and societal actors to reinstate equity that will otherwise continue to be intentionally withheld.

### **Appendix A**

*Facebook and community website data that was accessed to give depth to media analysis*

---



**‘Protect Ihumātao’ Facebook Page**

The Protect Ihumātao Facebook page had 103 posts during 2018. The first post of 2018 referenced the commemoration of the Bastion Point Occupation and the inspiration, motivation and encouragement from that kaupapa (discourse) that was expanded upon in the Protect Ihumātao project (Protect Ihumātao, 2018a). There were attachments of online news articles detailing current events in the negotiations with Fletcher construction and the Environmental Court (Protect Ihumātao, 2018b). There was a video of Newton discussing SOUL's submission to the UN forum on indigenous issues about social and environmental injustice occurring at Ihumātao (Protect Ihumātao, 2018d). The concluding recommendations from the UN were that the Special Housing Area planned to be built on Ihumātao and any further resource consents needed to be re-evaluated (Protect Ihumātao, 2018d). There were also statistics to show Heritage New Zealand prioritised colonial-built structures over indigenous landscapes of cultural significance, with 80% of protected sites as colonial and only 10% as wāhi tapu (sacred places) (Protect Ihumātao, 2018d). At the end of 2018, the Environment Court decision was posted, stating that the court ruled in favour of Fletcher Construction continuing the housing development plan and destroying the cultural heritage landscape in the process (Protect Ihumātao, 2018e, 2018f).

**‘Friends of the MST’ Facebook Page**

The Friends of the MST Facebook page had three posts regarding the Marielle Vive occupation. The first discussed the establishment of the community on April 14, 2018 (Friends of the MST, 2019). Following this, a post described the murder of a member of the Marielle Vive community (Nogueira & Moreira, 2019). Another post detailed agroecological resistance as significant symbolism as a mandala garden on the land represents the collectivity, cooperativity and internal organisation of the community and shows how non-productive land can become a livelihood source for local families (Lamir, 2020).

**‘Protect Ihumātao’ Website**

The website for Protect Ihumātao was taken down and inaccessible through the internet archives via the Wayback Machine.

**‘Friends of the MST’ Website**

The Friends of the MST website contained eight articles about the Marielle Vive community. The stories relating to Marielle Vive on the Friends of the ST Facebook page linked externally to this website giving detailed accounts of the occupation.

**Appendix B****Limitation of language in accessing data**

It is important to recognise that language is a critical tool in terms of accessibility, therefore an inherent limitation in this research is the data translation from Portuguese to English for news and social media posts regarding the Marielle Vive case study. A translation application, Smallpdf, scanned pdf files of the newsletters from the Marielle Vive community and Google Translate was used for the online news pages. This study did use an American partner movement of the Landless Workers’ Movement, Friends of the MST, to counter the Portuguese sources with the Facebook and website that added context and were written as original English data sources.

---

## References:

- Análise de Conjuntura: “Marchar novamente é preciso” (Conjuncture Analysis: Marching again is necessary). (2018, July 17). *Voices do Marielle (Voices of Marielle)*, 2(1). Anthony, J. (2018a, November 20). Fletcher Building directors dig heels in on controversial Ihumatao housing development. *Stuff, Business*.  
<https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/business-top-stories/108723266/protesters-opposing-fletcher-building-development-create-tension-at-annual-meeting>
- Anthony, J. (2018b, November 21). People of Ihumātao illegally occupying ‘our land’, Fletcher Building says. *Stuff, Business*.  
<https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/business-top-stories/108733102/ihumtao-residents-illegally-occupying-our-land-fletcher-building-says>
- Bauluz, L., Govind, Y., & Novokmet, F. (2020). *Global Land Inequality*. (World Inequality Database Working Paper No. 10).  
[https://wid.world/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/WorldInequalityLab\\_WP2020.10\\_GlobalLandInequality1.pdf](https://wid.world/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/WorldInequalityLab_WP2020.10_GlobalLandInequality1.pdf)
- Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights & Labour. (2011). *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011*. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/186707.pdf>
- Black, T. (2018, November 29). Home is where you make it. *Te Ao Māori News*.  
<https://www.teaomaori.news/home-where-you-make-it>
- Bryant, R. L. (2015). Reflecting on political ecology. In R.L. Bryant (Ed.), *The international handbook of political ecology* (pp. 14–24). <https://doi.org.ezproxy.auckland.ac.nz/10.4337/9780857936172>
- Bryant, R. L. & Bailey, S. (1997). *Third World Political Ecology*.  
<https://books.google.co.nz/books?id=T6i5pVeQPUC&lpq=PR11&ots=ZFLV0Woq&q=bryant%20and%20bailey%201997&lr&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q=bryant%20and%20bailey%201997&f=false>
- Butler, J. (2016). *Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?* Vol. [International version]. Verso.
- Charman, P. (2018, May 12). Last lot in the block hits the market. *Stuff, Property*.  
<https://www.nzherald.co.nz/property/latest-lot-in-the-block-hits-the-market/RH7PX36JIYI3HNI7YSEIZRLFZM/>
- Clapp, J., & Fuchs, D. (2009). Agrifood corporations, global governance and sustainability: A framework for analysis. In J. Clapp, & D. Fuchs (Eds.), *Corporate power in global agrifood governance* (pp. 1-27).  
<https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/auckland/detail.action?docID=3339032>.
- Clarke-Mamanu, M. (2018, November 27). Tāmaki Iwi welcome new urban housing agency. *Te Ao Māori News*.  
<https://www.teaomaori.news/tamaki-iwi-welcome-new-urban-housing-agency>
- Costa, P. (Director). (2019). *The Edge of Democracy* [Film]. Netflix.
- Dann, C. (2017, October 18). Fletcher rejects claims of destroying sacred Ihumātao. *Radio New Zealand, History/ Te Ao Maori*.  
<https://www.rnz.co.nz/national/programmes/morningreport/audio/2018618286/fletcher-rejects-claims-of-destroying-sacred-ihumatao>
- Darian-Smith, E., & McCarty, P. (2017). *The Global Turn: Theories, Research Designs, and Methods for Global Studies*. Oakland, California: University of California Press
- Delahunty, C. (2018, February 9). Opinion: Issues festering amid Treaty Grounds smiles. *NZ Herald*,

- New Zealand.  
<https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/opinion-issues-festering-amid-treaty-grounds-smiles/GCWWAWPFBR7VRBARLRA7CNEG2Q/>
- Dewes, T. K. M. (2018a, February 11). Whenua Warrior connecting communities to plant gardens. *Te Ao Māori News*.  
<https://www.teaomaori.news/whenua-warrior-connecting-communities-plant-gardens>
- Dewes, T. K. M. (2018b, March 19). Ihumātao land campaigners head back to the United Nations. *Te Ao Māori News*.  
<https://www.teaomaori.news/ihumatao-land-campaigners-head-back-united-nations>
- Dewes, T. K. M. (2018c, May 27). “We will continue to prepare for a mass human occupation.” *Te Ao Māori News*.  
<https://www.teaomaori.news/we-will-continue-prepare-mass-human-occupation>
- Escobar, A. (1996). Construction Nature: Elements for a post-structuralist political ecology. *Futures*, 28(4), 325–343.  
[https://doi.org/10.1016/0016-3287\(96\)00011-0](https://doi.org/10.1016/0016-3287(96)00011-0) Esse é o nosso País, essa é a nossa Banderia (This is our country, this is our flag). (2018, August 25). *Vozes do Marielle (Voices of Marielle)*, 2(2).
- Foucault, M. (1979). *Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison* (A. Sheridan, trans.). London: Penguin. (Original work published 1975.)
- Foucault, M. (1980). *Truth and power*. In C. Gordon (ed.) *Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977* (pp. 109–133). (C. Gordon, trans.). New York: Pantheon. (Original work published 1977.)
- Friends of the MST. (2019, May 22). *Marielle Vive Encampment*.  
[https://www.mstbrazil.org/news/marielle-vive-encampment?fbclid=IwAR04Lxd6658x7b61ykIEm463XEIFTwbky7Fka9CuXPe\\_9EZq9iJfuK9OtxI](https://www.mstbrazil.org/news/marielle-vive-encampment?fbclid=IwAR04Lxd6658x7b61ykIEm463XEIFTwbky7Fka9CuXPe_9EZq9iJfuK9OtxI)
- Fuatai, T. (2018a, January 23). New life in fight for historic Auckland land. *Newsroom*.  
<https://www.newsroom.co.nz/new-life-in-fight-for-historic-auckland-land>
- Fuatai, T. (2018b, July 23). Last chance to save historic stonefields zone. *Newsroom*.  
<https://www.newsroom.co.nz/last-chance-to-save-historic-stonefields-zone>
- Gibson, A. (2018a, November 9). Māori land protest appeal against Fletcher’s Ihumātao housing estate fails. *NZ Herald, Business*.  
<https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/maori-land-protest-appeal-against-fletchers-ihumatao-housing-estate-fails/ZPYW6CRYR53C6L6TV6ADYRCSVA/>
- Gibson, A. (2018b, November 9). ‘We look at Bastion Point’: Māori protester plans mass anti-Fletcher action. *NZ Herald, Business*.  
<https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/we-look-at-bastion-point-maori-protester-plans-mass-anti-fletcher-action/NE7IQEAR4XN5XWBXTAFQUCHXAA/>
- Gibson, A. (2018c, November 20). Protesters gather outside Fletcher AGM, voice concerns about Ihumātao. *NZ Herald, Business*.  
<https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/protesters-gather-outside-fletcher-agm-voice-concerns-about-ihumatao/BENORCXZHNU6PGDE22ISBCJMUM/>
- Gramsci, A. (1971). *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. In Q. Hoare & G. Nowell-Smith (Eds.) New York,

- International Publishers.  
[https://soth-alexanderstreet.com.ezproxy.auckland.ac.nz/cgi-bin/SOTH/hub.py?browse=full&showfullrecord=on&sourceid=S10019883&type=sour ce\\_details](https://soth-alexanderstreet.com.ezproxy.auckland.ac.nz/cgi-bin/SOTH/hub.py?browse=full&showfullrecord=on&sourceid=S10019883&type=sour ce_details)
- Green, K. E. (2016). A political ecology of scaling: Struggles over power, land and authority. *G Geoforum*, 74, 88–97.  
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2016.05.007>
- Hancock, F. (2018, November 19). The cost of our nation’s cultural heritage too high? *Newsroom*.  
[https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2018/11/18/322757/the-cost-of-our-nations-cultural-heritage-too-high?fbclid=IwAR32\\_pwJA7FOXcpI04s2UMMuLdtAioVs\\_BFnw0n45Cxsx3AwhatA321QM](https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2018/11/18/322757/the-cost-of-our-nations-cultural-heritage-too-high?fbclid=IwAR32_pwJA7FOXcpI04s2UMMuLdtAioVs_BFnw0n45Cxsx3AwhatA321QM)
- Hancock, F., & McCreanor, T. (2018, December 18). Frances Hancock and Tim McCreanor: Govt needs to intervene against housing at Ihumātao. *NZ Herald*, Politics. h t t  
<https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/frances-hancock-and-tim-mccreanor-govt-needs-to-intervene-against-housing-at-ihumatao/TDT4ODIAO6IP7J4MBHJ6E4WQP4/>
- Harrowell, C. (2018a, August 10). Meet the fed-up south Auckland teenagers taking on illegal rubbish dumpers. *Stuff*, Auckland.  
<https://www.stuff.co.nz/auckland/local-news/manukau-courier/106079191/meet-the-fedup-south-auckland-teenagers-taking-on-illegal-rubbish-dumpers>
- Harrowell, C. (2018b, November 12). Environment Court rules against group battling Auckland housing development. *Stuff*, Auckland.  
<https://www.stuff.co.nz/auckland/local-news/manukau-courier/108475956/environment-court-rules-against-group-battling-auckland-housing-development>
- Harrowell, C. (2018c, November 28). Fletcher Building eyes 2019 start date for Ihumātao Auckland housing development. *Stuff*, Auckland.  
<https://www.stuff.co.nz/auckland/local-news/manukau-courier/108876243/fletcher-building-eyes-2019-start-date-for-ihumtao-auckland-housing-development>
- Harrowell, C. (2018d, October 22). South Auckland land protester Pania Newton in the fight o of her life. *Stuff*, Auckland.  
<https://www.stuff.co.nz/auckland/local-news/manukau-courier/107862766/south-auckland-land-protester-pania-newton-in-the-fight-of-her-life>
- Ka’ai, T. M., Moorfield, J. C., Reilly, M., & Mosely, S. (2003). *Ki te whaiao: An introduction to Māori culture and society*. Auckland, N.Z.: Pearson Longman Education.
- Karriem, A. (2009). The rise and transformation of the Brazilian landless movement into a counter-hegemonic political actor: A Gramscian analysis. *Geoforum*, 40(3), 316–325.  
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2008.10.005>
- Koti, T. (2018, May 25). Take a stand on the land event in Ihumātao tomorrow. *Te Ao Māori News*. w  
<https://www.teaomaori.news/take-stand-on-land-event-ihumatao-tomorrow>
- Lamir, D. (2020). *Agroecology means popular resistance at MST’s Marielle Vive Encampment*.  
<https://www.mstbrazil.org/news/agroecology-means-popular-resistance-mst%E2%80%99s-marielle-vive->

- encampment?fbclid=IwAR0JFb1oa  
MuV WT  
WTFi2kKHBovP7La-  
I1QGMILptZDkq6gkNIT0YBX0M  
Z0HWI
- Mackintosh, L. (2019). *Shifting grounds: history, memory and materiality in Auckland Landscapes c.1350-2018*. [Doctor of Philosophy, History Thesis, University of Auckland]. The University of Auckland Research Repositories, ResearchSpace. <https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/handle/2292/46343>
- McMorrow, A. (2017). Poststructuralism. In S. McGlinchey, W. Walters., & C. Scheinflug (Eds.), *International Relations Theory* (pp. 69-75). <https://www.ir.info/publication/international-relations-theory/>
- Meszaros, G. (2000). Taking the Land into their Hands: The Landless Workers' Movement and the Brazilian State. *Journal of Law and Society*, 27(4), 517. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6478.00166>
- Mulligan, J. (2018, June 26). The young activist devoting her life to protecting ancestral land. *Radio New Zealand, Te Ao Maori*. <https://www.rnz.co.nz/national/programmes/afternoons/audio/2018650963/the-young-activist-devoting-her-life-to-protecting-ancestral-land>
- Nogueira, P. R., & Moreira, A. (2019). *Driver rams truck into demonstration, kills 72-year old outside MST encampment in Brazil*. <https://www.mstbrazil.org/news/driver-rams-truck-demonstration-kills-72-year-old-outside-mst-encampmentbrazil?fbclid=IwAR21qzMRifkktztFLratFrmu1216ZNn8m57-lnxmo6RbLdNbPwSsBl1UvKw>
- Pitasse, M (2018a, April 18). MST fights against real estate speculation in Valinhos, interior of São Paulo. *Brasil de Fato*, Cities: Resistance. <https://www.brasildefatorj.com.br/2018/04/18/mst-trava-luta-contra-especulacao-imobiliaria-em-valinhos-interior-de-sao-paulo>
- Pitasse, M. (2018b, May 9). Camp 'Marielle Vive!' has resisted for almost a month in Valinhos (SP). *Brasil de Fato*, Cities: Seed. <https://www.brasildefatorj.com.br/2018/05/09/ocupacao-marielle-vive-resiste-ha-quase-um-mes-em-valinhos-interior-de-sao-paulo>
- Protect Ihumātao. (2018a, January 5). Today we went to Ōrakei to remember and commemorate the 41st year since the Bastion Point Occupation started [Images attached]. Facebook. <https://www.facebook.com/protectihumatao/posts/1631283380299183>
- Protect Ihumātao. (2018b, March 15). Fletcher Building Ltd woes seem to continue week after week... SOUL will be returning to the UN to present... [Image attached]. Facebook.
- Protect Ihumātao. (2018c, April 6). FINALLY!! The recommendations from the United Nations CESCR meeting last month have been released ... significant references made to the human rights breaches ... [Images attached]. Facebook. <https://www.facebook.com/protectihumatao/posts/1724015901025930>
- Protect Ihumātao. (2018d, October 11). This Saturday Pania will take the TEDxAuckland 2018: Off-Piste stage to speak about the systemic imbalance on Heritage New Zealand's ... [Image Attached]. Facebook. <https://www.facebook.com/protectih>

- umatao/posts/1977962135631304
- Protect Ihumātao. (2018e, October 21). Auckland Council published a cynical piece of propaganda this week... filmed everything facing away from the new development [Video]. Facebook.  
<https://www.facebook.com/marisa.maclachlan/posts/10156412709648580>
- Protect Ihumātao. (2018f, November 19). "An Environment Court decision has paved the way for the destruction of the special cultural heritage landscape at Ihumātao... [Article attached]. Facebook.  
[https://www.facebook.com/protectihumatao/?ref=page\\_internal](https://www.facebook.com/protectihumatao/?ref=page_internal)
- Rist, G. (2007). Development as a buzzword. *Development in Practice*, 17(4–5), 485–491.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09614520701469328>
- Roberts, M., Norman, W., Minhinnick, N., Wihongi, D., & Kirkwood, C. (1995). Kaitiakitanga: Maori perspectives on conservation. *Pacific Conservation Biology*, 2(1), 7–20.  
<https://doi.org/10.1071/PC950007>
- Rodrigues, A. (2018, November 9). MST is a terrorist, says future secretary of Agriculture. *Agora*, São Paulo.  
<https://agora.folha.uol.com.br/saopaulo/2018/11/1984185-mst-e-terrorista-diz-futuro-secretario-da-agricultura.shtml>
- Sam, C. H. (2019). Shaping Discourse Through Social Media: Using Foucauldian Discourse Analysis to Explore the Narratives That Influence Educational Policy. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 63(3), 333–350.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764218820565>
- Santos, B. D. S. (2003). The World Social Forum: Towards a Counter-hegemonic Globalization (Part 1). The World Social Forum: Challenging Empires, 235–245
- Sartorato, D. (2018, April 14). MST occupies unproductive farm in Valinhos, Campinas region. *Brasil de Fato*, General: Land Reform.  
<https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2018/04/14/mst-ocupa-fazenda-improdutiva-em-valinhos-regiao-de-campinas>
- Save Our Unique Landscape [SOUL]. (2018, May 28). Strong demonstration at Ihumātao for Māori land struggle. *Scoop Independent News*, Regional.  
<https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/AK1805/S00620/strong-demonstration-at-ihumatao-for-maori-land-struggle.htm>
- Schwendler, S. F., & Thompson, L. A. (2017). An education in gender and agroecology in Brazil's Landless Rural Workers' Movement. *Gender and Education*, 29(1), 100–114.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09540253.2016.1221596>
- Singh, M. (2018, April 20). Valour displayed through advocacy. *Stuff*, Auckland.  
<https://www.stuff.co.nz/auckland/local-news/papakura-courier/103166370/valour-displayed-through-advocacy>
- Slinger, S. (2018, November 14). From a corporate life to teaching gardening. *Stuff*, News.  
<https://www.stuff.co.nz/taranaki-daily-news/news/108591953/from-a-corporate-life-to-teaching-gardening>
- Smith, L. T. (2012). Articulating an Indigenous Research Agenda. In L. T. Smith (Ed.), *Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples*, 213–237.  
<https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/auckland/reader.action?docID=1426837&ppg=56>
- Soares, L. E. (2018, March 20). Factory invasion in the South of Minas ends in violence in the Central

- Region. *Estado de Minas, General*.  
[https://www.em.com.br/app/noticia/gerais/2018/03/20/interna\\_gerais,945447/invasao-de-fabrica-no-sul-de-mg-termina-em-violencia-na-regiao-central.shtml](https://www.em.com.br/app/noticia/gerais/2018/03/20/interna_gerais,945447/invasao-de-fabrica-no-sul-de-mg-termina-em-violencia-na-regiao-central.shtml)
- State Content. (2018a, May, 17). MST course at PUC-SP has module against 'right-wing fake news'. *Gazeta do povo*, Education. <https://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/educacao/curso-do-mst-na-puc-sp-tem-modulo-contra-fake-news-de-direita-38mulntwrrm035wkvbqa1pqyf/>
- State Content. (2018b, November 8). MST begins walk to Brasília to register Lula's candidacy. *Gazeta do povo*, Politics. <https://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/politica/republica/eleicoes-2018/mst-comeca-caminhada-ate-brasilia-para-registro-da-candidatura-de-lula-3bqzsg1s0xajf3l86ck4etannm/>
- Theunissen, M. (2018, November 8). Decision allows development near sacred Māori site. *Radio New Zealand, New Zealand/Environment*. <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/375483/decision-allows-development-near-sacred-maori-site>
- Tyson, J. (2018, October 29). Documentary series on Ihumātao land protest wins top award. *Te Ao Māori News*. <https://www.teaomaori.news/documentary-series-on-ihumatao-land-protest-wins-top-award>
- Van Berkel, H. (2018, February 3). Tangata Hikoi: History of maori in Auckland. *NZ Herald, New Zealand*. <https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/tangata-hikoi-history-of-maori-in-auckland/OOV7SAWY6XWDICCBJK3N7A7HTE/>
- Watkin, T. (2016, November 3). Written in stone – the first Māori gardens. *Radio New Zealand, History/Science*. <https://www.rnz.co.nz/national/programmes/ourchangingworld/audio/201822061/written-in-stone-the-first-maori-gardens>

# IN SIGHT, OUT OF MIND

## A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PRACTICES AND POLICIES CONCERNING SEX TRAFFICKING IN NORTH KOREAN WOMEN AND GIRLS IN THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF CHINA

BY ELI M. PETTERSEN

BGLOBALST: GLOBAL POLITICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, ASIA, KOREAN

### Abstract:

The purpose of this work is to make further academic in-roads into the extensive human rights abuses committed against the North Korean people brought to the forefront following the United Nations' 2014 inquiry. Using comparative analysis, I explore the relationship between prescriptive obligations the government of China owes regarding transnational sex trafficking in Chinese territory, and the descriptive realities of practices alleged by North Korean sex trafficking victims and survivors. This being a multi-faceted issue, I reduce the scope by examining the allegations of abuse detailed in a report by NGO Korea Future Initiative (KFI), and balance this with a Chinese government perspective through an action on a counter-trafficking report from the IGO International Organization for Migration (IOM). Through comparison and contrast of these two reports, I conclude that policies and frameworks China has put in place to combat transnational sex trafficking and accommodate refugees from Southeast Asia could be and should be applied to North Korean women and girls also.

### Introduction:

The exploitative and illicit trafficking of North Korean women and girls constitutes an estimated 60% of all North Korean women who cross into China and is an industry worth upwards of one hundred million US dollars annually, according to human rights group Korea Future Initiative (KFI). On the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, The United Nations Special Rapporteur (UNSR) has submitted to the

General Assembly over several years recommendations that China reassess its policy on the status of these trafficked women and girls, providing them at the very least the means to transit to a third country to seek asylum, to recognize their status as refugees, and provide affected women and girls access to basic services like healthcare (Ojea Quintana, 2020). The Chinese government maintains that these women and girls who cross the border are economic migrants simply seeking to do better for themselves financially than they can in North Korea, and therefore refuse to recognize them as refugees, refugees-sur-place, or asylum seekers. As such, China also restricts the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) from accessing border areas and making assessments and determinations on the refugee status of these women and girls (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2009). According to North Korean law, if the women and girls are repatriated from China to North Korea, they will face penalties ranging from detention to execution (Gang & Hosaniak, 2018). Furthermore, China maintains a bilateral treaty with North Korea to repatriate North Korean citizens found in China, even when such action contravenes the 1951 Refugee Convention (DPRK-PRC Mutual Cooperation Protocol, 1986). With all these forces at play, the outcomes appear dismal for women and girls caught in a cycle of exploitation.

This work seeks to address the gap between norms and practices concerning the issues of sex trafficking and refoulement, using a mixed-methods approach to explore firstly the alleged breaches of human rights; and secondly the action China has taken thus far to combat human

---



trafficking and how such policies might be extended to North Korean trafficked women and girls. Interwoven throughout this work are some of China's international law obligations that could guide and direct efforts to combat female North Korean sex trafficking.

### **Methods and Methodology:**

#### **Where Testimony and Numbers Meet**

Research into human trafficking, particularly sex trafficking, is fraught with ethical concerns, many of which I will not claim to have the necessary experience nor training to satisfy at a primary research level. However, organizations that specialize in such undertakings have published extensive reports, such as the KFI and the UNHCR. Their work is crucial in building a database of evidence for the existence of transnational sex trafficking between China and North Korea; without these reports, allegations of abuse remain subject to more credible challenges by the parties involved. KFI's Sex Slaves report is used extensively in this work as a reference point for contextualizing the problem of trafficking; namely for the purposes of prostitution, cyber-sex, and forced marriage. The report also implicates Chinese state actors, primarily officers of local police, as being both complicit in the act of trafficking and turning a blind eye to criminal activity where they have both domestic and international obligations to act otherwise. Thus, the first portion of my research work will concern itself with this kind of evidence. I make use of Yoon Hee-soon's methodology, mixing quantitative analysis of available data with qualitative interviews conducted by her team. This gives experiential context to the data, and conversely allows personal experience to develop a quantified bigger picture.

#### **China's Government and Combatting Human Trafficking**

It is not the case that the government of China has made no progress on the elimination of sex trafficking within its territory. China has participated in a series of bilateral and multilateral workshops aimed at the elimination of trafficking, and it has developed two extensive National

Action Plans tasked with combatting trafficking. However, these workshops have focused on trafficking between China and its Southeast Asian neighbours, while North Korea is not mentioned in the documents produced from these workshops. China also has a bilateral agreement with North Korea to repatriate North Koreans who have migrated to China. With these structures in place, it is not out of the question that China could also extend its policies and agreements concerning trafficked women and girls from Southeast Asia to North Korean women and girls, which is the primary argument of this research work. Although, there are other political considerations at play, ultimately the Chinese government has the infrastructure and legal framework to treat North Koreans the same way as those from other neighbouring countries. Thus, the second portion of my work will deal with China's progress on eliminating trafficking, using qualitative analysis of workshop summary reports. Contrasts and comparisons are drawn between these measures and the practical issues highlighted in the first section.

#### **Comparison and Contrast**

Interwoven into these two sections are international conventions that China has signed and ratified which govern practices regarding human rights, the prevention of trafficking especially in women and children, the elimination of discrimination against women, and the treatment of refugees. International law is a highly normative field of study, and ultimately national governments gravitate towards that which is politically expedient for them. However, it is still worth exploring these conventions, as international law is founded on the consent of states. China, having ratified such treaties, is bound to abide by the articles contained therein, and evidence of the government having done so for its Southeast Asian neighbours but not for North Korea suggests that compliance with these international conventions is not contestable even from a cultural relativist approach to human rights. Similarly, China's leaders seem to make attempts to have it both ways,

---

---

namely that other nations should respect international law when it suits China (i.e., in the South China Sea), and simultaneously for Chinese leaders to ignore international law when it suits them. This divergence demands either amendment of China's domestic action or of international law; logical, ethical, and moral inconsistency result otherwise.

Conceptually, this work takes on a global perspective to address issues of trafficking, transnational crime, non-compliance with international law, and refugee treatment (particularly forced repatriation or refoulement). More broadly, the research offered here seeks to reconcile a major issue of human rights. Of particular concern to academics in the field of human rights is universalism versus cultural relativism, i.e., is it responsible for non-Chinese and non-North Koreans to set a standard of human rights that China and North Korea must abide by without holding their cultural worldviews? I take no particular side on this dichotomy here; however, I do seek to hold and address these tensions throughout the work. KFI's Sex Slaves report is largely comprised of data and testimony from North Korean women and girls who are also some of the strongest advocates against trafficking and maltreatment of trafficking victims and survivors. As for China, its government has ratified several anti-trafficking international conventions as well as domestic policies (e.g., the National Action Plan against Human Trafficking 2013-2020) that do not contest the content of those human rights obligations, yet omit North Korea from their scope of application, seemingly for political expediency (Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, 2013).

The analysis of norms and practices in this work centre around a set of concerns to be addressed. In the first section, I seek to understand the forms of human trafficking of North Korean women and girls in China alleged by the international community, trafficking victims and survivors, and NGOs. I explore the issues around repatriation and refoulement from China to North Korea as well as denial of North Korean refugee status

and their effects on trafficked women and girls; Finally, I consider the recommendations by the United Nations and KFI regarding these issues. This section thus seeks to make sense of the practices and realities alleged by the victims and groups organized to represent their interests. In the second section, I analyse what China's government has been doing to combat transnational human trafficking through international workshops and national policies. I also examine China's policies towards its Southeast Asian neighbours concerning trafficking of women and girls, and how they might be extended to trafficked North Koreans. This section thus seeks to understand the practices at a domestic level that might hinder or advance efforts to eliminate trafficking in women.

It is also wise to examine the type of evidence used in this work. In the first section, I make extensive use of KFI's Sex Slaves 2019 report. KFI describes itself as a "non-profit organization whose mission is to investigate human rights violations...to accelerate justice for victims and to support accountability for perpetrators" (Korea Future Initiative, n.d.). The report itself is investigative in nature, conducting primary research through a mixed-methods approach wherein victim interviews are interleaved with both quantitative and qualitative data. Some of the quantitative data is comprised of the interviews themselves, such as figures on how many North Korean escapees end up being trafficked and how many times they are sold/resold. Other data is external, such as the number of North Koreans living in China. Additionally, some quantitative data combines both external and primary research data, such as the estimated value of sex trafficking profits generated by the exploitation of North Korean women and girls in China (Yoon, 2019, p. 13). It is salient to recognize that much of the data in the report is published as a 'best estimate' given the difficulty of obtaining and corroborating such information from both China and North Korea, and the ethical and safety considerations in conducting any such inquiry.

In examining the type of evidence that I will use throughout the work, I have made use of Charles Ragin's

---

---

six “goals of social research” in his work on social inquiry (Ragin, 1994). Primarily, the KFI report gives voice. It intends to advocate for and speak on behalf of trafficking victims and survivors, thus focusing chiefly on problems from those perspectives and focusing less on other potential progress made by the Chinese government on trafficking policy. I have attempted to balance any potential bias in my work by presenting a second section on what the Chinese government has been doing to combat trafficking in other geopolitical areas, though the research suggests that such progress is almost non-existent vis-à-vis North Korean women and girls. The KFI report includes direct quotes from the affected women and girls, again reinforcing the research goal of giving a voice to victims and linking back to KFI’s purpose as stated above. A secondary but certainly prevalent social research goal expressed in the KFI report is the interpretation of events. The report does not simply identify patterns but goes further to be descriptive in its analysis of practical realities. Nowhere in the report is there found a clear hypothesis to be proven; rather than interpolate and test a theory, the author seeks to extrapolate a bigger picture from interviews and evidence. On the other hand, the International Organization for Management (IOM) Summary Report from the 2018 Seminar for Facilitating Network Building among Anti-Trafficking Criminal Investigation Experts in Sanya is not a social research investigation, and thus Ragin’s classification for research is not suitably applicable here. The type of evidence presented is from an international workshop attended by “20 Chinese officials from MPS [Ministry of Public Security] and 16 provincial public security departments” and “European experts representing EUROPOL” as well as police representatives from other European countries (International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2018, p. 1). Its purpose is to build networks of communication and action on counter-trafficking between these two geographical regions. As a report that summarizes a workshop officiated and attended by national security officials, it is influenced by the politics of the countries involved. I discuss this at length in the final section of the work.

**Discussion:****Sex Slaves and Allegations against China’s Government**

The availability of published academic work on the trafficking of North Korean women and girls is slim at best. Perhaps owing to the difficulty of obtaining, corroborating, and ethically publishing credible information, the issue is “under-investigated and under-reported” (Yoon, 2019, p. 7). Even the UNHCR relies heavily on testimony, much of which may not be independently verifiable. KFI has recently developed a robust report on this topic and for that reason I use it widely here. I acknowledge the potential limitations of estimated data based on testimony and interview, and the potential for bias from an NGO with advocacy goals. Nonetheless, such research methods do not preclude researchers from recognizing patterns of abuse and maltreatment across testimonies, and where consistent with documented evidence external to the report, every testimony helps build a clearer picture of what might be taking place in China and North Korea vis-à-vis sex trafficking. The Sex Slaves report is an extension of earlier research work conducted by James Burt into gender-based violence in North Korea, recognizing that such violence extended beyond North Korea’s borders (Burt, 2018).

Using the framework outlined above to guide this section, we examine first the putative realities of sex trafficking as identified in the report. What are the primary forms of trafficking identified by Yoon? Yoon conservatively estimates that the entire industry of North Korean female exploitation produces USD\$105 million in annual profits for their exploiters (Yoon, 2019, p. 13). This figure assumes that just 25% of all women who escape to China from North Korea (around 70% of the total number of escapees) end up being trafficked and generate USD\$12,000 in revenue per year for their traffickers; the authors themselves consider this figure to be conservative given that the report estimates 60% of female escapees end up in trafficking (Yoon, 2019, p. 12-13). Yoon (2019, p.12) also supposes that 50% of escapee women end up in

---

---

prostitution, more than 30% into a forced marriage, and 15% into a growing cybersex industry. Based on their primary data, KFI suggests that 59% of the women are sold more than once (Yoon, 2019, p. 25). The report also recognizes the major pathways into the Chinese sex trade – more than half of the victims are coerced or abducted in China, 16% are coerced while living in North Korea, and nearly a quarter are sold by Chinese citizens, police, or sub-brokers (Yoon, 2019, p. 19).

Given these assessments, it seems clear to me that the issues are beyond that of transnational crime, implicating state actors (namely the police) and, where forced marriage is concerned, everyday citizens who exploit North Korean women and girls to provide brides to rural Chinese men. Global perspectives are well-placed to examine such a transnational issue that is both local and global in nature. International agreements such as the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC) and Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) would suggest that the Chinese government take responsibility for combatting trafficking by organized crime units, by its own government and state actors, and by its citizens (CTOC is also cited in the KFI report).

### **Escape, Refuge, and Loopholes**

In a later section we will examine China's anti-trafficking developments in recent years vis-à-vis these international conventions. However, it is crucial to explore here an area of contention regarding the status of North Korean escapees in China, as it gives further context to the hardships faced by trafficked women and girls. The term 'escapee' is consciously employed here, as China does not recognize the refugee, refugee-sur-place, mandate refugee, nor asylum seeker statuses of North Koreans who migrate there. China utilizes several loophole tactics to avoid recognizing North Koreans as refugees; one is to identify North Korean escapees as 'economic migrants' rather than refugees (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2009). Such ascriptions, therefore, do not contest the content of the 1951 Refugee Convention but remove

North Korean escapees from its scope of applicability by simply defining them out of it (1951 Refugee Convention, 1954, Article 1). In some ways, the Chinese government is not incorrect in its assertion that North Koreans migrate because they want better lives for themselves and their families. On one hand, one might consider their position defensible in the sense that the Chinese government should not be obligated to take on the responsibility of providing for North Korean citizens simply because the North Korean government does not adequately provide for its own. On the other hand, such assertions might suppose that North Koreans are better off facing potential malnutrition and persecution at home than finding a way to survive; such assertions ignore human survival instinct and the very real impacts of material deprivation. In cases of human trafficking, either view fails to consider the minutiae involved in the decision to migrate. As Man Chuen Cheng (2014, p.56) points out in her work on the labels 'migrant worker' versus 'trafficking victim', the 'trafficking victim' ascription does not consider a person's agency when using "migration to gain economic security for [oneself] and [one's] family," while the 'economic migrant' label does not take into consideration a person's "structural vulnerability" in the "force, fraud, or coercion" involved in an act of trafficking. It is a false dichotomy.

In any case, the international community is not compelling China to bear the burden of a mass exodus of North Korean escapees. South Korea accepts the majority of North Koreans as its own citizens and would allow them to settle there if China would allow them to transit to South Korea. Yet, the Chinese government justifies its practice of forced repatriation through an active bilateral treaty with North Korea, known as the 1986 Mutual Cooperation Protocol for the Work of Maintaining National Security and Social Order in the Border Areas. Indeed, Article 5 of the Protocol provides that "in the event that there occurs the danger of...common criminals escaping into the other side's borders" ... "[when such] a criminal is investigated and arrested the offender shall necessarily be handed over to the other side" (DPRK-

---

PRC Mutual Cooperation Protocol, 1986, Article 5). Under North Korean law, a citizen is deemed to have committed a crime in the act of simply crossing the border and leaving the country without permission (The Criminal Law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 2009, s. 1 Article 65). Under Chinese law, a foreigner without a visa commits a crime by entering China without permission and the authorities "shall force the return of those who refuse to [return]" (although countries with similar immigration laws generally provide waivers for criminal charges of unlawful entry to those who have applied for asylum or refugee status on account of Article 31 of the Refugee Convention) (Exit and Entry Administration Law of the People's Republic of China, 2012, ch. 3 s. 2 Article 26). Thus, a general defence for the Chinese government is that any North Korean who crosses into China is breaking both North Korean law and Chinese law, and they are obligated under the 1986 Mutual Cooperation Protocol to repatriate offenders. However, as Margesson et al. (2008, p. 11 supra note 41) point out, "[t]he Refugee Convention is supposed to override bilateral agreements between states". As such, the principle of non-refoulement should overrule any bilateral agreement to necessarily force the repatriation of North Korean citizens to a country where they are putatively expected to face danger and abuse of their human rights. Curiously, it appears the Chinese government acknowledges this responsibility in high-profile cases. Margesson et al. (2008, p. 11 supra note 41) note that "China continues to allow virtually all asylum seekers who successfully enter foreign diplomatic compounds and schools to quietly leave for South Korea via a third country". Here they are referring to cases where North Korean escapees successfully enter foreign embassies, consulates, or international schools in China, and, due to the highly publicized nature of these cases in foreign media, the Chinese government generally deems it wise not to contravene the Refugee Convention by forcibly repatriating escapees who are now known to the international community. Therefore, we see a dualistic application of international and domestic law. Where escapees are visible to the wider world and under the

protection of a foreign diplomatic entity, China recognizes its obligations under international law and permits third-country transit for application of asylum. Where escapees may be invisible to the wider world and are potentially vulnerable on their own, even if they have faced alleged abuse at the hands of criminal traffickers of Chinese citizenship in contravention of Chinese domestic law, China evades its international law obligations and repatriates North Koreans based on defences of North Korean economic migration and the 1986 Mutual Cooperation Protocol. What the UNHCR appears to request of the Chinese government is first to allow UNHCR to make determinations on North Korean refugee status, and then extend that third-country transit policy to all North Korean escapees with refugee status, as investigated and identified by UNHCR, thus ending the dualistic application of policy (Ojea Quintana, 2020, para. 52).

#### **NGO and IGO Recommendations**

Returning to the concerns set out in the methods section, we have looked first at the issue of sex trafficking from NGO and IGO perspectives, followed by an examination of the issue of refoulement and non-recognition of refugee status by the Chinese government. This leads us then to ask what it is that KFI and the UNHCR are requesting of/recommending to nations involved as well as the international community. In both the KFI Sex Slaves report and the UN Special Rapporteur's report, they conclude with a direct set of recommendations, which we will observe in turn. These recommendations are prescriptive and ambitious; it is unlikely the Chinese government will respond to or move to implement the recommendations. It is also unlikely that the international community will impose sanctions in response to the North Korean trafficking and refugee situation in China.

To a limited degree, Yoon Hee-soon has recognized elements of this reality in her recommendations. The KFI report's author writes, "evidence suggests that the Government of China will not revise its policies towards North Korean refugees" (Yoon, 2019, p. 46). On North

Korea, the author states, “the Government of North Korea will not eradicate the institutions of rule that push women and girls into China” (Yoon, 2019, p. 46). Yoon recognizes the power held by governments and institutions and the substantial political factors that lead to what she sees as an immoral and unethical abuse of the rights of everyday North Koreans. Having acknowledged this, her recommendations are not directly addressed to the governments in question but instead to the international community and to other states with interests in the region. Concerning the government of China, she recommends that other states “should lodge complaints with the International Court of Justice and impose sanctions on China as a violator of a legally binding Convention” (Yoon, 2019, p. 46). It is unclear here which convention she is referring to, as the report alleges China has breached the CEDAW, the CTOC, and the Refugee Convention. Regardless, this recommendation makes clear her view that the Government of China has committed internationally illicit offenses. Further, she recommends that other states “facilitate the escape of North Koreans in Chinese territory” and that “[e]mbassies should accept North Korean asylum seekers as refugees” (Yoon, 2019, p. 46). It appears she is aware of the point Margesson et al. made, that the Chinese government has been more willing to allow North Koreans to transit to a third country for asylum application for high-profile cases. Human Rights Watch (2002) claims this may only get more difficult as China doubles down on security around diplomatic areas and makes “arrests and prosecutions of those who were helping North Koreans escape”. Both of these recommendations focus more on the transit and repatriation elements of trafficking. It is clear in Yoon’s view that until and unless these issues are addressed, it will be difficult to see a path forward that offers protection to these women and girls.

A further two of Yoon’s recommendations deal directly with sex trafficking. The first relates to the aforementioned acknowledgement of the refusal of the government of North Korea to remove institutions and systems that cause North Korean women to be vulnerable

to exploitation in China. Implied throughout the report is that these structures include a woman’s inferiority and inequality in North Korea. To that effect, Yoon (2019, p.46) simply states, “these structures...must be targeted for removal”. She also makes a universal statement regarding sexist norms that allow trafficking to take place; “male dominance over women must be challenged publicly at the highest level of every State” (Yoon, 2019, p. 46). She also recommends that South Korea’s government needs to raise its voice on the issues of sex trafficking and refugee repatriation, and that South Korean citizens should keep their government accountable for this. Finally, she advises that NGOs need greater funding and resourcing to continue their rescue work. These recommendations appear to reflect the frustration of aid organizations and refugees that the states involved are unwilling to reform their policies, written or unwritten, on the treatment of North Koreans, and thus instead petition various members of the international community.

The UN Special Rapporteur’s recommendations, on the other hand, deal directly with China. They will not be analysed at great length here, but they primarily address the issue of forced repatriation and refugee status in China. Ojea Quintana (2020) recommends the government of China “apply the principle of non-refoulement” to North Koreans; “consider adopting” legislation to allow North Koreans to “seek asylum or apply for settlement of countries of their choice;” and allow UNHCR staff to “travel to relevant border areas to enable escapees...to access their right to seek asylum from persecution”. On the trafficking issue, the Special Rapporteur recommends China adopt “a legal and policy framework to protect victims of human trafficking in China, in particular women and children, that would allow for basic health care and education, among other basic services” (Ojea Quintana, 2020). It is clear in this sense that the UN Special Rapporteur sees China as having, at a minimum, a responsibility to allow the UNHCR to conduct refugee assessments, and as a standard, provide basic needs to North Korean escapees

---

as they are assessed and transited for asylum in third countries.

### **China and a Differentiated Trafficking Response**

Having examined the issue of sex trafficking and refugee status at length, we are naturally led to question of what the government of China has been doing to combat transnational trafficking in its territory. Through this section, I also hope to balance the troubling realities of the previous section with progress that is ongoing in China's anti-trafficking activities and illuminate a Chinese cultural perspective.

China borders many other nations, and the issue of trafficking is not limited to North Korea. Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand are also source countries for traffickers in China to coerce, abduct, and force women and children into sex trafficking. China has acknowledged these cases, but usually only insofar as they relate to marriage of Chinese nationals, not prostitution or cybersex (IOM, 2018). A 2018 international seminar hosted in China by the IOM explored ways for China and the European Union to build networks to combat trafficking. This demonstrated a positive move from the Chinese government to cooperate on this issue where such measures meet its domestic and foreign policy goals. The representative from China's Ministry of Public Security identified three trafficking streams: Chinese women trafficked abroad, migrant women trafficked into China for the purpose of marriage, and intranational trafficking of Chinese women for marriage migration (IOM, 2018). These are substantial elements of the practice of trafficking, and the push for further counteraction in these areas is one welcomed by the UN and the IOM. It touches on the issue of transnational trafficking for the purpose of marriage, as also identified in the KFI report (IOM, 2018). However, it omits the issue of trafficking in women and girls for prostitution, the growing cybersex industry, and other forms of sexual slavery, which KFI estimates to constitute approximately 65% of North Korean trafficked women in China (Yoon, 2019, p. 12). Indeed, these are elements that concern and affect trafficked women and girls

from Southeast Asia as well as North Koreans, so it is not the case that such elements of anti-trafficking efforts would have been beyond the scope of this seminar.

The report also omits all mention of North Koreans. The seminar does not strictly state that its focus is on Southeast Asia, so it would not have been beyond the scope of this seminar to have included North Koreans either. It seems that China's wider political ambitions and considerations supersede willingness to include North Korean women and girls in their official activities on combatting trafficking. Indeed, the same official from MPS present at the seminar mentioned that "female victims of trafficking into China...are provided with legal, psychological, social, and medical services" (IOM, 2018). This could indeed be the case for women from Southeast Asia, but it seems clear to me that KFI and the UN Special Rapporteur strongly dispute this claim as it applies to North Korean trafficking victims.

Further, the Chinese government has signed bilateral agreements with these Southeast Asian nations regarding transnational trafficking, and at the time of the report were continuing to extend such efforts with Thailand's government. The official stated he was eager to "establish formal cooperation with countries that China doesn't have an agreement with" (IOM, 2018). The positive impact made through international workshops, such as the one in Sanya, must be noted; the report author states that 15 of 18 participants "found [the seminar] useful and relevant to their work" in anti-trafficking enforcement and networking between China and the European Union (IOM, 2018). What the seminar explicitly highlights is that China has the capability and willingness to combat trafficking where it so chooses and within the scope of definitions it sets. It would thus be fallacious to assert that the Chinese government does not see trafficking of women and girls as a domestic and international problem; the information detailed above suggests it does see it this way. This is important to note as a counterargument to claims that human rights are culturally relative and must be seen through a Chinese cultural perspective.

---

---

What this seminar summary report reveals, at least as far as trafficking for marriage is concerned, is that first, the Chinese government believes transnational trafficking of women and girls is a matter of concern and action. Second, the Chinese government considers frameworks for cooperation and both proactive and reactive response to be possible, useful, and necessary. Finally, the Chinese government has the capacity to gather and publish data on trafficking where it chooses to. Therefore, putting aside universalist views on human rights, even a cultural relativist/social constructivist perspective must admit that at least as far as the Sanya seminar is concerned, sex trafficking as a human rights and crime issue is culturally recognised as valid in China. The IOM summary report also mentions that China's most popular government social media account is that which focuses on fighting trafficking, suggesting that the average Chinese citizen sees trafficking as a culturally relevant issue as well (IOM, 2018). This makes it difficult to argue that extending the framework presented here to include and serve trafficked North Korean women and girls is not in China's general human rights, immigration, and/or criminal response interests. Therefore, I would posit that the omission of North Koreans in anti-trafficking policy application must stem from political expediency rather than both universalist (e.g., from a United Nations perspective) and cultural relativist understandings of sex trafficking.

It may be the case that China sees the economic and security challenges stemming from an influx of North Korean refugees as a greater concern than human trafficking. A Chinese state media article explicitly mentions that "individuals' interests are upheld via the realization of collective interests" (China Daily, 2005). Dr. Jiyoung Song (2011, p.27) recognises the same to be true of North Korean society when she writes, "all constitutions of Marxist states clearly stipulate the collective principle over individual interests". Still, this does not adequately account for the differentiated application of anti-trafficking policy towards Southeast Asian nations compared with North Korea. Certainly, the domestic conditions in Vietnam are not the same as those

in North Korea, yet the potential economic and security impacts of cross-border trafficking could have a similar effect regardless of the country from which the trafficked women emigrate.

### **A Coordinated, Even Response**

UNHCR is not suggesting China bear the burden of anti-trafficking measures alone. The UN Special Rapporteur recognises that South Korea will (at least for the time being) accept North Koreans as their own citizens and rehabilitate them and asks only that China provide assistance and allow UNHCR access to refugees until they are able to transit to South Korea (Ojea Quintana, 2020). An official handbook on the Refugee Convention provides a framework for UNHCR to assist in making refugee determinations if the government of China is unwilling to incur the full costs and challenges of such an undertaking (UNHCR, 1992, p. 12).

We see that China's government has demonstrated first its belief that transnational sex trafficking is a crime, human rights, and immigration issue. We have seen its ability to create structures and policies that accommodate victims whilst tracking and prosecuting perpetrators, such as the provision of basic services and transit to third countries for asylum. The government has also shown a willingness to work with the international community on such matters. Yet, it seemingly maintains immovable desire to keep North Korea out of the conversation. This contrasts with the KFI Sex Slaves report that makes it clear that omission of North Korea from these solutions is not a defensible option, nor a legal one.

Based on these conclusions, I recommend that present and future work on combatting sex trafficking in China necessarily include North Korean women and girls; that provisions and policies afforded to other victims be also afforded to North Korean victims of trafficking; and that the international community be supportive of and engaged with China in doing so, demonstrating a keen willingness to accept North Korean victims as refugees so as to offer a viable long-term settlement solution.

---



### Conclusion:

The multi-faceted issue of transnational sex trafficking involves international law, domestic politics, human rights abuses, gender-based violence, and intercultural communication, yet the focus of debate (as often is the case) tends to centre on international political relationships and fierce debates over political ideologies and alignments between the ‘West’ and the ‘East’. As a result, the women and girls facing sexual exploitation fall by the wayside. It is a ‘damned if you do, damned if you don’t’ situation; ignore the alleged ongoing issues in sex trafficking, and the victims and survivors suffer in silence; illuminate the issues, and the victims and survivors suffer while politicians argue economics, law, politics, and anything else under the sun. Hence, this global studies approach has shown to be well-placed to reflect on the circumstances, holding in tension the conflicts of traditional disciplines and borders, and advocating for a global response drawing from transnational experiences of tragedy in local communities.

The KFI report has implicated Chinese nationals in transnational sex trafficking of North Korean women in girls for a variety of purposes, and suggested its government is being wilfully ignorant on the matter. The IOM report on the other hand has shown China’s government is making progress on combatting trafficking in other areas, and that it has capacity to collect and publish data, build networks, and establish frameworks that could alleviate the suffering of North Korean women and girls. The disconnect between practice and policy having now been illuminated, the onus is on the international community to persuade and work with China to make policy work for all trafficked women and girls.

### References:

- Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. (2009). *2008 Human Rights Report: China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau)* [Government Report]. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. <https://web.archive.org/web/20090226175344/http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eap/119037.htm>
- Burt, J. (2018). *Us Too: Sexual Violence Against North Korean Women & Girls* [NGO Report]. Korea Future Initiative. <https://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/Korea%20Future%20Initiative%20-%20Us%20Too%20Sexual%20Violence%20Against%20North%20Korean%20Women%20and%20Girls.pdf>
- Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China. (2013). *Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Printing and Distributing China’s Action Plan against Human Trafficking (2013-2020)*. Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China. [http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-03/08/content\\_2349019.htm](http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-03/08/content_2349019.htm)
- China Daily. (2005). *Human rights can be manifested differently* [News Article]. China Daily. [https://web.archive.org/web/20071209093707/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-12/12/content\\_3908887.htm](https://web.archive.org/web/20071209093707/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-12/12/content_3908887.htm)
- Gang, D., & Hosaniak, J. (2018). *They Only Claim That Things Have Changed: Discrimination against Women in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea* [NGO Report No. 8; NKHR Briefing Report, p. 105]. Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights. <http://www.nkhr.or.kr/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/They-only-claim-that-things-have-changed...-Discrimination-against-Women-in-the-Democratic-Peoples-Republic-of-Korea-2.pdf>
- Human Rights Watch. (2002). *The Invisible Exodus: North Koreans in the People’s Republic of China*. Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2002/11/19/invisible-exodus/north-koreans-peoples-republic-china>
- International Organization for Migration (IOM). (2018). *Seminar for facilitating network building among anti-trafficking criminal investigation experts* [Summary Report].

- International Organization for Migration (IOM).  
<https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/country/docs/china/IOM-China-N9-A3-1-Seminar-for-Facilitating-Network-Building-among-Anti-trafficking-Criminal-Investigation-Experts.pdf>
- Korea Future Initiative. (n.d.). *Who we are* [NGO Homepage]. Retrieved May 13, 2021, from <https://www.koreafuture.org/about>
- Man Chuen Cheng, C. (2014). Migrant Workers or Trafficked Victims? Structural Vulnerabilities of Women Migrant Workers in Contemporary China. In *Human Trafficking Reconsidered: Rethinking the Problem, Envisioning New Solutions* (pp. 50–57). International Debate Education Association.
- Margesson, R., Chanlett-Avery, E., & Bruno, A. (2008). *North Korean Refugees in China and Human Rights Issues: International Response and U.S. Policy Options* [Congressional Report No. RL34189]. United States Congressional Research Service.
- Mutual Cooperation Protocol for the Work of Maintaining National Security and Social Order in the Border Areas, 6. (1986). [http://www.nkfreedom.org/UploadedDocuments/NK-China-bilateral\\_treaty.pdf](http://www.nkfreedom.org/UploadedDocuments/NK-China-bilateral_treaty.pdf)
- Ojea Quintana, T. (2020). *Situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: Note by the Secretary-General* [UN General Assembly Item A/75/388; p. 21]. United Nations. <https://undocs.org/A/75/388>
- Exit and Entry Administration Law of the People's Republic of China, Pub. L. No. 57. (2012). [http://subsites.chinadaily.com.cn/2018-03/29/c\\_208720.htm#:~:text=Article%2079%20Persons%20harboring%20or,not%20more%20than%20RMB%2010%2C000](http://subsites.chinadaily.com.cn/2018-03/29/c_208720.htm#:~:text=Article%2079%20Persons%20harboring%20or,not%20more%20than%20RMB%2010%2C000)
- Ragin, C. (1994). *Constructing social research: The unity and diversity of method*. Pine Forge Press.
- Song, J. (2011). *Human Rights Discourse in North Korea: Post-colonial, Marxist, and Confucian perspectives*. Routledge.
- The Criminal Law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Chapter 3 - Crimes Against the State and the Nation (2009). [https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/The%20Criminal%20Law%20of%20the%20Democratic%20Republic%20of%20Korea\\_2009\\_%20\(1\).pdf](https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/The%20Criminal%20Law%20of%20the%20Democratic%20Republic%20of%20Korea_2009_%20(1).pdf)
- UNHCR. (1992). *Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees*. United Nations.  
<https://www.unhcr.org/4d93528a9.pdf>
- Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS 137 (1951).  
<https://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10>
- Yoon, H. (2019). *Sex Slaves: The Prostitution, Cybersex & Forced Marriage of North Korean Women & Girls in China* [Research Report]. Korea Future Initiative.

# ‘FROM TÚPAC TO TUPAC’ PERCEIVING HIP HOP MUSIC AS A FACET OF SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN BOLIVIA.

BY ALEXANDER KING

BMUS/BGLOBALST: CLASSICAL PERFORMANCE, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, LATIN AMERICA, SPANISH

## Abstract:

**If you asked someone where in the world they would find hard-driving, culture-shaking politically-fuelled hip hop, most people’s first guess would seldom be the high mountaintop plains of El Alto, Bolivia. However, in the city four kilometres above sea level, indigenous Aymara youth activists are doing just that. Through experiencing first-hand the effects of systemic oppressions and social injustices, young Bolivian activists are expressing their anger and frustrations through hard-hitting rap excoriating Bolivia’s systems of governance and verbalising their feelings towards the dire social, economic, and environmental conditions of the country’s population. This new cultural revolution, coupled with compelling social protest, has brought an invigorating voice to the indigenous peoples of El Alto facing oppression in all facets of life and has set the cogs in motion for meaningful systemic change and action to occur. Through political hip hop, activists have found a way to connect not just with the people around them, but to the world. That is, of course, if the world is willing to listen.**

## Introduction:

*“Bolivia, ¡Una tierra herida por opresores que se autodenominan defensores de mi tierra!”*(1) thunders over the mountains of the Andean Plateau. Bolivia, once a country for the people and the land, is now at the feet of the oppressor, the so-called defender of the land. The indigenous peoples of Bolivia are no strangers to oppression; the ruinous fall of President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in 2003 sparked national protest leading to the

massacre of sixty indigenous demonstrators. The bitter struggle over the development of Bolivia’s vast natural gas reserves as well as the national resentment towards the Washington-financed eradication of coca caused desperate nationwide poverty, creating a social environment of suffering and subjugation for the people of Bolivia. As the world grew bigger, the pleas of indigenous Bolivians were confined and the separation between the persecutors and the persecuted proliferated, but from oppression grew objection. Drawing inspiration from inner-city New York of the 20th Century, and on the back of pirated cassette tapes of 1990’s United States hip-hop artists, young Bolivians found the vehicle to advance their voices within the national structures, a cultural revolution that held the systemic shackles of oppression to account—music. Although music already functioned as an integral ritualistic aspect of Bolivian culture, this movement took shape through the United States East Coast-influenced hip-hop in which young Aymara and Quechua activists expressed their emotions through revolutionary hard-hitting rap condemning the systems which perpetuated division between their people and verbalising their feelings towards the dire socio-economic and environmental conditions of the country’s population. A blend of lyrics exclaiming love for their people and country juxtaposed with aggressive indignation towards both external and internal oppressors created the perfect setting for uncompromising revolutionary discourse.

Fundamentally, this project aims to understand the growth of rap music as a tool for social, political, and economic activism within the localised context of El Alto, Bolivia

(1) Translation: “Bolivia, a land wounded by oppressors who call themselves defenders of my land!” lyrics taken from Aymara rap collective, ‘Lyrical Urban Movement’.

and New York City, United States. Both cities bore witness to cultural insurgences activated by music, predominately hip-hop, under comparable social circumstances and so act as collocated geographies for comprehensive discourse and comparative analysis on localised manifestations of this global instrument for change. To fulfil the overall aim, the project has three core objectives:

- Analyse the works by the politically influenced musical artists of the two cities responsible for the cultural shift in social discourse;
- Draw comparisons and document the relationship between the social movements created and supplemented by the politically influenced musical artists of the two cities using theoretical frameworks of postcolonialism and constructionism;
- Theorise the influence these movements have had on the societies around the artists—analysing to what extent music has guided particular rhetoric in the socio-political and educational sphere of El Alto in comparison to New York.

Activism as a social philosophy asks how, and utilises the ways in which, collective and interpersonal interactions can shape the way people view and react to the society around them. In line with the core objectives, this project seeks to understand:

*To what extent has activist rap music been utilised in El Alto, Bolivia to create an environment that acknowledges the role of indigenous perspectives in spheres of social, economic and political discourse?*

This project hopes to reveal that music, in this context, hip-hop, has been a fundamental element of social change globally, particularly when looking at indigenous oppression and social exploitation. Through the case study of El Alto, Bolivia, one can observe exactly that—an indigenous community that draws upon music to tap into the activist sphere and advocate for their voices to be

prioritised.

The intention of the project is primarily to understand the contextual elements that have led to this cultural movement being vital to the youth, indigenous, and oppressed peoples of Bolivia, but also to understand the key roots of the movement which have enabled its growth across the globe. By also drawing upon the subsidiary case study of New York in the late 20th Century, this project has the opportunity to recognise the trajectory which that particular movement took and how that can be realised under the El Alto context. In current scholarship pertaining to Bolivia, particularly indigenous groups within Bolivia such as Aymara in El Alto, there is an inclination towards interpreting social movements through a ‘neo-political economic’ lens in which the activist movements are seen exclusively within the framework of ecopolitical dogma. This perspective, however, is seldom a reflection of the many other nuanced social and cultural factors that play into the vast activist movements that exist. This project highlights only a single facet of social revolution in Bolivia, however, aims to contribute to a wider scholarship that develops a fuller, more context-sensitive account of the factors which necessitate activism in Bolivia.

Music’s capacity to provide a contextual understanding of an artist’s sociocultural surroundings in such a short medium is an anomaly when studying culture. The decisions made by an artist in reference to their lyrical, harmonic, rhythmic, timbral, textural, and tonal content gives the listener a robust and comprehensive understanding of the influences which shaped the artist’s need for the art. With this concept in mind, the project aims to understand the extent of activist music as a key facet in creating an environment that acknowledges indigenous perspectives through an analysis of two songs written and performed by two artists of different cities, in different decades, under comparable circumstances to establish parallels in the art and to establish the context of the works in the wider zeitgeist.

**Methods:**

The project seeks to more comprehensively understand to what extent activist music has been utilised in El Alto, Bolivia to create an environment that acknowledges indigenous perspectives in regards to social, environmental, and political discourse. Methodologically, in order to answer this question, the project requires an ability to gain exhaustive qualitative understandings of many aspects.

An ethnomusicological understanding of activism is seldom the primary investigation when analysing social change and consequentially has resulted in little research being facilitated in academia. Using secondary research methodology, the project will draw on the few academic articles and papers that currently exist, local and international magazine/newspaper articles and reports, interviews with the artists and producers involved, and the lyrics of the artists' work. The project will also rely on comparative analysis to other regions of the globe with socially homogenous circumstances—New York in the 20th Century—as the approach and social conditions are deeply interwoven. This comparative element will allow for the project to look into qualitative resources not pertaining to El Alto specifically, drawing on a wider breadth of knowledge. In order to reach the first two core objectives of the project, discourse analysis and comparative analysis must be conducted. The primary objective of the discourse analysis is to provide contextual information to what the artists are rapping about and why, which in turn will aid the comparative analysis that looks at the roles hip-hop has played in El Alto in contrast to New York.

The qualitative data gained through this methodology will provide insight into five key areas of research: the actors which contribute to indigenous oppression in Bolivia as well as those that are oppressed, the institutions which have created the space for activism to take place—notably 'Wayna Tambo' radio, the systems in place that have created the oppression the activists seek to address though

their art, the networks of communities that have created pathways for activism, and the conditions within El Alto that have facilitated all aspects of the movement.

**Historical Context of Bolivia:**

Bolivia's history is burdened with a complex web of political and social aggressions. The landlocked country surrounded by the vast Andean mountain range in western-central South America was once part of the powerful Incan Empire before Spanish conquistadors administered colonial rule over the region in the 16th Century. Defiled for its rich silver mines, the country was rebuilt in the colonial vision on the labour of the original indigenous peoples of the land. Calls for independence from the colonial regime established by Spain became a prominent rally by 1809, and after 16 years of war and revolution, Bolivia was proclaimed an independent sovereign state on August 6th of 1825. Though now liberated, the peoples of Bolivia were not the same. Dwindling diverse indigenous populations, and with cultures minimised through years of colonial occupation, the hangover from the systems of oppression that controlled structural policy ravished the geopolitical landscape, and the frustrations of Bolivian peoples manifested into cycles of protest, violence, and demonstrations. With neoliberalism rearing an uncompromising head at the turn of the 21st Century, as well as the country's shift to pluralist ideology from the established corporatist systems that predated the incoming government, concerns from all facets of the society began to unveil as people understood that their perspectives and voices were becoming weakened despite their needs growing under the increasingly repressive economic policies (Barr, 2005).

It was not until 2005—196 years after Bolivia's liberation—that the country saw its first indigenous person lead their country as an elected President, Evo Morales. A member of the Movement for Socialism, the Aymara president exclaimed "*¡Compañeros indígenas, por primera vez somos presidents!*"<sup>(2)</sup> at his inauguration ceremony. The

(2) Translation: "Indigenous comrades, for the first time we are the presidents!"

movement which sought to provide agency to cultural recognition and inclusive representation had culminated in a new form of activist dogma, and the voices of the original peoples of Bolivia finally had the opportunity to be centred in systems of governance (Postero, 2008). Changes in the development of regional Latin American politics had large scale effects on the domestic social stability of Bolivia, and with the fluctuation of global imperialism providing intercontinental economic instability, it was imperative for the country to establish its strengths as a liberated indigenous republic on the international stage (Webber, 2011). Despite Morales' victory being built on the indigenous struggle movements, as well as maintaining a prominently indigenous supporter base, reform for indigeneity in Bolivia and strengthening of integral democratic regimes still had a long way to go before the era of apartheid-like systems of race relations in the country were remedied (Webber, 2011). Under Morales, Bolivia began to undertake the abandonment of restrictive economic systems of orthodox nature which were established by globalised institutions. Establishing the country as one which could stand on the global stage, Bolivia rejected the notion that its drug eradication policies were to be dictated by Washington bureaucracy and through an economic upheaval, began to establish international relations through self-driven commodity exports and summit participations (Crabtree & Chaplin 2013).

Set on providing leverage on the international stage, the new era of Bolivia was becoming a strident nation with a strong social participation in domestic policy and yet despite the country's efforts, it was not serving all of its peoples. While the voices of indigenous peoples became centred in policy and debate, the systems of ethnic oppression that engulfed the country for majority of its history persisted. As it unravelled it became increasingly evident that it would take more than a shift in government to overhaul the class nature of the Bolivian state (Carvalho, 2020).

### **Historical Context of Rap:**

Critical to perceiving knowledges, awareness, mobilisations, and actions of inner-city black communities of the late 20th Century (Pough, 2004), the rap genre has become an agent for political discourse and critique while simultaneously being a unifying medium for subjugated peoples in the United States of America. Understanding the society of rap globally has contextualised the culture to be a channel which has allowed those most ostracised and without voice to assert their socio-political demands from the spheres which they are most often marginalised from (Bonnette, 2015).

An ubiquitous agency for entertainment and justice, the movement of commercialised rap formed in the inner boroughs of New York throughout the early 1970s. Stemming from rhythm breakdowns of funk, soul, and disco, MCs of underground block parties would metrically sync their announcements with the rhythm played underneath by the performers. As this became more ingrained in the urban culture, it developed into a produced medium for entertainment on its own accord. This development in the genre's history, however, was not the beginning of the movement, with its roots originally held in chant and storytelling by West African orators known as 'Griots'. A living archive of the people around them (Bebey & Bennett, 1999) their societal role was to ensure the histories and traditions were acknowledged and passed generationally to develop a rich tapestry of local knowledges and oral histories. Scholars have debated the stereotyping of rappers as modern, Americentric Griots, which has incited problematic comparisons and conclusions, particularly when contextualising Griots through the position within tribal society which most aligned with patrician-adjacent peoples, as opposed to cultures of rap which have grown out of oppressions (Sajnani, 2013).

A vehicle for progressive justice, the genre in the modern age was a self-determining artform for disenfranchised youth. Neglected by government agencies and ravaged by

---

the urban quandaries of city violence, drug dependency, and education inadequacies, young African-Americans were able to scrutinise issues which they identified as deeply institutional injustices within their communities. As the genre progressed, it became a web of collective resentments which, when mobilised, became an instrument for critique towards the state of race relations in the United States of America (Allen, Dawson & Brown, 1989). Now synonymous with what academics perceive as the 'black rhetorical continuum', rap music has borrowed and expanded upon global emanations of the artform from West African 'Griots' to Anglo-Caribbean 'Toasters' to progress rhetoric of resistance against institutionalised spheres of race and class. West-Indian philosopher, Frantz Fanon, theorised in relation to linguistic determinism that the dexterity of a language consequently allowed one the "possession of the world" (Fanon 1952, p.18). Theories surrounding language and its power within institutions of control and subjugation all lend themselves to a simple notion, when one masters language, it affords undeniable power; if you control the language, you can control the rhetoric. It is with this ideology that the movement of contemporary political rap came to fruition in the context from which we now know it. Rap music as a concept is not a vehicle for discussion nor idealism; it uses its rich histories of symbols, myths, and sounds to cry out against the established structures (Kopano, 2002), to gain attention, and rally for the lives of the artists' communities through the injection of their own linguistic capacities into the zeitgeist: a new way of thinking, a new form of revolution.

### **Discourse Analysis of 'Chamakatsartasiry'-Wanya Rap:**

Existing within a sphere of systemic oppression on the basis of race and class, 'Chamakatsartasiry' by the Wayna Rap collective of El Alto, Bolivia, is an encapsulation of the purest role of rap music within a societal framework. The collective's hometown of El Alto is home to the largest concentration of ethnically Aymara Bolivians with nearly half of all Aymara speakers globally

(Swinehart, 2012). Despite the country's second-liberation that came through the rise of President Evo Morales and the indigenous peoples Movement for Socialism, the exclusion which Aymara people faced within political, cultural, and economic frames persisted long into the modern day. Through discrimination on the basis of phenotype, family lineage, cultural symbols, and language, Aymara peoples opted for shifts to the dominant structures of Spanish linguistic customs as a marker of upwards societal positioning and to alleviate the stigmatism of rurality and poverty which accompanied Aymara language (Swinehart, 2012). However, through the art form of protest rap, Aymara youths possessed a unique advantage in that their proficiency in indigenous languages garnered them a notable symbolic capital which was attached within their linguistic spheres. This provided the artists not only with a much more significant weight to their lyrical content but also a wider and more accessible reach of their art (Hornberger & Swinehart 2012).

Positioned to criticise the neoliberalist agenda of the 1990s and to demand the expansion of radical social change within all facets of centralised structures, young rappers at the centre of the movement became known as the '*hijos de cholos*'<sup>(3)</sup> as their indigenous identity within systems of colonialism began to shift from shame to pride (Stefanoni, 2007). A site of great bloodshed and turmoil during Bolivia's Gas Wars of the early 21st Century, El Alto fostered an environment which allowed youth activists to truly grapple with the intergenerational trauma which seeped through their lineage. The song, 'Chamakatsartasiry' translating to 'Coming out of the Darkness', is an example of the integration and influence drawn from both musical artists of indigenous Bolivian heritage as well as from the new age rap from the United States. Blending a mix of harmonies from traditional Andean t'arka flute and siku pan flute, underlaid by a standardised 8th note groove drum beat influenced by Western music (fig. 1), the sample which this song utilises creates a fluid blend between both musical and cultural narratives.

(3) Translation: "Children of Cholos". MC Marcelo "El Cholo" Yáñez was regarded as the first of the urban indigenous artists to progress a decolonial agenda.

### 'Chamakatsartasiry' – Wayna Rap (2012) (4)

Wayna Rap's 'Chamakatsartasiry' at its core is an exposition of the abuse of colonialism on Bolivia and its people. The work predominantly looks at what it means to be "indigenous", a largely colonial construct, when local processes and systems that have allowed parts of the country to thrive are discarded via systemic force. The work takes influence from the suffering of Aymara and Quechua communities under colonialism and understands the original 'Bolivia' under a modern context.

The opening verse of Wayna Rap's song pertains to the rich histories of Aymara people within the colonial borders of 'Bolivia'. The lyrics understand perceptions of identity to be linked through the lineage of the community and that it is now time for action through the spirit of revolutionary, Tupac Katari.

Reintegrating indigenous systems of governance surrounding both social and natural environments is a key element of the second verse. The intersect between these two environments is a key learning from indigenous cultures globally and it is through this intersect that Wayna Rap implicate their rise to freedom and autonomy.

The oppressions as caused by external power structures within indigenous communities is explored through the third verse. The eradication of culture within pre-colonial Bolivia was accomplished through bloodshed and suffering. Through their lyrics, Wayna Rap assure that the taking back of systems will be no different and that there can be no complacency nor fear through the revolution.

Analyzing the work through the lens of the western classical paradigm, 'Chamakatsartasiry' is centred in the key of diatonic E natural minor and follows a simple 4/4-time signature sitting at 90bpm. Largely a monophonic work, this song consists of a simple t'arka melody undercut by standardised North American drum patterns. This simple backing allows for the emphasis to rest on the content within the lyrical performance. As the work moves into the chorus, Wayna Rap add layers of chordal progressions to the backing to create a movement from monophony to homophony. This change, similar to the content of the lyrics, shifts the context of the song from the constant lyrics of looking back in the verse to the complex ideas of moving forward in the chorus.

**We Aymara are original peoples of America.  
We lived here for thousands and thousands of years**

**From these lands**

**He's saying that its growing in the shade**

**He is beginning to talk forever**

**No and without shame**

**Thousands and thousands are millions my Aymara community**

**With the blood of Tupac Katari**

**This name we write on the walls**

**Aymaras, Quechuas are rising up with force**

**With force they are coming**

**Our forefathers left us all that is good, beautiful and grand**

**Their children should learn the Ayllu is an organisation**

**Our forefathers left us all that is good, beautiful and grand**

**The original Aymaras should continue to guide us**

**And we should not depart from this life**

**The voice of the Aymara of the Quechua**

**Rises up from darkness**

**Lighting Latin America with a great light that emerges, creates**

**Now the sun is going to leave**

**Now for us we arrive on the path**

**On the path we will illuminate**

**White clouds that seem like swirls of wind**

**That lift to fly like the condor Mallku**

**To be like the cold snow of the mountain range**

**Aymaras, Quechuas are rising up with force**

**With force they are coming**

**My community I don't want to see suffering**

**My community I don't want to see crying**

**I don't want to see them sad**

**Lets go, let's go blood brothers**

**We won't die kneeling, that's how it will be**

**Now yes, now we're going to do it**

**This great day for everyone will arrive**

**That [day] which is going to illuminate the dark is coming**

**The return, now yes.**

**Now, yes, now we're going to do it**

**To complete the dream of our ancestors to walk on the paths of our ancestors**

**To sing together new winds**

**Aymaras, Quechuas are rising up with force**

**With force they are coming**






Figure SEQ Figure 1\* ARABIC 1: 8<sup>th</sup> note groove drum beat

This mix of genre is mirrored in the visual aspect of the song also, as the background images of the music video portray that of rural life in the Andean townships juxtaposed against the Wayna Rap collective in the forefront at a low camera angle, suggestive of Western rap videos of the late 20th Century. The artists in this video also contrast their two comparable ideologies through the garments and dress which they wear, blending traditionally made lluch'us hats from Bolivia against their baggy shirts and pants, reminiscent of the US EastCoast rappers of the 1990s (Swinehart, 2012). Combining the two identities, from their indigenous roots to their new rap cultural identity, El Alto artists unite a global voice against marginalis.

Unlike revolution through diplomacy, the artform of rap in the El Alto context possesses no hindrances to accessibility; it acts as a form of pure advocacy for those most affected by systems of subjugation. Regardless of one's lack of access to a heard voice or sufficient resourcing, the artform lends itself to support, making it the perfect vessel for indigenous peoples of Bolivia to exonerate their leaders (Librado, 2010). The longevity and reach of 'Chamakat Sartasiry' alongside the Wayna Rap collective's other works has been preserved through the community-integrated participatory facilities of Wayna Tambo Radio. A space for young locals of El Alto to engage with their community through intercultural music, debates, and conversations of identity, the station has been a key figure in the evolution of decolonising the digital networks of Bolivian media. Through media outlets such as Wayna Tambo Radio, ideas of what it is to be indigenous—particularly an indigenous youth—within the colonial sphere of 21st Century Bolivia are challenged and

local knowledges are centred within the dialogues created. The station not only acknowledges perspectives of indigenous youth but also understands this subset of their community to be significant generators of culture and identity rather than simple consumers of it as they are categorised within colonial structures (Pojman, 2007).

#### **Discourse Analysis of 'Changes'- Tupac Shakur:**

Described as the most influential rapper of all time, an activist, visionary, rebel, poet, rapper, Tupac Shakur was the pinnacle voice of the oppressed in the United States of America during the late 1980s and early 1990s (Light, 1997). Using his dexterity of African American Vernacular English to progress the voices of voiceless urban communities, Shakur was able to integrate his ideology and culture into the wider zeitgeist of United States political discourse (Motavalli, 2019). The use of African American Vernacular English in Shakur's work, alongside his philosophic-like flow of phrasing allowed for a total immersion into the culture of the urban working class, while also providing light to systems of oppression which kept black Americans disenfranchised within the socio-political framework (Edwards, 2002). The use of this integrative language allowed Shakur to communicate directly with the people who were most affected by the content of his poetry. Utilising this medium to convey his ideology allowed barriers and disillusionment that traditionally accompanied political discourse and brought perspectives and ideas to communities otherwise ignored in dialogue. Shakur's 'Changes', released in 1998 posthumously demonstrated Shakur at his most direct. It was a poem that tackled systemic issues of poverty, violence, and crime that accompanied perceptions of black communities in the United States as well as the perpetuation of state funded violence as a result of institutionally racially biased police forces.

State-led policy targeting subaltern communities through 'red-lining' and 'urban ghettoisation' resulted in a stark—and increasing—disconnect between the lives of the

### 'Changes'– Tupac Shakur (1992/1998)

Tupac Shakur's (2Pac) 'Changes' makes references to the United States' war on drugs, racism (explicitly the reconciliation between the black and white people in America as well as police's treatment of black people), the perpetuation of poverty and crime within urban black culture, also exploring the difficulties of life in urban poverty. Shakur imagines a future without progress, and what it means to be black in America.

The opening verse of Tupac Shakur's song immediately identifies the need for justice within the systems of oppression in the United States. Civil rights movements of the mid-20<sup>th</sup> Century didn't provide the alleviation of poverty or institutionalised racism. The expected results of social justice and equity through all levels of social structures have remained unchanged.

Highlighting the intersectionality of social equity within his country, Shakur's verses look at the complexities in undertaking social change, as sweeping, monolithic ideas which don't often tackle the core of injustice. Understanding the ways in which systems of dominance maintain control through regarding each social issue as its own independent issue within a vacuum is a key message.

Changing perceptions of poverty and racism within the social framework is a key theme of the song. Shakur alludes to the toleration of institutionalised poverty from minority communities and that to break away from the stigmatisation and suffering requires taking the hard route to question and fight back against systems. Until the community stops settling for "That's the way it is", change will never happen.

Analysing the work through the lens of the Western classical paradigm, 'Changes' is centred in the key of diatonic G major and follows a simple 4/4-time signature sitting at 111bpm. This work is largely polyphonic texturally, however, the effect relies on Shakur's rhythmic dexterity. Unpredictable and playing with the placement of emphasised beats within the structure of simple 4/4-time, Shakur uses elements of rap that ensure the work is focused on the content of his lyrics like that of a spoken-word beat poem. The juxtaposition between G major as an idyllic, calm and gracious key signature (within western classical frameworks of perception) with the weight of Tupac's lyrics adds a sense of irony which plays into the hypocrisy and duplicity of his content.

*I see no changes, wake up in the morning and I ask myself:  
"Is life worth living? Should I blast myself?"  
I'm tired of being poor and, even worse, I'm black  
My stomach hurts so I'm looking for a purse to snatch  
Cops give a damn about a negro  
Pull the trigger, kill a nigga, he's a hero  
"Give the crack to the kids: who the hell cares?  
One less hungry mouth on the welfare!"  
First ship 'em dope and let 'em deal to brothers  
Give 'em guns, step back, watch 'em kill each other  
"It's time to fight back," that's what Huey said  
Two shots in the dark, now Huey's dead  
I got love for my brother  
But we can never go nowhere unless we share with each other  
We gotta start making changes  
Learn to see me as a brother instead of two distant strangers  
And that's how it's supposed to be  
How can the Devil take a brother if he's close to me?  
I'd love to go back to when we played as kids  
But things change... and that's the way it is  
I see no changes, all I see is racist faces  
Misplaced hate makes disgrace to races  
We under, I wonder what it takes to make this  
One better place, let's erase the wasted  
Take the evil out the people, they'll be acting right  
'Cause both Black and White are smoking crack tonight  
And the only time we chill is when we kill each other  
It takes skill to be real, time to heal each other  
And although it seems heaven-sent  
We ain't ready to see a black president  
It ain't a secret, don't conceal the fact:  
The penitentiary's packed, and it's filled with blacks  
But some things will never change  
Try to show another way, but you staying in the dope game  
Now tell me, what's a mother to do?  
Being real don't appeal to the brother in you  
You gotta operate the easy way  
"I made a G today," but you made it in a sleazy way  
Selling crack to the kids  
"I gotta get paid!", well hey, but that's the way it is  
We gotta make a change  
It's time for us as a people to start making some changes  
Let's change the way we eat, let's change the way we live  
And let's change the way we treat each other  
You see the old way wasn't working  
So it's on us to do what we gotta do to survive  
And still I see no changes  
Can't a brother get a little peace?  
It's war on the streets and a war in the Middle East  
Instead of war on poverty  
They got a war on drugs so the police can bother me  
And I ain't never did a crime I ain't have to do  
But now I'm back with the facts giving it back to you  
Don't let 'em jack you up, back you up  
Crack you up and pimp-smack you up  
You gotta learn to hold your own  
They get jealous when they see you with your mobile phone  
But tell the cops they can't touch this  
I don't trust this, when they try to rush I bust this  
That's the sound of my tool  
You say it ain't cool, my mama didn't raise no fool  
And as long as I stay black, I gotta stay strapped  
And I never get to lay back  
'Cause I always got to worry 'bout the payback  
Some buck that I roughed up way back  
Coming back after all these years  
"Rat-a-tat-tat-tat-tat!" That's the way it is  
Some things'll never change*

mainstream in comparison to those of people of colour living in poverty, culminating in a dire segregation of neighbourhoods well into the late 20th Century. Despite gaping holes in government policy concerning urban minority communities and their struggles for fundamental rights within the established systems, the government instead turned its eye away and focused on undertaking a social war against its own citizens. Predominantly focusing on the War on Drugs campaign initiated by Reagan's Washington, 'Changes' recognises the targeting of institutionally disadvantaged black minority communities through the government-funded 'war'. Shakur reveals this injustice through his lyrics in a way which identifies the hypocrisies of the political illusion that white illicit drug use transpires as a private health concern in juxtaposition to black illicit drug use being that of a criminal public concern (Steiner & Argothy, 2001), thus propelling the perpetuation of black urban minority rates of poverty, criminality, and violence into deeper crevasses of society. 'Changes' not only provided a medium for Shakur to exonerate the localised systems which kept his community in poverty through racial prejudice, but also an opportunity to make accessible ideas of political motivations aimed at racial segregation and the corresponding strategies of social control through incarceration (Dahm, 2017). Throughout the song, referencing the criminality of race, Shakur justifies what society perceived as 'criminality' as a means of operation within a system which held him within the shackles of social, economic, and legal oppression, suggesting that lawlessness is a justifiable reaction towards the institutionalisation of drug-fuelled incarceration (Nisker, 2007).

### **Comparative Analysis of Discourse Analysis: The Global Tool of Resistance:**

*"No one cares about the lives of the poor in this country... [I rap] because of the anger, brother. Because of the anger." – MC Renzone. La Paz, Bolivia, 11th March 2009.*

The utilisation of music to propel one's consciousness of the human condition is not a new phenomenon, however, as injustices become integrated into systems of governance through intergenerational policies of oppression, youths internationally have appropriated the genre of rap to oppose the great social inequities which they experience (Herrera & Ballivian, 2012). Used as a tool to motivate, mobilise, organise, and educate, music has solidified itself as an agent for social change, fostering group solidarity and reinforcing specific ideologies (Berger, 2000). Despite the geographic disparities between New York City and El Alto, the social conditions which have necessitated action, as well as the consequential ramifications of said action, are acutely comparable. Used to motivate, mobilise, organise, and educate, the role which music plays in the alleviation of socio-political and economic subjugations has provided agency for marginalised populations to contextualise the systems which work against their interests and exacerbate the obstacles keeping them in dire states. Indigenous youth of El Alto, politically adjacent to black minority communities within New York's boroughs, live within environments in which systemic oppressions have resulted in a scarcity of formal education with limited opportunities for employment. The medium of rap in both geographic contexts provides not only an agency for protest culture through scrutiny of public institutions and structures, but in turn has manifested into a form of non-institutionalised education through the public sphere. Providing unimpeded educational access to the ideology which decodes the administrations perpetuating their situation in an accessible format has created a culture which has allowed mobilisation, and for youths to react pragmatically and appropriately to social change around them (Herrera & Ballivian, 2012).

Understanding the parallels between rap as a cultural tool for social movement in El Alto as compared to New York relies on four key pillars of which the rap identity is based upon: culture, class, historical oppression, and youth rebellion (Alim, 2010). Through these four stems of

---

(3) Translation: "Children of Cholos". MC Marcelo "El Cholo" Yáñez was regarded as the first of the urban indigenous artists to progress a decolonial agenda.

actuality, artists have been able to share experiences of collectively lived conditions through connective marginality. Despite the geographic context being so vastly different, it is the perceived linkages across nation states' institutionalised marginalisation which has necessitated the formation of an environment for the urban underclass' articulation of rage and defiance of systems. In both locations, the proliferation of rap can be mapped to coincide with the effects of structural adjustment at the helm of neoliberal reforms. The withdrawal of state interventions in welfare subsidising and provisioning in both geographies revealed wider inequities of employment and wealth distribution (Herrera & Ballivian, 2012) and through collective experiences in El Alto and New York City, artists were presented the possibility for collaborations between like-minded oppressed peers to flourish within the rap scene.

Aymara rapper and producer, Renzy, describes his experiences within the culture as one which mirrors the realities on the streets of his city. While each individual had different and distinct upbringings, it was ultimately poverty and social exclusion as a result of top-down policy implementations that led him and his peers to the pathway of rap. The artform was not simply an interest, it was a way of being, "... [the artform] is more than a culture, it is an essence, you do rap, but you are hip-hop." (Renzy, 2012). Learnings within formal streams of education for indigenous peoples of Bolivia has reinforced internalised perceptions of self and inferiority within identity as a repercussion of a colonial education system. Redressing inequities within El Alto society begins in informal education; by providing alternative perspectives on one's sense of self through rap, artists are providing a social education which is shifting the perception of indigenous minorities within Bolivia, not just within the institutional spheres, but within themselves. By progressing their voices through the medium of rap, activists are presented with the opportunity to condemn marginalising systems and rally for a society in which indigenous peoples, both in Bolivia and elsewhere, are valued for their inherent

elves: where their identities are re-engraved within the social fabrics of culture, economy, and politics, and where their voices are centred within societal customs (Goodale, 2006).

Similarly to rappers in El Alto, rappers in New York used their moral reimaginings of a future society, where their communities were not the subject of oppression by their own systems of governance, to progress calls for revolutionary action through their artform. This reimagination focused on challenging exclusion from social participation and political negotiation as well as demonstrates the power that the appropriation of rap as a tool of cultural resistance had upon the wider sphere of society (Librado, 2010). The parallels which exist within the indigenous spheres of El Alto and the black communities of New York are most notable, not only in the contexts out of which they have grown, but rather through the ways in which the medium and its impacts have actively contributed to the revitalisation of identities within their respective societies. Through reflections of self-worth and value in their message, activists have ensured that their minority voices are respected in the face of discrimination and systemic misrepresentations. The movement of utilising rap to fight against the social context of their respective societies has ensured that processes of decolonisation are active within colonial constructs.

As the strength of identity grows from within the marginalised voices of society, predetermined understandings of societal structures are beginning to be called into question (Librado, 2010).

### **Conclusions of Analysis: Culture and Resistance:**

The extent to which activist rap music has been utilised in El Alto, Bolivia to create an environment which acknowledges the role of indigenous perspectives in spheres of social, economic, and political discourse is comprehensive and deeply nuanced. Through an avenue of unpredictable linguistic art, youths have cemented

---

(3) Translation: "Children of Cholos". MC Marcelo "El Cholo" Yáñez was regarded as the first of the urban indigenous artists to progress a decolonial agenda.

themselves as creators of identity and values which represent not just themselves but their entire culture. Speaking to systemic misrepresentations, activists globally who utilise rap for symbolic capital within their local spheres of governance have ensured that indigenous voices are not just considered in policy and structuring of society, but centred within frameworks of legitimate change through informal education and collective support. Through the upheaval of traditionalist action and adoption of external global identities to create the groundwork for change, indigenous youth activists have progressed the agendas of decolonisation and identity within dominant colonial structures to hold a significantly different weight as their voices broadcast internationally through the medium of rap. The use of the Aymara and Quechua vernacular has further ensured that their identity, supplemented by their New York hip-hop era global persona, retains its importance and acknowledges the central pillars of indigeneity, culture, and community for which the activists are rallying. The future Tupac Shakur hoped for through his poetry is yet to come into full fruition in the modern age, but he can rest easy, knowing that the descendants of his namesake, Túpac Amaru, are fighting to continue his mission to alleviate the struggles of oppression through art.

### References:

- Alim, H. S. (2010). *Global linguistic flows: Hip hop cultures, youth identities, and the politics of language*. New York: Routledge.
- Allen, R. L., Dawson, M. C., & Brown, R. E. (1989). A Schema-Based Approach to Modeling an African-American Racial Belief System. *American Political Science Review*, 83(2), 421-441. doi:10.2307/1962398
- Ballivián, R. R., & Herrera, L. (2011). Schools of the Street: Hip-hop as Youth Pedagogy in Bolivia. *International Journal of Critical Pedagogy*.
- Barr, R. R. (2005). Bolivia: Another Uncompleted Revolution. *Latin American Politics & Society*, 47(3), 69-90. doi:10.1353/lap.2005.0028
- Bebey, F., & Bennett, J. (1999). *African Music: A Peoples Art*. Chicago: Chicago Review Press.
- Berger, L. M. (2000). The Emotional and Intellectual Aspects of Protest Music. *Journal of Teaching in Social Work*, 20(1-2), 57-76. doi:10.1300/j067v20n01\_05
- Bonnette, L. M. (2018). *Pulse of the people: Political rap music and black politics*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Carvalho, S. D. (2020). The End of the Oppression of Indigenous Peoples under Capitalism? Bolivia under the Morales Government. *Latin American Perspectives*, 47(4), 58-75. doi:10.1177/0094582x20920271
- Crabtree, J., & Chaplin, A. (2013). *Bolivia processes of change*. London: Zed Books.
- Dahm, A. N. (2017). *"I See No Changes" Exploring Mass Incarceration in the United States Through Tupac Shakur's Lyricism: A Decolonial Approach* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Freie Universität Berlin.
- Dangl, B. (2006). Rapping in Aymara: Bolivian Hip Hop as an Instrument of Struggle. *Upside Down World*. Retrieved from <http://upside-downworld.org/archives/bolivia/rapping-in-aymara-bolivian-hip-hop-as-an-instrument-of-struggle/>
- Edwards, W. (2002). From poetry to rap; The Lyrics of Tupac Shakur. *Western Journal of Black Studies*, 26(2), 61-70.
- Fanon, F. (1952). *Black Skin, White Masks (Peau Noire, Masques Blancs)*. France: Éditions du Seuil.

(3) Translation: "Children of Cholos". MC Marcelo "El Cholo" Yáñez was regarded as the first of the urban indigenous artists to progress a decolonial agenda.

- Goodale, M. (2006). Reclaiming modernity: Indigenous cosmopolitanism and the coming of the second revolution in Bolivia. *American Ethnologist*, 33(4), 634-649. doi:10.1525/ae.2006.33.4.634
- Haynes, N. (2012, May 13). Wayna rap. Retrieved from <http://www.nellhaynes.com/fieldnotes/wayna-a-rap>
- Hornberger, N. H., & Swinehart, K. F. (2012). Bilingual intercultural education and Andean hip hop: Transnational sites for indigenous language and identity. *Language in Society*, 41(4), 499-525. doi:10.1017/s0047404512000486
- Kopano, B. N. (2002). Rap Music as an Extension of the Black Rhetoric Tradition: "Keepin' it Real". *Western Journal of Black Studies*, Winter 2002(26), 4th ser., 204-214.
- Librado, D. (2010). An Instrument of Resistance: Rap Music and Hip-Hop Culture in El Alto, Bolivia. Retrieved August 13, 2020, from <http://hdl.handle.net/1807/24502>
- Motavalli, Z. (2019). *The Voice of the Voiceless: The use of African American Vernacular English and linguistic discourses in Tupac Shakur's Changes* (Doctoral dissertation, University West, 2019). Trollhättan, Sweden: University West Press.
- Nisker, J. (2007). "Only God Can Judge Me": Tupac Shakur, the Legal System, and Lyrical Subversion. *Journal of Criminal Justice and Popular Culture*, 14(1), 176-196.
- Pojman, A. (2007). Unmasking the Voice of Young Shoe Shiners in La Paz. *New Glocal Times*, (8).
- Pough, G. D. (2004). *Check it while I wreck it black womanhood, hip-hop culture, and the public sphere*. Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press.
- Renzy. (2011). Bolivian Hip-Hop Artist, Renzy, in conversation with Rocio Ramírez Ballivian & Linda Herrera [Interview by R. R. Ballivian & L. Herrera].
- Sajani, D. (2013). Troubling the Trope of "Rapper as Modern Griot". *The Journal of Pan-African Studies*, 6, 156.
- Stefanoni, P. (2007, March). Rap Aymara: Música de Protesta y Propuesta. *Diario Clarín*.
- Steiner, B. D., & Argothy, V. (2001). White addiction: Racial inequality, racial ideology, and the war on drugs. *Temple Political & Civil Rights Law Review*, 10, 443-475.
- Swinehart, K. F. (2012). Ayllu on the Airwaves: Rap, Reform, & Redemption on Aymara National Radio. Retrieved August 13, 2020, from <https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/585>.
- Swinehart, K. F. (2012). Tupac in their Veins: Hip-Hop Alteño and the Semiotics of Urban Indigeneity. *Arizona Journal of Hispanic Cultural Studies*, 16(1), 79-96. doi:10.1353/hcs.2012.0030
- Wayna Rap. "Chamakart Sartasiry." Bolivia, 2003.
- Webber, J. R. (2011). *Rebellion and reform in Bolivia: Class struggle, indigenous liberation, and the politics of Evo Morales*. Chicago, IL: Haymarket.
- Wright, A. (1997). Tupac Shakur. *New York*. 2Pac. "Changes." *Greatest Hits*, Deon Evans, Interscope, USA, 13 Oct. 1998.

# WHAT HAS INCREASED DE-GLOBALISED FRENCH SENTIMENT IN THE LAST DECADE AND WHAT IMPACT WILL THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC HAVE ON IT?

BY GEMMA DEFTEREOS

BCOM/BGLOBALST: ECONOMICS AND COMMERCIAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND BUSINESS, EUROPE, FRENCH

## Abstract:

The “de-globalisation” or “anti-globalist” phenomenon seems an unlikely possibility given the unprecedented stages of globalisation today. However, the long standing global institutions which have fostered decades of economic, societal and political integration are beginning to falter under the pressures of a dark horse called de-globalisation. Over the last decade, a series of global crises have exposed nations to economic, security, and public health threats, consequently inducing a realisation of globalisation’s inherent weaknesses. This has spurred on a sense of societal pessimism with the status quo, thus creating increased support for nation state autonomy and less global integration. For the purposes of this study, France has been considered to take the international lead against the spread of globalisation, therefore becoming a prime example of how de-globalised aspects are advocated and employed. In this paper, the theory of de-globalisation will be discussed in the modern French context, explaining first its existence within France and then how global crises of the last decade have prompted anti-globalist mentalities. This paper will conclude with an analysis into the COVID-19 pandemic and will evaluate whether or not it has the potential to increase de-globalised French sentiment.

## Introduction:

Over time, our world has reaped the benefits of integrated global systems like immigration, technological progress, and economic unions. However, in the recent decade, trade and financial integration has slowed and

protectionist and nationalist policies have become more prominent (Van Goubergen & Hove, 2020). This shift away from globalised systems is suspected to be a result of the rapid progression of globalisation itself (Darvas, 2020). The question therefore arises as to why globalisation has become its own deterrent. For the purposes of this study, the de-globalisation phenomenon will be localised onto French society and analysed in accordance with three main objectives. Firstly, an explanation will be provided into the de-globalised existence within France by using the theories of populism, realism, nationalism and protectionism to explain how de-globalisation has become a reality. The second objective is to address the reasons why de-globalised French sentiment has risen to its current levels. This will be achieved by discussing global crises of the Great Recession (2008), the Greek-Debt Crisis (2009), and the Refugee Crisis (2015), which consequently have convinced a significant portion of French civilians that globalisation threatens their economic stability and proud cultural identity. Thirdly, the COVID-19 pandemic will be analysed in terms of its ability to increase de-globalised French sentiment. This seems to be a likely proposition as the hyper-connectivity of the world has been blamed for the pandemic’s rapid spread and adverse impacts (Irwin, 2020). Evidently, global crises which have been created by globalisation itself have shaken up the integrated fabric of the world and thus has provided anti-globalists with opportunities to further their rationale for de-globalisation.

## Design, Methodology and Approach:

The use of secondary sources, in terms of contextual and

---

---

theoretical literature, has been applied to address all three objectives. Evidence has also been accompanied by media articles and statistical databases which mainly contain government polling and survey statistics. To avoid bias of sources an extensive range of research was collected, consisting of interdisciplinary study to verify concepts and statements between articles. The scope of the research contains an evaluation of global crises between 2008 to 2020 and will be localised onto French society. The discussion of recent events has a risk of becoming inaccurate due to the fluidity of the current circumstances in the wake of a crisis. Therefore, assumptions and considerations made in this paper are strictly based on events leading up to May 2021.

Globalisation will be defined as increasing interdependence and integration by nations toward a world society (Kim et al., 2020). Examples discussed will include the European Union as an entity, the Eurozone and the free movement within the Schengen Area. De-globalisation will therefore be defined as the process of diminishing interdependence and integration between nation states (Kim et al., 2020). Examples will include Brexit, the demand for less immigration, increased border security and greater nation state autonomy. Therefore, the relationship between globalisation and de-globalisation will be analysed through social, economic, and political indexes.

### **Objective 1: Defining de-Globalisation and Its Existence Within France**

#### **Globalisation Versus De-Globalisation**

The interaction between capitalism and technological innovation has been considered to be the foundation of modern-day globalisation. However, such integration could not have been achieved without the use of distinctive political and industrial architecture (Zámborský, 2019). This was evident through the use of the French political term “laissez-faire”, translating to “allow to do”, as it enabled governments at the end of the 19th century to create integration-motivated policies of private entrepreneurship and free trade, thus ultimately

contributing to the expansion of a world economy. However, global crises of World War I (1914–1919) and later the Great Depression (1929–1939) highlighted the involuntary consequences and obligations of global dependency, giving rise to hesitant and reluctant attitudes towards further integration. Nations therefore began focusing inwardly to protect their economies by establishing trade tariffs and nationalising public works like mines, railways, and power stations (Dreher et al., 2008). However, such nationalism proved to be a double-edged sword as although it prioritised the welfare of citizens, it also enhanced the onset of World War II (1939–1945). Following this, international cooperation was soon realised to be essential in minimising the chances of another world war. Binding nations economically was expected to generate greater unitary peace as collaboration would serve to complement what lacked in one but benefited the other (Scuira, 2017). Examples of successful post-war global cooperation, which are still evident today, include the United Nations (1945), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (1949), and the European Coal and Steel Community (1952) which is now known as the European Union (EU) since 1993.

Over time, the EU’s policies have progressed towards unprecedented stages of integration such as the free movement of people in the Schengen Area, the shared Euro currency, and the expansion of obligations member governments are expected to comply with, such as refugee quotas. With the emergence today of anti-globalist movements within Europe, there is a likelihood that such advanced stages of globalisation enacted by the EU have in fact become a catalyst for a de-globalised societal and political backlash. Therefore, what may have been early, unquestioned enthusiasm for globalisation has now been supplanted by genuine concerns about further integration (Dreher et al., 2008).

De-globalisation is now perceived by many as a distinct possibility. Liberalists predict it will induce a patchwork of economic linkages amongst the willing countries while

---



realists predict economic blocs around major countries (Zámborský, 2019). Regardless of its form, the more pressing question concerns whether de-globalisation is a progressive or temporary state. The “pendulum theory” is often considered as a way of defining eras of globalisation. It suggests that globalisation moves through phases of liberalisation, followed by rejection and the reimposition of controls (Zámborský, 2019). According to this theory, de-globalisation is simply a weaker, temporary phase of globalisation. Although this may be true, the research in this paper has proved the contrary, supporting the idea that de-globalisation is more of a progressive state as various global crises have over time created more momentum for the lingering de-globalised sentiment. To provide further explanation into the de-globalisation phenomenon, existing anti-globalist theories of populism, nationalism, protectionism, and realism will be discussed. These theories will be examined in the context of modern France to further explore the existence of de-globalised sentiments and the impacts.

**Populism:**

Populists perceive the role of the state to solely serve the general will of the people. However, as it stands, populists are viewing the “political elite” to be an oligarchy and separate “caste” while simultaneously claiming to represent the ordinary people (Ivaldi, 2019). This has resonated a sense of societal pessimism amongst populists as this feeling of displacement and misrepresentation by mainstream politics, media and global establishments has left citizens to feel forgotten by their state. Therefore, the populist movement has been praised for their role in voicing the opinions of the forgotten masses of ordinary people (Canovan, 2004). Additionally, populism is a somewhat nostalgic ideology which also explains its apparent pessimistic character towards globalised progression (Zámborský, 2019). Populists have therefore attributed their grievances towards increased globalisation, perceiving it as the cause for the changing times which is leaving “ordinary people” behind.

One of the longest standing populist cases in Europe is considered to be France’s Front National Party (FN) led by Marine Le Pen, which was rebranded to Rassemblement National in 2018. The majority of populist support in France resides in regions known as “peripheral France”, who evidently have felt the most vulnerable to globalised job insecurities, political misrepresentations and lost national identities as a result of globalisation (Beard, 2017). Therefore, one of the more prominent grievances of globalisation from which the FN gains support is immigration. The French and Europeans in general take great pride in their nationality, including their cultural values, religions, and languages. Therefore, when other customs are practiced in their “territory”, it can be viewed as offensive and a refusal to assimilate. This is supported by 2017 statistics which recorded 51% of FN supporters as believing Muslims in France did not want to adjust to French customs, resulting in a negative attitude towards them (Wike, 2017). Additionally, immigration has been blamed for the Paris terrorist attacks of 2015 and 2016, which have without a doubt exacerbated French non-Muslim–Muslim tensions and altered political affiliation. Research conducted in France proved that terrorism does prompt shifts towards support for right-wing authoritarian policies regarding security measures (Boyer, 2019). Critics therefore claim that the FN has framed Muslims unreasonably, which has increased hostility and suspicion towards them. This has created the argument that the FN has risen to prominence based on sentiments of xenophobia and Islamophobia (Boyer, 2019). However, populists remain in strong belief that to some degree, the large Muslim population pose a realistic threat to job security, French republicanism, and French cultural identity. The French 2017 polls proved as such with 75% of FN supporters having perceived refugees as triggers for increased terrorism, alongside 82% of whom believed refugees took away jobs and social benefits that belonged to French nationals (Wike, 2017). Therefore, in order to address populists’ concerns, the FN positions itself upon a nationalistic platform, advocating to restrict immigration, re-negotiate all current

---

EU–French agreements, increase border security, and leave the Euro (France 24, 2014).

Today, active and retired French soldiers and generals have written two open letters to President Emmanuel Macron warning of growing Islamism, delinquency, and violence to be threatening France’s very survival. Although Macron condemned the letters for “defying the principles of the republic”, a poll suggests that the majority of French civilians are in support of these letters (Bryant, 2021). These recent events that potentially threaten a civil war, in addition to the stringent measures of COVID-19 discussed later, have a likely probability of significantly increasing the support for the FN party in the 2022 elections, especially as the 2017 polls already showed 45% in support of populist parties collectively (Ivaldi, 2019). Politico has predicted that the FN will surpass the current La République en Marche party in the next elections by 27% to 24% (Politico, 2021).

**Nationalism:**

Nationalism represents isolation, fragmentation, and localisation between nation states (Sabanadze, 2010). It is closely linked to the populist ideology in the sense of losing a cultural identity due to international unions and open borders. Nationalism can therefore be considered to have influenced the Brexit referendum, first introduced in 2016.

The EU has proved to be a difficult system to sustain as it constantly faces cultural differences, uneven economies, technological discrepancy, regionalism, language barriers, and racial segregation (Scuira, 2017). An example of how these factors have restricted successful integration was when the Eastern European countries joined the Union. The West’s cutting edge technological products had overtaken Eastern markets, causing their own to become obsolete and thus resulting in masses of unemployed Eastern Europeans migrating to the West. This process of displacement enhanced the pre-existent disparities between the levels of societal, technological, and

economic progression. Therefore, in an attempt to align objectives, the EU has made it a requirement for member states to place some of their national objectives second behind the Union’s like in the instance of accepting refugee quotas (Scuira, 2017). Not only did such austerity politics have an influence on Brexit, but so did the feeling of alienation and abandonment by the Union. By exiting the Union, Britain could prioritise their citizens and no longer be subject to the EU’s authority to conduct more than 60% of Britain’s legal decisions. Britain’s persistence in rejecting the Euro and preserving the British pound was just one example of their reluctance to give up aspects of their national sovereignty (Scuira, 2017).

The sovereignty ideals which motivated Brexit have seemingly opened the floodgates for the separatist nationalist who has arguably been lying in the roots of European culture. Evidently, 61% of French people in one poll in 2017 answered that the EU was unfavourable to their interests (Wike, 2017), making France the least content with globalisation out of the six largest EU countries (Darvas, 2019). Therefore, the introduction of “Frexit” at the French presidential elections in 2017 encouraged the popularity of underdog candidates and thus amounted to a re-composition of the French political landscape (Malgouyres & Mazet-Sonilhac, 2017). Other member states following in the “exit” footsteps involve the proposal of Netherlands’ “Nexit”, Italy’s “Ixit”, and Austria’s “Auxit” (Scuira, 2017) which further suggests that the de-globalised movement is a global one.

**Realism:**

Realism is understood to be a “timeless theory” as it seems to persist throughout human history. It assumes that human behaviour is essentially egoistic and desiring of power. This results in the inability to trust others and therefore focuses on building the nation state to be the principal actor in international relations. The theory also suggests that there is no established hierarchy internationally, therefore realists believe they can only

---

rationally rely on themselves (Antunes & Camisão, 2018). Realism typically arises in times of crisis as it enables the state to independently monitor economic security, allocate the flow of resources, and manage domestic conflicts accordingly (Zehra, 2011).

French political culture is essentially rooted in the realist idea of an omniscient and omnipotent state. Since the liberalisation stemming from the French Revolution in the 18th century, France has been accustomed to relying on the state for entrepreneurship, political leadership, and economic support. Globalisation, therefore, threatens this political structure because it bypasses the state's authority and gives more responsibilities to unions and private actors (Meunier, 1999).

Realism will likely have more of a palpable presence after the COVID-19 pandemic. As part of the EU's recovery plan, there is expected to be some form of debt mutualisation whereby member states will be expected to contribute to an EU bailout fund (Napier, 2020). In a recovery plan proposed by France and Germany, the provision of these bailout funds is not considered to be loans but budgetary expenditure. They would be sourced by borrowing money through financial markets which would essentially require borrowing the maximum amount that can be called on by member nations (Bayer et al., 2020). There are two main problems with this. Firstly, the EU's borrowing would require repayment to those financial markets it has sourced from, therefore incurring a heavy burden of principal and interest back onto nations, especially France and Germany who are understood to be the most important for EU financial support. Secondly, EU funds will likely incur unequal distributions as bailouts will only be provided to regions and corporations most affected. Therefore, for some nations like France and Germany, a significant portion of their contributions will be granted to other nations' corporations. This essentially submits them to the EU's centralised control which would dictate France's spending decisions (Napier, 2020) As the EU has enacted centralised control, nations will naturally

question its authority due to the inequalities of distribution and repayment that would occur. From a realist point of view, states would rather have their contributions going towards their own welfare.

Furthermore, France is also "much too big to save" in the sense that not even EU funds can help reduce its drastically high debt to GDP ratio of 116%. France is not the only one in this position as Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Cyprus all have much higher debt ratios and when compared with nations like Estonia, Bulgaria, and Luxembourg, which have ratios of less than 40%, the stability of the EU's single market is bound to falter (Statista, 2020). This is because the variance in debt ratios adds to the multiple disparities between member states, further reinforcing the notion that uniform EU policies are not sufficient to meet independent nations' needs. With this understanding, central banks of each member state may adopt more appropriate national policies for funding their own economic recoveries and reducing their record high debt-to-GDP ratios. When this realism shift becomes necessary, the Euro will exist merely as a name (Napier, 2020).

#### **Protectionism:**

The Great Recession has given rise to a 'New Protectionism,' which supports policies in favour of government interventionism and against free markets. Government intervention thus far has become more prominent in domestic policies like subsidies and bailouts (Erixon & Sally, 2010). Protectionism also takes the form of "Global Protectionism" which has proved more popular than economic protectionism because it focuses more broadly on border security and the collective safeguarding of national identities, employment, and limits to immigration (Meunier, 1999).

The dominant political debate within France focuses on how much control France should retain over its borders. As a result, France has effectively taken the international lead in opposing globalisation with a protectionist

---

weapon. Globalisation poses challenges for France because it directly threatens the dirigiste traditions of the French, which is defined as having control over its economy and society. It further irritates the French's proud sense of culture as globalisation is largely influenced by American culture, which is seen to compromise French traditions and identity (Meunier & Gordon, 2002). Therefore, in reacting against globalisation, many in France are reacting to the collapse of their political traditions in favour of a foreign system (Meunier, 1999). This explains why French sheep farmer José Bové had been idolised for dismantling a French McDonald's site in 1999. This was done to protest the uncontrolled spread of market liberalism, globalisation, and American imperialist capitalism. His response was praised by both sides of the French political spectrum resulting in a popular appeal for the anti-globalist theme (Northcutt, 2003). The concern with protectionism, however, is that the French economy operates under so many international constraints that it seems that France no longer has an option of retreating from international competition behind protected borders (Meunier, 1999). Nevertheless, integration with the EU and the world has appeared to act as a trigger for the protectionist debate, further reinforcing the notion that globalisation is its own deterrent.

## **Objective 2: Determining What Has Caused Increased de-Globalised Sentiment in France on the Societal / National Level**

### **The Great Recession (2008)**

The "fourth era of globalisation" titled as "liberalisation" lasted from 1980 to 2008. This era witnessed economic integration rise to unprecedented levels, with developing countries dismantling their trade barriers and the Soviet bloc in East Germany moving towards democracy. More significantly, changes in technology had led to improvements in information and communication, thereby strengthening integration and resulting in the creation of a global supply chain. However, this era reached its peak in 2008 and drastically shifted towards a newer era called

"slowbalisation". As measured by trade flows, the Great Recession resulted in the world trade to GDP ratio dropping significantly and faltering ever since (Irwin, 2020). Due to these diminishing growth rates, various scholars came to the conclusion that de-globalisation was a distinct possibility. Martin Wolf, a chief economic advisor of the Financial Times, said an "ideological God" had failed when referring to globalisation, claiming that the legitimacy of the market would weaken, globalisation itself would flounder, and the integration of the very depended-upon global economy might be reversed. This is due to the assumption that globalisation is a choice, therefore the globalisation process could be reversed by the policies adopted at each moment. Furthermore, globalisation does not depend solely on the financial system, but in a modern economy it acts as a nervous system, so a dysfunctional financial system can lead to the collapse of much of the world's economy, as seen in the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (Canals, 2009).

The Great Recession in France was argued to have caused its economic collapse, however, due to its limited reliance on exports and lack of regulation on financial markets (Dumoulin, 2009), France was able to avoid a more severe recession. Its relatively quick recovery can also be attributed to the government's timely and decisive interventions, together with its fairly resilient financial sector which had large social safety nets (De Vrijer & Xiao, 2010). In saying this, France did not escape the recession completely as public debt became a serious concern in the wake of the crisis. By 2009, France's public debt as a percentage of GDP was 97.6% (Statista, 2018). At this point, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had strongly recommended a well-designed fiscal consolidation plan so that public finances could reach a sustainable path (De Vrijer & Xiao, 2010). Unfortunately, since the crisis, France has suffered from a steady increase in its debt-to-GDP ratio, levelling at 116% in 2020 (Statista, 2021) and estimated by Goldman Sachs to remain at this high level until 2024 (Amaro, 2021).

---

Measures France had taken to reduce public debt had negative impacts on the welfare of its citizens. Cutting public debt required a sharp decrease in public spending. As such, the government did not renew some aspects of support given to the economy during this downturn. Over a six-year period, pension reforms were proposed which would increase the retirement age from 60 to 62, the full pension benefit recipient age from 65 to 67, and the number of years of work required to receive a full pension benefit from 40 to 41 years. Therefore, in order to be eligible for the full pension, a new financial incentive scheme was implemented which aimed at encouraging companies to hire some unemployed workers aged over 55. Additionally, the government was looking to phase out pension privileges for civil servants and social contributions would be afforded to those in the private sector. In terms of institutional reforms, local authorities' expenditure was to be controlled, as well as the management of healthcare expenditure (OECD, 2011). Due to these structural shifts in economic reform, a significant strain was placed upon French people's livelihoods which introduced the idea of a "new nationalism" (Roubini, 2014). This phenomenon was experienced by other nations too as the rapid international transmission of the Recession was believed to have been facilitated by globalisation's financial integration (Canals, 2009). This led to the increased use of protectionist policies such as trade barriers, increased favour for domestic workers and firms, anti-immigration measures, and increased monitoring of foreign direct investment (Roubini, 2014).

It has therefore become evident that populist advocates not only in France but throughout Europe took advantage of the prolonged and stringent recovery measures to further their ideology and blame the inequities of the recession on the globalised economy, foreign trade, and foreign workers (Roubini, 2014). The consequences of the Great Recession have indeed created a reluctant attitude towards interdependence, and such confidence has not fully recovered (Canals, 2009). The post-recession period

therefore marks the beginning of increased anti-globalist French sentiment.

### **The Greek Debt Crisis (2009)**

France was Greece's most powerful ally during the crisis; however this support was likely driven by France's own insecurities about its future as an EU member (Bryant, 2015). France and Germany were in opposition over the idea of "Grexit" which tested the powerful France-German alliance. The diverging of this alliance presented signs of undermining unity over where Europe was headed. As a result, a French survey showed almost two-thirds of those polled believed the EU was heading in the wrong direction (Baker & Melin, 2013) which created a situation of uncertainty and distrust.

Second to Germany, France was most exposed to the potential default of Greek debt, facing a possible €65 billion loss. In addition, France's unemployment rate was double that of Germany, it had a much slower growth rate and their socialist government at the time was reluctant to make any radical economic reforms which were seen as essential for France's domestic welfare. The combined effect of all these factors put France in no position to cope with uncertainty like Germany could. This is partly why France was so determined to keep Greece in the EU. "We must be at the side of the Greeks, ensuring that the Eurozone we belong to is protected", French president at the time Francois Hollande said (Bryant, 2015). Greece is evidently still reliant on France for maintaining negotiations with bailout lenders to help prevent them from defaulting (Gatopoulos & Becatoros, 2017).

However, former French president Nicolas Sarkozy had opposed Hollande's stance, claiming that the real question was about how to protect the Eurozone from a Greek disaster, not simply protecting Greece. Another key opposer was Marine Le Pen who said it was expected for French taxpayers to have to throw billions of euros into the bonfire of Greek debt, calling out Hollande for lying when he had said the Greek bailout deal was going to be

---

painless for France (Bryant, 2015). A survey taken in 2013 indicated that the opposition's message was well-received, as more than half of the French public disapproved of Hollande's leadership during the crisis (Baker & Melin, 2013). In saying this, there still remained a portion of French citizens who believed Greece should remain in the Eurozone, but also opposed the provision of further concessions as they doubted Greece's ability to fully repay their debts. In a 2012 poll, France, the UK, and Germany had ranked Greece as having the least hard-working population, and second behind Italy for being the most corrupt in the Eurozone (Pavlakis, 2013). This further weakened the EU's solidarity principles as a negative stigma was placed on Greece, restricting further collaboration.

The mindset lingering behind French attitudes was that if Greece left, then France would likely be next (Bryant, 2015). This is because France was experiencing increased disillusionment with the EU as it already faced rising unemployment and slumping growth rates since the Great Recession. It therefore became clear that the French were losing confidence in globalisation and growing more insecure in their position as an EU member. This had opened the doors for the possibility of leaving the Eurozone with 34% expressing a willingness to exit in 2013, as focusing on national concerns became increasingly more desirable (Baker & Melin, 2013). The Greek Debt Crisis has seemingly built upon the growing de-globalised French sentiment as it had emphasised the growing disparities over the "Frexit" possibility and the risks France faces as an EU member.

### **The Refugee Crisis (2015)**

It is said that no single state of affairs may represent a "crisis" in and of itself, but any situation can become one if social actors interpret its consequences as such. This is what happened in the migrant crisis (Gattinara & Zamponi, 2020).

The populist mentality is largely influenced by increased

levels of migration. Critics of populism believe government representatives have taken advantage of people's nationalist propensity by nurturing a xenophobic sentiment in the population. Populists argue, however, that given citizens are the true hosts of foreign nationals, it should be up to citizens to decide whether or not to welcome immigrants. Britain followed such ideals with the enforcement of a "loyalty pledge" which is intended to signal to immigrants the standards they are meant to embody so as to avoid cultural tensions. George Soros, a Hungarian-born billionaire investor and philanthropist had argued that the "European migration crisis and the Brexit debate fed on each other. Therefore, the 'leave' campaign [experienced throughout Europe, had] exploited the deteriorating refugee situation" (Scuire, 2017).

In 2015, migration took on unprecedented levels with some one million people arriving in Europe. German Chancellor Angela Merkel had supposedly risked her chancellorship by granting asylum to 900,000 refugees (France 24, 2020). This was viewed as problematic by many nations' citizens and indicated to other European politicians what not to do. Countries like Hungary and Slovenia began building walls to protect their national entry points along migratory routes. This was met with resistance by other member countries like Luxembourg, which had motioned to suspend or even expel Hungary in 2016 for its failure to comply with EU imposed refugee quotas. Europe, which once liberalised the construction of bridges to unite itself had now progressed towards building walls along their borders (Scuire, 2017). Further self-defence mechanisms were created as nations began tightening their controls through limiting refugee rights or raising the bar for granting asylum. Paris had tried to speed up the rejection of requests that had no merit, according to an anonymous French official (France 24, 2020).

The influx of refugees into France placed great strain on places of transit such as the Calais region. Asylum requests grew steadily from 64,000 in 2014 to a record

---

98,000 in 2017, which led to the emergence of additional refugee camps near the train stations of border towns. It is also important to consider the Paris terrorist attacks which were among reasons for insistence that a camp in Calais be cleared when it became over-populated. The estimated 6,000 refugees residing at the camp were relocated to areas which provoked the opposition of citizens living nearby. Evidently, it is the very existence of these campsites which have proved to be the battleground for political discourse within France (Gattinara & Zamponi, 2020).

The material inadequacy of EU governments to cope with exceptional migration flows triggered perceptions of distrust in local administrations, national governments and supranational bodies. Civilians therefore felt driven to take collective action and intervene directly. Within France, one such group focused on solidarity with asylum seekers and provided food and blankets to various campsites. This was because the group believed that Europe was facing a crisis due to the lack of welcoming policies, not because of the influx of migrants. Therefore, governments were accused of having created an emergency that they were not able to solve. This is why these “solidarity” activists, as they became known, felt the need to intervene (Gattinara & Zamponi, 2020).

An opposing view comes from the “anti-refugee” collective which largely focuses on security concerns by carrying out small vigilante walks and occasional night watches. These types of groups, notably the Calaisiens en Colère, claimed their activities were complementary to those of the police, motivated by the urge to protect fellow citizens from the security threat and criminality posed by migrants. These groups not only support a halt to immigration but also an encouragement for new arrivals to return to their own countries. The same rationale appears in the “Defend Europe” campaign run by the French Génération Identitaire group which is present in other European countries too. Defend Europe is driven by their belief in the need to act “here and now” by engaging on

behalf of law enforcement to offer services that the state seems unwilling or unable to fulfil. For example, Defend Europe once located itself on the French Alps in 2018, where they deployed rented helicopters and about 1,000 activists who erected a makeshift barrier acting as a temporary checkpoint, and patrolled the area. The French Identitarians claimed that their actions triggered the reaction of national governments (Gattinara & Zamponi, 2020). French Prime Minister at the time Manuel Valls realised that Europe was grappling with the worst refugee crisis since World War I and claimed that Europe had been stretched to its limits. He said Europe could not possibly take in any more refugees given the risk of destabilising its communities (Reuters, 2015). Other nations reacted similarly to France in rejecting the EU’s refugee quotas, claiming it should be more of a domestic decision. These nations included the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Hungary, and Lithuania (Maurice, 2015). In 2019, France had continued to resist migrant inflows, as concerns persisted surrounding immigration and terrorism. Measures taken involved cutting medical care for those without rights to stay and the clearance of migrant camps in north-eastern Paris, all with the motivation for retaining national sovereignty (BBC, 2019). The refugee crisis has therefore provided for increased rationales for de-globalised sentiment with the implementation of border controls and the reinstatement of increased national autonomy. It is therefore clear that the migration crisis has laid bare the structural and political divisions within Europe, significantly weakening the Schengen Area.

### **Objective 3: Identifying the Potential for COVID-19 to Contribute to the Increased de-Globalised French Sentiment**

Bill Gates, the co-founder of Microsoft, had referred to the COVID-19 pandemic as a “world war” that would have the ability to bring nations together for a common cause. However, the global response turned out to be one of international competition rather than cooperation (Gvosdev, 2020). This was because the severity of the

---

crisis caused nations to compete for essential medical equipment by securing supplies through export protectionism and trade prohibitions. This has been coined “medical nationalism” which, alongside “food nationalism” and “economic nationalism”, has become a prominent form of nationalism during the crisis of the pandemic. In early 2020, France exemplified such medical nationalism by requisitioning stocks of FFP2-type masks and further expanding its list of drugs covered by export restrictions. This was at a time when Italy was in dire need of supplies; therefore, although such nationalism may appear selfish, it may be considered essential when a crisis has just as much potential to threaten one nation as it does another. As German Interior Minister Horst Seehofer had acknowledged, the pandemic was not just a health crisis but also a national security one. Therefore, national governments should ensure the security of their borders, food supply, and medical products in order to suffice for their regional needs (Wang, 2021).

“Economic nationalism” has also arisen due to the pandemic’s lockdown measures, consequently bringing the EU single market to a standstill. Due to the pandemic’s disruption of trade and investment flows, the market had faced its sharpest decline in GDP since the Great Recession, a decline of 3.6%, thus predictions have been made for a record fall in GDP and increased unemployment rates. The highest decline in GDP amongst member states was in France and Italy at 5.3% (Wang, 2021). Macron had warned that the Euro, and possibly the EU itself, has the potential to collapse if an institutional framework is not created to support pandemic-stricken economies (Napier, 2020). However as discussed in the above section defining realism, such a centralised institutional framework can impose powerful rationales for the realist state.

Another form of nationalism which has emerged from the pandemic is “food nationalism” which is the imposition of trade restrictions on foodstuffs to promote “patriotic eating” and local production. France’s Agriculture

Minister Marie-Claude Bibeau had called for agricultural patriotism, encouraging citizens to buy French cheese, strawberries, and tomatoes over imported ones (Wang, 2021).

The prospect of the COVID-19 pandemic creating a world that is less free, open, and prosperous is becoming realised, further reinforcing the existing trend towards economic nationalism and protectionism (Wang, 2021). Macron stated that it was becoming clear that “this type of globalisation was reaching the end of its cycle”, indicating that the pandemic was going to cause significant change to the status quo. Given that the crisis had exposed vulnerabilities of globalisation both through transmission of and recoveries from the virus, trusting in an international power to guarantee national security and prosperity is becoming an increasingly risky proposition (Irwin, 2020). Therefore, as other crises have shown, therein lies a motivation for nations to establish self-sufficiency measures to protect against future adverse events. Examples of such measures post-pandemic include European nations implementing stronger screening processes for foreign investment, safeguarding industries from foreign takeovers, and nationalising industrial policies (Wang, 2021). Concerns have arisen as to whether EU member states will become more tribal, more narrow-minded, and more anti-globalised after their recoveries. It is possible that nationalists will use the political uncertainty to their advantage by furthering their ideals of greater protectionism and national autonomy (Wang, 2021). In a more protectionist post COVID-19 environment, Europe will face two main problems. One will involve increased efforts for creating ambitious financial measures to stimulate and rescue their regional economies. The second will be to face the rise of eurosceptic populism and nationalist movements provoked by a more authoritative EU and the introduction of mutualised debts (Wang, 2021).

**Conclusion:**

It has become evident that the possibility of de-

---



globalisation is a very real one, not only within France but throughout Europe and the world. The existence of de-globalisation within France is apparent through the FN party's policies, Frexit, resistance to immigration, and to the EU's centralised control which bypasses the state. Furthermore, the proud cultural identity of French people and dirigiste traditions create high standards for cultural assimilation, therefore making it more difficult to globally integrate. France's increased anti-globalised sentiment has been attributed to the series of global crises of the recent decade, which emphasised the weaknesses of globalisation and sparked a rejection of integrated political and economic systems that exist today. The COVID-19 pandemic has certainly contributed to the anti-globalist movement as it has proved once again that hyper-connectivity has been detrimental to individual livelihoods and national welfare.

This paper has suggested that increased levels of globalisation has initiated anti-globalist political and societal backlashes, therefore it may be beneficial to seek some balance between international cooperation and national sovereignty. For example, globalised flows could be better moderated so that refugee camps are effectively controlled, migration could reach more manageable levels, security measures could be better enhanced, and national cultures could be more celebrated. It is apparent that in accordance with populist ideology, national sovereignty is becoming idle in a globalised world and there is a need to re-establish nationhood and pride. This is particularly evident amongst European states which possess a long-standing history and cultural heritage that is arguably being forgotten amongst a sea of multiculturalism, refugee quotas, and international unions. Naturally, there is a desire for host cultures to be recognised proudly and represented as such within their own nation.

The correlation between the increased motivation for further integration and the de-globalisation movement in the recent decade suggests that globalisation's progression is its very own deterrent. Therefore, integration is something that cannot be forced or pushed before its time.

If globalisation is persistently forced upon citizens, populism will reach levels that may impose irreversible action upon decades of integration, which is a situation our world does not deserve. The strengthening anti-globalist movements serve as a sign that globalised flows need to be better moderated, otherwise societal and political discourse will continue to stain nations resulting in the EU, alongside other international entities, to become fractured in the process.

---

---

**References:**

- Amaro, S. (2021). *France's debt pile is surprisingly high - but experts aren't worried*. CNBC. <https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/07/frances-debt-pile-is-surprisingly-high-but-experts-arent-worried.html>
- Antunes, S., Camis o, I. (2018). *Introducing Realism in International Relations theory*. E-International Relations. <https://www.e-ir.info/2018/02/27/introducing-realism-in-international-relations-theory/>
- Baker, L., Melin, A. (2013). *Most Europeans, especially the French, unhappy about EU*. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-eu-popularity-poll-idUKBRE9540F620130605>
- Bayer, B., Von Der Burchard, H., Smith-Meyer, B. (2020). *France, Germany propose  500B EU recovery fund*. Politico. <https://www.politico.eu/article/france-germany-propose-e500b-eu-recovery-fund/>
- BBC. (2019). *France 'takes back control' with non-EU migrant quotas*. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50317442>
- Beard, S. (2017). *French voters increasingly question globalisation*. MarketPlace. <https://www.marketplace.org/2017/04/21/french-voters-increasingly-reject-globalization/>
- Boyer, E. (2019). *The Rise of Populism in 21st Century France: Normalising Islamophobia*. *CMC Senior Thesis 2169*, 8 - 12. [https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3277&context=cmc\\_theses](https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3277&context=cmc_theses)
- Bryant, E. (2015). *As Greek crisis lingers, France worries about its own future*. DW: Made for Minds. <https://www.dw.com/en/as-greek-crisis-lingers-france-worries-about-its-own-future/a-18591793>
- Bryant, L. (2021). *Second Open Letter by French Soldiers Warns of Civil Insurrection*. Voice of America. <https://www.voanews.com/europe/second-open-letter-french-soldiers-warns-civil-insurrection>
- Canals, J. (2009). *The multiple faces of globalisation*. BBVA. <https://www.bbvaopenmind.com/en/articles/globalization-after-the-financial-crisis/>
- Canovan, M. (2004). *Populism for political theorists?* *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 9(3), 242. <https://doi-org.ezproxy.auckland.ac.nz/10.1080/1356931042000263500>
- Darvas, Z. (2020). *Resisting deglobalisation: the case of Europe*. *Bruegel, Working Paper*, 2 - 15. <https://www.wita.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/WP-2020-01-Zsolt-Darvas-Resisting-Deglobalization-the-case-of-Europe.pdf>
- De Vrijer, E., Xiao, Y. (2010). *IMF Survey: France: Recovering Well But Public Debt a Challenge*. International Monetary Fund. <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/socar073010a>
- Dreher, A., Gaston, N., Martens, P. (2008). *Measuring Globalisation: Gauging its Consequences*. *Springer Science+Business Media*, 7-9. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-74069-0>
- Dumoulin, E. (2009). *The current financial crisis and its effects on the French economy*. *Mid Sweden University  stersund*, 8 - 18. <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:302360/FULLTEXT01.pdf>
- Erixon, F., Sally, R. (2010). *Trade, Globalisation and emerging protectionism since the crisis*. *Ecipe Working paper*, 2, 6. <https://ecipe.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/trade-globalisation-and-emerging-protectionism-since-the-crisis.pdf>
- France 24. (2020). *Europe still mired in division after migration crisis*. <https://www.france24.com/en/20200830-europe-still-mired-in-division-after-migrant-crisis>
- France 24. (2020). *Five tense years since the 2015 migrant crisis*. <https://www.france24.com/en/20200831-five-tense-years-since-the-2015-migrant-crisis>
- France 24. (2014). *What does France's National Front stand for?* <https://www.france24.com/en/20140528-france-national-front-policy-eu>
- Gatopoulos, D., Becatoros, E. (2017). *Greece seeks France's help on bailout, eyes 2017 bond 'test'*. AP News. <https://apnews.com/article/e90112b820404841b84d2ba9fb302a57>
- Gattinara, P., Zamponi, L. (2020). *Politicising support and opposition to migration in*
-

- France: The EU asylum policy crisis and direct social activism. *Journal of European Integration*, 42(5), 627 - 633.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2020.1792459>
- Gvosdev, N. (2020). *Why the pandemic has revived hard-nosed realism*. World Politics Review. <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/29039/looking-at-the-coronavirus-crisis-through-realist-theory>
- Irwin, D. (2020). *The pandemic adds momentum to the deglobalisation trend*. VoxEU. <https://voxeu.org/article/pandemic-adds-momentum-deglobalisation-trend>
- Ivaldi, G. (2019). Populism Around the World. *Springer Nature Switzerland AG*, 27 - 28.  
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-96758-5>
- Kim, H., Li, P., Lee, Y. (2020). Observations of deglobalisation against globalisation and impacts on global business. *International Trade, Politics and Development*, 4(2), 83.  
<https://doi.org/10.1108/ITPD-05-2020-0067>
- Malgouyres, C., Mazet-Sonilhac, C. (2017). Political Uncertainty, Risk of Frexit and European Sovereign Spreads. *Applied Economic Letters*, 25(14), 1005. <https://doi.org.ezproxy.auckland.ac.nz/10.1080/13504851.2017.1391991>
- Maurice, E. (2015). *France opposes EU migrant quotas*. EU Observer. <https://euobserver.com/political/128730>
- Meunier, S. (1999). France, Globalisation and Global Protectionism. *Princeton University*, 1 - 17.  
<http://aei.pitt.edu/9150/1/Meunier.pdf>
- Meunier, S., Gordon, P. (2002). *The French Economy's adaptation to globalisation has been remarkable*. Brookings. <https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/the-french-economys-adaptation-to-globalization-has-been-remarkable/>
- Napier, R. (2020). *Is France Too Big To Save? The Debt Crisis In The EU*. Briefings for Britain. <https://briefingsforbritain.co.uk/is-france-too-big-to-save-the-debt-crisis-in-the-eu/>
- Northcutt, W. (2003). José Bové vs. McDonald's: The Making of a National Hero in the French Anti-Globalisation Movement. *Journal of the Western Society for French History*, 31. <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/w/wsfh/0642292.0031.020/--jose-bove-vs-mcdonalds-the-making-of-a-national-hero?rgn=main;view=fulltext>
- OECD. (2011). Country Notes: France. *OECD*, 108 - 113.  
<https://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/47840767.pdf>
- Pavlakis, E. (2013). European Disintegration: Anti-Greek Bias in the Eurozone Crisis. *CUREJ: Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal*, 55 - 56.  
<https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1197&context=curej>
- Politico. (2021). *Poll of Polls*. <https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/france/>
- Reuters. (2015). *French PM Valls says 'no room for more refugees' in Europe*. <https://www.france24.com/en/20151125-france-manuel-valls-refugees-migrants-europe>
- Roubini, N. (2014). *Economic insecurity and the rise of nationalism*. The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/business/economics-blog/2014/jun/02/economic-insecurity-nationalism-on-the-rise-globalisation-nouriel-roubini>
- Sabanadze, N. (2010). *Globalisation and Nationalism. The Cases of Georgia and the Basque Country*. (Central European University Press). <https://books.openedition.org/ceup/570?lang=en>
- Scuire, L. (2017). Brexit Beyond Borders: Beginning of the EU Collapse and Return to Nationalism. *Journal of International Affairs*, 70(2), 10 - 121.  
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/90012623.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A48071946eb04cca398c6d341c08c6238>
- Statista. (2020). *National Debt in EU countries in the 3rd quarter 2020 in relation to gross domestic product*. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/269684/national-debt-in-eu-countries-in-relation-to-gross-domestic-product-gdp/>
- Statista. (2018). *Public Debt of France from 2004 - 2018*. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/460149/public-debt-france/>

- Van Goubergen, J., Hove, J. (2020). *The future of (de)globalisation; Challenges for international trade in pre- and post-corona times*. KBC Economics.  
<https://www.kbc.com/en/economics/publications/the-future-of-deglobalisation.html>
- Wang, Z. (2021). From Crisis to Nationalism? *PMC Open Access Subset*.  
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111-020-00169-8>
- Wike, R. (2017). *5 charts showing where France's National Front draws its support*. Pew Research Centre.  
<https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/21/5-charts-showing-where-frances-national-front-draws-its-support/>
- Zámborský, P. (2019). De-globalisation, populism, and the future of Europe. *New Zealand Journal of Research on Europe*, 13(1), 4-8.  
[https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Peter\\_Zamborsky/publication/336881898\\_De-globalisation\\_populism\\_and\\_the\\_future\\_of\\_Europe\\_New\\_Zealand\\_Journal\\_of\\_Research\\_on\\_Europe\\_131\\_pp\\_1-14/links/5e266596a6fdcc38d24dfbc2/De-globalisation-populism-and-the-future-of-Europe-New-Zealand-Journal-of-Research-on-Europe-131-pp-1-14.pdf](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Peter_Zamborsky/publication/336881898_De-globalisation_populism_and_the_future_of_Europe_New_Zealand_Journal_of_Research_on_Europe_131_pp_1-14/links/5e266596a6fdcc38d24dfbc2/De-globalisation-populism-and-the-future-of-Europe-New-Zealand-Journal-of-Research-on-Europe-131-pp-1-14.pdf)
- Zehra, N. (2011). The Realist state and Deglobalisation. *Pluto Journals*, 8(2), 33 - 52.  
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/42909286?seq=1>
-

# FIRST STEPS TOWARDS ALLEVIATING URBAN TRAFFIC CONGESTION – LESSONS FROM TOYAMA AND CURITIBA

BY JERALD YUTAKA CHAN

BGLOBALST: GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT,  
ASIA, JAPANESE

## **Introduction:**

**Urban traffic congestion is a rapidly growing global issue that affects many aspects of urban lifestyles. Areas affected include the city's environmental conditions, economic productivity and social issues surrounding equal urban mobilities and inclusive accessibility to a city's opportunities. This global issue affects a significant proportion of urban residents – from the middle age worker stuck in morning rush-hour traffic to the marginalized groups of society. These marginalised groups include the elderly, children, women and the economically disadvantaged, who have limited access to opportunities within cities due to cities being designed around the automobile. Being stuck in traffic is considered to be a “miserable waste of time” for many (Arnott, Rave & Schöb, 2005), while others think urban traffic congestion makes driving unenjoyable, with an undesirable economic cost (Hutton, 2013). Urban traffic congestion plays a significant role in shaping the way people live and where and how they can access social and economic opportunities around the city (Falcocchio & Levinson, 2015; Wright, 2005).**

Urban traffic congestion needs to be tackled because increasing automobile ownership directly causes numerous environmental and social challenges, especially in the economically developing world. Urban populations worldwide are continuously growing, especially in economically developing nations, where people seek to attain the same quality of life experienced in economically developed countries (Linfield & Sterling, 2012). A combination of poor public transport services, rising

incomes and policies which minimalize import restrictions contribute towards increasing automobile ownership globally (Wright, 2005). Therefore, taking the first step to alleviate urban traffic congestion gives cities the opportunity to simultaneously tackle a range of urban environmental, social and economic challenges while overall improving people's quality of life.

It may be easy to suggest that building more roads would alleviate urban traffic congestion as it would meet the increasing travel demand of automobile users. However, while constructing more roads may be able to accommodate urban traffic congestion in the short run, it would not be a sustainable long-term solution. This is because constructing roads are expensive; they take up space, and the rising travel demand from automobile users occupying the newly built road space would not reduce urban traffic congestion. With this said, cities need to create a plan which improves people's mobility around the city while alleviating urban traffic congestion and its negative externalities on both the local and global scales (EMBARQ Network, 2020; Nunns, 2014).

This research project will present public transportation implementation as a possible first step towards alleviating urban traffic congestion, improving urban mobilities while achieving sustainable development outcomes at the same time. Urban traffic congestion will be first introduced as a global issue in cities, along with its interconnected challenges which reduce the quality of life for urban dwellers. Sustainable development will be the overarching theoretical framework and will be discussed as a series of actions for cities to improve the quality of

---

life for urban dwellers by alleviating urban traffic congestion. To place urban traffic congestion into a local-global context, I have chosen to use Toyama's light-rail transit (LRT) in Japan as my local case study and Curitiba's bus rapid transit (BRT) in Brazil as my global study. These two 'non-global' and 'non-western' cities have been chosen to illustrate my theoretical discussion because both Toyama and Curitiba have taken their first step to improve urban lifestyle by implementing public transportation systems that cater to the urban dwellers' needs. Both cities also challenge the paradigm of Western knowledge being 'superior' or 'universal', because these two cities created solutions that were successfully tailored to their local contexts. This is by no means a comparative study of which city's solution is better, but rather a demonstration and critical analysis of how these two cities have similar, yet different approaches and opportunities when tackling urban traffic congestion. While cities have varying capacities to respond to local and global challenges, cities need to take the first step to create innovative solutions to improve urban dwellers' quality of life by tackling urban traffic congestion and planning for the inevitable global urban population increase.

For each case study, I will establish the historical contexts of urban traffic congestion and the types of challenges which impacts urban dwellers' quality of life. This will then be followed by introducing a public transportation system which was used as a solution to alleviate urban traffic congestion, before demonstrating how it was applied in the local case study chosen to ease urban traffic congestion while achieving sustainable development outcomes. This research project's critical discussion revolves around the successes of Toyama and Curitiba regarding alleviating urban traffic congestion and achieving sustainable development outcomes through public transportation implementation. It will also acknowledge the limitations that are prevalent within these solutions.

In this research project, I will be using a transdisciplinary

theoretical framework by critically analysing the issues and outcomes interconnected within urban traffic congestion, while engaging and grappling with the tensions between human rights, environmental/social justices and the economy when working towards achieving sustainable development outcomes. I will also use an explanatory framework by using inductive reasoning to demonstrate how real-life issues of urban traffic congestion are used to formulate theories (Darrian-Smith & McCarty, 2017).

### **Urban Traffic Congestion – Background:**

Urban traffic congestion occurs when commuting demands exceed the city's capacity to cater for people's commuting needs (Falcocchio & Levinson, 2015). Several reasons that make urban traffic congestion a global issue in need of addressing includes a rapidly growing urban population around cities globally and industrialising nations aspiring to attain the quality of life that economically developed nations have. While increasing economic development correlates with a higher quality of education; sanitation and health challenges around urban traffic congestion worsen (Linfield and Sterling, 2012). As a consequence of mass urbanisation and increasing economic growth, automobile ownership became increasingly popular in the 20th Century, which consequently led to increasing rates of urban traffic congestion (Linfield & Steinberg, 2012). This is a global phenomenon which already hinders the quality of life in more 'economically' developed nations. At the same time, newly industrialising countries that are aspiring to attain this quality of life are also bound to be affected by traffic congestion's negative externalities. To put this into context, half of the global population now live in urban areas; this number is projected to rise to 60% by 2030 (Al-Zu'bi & Radovic, 2018). There are around 982 million automobile users globally in 2005. By 2050, this figure is forecasted to increase to 2.6 billion, where much of growth in automobile ownership/usage will come directly from developing nations aspiring to attain the same quality of life that is experienced in economically

---

developed countries (Wright, 2005).

Some of the negative externalities that come from urban traffic congestion include: (1) reduced air quality which leads to respiratory and cardiovascular diseases; (2) drop in economic output from time lost in traffic and costs associated with automobile expenditure and (3) increased greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions accompanied with depleting fossil-fuel sources. Globally, more than 1.5 billion people are susceptible to air pollution that is significantly higher than usual levels, contributing to 400,000 deaths per year (Whitelegg & Haq, 2003). In 2010, time spent stuck in traffic from wasted fuel and passenger travel in the United States of America had cost around a US\$101 billion loss (Lindfield & Sterling, 2012). In Auckland, New Zealand, an Automobile Association study found that locals are stuck in traffic for more than 80 hours each year, resulting in a NZ\$2 billion loss in productivity annually (Peacock, 2018). Fujimoto (2008) found that automobiles emit more than ten times the amount of carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) than trains and more than twice the amount from buses. Transportation is also one of the fastest-growing sources of GHG emissions, making up for more than one-fifth of global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by the year 1999 (Wright, 2005). This shows that the need to address urban traffic congestion as a global issue comes from the future of population increase and lifestyle aspirations by people living in economically developing cities. Therefore, cities must create innovative solutions which are tailored to the local context by learning from the cities that have successfully taken the first step to alleviate traffic congestion through public transportation implementation.

#### **Sustainable Development:**

Since the term was first coined in the United Nations' 1992 Earth Day Summit in Rio De Janeiro, there have been numerous interpretations of what it means to achieve sustainable development. The Brundtland Commission (1987) defined sustainable development as responsible resource consumption by people that meets "the needs of

the present without compromising the needs of future generations" while encouraging equal growth in society, the economy and the environment. However, there needs to be a shift in theoretical approach as it is not realistic in the long-term to equally focus on all three components of the sustainable development model.

Therefore, this research project will extend the definition of sustainable development to a series of actions which "promotes social justice, economic wellbeing and environmental quality at the same time" (Withgott, Breenan & Murck, 2008). This interpretation of sustainable development does not intend to suggest that the environment should be equally prioritized to society and the economy. However, it seeks to highlight the importance of tackling multiple interconnected issues realistically, considering the environment and society at the forefront. This is especially relevant when tackling urban traffic congestion because cities and governments have the potential to achieve a range of sustainable development outcomes through public transportation implementation, while working with time, financial, and even social constraints simultaneously (United Nations, 2013). Nevertheless, there is still a long way to go for cities before they can genuinely alleviate urban traffic congestion, but they can take the first steps to improve people's quality of life in cities through public transportation implementation.

#### **Methodology:**

The data used in this research project is wide-ranging, including both qualitative and quantitative data from academic sources, non-governmental organisation reports and government websites. I have chosen to highlight urban traffic congestion as a multi-dimensional global issue by using a range of sources to align with the transdisciplinary nature of this research.

I will also conduct data analysis of Toyama's and Curitiba's dependent population (Below 15 years old and above 65) to the overall city population, along with

---

Curitiba's women to men population ratio as evidence to reinforce the importance of creating accessible public transportation for the dependent population in Toyama, women, and the economically poor in Curitiba. Both cities' population demographics will be attained from their respective government and non-government websites using the most recent online data available (Darrian-Smith & McCarty, 2017).

#### Case Study: Toyama's Light-Rail Transit (LRT)

Before the introduction of the automobile, Toyama had one of the lowest population densities out of the prefectural capitals in Japan. However, more significant purchases of automobiles and suburban housing occurred, caused by increasing wealth among residents leaving the city's central business district (CBD). This resulted in increased costs to maintain and improve the city's road infrastructures (Fujimoto, 2008).

Currently, Toyama has a population of 414,573 people, with around 41% of its population being dependent (Toyama City, 2019; see also Toyama City, 2020). Some of Toyama's significant urban traffic congestion challenges stem from (1) high automobile ownership and reliance resulting in urban sprawl; (2) population decline in the city centre and (3) an increasingly ageing population (Takami & Hatoyama, 2008). Takami and Hatoyama's (2008) study found that Toyama residents own more than 1.75 automobiles per person, making this city have the second-highest automobile ownership rate in Japan with public transportation ridership reduced by one third between 1989-2004 (Portugal-Pereira et al., 2013). High automobile ownership rates influenced the city centre's population which declined by over 50% during the last four decades of the 20th Century. This also led to a 40% decrease in retail turnover between 1994-2004. Toyama's elderly population experience difficulty when commuting around the city, and they currently make up for nearly 30% of the city's overall population (Fujimoto, 2008; see also Toyama City, 2020). These issues are all interconnected because high automobile ownership and

reliance allows people to live outside the main city centre, leading to the city centre's population decline. With an increasingly ageing population and limited quality public transport infrastructure to travel around the city with, urban mobility for the elderly is going to be a challenge which needs to be addressed in the fight to alleviate urban traffic congestion.

One solution that Toyama decided to use as a first step to alleviate urban traffic congestion was the implementation of the LRT system in 2006, replacing the West Japan Railway Co (Portugal-Pereira et al., 2013). The LRT is an electric rail borne transport which has features that crossovers between a bus and a train, typically operating at "surface level with overhead electrical connectors" with a high or low platform for commuters to board on (United Nations, 2013). LRT services operate every 15 minutes during the day, with greater/lesser frequencies during the different times of the day. A fixed LRT fare allows for reasonable commute around the city. Adults (Persons aged 12 years old or above) are charged ¥210, children between 6-11 years old are charged ¥110 and children under six years old may travel without charge (Toyama Net, n.d.). To put this to scale, each passenger pays a fixed price rate of less than US\$2 to commute around Toyama using the LRT.

The LRT system has the potential to achieve numerous sustainable outcomes in cities, such as Toyama, while alleviating urban traffic congestion. Some of the outcomes achieved in Toyama includes reduced GHG emissions and pollution; improved passenger experience; revitalizing the city's CBD and increased elderly ridership (United Nations, 2013; see also Fujimoto, 2008). The LRT releases 100-138 grams of GHG emissions per passenger per kilometre travelled, which is almost half that of buses which emit 204-228 grams of GHG per passenger per kilometre travelled. Air pollution is reduced as the LRT's primary renewable power source is electrical and is without tailpipe emissions (United Nations, 2013). Passenger experiences can make or break

---



people's perception of public transportation usage, which in turn dictates the success of public transportation implementation. The implementation of the LRT has dramatically improved both passenger experiences and public transportation services as its low floor vehicle and platform caters for a whole range of commuters, including the elderly and the physically disabled while reducing costs to construct platforms. With minimal swaying motions in comparison to buses, the LRT has improved passenger experiences and perception of the public transportation system – especially to the dependent population, which makes up a significant proportion of LRT users. Subsequently, these factors contribute to elderly ridership in Toyama increasing by “3.5 times on weekdays and 7.4 times on weekends” (Fujimoto, 2008), while improving the city's environmental conditions through reduced GHG emissions and, most importantly, enhancing people's urban mobility around Toyama and rejuvenating its CBD.

However, despite the success of Toyama's LRT when achieving sustainable development outcomes, there were some limitations which need to be acknowledged. Some of the limitations of the LRT system include (1) high financial costs of implementation; (2) uncertainty of rising automobile demand and (3) challenges in integrating the LRT system with already existing urban infrastructures. To improve rail infrastructure and purchase new light rail vehicles, it cost Toyama City's government ¥5.8 billion, not including the start-up capital required (Takami, Hatoyama, 2008). As a result, the LRT would be expected to have annual debts of JP¥20-30 million per year for the next decade (Nagayama & Kitaide, 2006). If the demand for automobiles by Toyama's residents continues to rise despite the LRT being implemented, GHG emissions will have a net increase. This means that the LRT's theoretical environmental benefits could be cancelled out by consumer demand for automobile consumption (Fujimoto, 2008). As the LRT operates on fixed cables, it cannot branch out and integrate its transportation network with already existing urban infrastructure to the extent that the

BRT can (United Nations, 2013). With the LRT solution bearing high financial costs, uncertainty around environmental benefits and limited ability to integrate with already existing urban infrastructures, Toyama's City Government need to be sure that the more vulnerable members of society will use the LRT if implemented. For the LRT to be successful in the long-term, the social and environmental benefits would outweigh, yet justify the financial costs to improve urban mobilities and quality of life for the growing dependent population in Toyama.

Implementing the LRT in Toyama has been successful overall because it managed to attract a large number of passengers to the extent that the project could pay for itself. This public transportation implementation converted around 12% of automobile users to use the LRT system and reduced Toyama's CO2 emissions by 436 tons in 2006 (Fujimoto, 2008). The LRT system also catered to the social needs of the elderly population as they consist of 30% of weekday and 43% of weekend LRT users (Fujimoto, 2008). Therefore, the implementation of the LRT system in Toyama was a significant first step towards alleviating urban traffic congestion while simultaneously achieving sustainable development outcomes which improved urban dwellers' mobility and quality of life.

#### **Case Study: Curitiba's Bus-Rapid Transit (BRT)**

Automobiles in Curitiba first grew in popularity in the 1950s through a combination of economic development and policies which favoured the automobile industry and automobile users. The arrival of automobiles and the automobile industry in 1955 led to the Brazilian government providing indirect subsidies to automobile users such as free parking and reduced petrol prices (Vasconcellos, 2017).

By 2010, Curitiba has a population of 1,751,907, with women and dependent population making up for a significant proportion of the city's population.

Some of Curitiba's biggest transport planning challenges

---

came from: (1) increased traffic congestion because of greater automobile ownership; (2) unequal access and mobility around the city by women and the poor and (3) constrained budget to implement their ideal public transportation system. As a result of the automobile industry booming in Curitiba during the 1950s, this city has one of the highest automobile ownership rates per person in Brazil, with nearly 400 automobiles owned per 1000 people (Lindau, Hidalgo & Facchini, 2010). In developing cities like Curitiba, wide poverty gaps, unreliable bus services, and other social factors hinder certain groups of people. These groups include women, dependent populations, and the economically poor, and their access to opportunities within the city that they live in compared to wealthier residents who could afford to travel around by automobile (Vasconcellos, 2017). It is also ironic that while the wealthier urban dwellers contribute to rising GHG levels, they are least susceptible to urban traffic congestion's negative externalities (Wright, 2005). Initially, the LRT project, which was initially proposed before the BRT system, was projected to be US\$492 million to implement, without running cost (Lindau et al., 2010). Because of this, Curitiba needed to create an innovative solution which allowed for greater urban mobility for all members of society, while working within their financial constraints.

The Institute for Research and Urban Planning of Curitiba created the BRT system, which was implemented in 1974 by mayor Jamie Lerner when Curitiba was still a small city (Lindau et al., 2010). The BRT fleet consists of a mix of diesel-fuelled and hybrid buses which operate on designated barricaded lanes, with stops every 400-800 metres. The BRT is well known for its customer-oriented service, safety, and has the potential to easily integrate with the existing urban infrastructure (Mees, 2009; see also United Nations, 2013). BRT commuters pay a set single fare of US\$1.10, which allows commuters to have unlimited transfers within and in-between services (Lindau et al., 2010).

The BRT system can achieve several sustainable development outcomes in cities, such as Curitiba, while alleviating urban traffic congestion. Some of these outcomes include encouraging greater urban mobility for women, dependent population, and the economically poor; reduced automobile usage and pollution; and innovating a system which was a pioneer for developing cities. With Curitiba's population being made up of more than 50% women and over 30% dependent (City Population, n.d.), the BRT has encouraged improved travel modes for the more vulnerable members of society through its levelled boarding platform for the elderly; providing safe infrastructure and high customer-oriented services to promote greater urban mobility for women, along with free or discounted travel for much of the dependent population (United Nations, 2013; see also Lindau et al., 2010). BRT's single-fare pricing system has promoted social and economic justice, especially since 37% of the city's residents earn less than three minimum wages per month (Macedo, 2004). The BRT's hybrid buses have lowered Curitiba's public transportation fuel needs by 35% while also eliminating its pollution emissions (C40 Cities, 2016). The BRT system is an innovative solution towards alleviating urban traffic congestion while achieving sustainable development outcomes in economically developing cities, such as Curitiba, because it is 4-20 times more affordable to implement than the LRT system, which is 10-100 times less expensive than the metro system while having comparable capacity and service levels (United Nations, 2013). Its low cost of US\$800,000 to build one kilometre of busway and highly focused customer-oriented services inspired many economically developing cities around the world, especially in Latin America and Asia, to implement this system into their city's design (Jagiełło, 2017)

However, some of the limitations of the BRT system in Curitiba include (1) noise pollution and continuous environmental degradation if its old bus fleet remains in operation; (2) limited size of bus fleet as a consequence of

avenue incentives and (3) limited real-time user information for commuters. While Curitiba is making a conscious effort of converting their diesel fleet to hybrid, it is essential to address that significant air and noise pollution by the BRT fleet. This will continue if the diesel buses' internal combustion engine that uses tailpipe emissions continues to operate on rubber roads (United Nations, 2013). Despite buses experiencing higher passenger occupancy levels during peak hours, private bus operators do not want to increase their fleet to accommodate increased travel demands as they wish to keep costs as low as possible. On top of that, the BRT system does not provide adequate real-time information for commuters, and there are few resources accessible to commuters, such as guides or maps (Lindau et al., 2010). Overcrowding and a lack of real-time information for commuters ultimately contradict the aim of the BRT system being revolved around customer service. These points are crucial to consider if Curitiba's City Government wishes to shift its urban dwellers' travel patterns from automobile to the BRT on a long-term scale.

Implementing the BRT system in Curitiba has been successful overall because it is an innovation that addressed Curitiba's social and environmental challenges while working within their financial constraints. Recently, 1.5 million passengers or 75% of weekday commuters were using Curitiba's BRT (Vasconcellos, 2017). Although Curitiba's population has more than doubled since the BRT was first implemented, automobile usage has decreased by 30% (Soltani, Sharifi, 2012). This innovation is a pioneer of how cities in economically developing countries can take the first step to implement a budget-friendly yet sustainable public transportation solution.

#### **Similarities and Differences Between the Two Cities' Approach to Urban Traffic Congestion:**

Toyama and Curitiba's approach to urban traffic congestion and public transportation implementation have some similarities and differences which are worth

acknowledging. In the Global Studies field, it is imperative to critically engage with, while discouraging the notion that there is, or should be a single, homogeneous solution which is applied on the global scale. Instead, Global Studies research seeks to forward yet celebrate heterogeneous innovations which is tailored to the local contexts while considering the global contexts at the same time.

Both Toyama and Curitiba's approaches have planned with social and environmental justice at the forefront. In Toyama, the local government considered the needs of the dependent population's ability to move around the city and the outskirts. On top of focussing on the needs of the dependent population, Curitiba has considered the needs of women and the economically poor into their planning as well. Both cities planned from a top-down approach, where the respective local governments oversaw the big picture of urban traffic congestion's challenges before providing directions to improve urban mobilities in their respective cities. Both the LRT and BRT systems collect big data through their intelligent transport systems when collecting commuters' fares. This is an essential tool for planners when planning a city's transport network into the future as they need to understand commuters' travel patterns to make informed long-term decisions (United Nations, 2013).

However, Toyama and Curitiba have some notable differences in their ability to implement public transportation systems. One such difference is their planning contexts. Toyama is a wealthier city which needed to revitalize the city centre to counteract its local ageing population, while Curitiba sought to tackle the societal and environmental injustices in the economically developing world. It is also worth noting that the cities' respective local governments have contrasting environmental perspectives when it comes to alleviating urban traffic congestion. In Toyama, the local government do not prioritize environmental sustainability in the forefront of their solution, while Curitiba's local

---

local government has vigorously promoted, and continues to promote environmental sustainability at the forefront of their city's plans (Takami & Hatoyama, 2008; see also Lindau et al., 2010). This attitude difference between the cities' local governments has the potential to determine how successful these cities' implementation of public transportation will be when promoting greater environmental sustainability.

**Limitations:**

While sustainable development is essential when taking the first step to alleviate global environmental challenges such as urban traffic congestion, many would argue the need to shift towards achieving total environmental sustainability through taking radical actions which would 'save' the global environment. Sustainable development, while essential as a first step, is not necessarily enough to reverse the effects of climate change in the long run (Kopnina & Shoreman-Ouimet, 2015; see also Wright, 2014). With urban traffic congestion, it is crucial to understand and be critical of the different environmental, social and economic forces that drive the challenges surrounding urban mobility, access, and its impact on the quality of life for urban dwellers. While cities can start tackling urban traffic congestion by using the principles of sustainable development, it is vital to shift the approach from achieving sustainable development into environmental sustainability once the systems in cities are equipped to make this change.

In terms of data acquisition, I have chosen to present two case studies which took place at different temporal and economic contexts because these were the times where both cities addressed and took the first steps to alleviate urban traffic congestion. Both cities' solutions provide unique insights on how economically developed and developing cities can tackle urban traffic congestion and how the success stories of Toyama and Curitiba demonstrate the successes of public transportation implementation as a first step to achieving sustainable development outcomes.

The success of public transportation implementation depends on a range of factors. The purpose of this research project is to highlight the broad picture of urban traffic congestion, rather than zeroing in on a particular solution, such as road-pricing, urban policy or behaviour change programmes. While public transportation implementation may be a possible first step to alleviate urban traffic congestion, critics such as Nunns (2014) argue that public transportation would not alleviate urban traffic congestion, but only improve urban mobilities. Therefore, adequate provision of public transport infrastructure by the government, accompanied by plans and policies to encourage greater public transport ridership is necessary if cities around the world seek to alleviate urban traffic congestion and simultaneously promote accessible yet sustainable urban mobilities for all people.

**Concluding Remarks:**

Overall, urban traffic congestion has a range of interconnected environmental, social and economic issues which significantly impact the quality of life for people living in cities globally. While the cases of urban traffic congestion alleviation in Toyama and Curitiba are significant urban issues, this is one of many sustainable development challenges in cities which need to be addressed on both the local and global scales. Toyama and Curitiba tackled urban traffic congestion while improving urban mobilities and people's quality of life through public transportation implementation. Toyama's LRT was designed to rejuvenate the city's CBD, as well as cater to the ageing population, while Curitiba's BRT sought to address the social and environmental injustices that were prevalent in the late 20th Century.

While this research project may have demonstrated one possible way to alleviate urban traffic congestion and improve urban mobilities for urban dwellers, there are still wider questions that are worth considering when it comes to achieving sustainable outcomes in cities and ways to tackle the global environmental challenges in the

---

21st Century. Some of these questions include (1) ways to strike a balance between an efficient top-down leadership and bottom-up democracy as in to take decisive and timely action while engaging urban dwellers in the planning processes; (2) the tensions of policy-making and whether to pursue radical actions to protect the global environment or continue making decisions using the current rules of economics – price, demand and supply; and (3) what will the future for cities hold, along with how cities can ensure sustainable urban development into the future which maximizes people’s accessibility to the vast opportunities present within an urban area.


For cities to thrive and sustainably develop into the future, people and the environment should be at the heart of the decision-making process. While there is the argument that the world needs to take radical actions to mitigate adverse environmental degradation; I believe that people and cities need to take the first actions towards achieving greater sustainable development in cities before shifting towards attaining environmental sustainability. This is evident in Toyama and Curitiba’s cases of alleviating urban traffic congestion. As humanity takes its first actions to achieve sustainable development outcomes in cities, there is so much more that needs to be done to improve the quality of life for all urban dwellers in cities globally.

## References:

- Al-Zu’bi, M., & Radovic, V. (2018). Cities and Key Interactions. In *SDG11– Sustainable Cities and Communities: Towards Inclusive, Safe, and Resilient Settlements* (pp. 3-20). Emerald Publishing Limited.
- Arnott, R., Rave, T., & Schöb, R. (2005). Alleviating urban traffic congestion. *MIT Press Books, 1*.
- C40 Cities. (2016). Good Practice Guide: Bus Rapid Transit. Retrieved from: [http://c40-production-images.s3.amazonaws.com/good\\_practice\\_briefings/images/2\\_C40\\_GPG\\_BRT\\_original.pdf?1456788644](http://c40-production-images.s3.amazonaws.com/good_practice_briefings/images/2_C40_GPG_BRT_original.pdf?1456788644)
- City Population. (n.d.). Curitiba. Retrieved from: [https://www.citypopulation.de/en/brazil/parana/curitiba/410690205\\_\\_curitiba/](https://www.citypopulation.de/en/brazil/parana/curitiba/410690205__curitiba/)
- Darian-Smith, E., & McCarty, P. C. (2017). *The global turn: theories, research designs, and methods for global studies*. University of California Press.
- EMBARQ Network. (2020). Building more roads does not ease traffic congestion. Smart Cities Dive. Retrieved from: <https://www.smartcitiesdive.com/ex/sustainablecitiescollective/building-more-roads-does-not-ease-congestion/31285/>
- Falcochio, J. C., & Levinson, H. S. (2015). *Road traffic congestion: a concise guide* (Vol.7). Cham: Springer.
- Fujimoto, H. (2008). *The modal shift to environmentally sustainable transport: prospects of urban transport systems: LRT, BRT and buses*. NISTEP Science & Technology Foresight Center.
- Hutton, B. (2013). *Planning sustainable transport*. Routledge.
- Jagiełło, A. (2017). The role of the Bus Rapid Transit in public transport. Transportation Overview. University of Gdansk.
- Kopnina, H., & Shoreman-Ouimet, E. (Eds.). (2015). *Sustainability: key issues*. Routledge.
- Lindau, L. A., Hidalgo, D., & Facchini, D. (2010). Bus rapid transit in Curitiba, Brazil: A look at the outcome after 35 years of bus-oriented development. *Transportation Research Record, 2193*(1), 17-27.
- Lindfield, M., & Steinberg, F. (2012). *Green cities*. Asian Development Bank.
- Macedo, J. (2004). City Profiles: Curitiba. *Cities* 21(6).

- Mees, P. (2009). *Transport for suburbia: beyond the automobile age*. Routledge.
- Nagakawa, A., & Kitaide, A. (2006, May 19). Toyama's Light Rail Transit seen as a way to revitalise city. *Yomiuri Shimbun*. Tokyo. Retrieved from: <https://gogalecom.ezproxy.auckland.ac.nz/p/s/i.do?id=GALE%7CA145988672&v=2.1&u=learn&it=r&p=ITOF&sw=w>
- Nunns, P. (2014, October 16). Why it's not possible to build our way out of congestion. Greater Auckland. Retrieved from: <https://www.greeterauckland.org.nz/2014/10/16/we-cant-build-our-way-out-of-congestion/>
- Peacock, A. (2018, March 1). Congestion chaos: Aucklanders spend 80 hours a year stuck in traffic jam. *NZ Herald*. Retrieved from: <https://www.nzherald.co.nz/aucklander/news/congestion-chaos-aucklanders-spend-80-hours-a-year-stuck-in-traffic-jam/GCFKCBNPZFKR2ZMUEMV3ZSZTBM/>
- Portugal-Pereira, J. O., Doll, C. N. H., Suwa, A., & Puppim de Oliveira, J. A. (2013). The Sustainable Mobility-Congestion Nexus: A Co-Benefits Approach to Finding Win-Win Solutions. *Transport and Communications Bulletin for Asia and the Pacific*, 82, 19-31.
- Soltani, A., & Sharifi, E. (2012). A case study of sustainable urban planning principles in Curitiba (Brazil) and their applicability in Shiraz (Iran).
- Takami, K., & Hatoyama, K. (2008). Sustainable regeneration of a car dependent city: the case of Toyama toward a compact city. In *Sustainable City Regions*: (pp. 183-200). Springer, Tokyo.
- Toyama City Official Travel Guide (Toyama Net). (n.d.). Getting Around Toyama. Retrieved from: <http://www.toyamashikankoukyoukai.jp/en/get-around/>
- Toyama City Official Web Site (Toyama City). (2019). Population and Household. Retrieved from: <http://www.city.toyama.toyama.jp/kikakunribu/johotokeika/tokei/jinkosetai/jinkosetai.htm> (In Japanese).
- Toyama City Official Web Site (Toyama City). (2020). Demographic table by age and district. Retrieved from: <https://www.city.toyama.toyama.jp/kikakunribu/johotokeika/tokei/jinkosetai/R2/nenreibetsu2008.html>
- Vasconcellos, E.A. (2017). Brazil. In *The urban transport crisis in emerging economies* (pp. 11-31). Springer.
- United Nations. (2013). Planning and design for sustainable urban mobility. *New York*. Whitelegg, J., & Haq, G. (2003). *The Global Transport Problem: Same Issues but a Different Place*. John Whitelegg and Gary Haq. In *The Earthscan reader on world transport policy and practice* (pp. 3-23). Routledge.
- Withgott, J., Brennan, S. R., & Murck, B. W. (2008). *Environment: The science behind the stories* (No. Sirsi) i9780805395730). San Francisco: Pearson Benjamin Cummings.
- Wright, L. (2005). *Car-Free Development*. Eschborn: GIZ.
- Wright, R. T. (2014). *Environmental science: toward a sustainable future*. Boston: Pearson.

If you are interested in joining the Nomad team  
Or would like to send a submission,  
Contact us at:  
[gsundergrad@gmail.com](mailto:gsundergrad@gmail.com)



NOMAD