HISTERIA!



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Histeria!

Edition 19

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EDITORIAL PREFACE

Making Sense of History's Dinglehoppers: Introducing *Histeria!* 2022

Blair McIntosh

In the iconic Disney film *The Little Mermaid*, an inquisitive Ariel convinces Flounder to help her explore a vast treasure ship recently destroyed in a storm. Despite a close shave with a cantankerous shark, Ariel and Flounder escape the wreck unharmed, with a satchel full of fine new artifacts from the 'human world' in tow. Excited, Ariel pays a visit to Scuttle the Seagull—the Sea's foremost authority on the curious customs of the human world—to make sense of her finds. After fossicking through her satchel, Scuttle pulls out a small, silver object with three sharp prongs, exclaiming:

> SCUTTLE: "Look at this! Wow. This is special, this is… unusual…"
>
> ARIEL: "What? What is it!"
>
> SCUTTLE: "It's a… DINGLEHOPPER!"[1]

Figure 1: An example of a "Dinglehopper". Courtesy of the Walters Art Museum, accession number 57.2119 © CC-O 1.0.

[1] John Musker and Rom Clements, *The Little Mermaid*, 1989, at 9:35.

A ‘dinglehopper’, according to Scuttle, is a comb-like accessory used by humans to create an “aesthetically pleasing configuration of hair that other humans go nuts over”.[2] Enamoured by its ingenuity and metallic sheen, the dinglehopper takes pride of place in Ariel’s underwater grotto, spurring on her quest to one day be “part of that world”. It is not until she has a banquet with a very confused Prince Eric does she learn that her dinglehopper is… well, not a dinglehopper at all.

Although *The Little Mermaid*’s attempts to (mis)understand the human world are amusing, the film is more applicable to historians than we might care to admit. Indeed, in February this year a neglected artifact was briefly catapulted to internet fame after it was ‘rediscovered’ in Newcastle University’s archives. Found at a dig site near Northumberland in 1992, the tapered wooden artifact measuring 6 ½ inches in length had originally been catalogued as a remarkably well-preserved ‘wooden darning tool’ from Ancient Rome.[3] For 30 years this classification remained unchallenged, until a team at Newcastle University posted about the artifact online. Rather than an innocuous darning tool, historians and the court of public opinion alike quickly concluded that this wooden artifact had likely lived a far more… *risqué* …life. I will leave the good readers of *Histeria!* to ponder the image below to deduce what I might mean:

Figure 2: The suspect ‘wooden darning tool’. Courtesy of *The Guardian*, 20 February 2023.

[2] Musker and Clements, at 9:59.
[3] *Guardian*, 20 February 2023.

Taken together, what *The Little Mermaid* and this unusual Roman artifact (which I must admit, 'dinglehopper' seems a rather fitting euphemism for) reveal about the inherent difficulties of history are two-fold.

On the one hand, they both alert us to the fundamental *strangeness* of the past. Much like Ariel and Scuttle's misguided attempts to explain the purpose of human trinkets, we are constantly forced to make educated guesses about how past people lived and made sense of their world. As historians like Sam Wineburg compellingly argue, we cannot ever truly bridge the temporal divide that lies between the lives of the historical subjects we study and our position in the present.[4] Nor can we rely on the documentary evidence to fill in all these gaps. Like a forensic team who arrive at a crime scene, historians are left with only the surviving scraps of evidence—a bloodstain, but no weapon; signs of an altercation, but no transcript; a victim, but no assailant—to piece together history's whodunits. The past is, and always will remain, fundamentally *strange*.

On the other hand, however, we cannot argue that the past is so alien it defies comprehension altogether. Ariel's confidence that a dinglehopper is used for combing hair might be misplaced, but her decision to proudly display it beside a knife and spoon in her underwater grotto is remarkably similar to how many people organise and show off their silverware today.[5] Without some level of *familiarity* with the past—be it familiar rituals, materials or reactions—understanding 'history' would be impossible. Indeed, as the suspect Roman darning tool aptly demonstrates, sometimes the past can be far more like the present in its moral sensibilities and proclivities than we first imagine.

[4] Sam Wineburg, "Historical Thinking and Other Unnatural Acts", *Phi Delta Kappan*, 80, 7, pp.493-494.
[5] Musker and Clements, at 15:28.

What the budding historian is faced with, then, is a past riddled with dinglehoppers: moments or realities that are both intimately familiar *and* inextricably strange. But if this is true, how can we meaningfully engage with history? Are our efforts always doomed to either repeat the same naive guesswork of Ariel and Scuttle, or the intellectual prudishness of the original researcher at the Northumberland dig?

As the exemplary essays in this year's edition of *Histeria!* wisely remind us, there are many ways we can move beyond this historical quandary.

The first half of essays introduced in *Histeria!* 2022 deal with topics that initially feel intimately familiar. These include histories of places like Aotearoa New Zealand, or historical events that loom large in our collective imaginary like the Civil Rights Movement. All too often, these topics are also ones that easily succumb to well-worn tropes of explanation, half-hearted historical analysis and provoke various feelings of sameness, boredom, even irritability. Each author in this section has pushed past these normative assumptions, and consciously sought to apply new interpretations, new voices and new ways of thinking about this familiar past.

Michaela Topia opens this year's edition with her arresting essay on indigenous dispossession and spiritual resistance in the New Zealand Land Wars. Rather than echo dominant narratives of the 'Land Wars' which fixate on the eventual loss of Māori land and autonomy to Pākehā settlers, Topia argues we should rename this conflict after the Pai Mārire term 'Te Rirerire Hau' or 'the Merciful Breath'. By reconsidering the Land Wars through a Māori spiritual lens, Topia encourages us to recognise the important role Māori faith movements played in helping Māori resist and transcend the trauma of colonial conflict.

Friederike Voit also focuses on Aotearoa New Zealand, but challenges us to reconsider the historical significance of a far more intimate space: that of 'Home'. Charting the changing ways cultural historians have made sense of this term, Voit's sophisticated essay concludes that

Pākehā New Zealanders have not just one, but many 'homes' that they draw a sense of identity, purpose and belonging from.

Anneke Hutt shifts our gaze over the Tasman Sea, in her probing essay on the historiography of the Australian frontier. With a discerning eye, Hutt explores beneath the sensationalised surface of the so-called 'history wars' to uncover a dense, and at times troubling, debate over how to best narrate histories of Aboriginal and settler violence. Instead of engaging in academic 'point-scoring', Hutt rightly identifies that historians need to continue rethinking about this common past in ways that can help facilitate the difficult task of national reconciliation.

Samuel Turner-O'Keeffe's insightful essay critically interrogates the nebulous nature of 'freedom', perhaps the most lauded—and derided—value in contemporary America. Carefully considering how American freedom's meanings and boundaries have changed since the nation's founding to the early 2000s, Turner-O'Keeffe rejects any suggestion that notions of American freedom have remained linear or static. Instead, Turner-O'Keeffe paints a nuanced picture of how freedom's promises have been renegotiated by successive generations of Americans, culminating in the emergence of a more inclusive, flexible, yet polarised understanding of American freedom today.

Jake Eagar concludes this first section of essays with his perceptive reading of the American Civil Rights Movement. Debating when the Civil Rights Movement begins and ends, Eager encourages us to expand the national fight for racial equality beyond the traditional confines of the Fifties and Sixties. By doing so, Eager demonstrates how this enlarged field of historical vision enables us to better identify the Civil Rights Movement's antecedents in the Great Migration of 1915—and its unfulfilled promises African Americans are still fighting for today.

Together, we might consider these approaches as encouraging us to make sense of the past by making the *familiar strange*.

The second half of this journal deals with contributors who are studying topics that lie outside the familiarity zone of most contemporary Aucklanders. This might be due to atypical time periods, such as Medieval Europe or early eighteenth-century London; or unfamiliar histories, such as the Easter Rising, or the rich oral traditions of Tibetan monks. Yet rather than become overwhelmed and ultimately numb to the strangeness of these pasts, each contributor has made a conscious effort to seek out the points of interaction and connexion that make these histories meaningful today.

Max Skerjl-Rovers provides an engaging and incisive essay on the transformation of early eighteenth-century London from an English city into a global one. Studying how the city's commerce, consumption habits and vibrant cultural spheres intersected together to create a 'global community' underpinned by shipping, Skerjl-Rovers breaks down our assumptions about pre-Industrial parochialism. Instead, he finds a dynamic city in motion, and Londoners with their gazes fixed firmly out towards the world.

Elinor Graham delves deep into the revolutionary fervour of modern Ireland, with her lucid essay on the motivations of Patrick Pearse and his collaborators for undertaking the 1916 Easter Rising. Although initially confronted by the extreme rhetoric of political martyrdom and blood sacrifice, Graham pushes beyond this symbolic language to critically consider why the Easter Rising's leadership turned to this imagery to legitimise their struggle. After considering the cultural, social and political climate of 1916 Ireland, Graham concludes that Irish nationalists were increasingly convinced that the use of physical force to bring about revolutionary change was both permitted and necessary, a call that Pearse and collaborators would increasingly heed.

Grace Baylis shifts our attention to Medieval Europe, exploring the intersection between Christian faith, magic and witchcraft. Rather than uphold many clerical sources' insistence that magic and witchcraft were 'heretical abnormalities', Baylis contextualises these alternative faith rituals among laypersons as natural extensions of popular forms of Christian devotion. By

emphasising the fundamental continuity between sanctioned and 'heretical' faith in Medieval Europe, Baylis brings this unorthodox history back into the familiar fold.

Holly Bennett's honours-level essay on the relationship between orality and literacy is a fitting conclusion to this year's submissions. Tasked with understanding how the mode of transmission influences the composition, interpretation and reworking of sacred texts, the scope of Bennett's historical inquiry is vast: bouncing between illicit sects in late-Imperial China, Buddhist scriptures in modern Tibet, sermons in seventeenth-century England to 'black' iconography in late-modern Europe. Yet despite the vast divergences in her case studies, Bennett constructs a coherent and compelling argument that the relationship between orality and literacy in historical transmission is complex, contingent and iterative. Viewed collectively, Bennett's essay—along with those of all the contributors in this section—highlights the depth of insight that can come from making the strange *familiar*.

Although we are unlikely to get the opportunity to learn if our dinglehoppers were actually forks like Ariel did, we can still find value in learning and practising history. So long as we approach our task with integrity, openness and a healthy dose of humility, we too get the chance to learn where we fit into the colourful and messy tapestry that is the human race—and in doing so, finally become "part of that [past] world".

I: Making the Familiar *Strange*

Te Rirere Hau – Michaela Topia

Locating Home in New Zealand Cultural History – Friederike Voit

Blood and Ink: The Battle Between Historians over Australia's Frontier History – Anneke Hutt

The American Pursuit of a Flexible Freedom – Samuel Turner O'Keeffe

A Historic Moment or Ongoing Event? Assessing when the Civil Rights Movement Begins and Ends – Jake Eagar

Te Rirerire Hau

Michaela Topia

Essay Prompt: What should we call the nineteenth century wars between Māori and the Crown? Justify your answer in relation to at least two conflicts or wars from this period.

Hana to kororia hana te kororia hana te kororia, rire rire, Amene.[7]

Spiritual empowerment was a weapon of hope and peace in the context of never-ending warfare between Māori and the Crown which dominated nineteenth-century Aotearoa New Zealand. While dominant narratives of the 'Land Wars' centre around the illegal confiscation of Māori lands by the Crown and Pākehā settlers, these accounts are immensely disempowering for Māori who are repeatedly framed as the victims and Pākehā as the victors. Lasting ideas of powerlessness, death and landlessness are all that remains when narratives fail to centre and celebrate Māori as active agents within the histories of nineteenth century raupatu. By

Fig 3: Photograph of Te Ua Haumēne, prophet and founder of the Pai Mārire movement. Photograph courtesy of Lyndsay Head, NZHistory.govt.

[7] Paul Clark, *Hauhau: The Pai Marire Search for Maori Identity*, Auckland, 1975, p.137.

decentring Māori victories and voices, these histories fail to properly investigate how Māori, tāngata o te whenua, were able to overcome the confiscation of and displacement from their whenua, when they were intrinsically connected to it. The name 'Te Rirerire Hau' will be offered in place of the 'Land Wars' to better reflect these conflicts and argue that Māori religious movements were central to nineteenth century conflicts between Māori and the Crown. This essay will use the Pai Mārire movement as a lens through which we can establish the importance of renaming the 'Land Wars' Te Rirerire Hau, discuss the relevance of a Māori religious lens in interpreting nineteenth century conflicts between Māori and the Crown, and finally use this lens to re-investigate popular accounts of the conflicts over land and power in Ōpotiki and Tūranganui-a-Kiwa.

Te Rirerire Hau is a name drawn from the powerful karakia Pai Mārire which often ends with 'rirerire hau' in place of the Christian 'Amene'.[8] While less literal than other names which could have been used to describe the Land Wars such as 'Te Pakanga Nui mō te Wairua', it seems fitting that a more symbolic name be offered given the focus on religion and centring Māori narratives. The symbolic nature of the name means that interpretations and translations for Te Rirerire Hau are vast, but it can be understood loosely as 'the merciful' or 'the glorious' wind or breath of life (hau). Through the symbolism of the wind, Te Rirerire Hau invokes the connections between this 'merciful wind', the alternative Pai Mārire name, Hauhau, and the creator of the Pai Mārire movement, Te Ua Haumene. By renaming these wars Te Rirerire Hau, we paint a picture of the 'Land Wars' which is uniquely Māori, embracing te reo in all its metaphoric quality. Reframing the 'Land Wars' as Te Rirerire Hau allows us to move away from understanding these conflicts between Māori, the Crown and settlers as starting and ending with wars over land. Instead, it allows us to emphasise Māori religious movements like Pai

[8] Clark, pp.11; 91.

Mārire as the pathway from these conflicts over land to the eventual fight for peace and hau mārire.

The Pai Mārire religion, symbolic of 'goodness and peace', provided Māori with a Māori-led, peace-centred pathway to dealing with the dispossession of land and ceaseless struggles for power that had dominated Māori lives since the European invasion.[9] Seeing these conflicts through the lens of a Māori religious movement like Pai Mārire is an extremely useful tool for investigating beyond dominant accounts of the 'Land Wars'. This religion, like many other syncretic Māori religions, was regularly framed by Pākehā settlers and the Crown as barbaric, savage and intent on exterminating Europeans.[10] When these sensationalist accounts are compared to what Pai Mārire actually preached and practised, it quickly becomes obvious that these negative views were actively encouraged by hateful and violent Pākehā settlers who were intent on encroaching on Māori land.[11] Not only did these portrayals of Māori by Pākehā incite further violence, they played into the deeply held belief of European superiority and entitlement to lands they had no claim to. Understanding the biases and privileging of Pākehā voices in historical accounts is crucial to re-investigating the conflicts between local iwi, Pai Mārire followers, Pākehā settlers and the Crown in Ōpōtiki and Tūranganui-a-Kiwa.

Accounts of the 1865 Pai Mārire conflict in Ōpōtiki centre on the murder of Carl Volkner and the consumption of his eyeballs, invoking prejudicial views of Māori as savage, cannibalistic and barbaric.[12] These accounts fail to mention, however, that the aftermath of these events permitted Governor Grey to invoke martial law and seize over 175,000 acres of Ngāti Awa and

[9] James Belich, *Making Peoples: A History of the New Zealanders: From Polynesian Settlement to the End of the Nineteenth Century*, 1996, pp.220-222.
[10] Ibid., pp.viii; 14; 220-222.
[11] Tainui Stephens, *The Prophets. Te Ua Haumene,* 2013.
[12] Clark, pp.20-40.

Te Whakatōhea land through the 1863 New Zealand Settlements Act.[13] The hanging of five Whakatōhea Rangatira, including Mokomoko, and the pursuit, capture, hanging and eventual pardoning of Kereopa over 150 years later are almost invisible in historical accounts. When Pai Mārire prophets Kereopa Te Rau and Patara Te Raukatauri arrived in Ōpōtiki in February 1865, the local iwi, Te Whakatōhea, were already struggling with the devastating effects of disease, the collapse of the trading industry and strained iwi-settlers relations.[14] While this conflict led to the condemnation of the Pai Mārire religion in its entirety, it can better be understood as a catalyst that led to catastrophe.[15] Looking through the lens of Pai Mārire religion, we see beyond the murder of Volkner and understand these events as a combination of conflicts rather than simply 'Land Wars'. Invoking Te Rirerire Hau, we can reimagine this conflict in the form of a sweeping wind which provided desperate and landless Māori with a renewed 'breath of life' to continue fighting not just for survival but for hau mārire, peace. Indeed, this reframing allows us to consider Māori religion as a powerful expression of Tino Rangatiratanga which was viewed by Pākehā settlers, missionaries and the Crown as a direct threat to their own possession of power. Only through this framing can we truly understand the motivations behind the portrayal of the religion and 'hauhaus' as 'wild cannibal savages'.[16]

Across Aotearoa, Māori were driven off their land and forced to fight, surrender or relocate if they wanted to live. In the context of such devastation, it becomes obvious why Māori religious movements gained a strong following. They provided Māori with an alternative solution to these never-ending conflicts over power and land: a pathway towards peace. By the time the Pai Mārire message arrived in Tūranganui-a-Kiwa (Gisborne area) the religion had been labelled violent, false, murderous and rebellious. Despite this condemnation, Pai Mārire emissaries

[13] Clark, pp.34-35.
[14] Atholl Anderson, Judith Binney and Aroha Harris, *Tangata Whenua: An Illustrated History*, Wellington, 2015, p.271.
[15] ibid., p.272.
[16] Clark, p.77.

Kereopa Te Rau and Patara Te Raukatauri were permitted by Rangatira Hirini Te Kani, to seek shelter in the area.[17] Less than nine months after the arrival of the Pai Mārire emissaries, an estimated third of the local hapū identified as followers of the Pai Mārire faith, and a further third as neutral.[18] Anaru Matete, a leading Rangatira of Ngāti Maru demonstrates the motivation behind the conversion of his people in his words, "We have joined the Hauhau because we think by doing so we shall save our land (te Ao) and the remnant of our people".[19] Pākehā settlers, Crown officials and competing iwi became increasingly paranoid about Pai Mārire claims to peace alongside their growing support, particularly given the faith's association with the conflicts in Ōpōtiki which centred on Volkner's murder. These hostilities escalated to the destruction of two Pai Mārire pā in October 1965, and the siege of another Pai Mārire pā at Warenga-a-Hika in November with over eight-hundred people inside.[20] This siege was one of many well-resourced military attempts which followed, as the Crown tried to crush the remainder of Pai Mārire followers wherever they fled to.[21] Through reframing this conflict under Te Rirerire Hau, we can again understand the power and hope provided to local Māori through emphasising hau mārire as an expression of tino rangatiratanga in the face of endless war. The Pai Mārire lens also helps us better understand the motivations of local iwi who were threatened with land dispossession and imprisonment if they disobeyed Crown commands, as well as those of Pākehā and Crown forces who were driven by fear, hate and greed to acquire Māori lands by any means necessary.[22]

Māori religions like Pai Mārire were a critical beacon of hope, or indeed a breath of life, in the context of ongoing and brutal land dispossession, imprisonment and war. Renaming the 'Land Wars' Te Rirerire Hau highlights the role Māori faith played in providing Māori with an

[17] Anderson, Binney and Harris, p.272.
[18] Ibid., p.274.
[19] ibid., p.272.
[20] ibid.
[21] ibid.
[22] ibid., p.274.

alternative path to not just survive, but seek Pai Mārire and a way to coexist in te ao hou. Importantly, reframing these conflicts through a Māori name that reflects the depth of mātauranga Māori allows us to question and reframe historical accounts of nineteenth-century Aotearoa New Zealand in a way which empowers Māori. If we continue to privilege Pākehā words, narratives, values, and experiences of these conflicts, true pai mārire between Māori, Pākehā and the Crown will never be achieved.

Te Rirerire Hau e pupuhi tonu ana. The merciful breath of life continues to blow.

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Locating 'Home' in New Zealand's Cultural History

Friederike Voit

Essay Prompt: Do Cultural History approaches change the way we think about Aotearoa/New Zealand's past?

Contemplating her Canterbury house, the settler Sarah Courage remarked that "all was still and restful, making one feel it was 'home.'"[24] This sense of belonging, however, has often been denied to her by historians. It goes unrecognised in the nationalistic arc of early cultural history, which holds that nineteenth century settlers considered Britain their 'Home' until twentieth century residents located 'home' in New Zealand. This essay acknowledges the impact of this nationalistic thesis while arguing that more recent cultural history calls for a new interpretation. By exploring Pākehā New Zealanders' conceptions of 'home,' it exemplifies how

Fig 4: An Edwardian villa, the most common type of home in Colonial New Zealand until the Californian Bungalow

[24] Katherine Raine, 'Domesticating the Land: Colonial Women's Gardening,' in Bronwyn Dalley and Bronwyn Labrum, eds., *Fragments: New Zealand Social and Cultural History*, Auckland, 2000, p.94.

cultural history changes our understanding of New Zealand's past. First, I will demonstrate how constructions of place challenge the nineteenth century side of this nationalistic arc. Settlers did not simply import their British 'Homeland' but built a new New Zealand 'home.' Second, I will consider commercial cultures in the mid-twentieth century, arguing that later New Zealand residents maintained the notion of Britain as 'Home' as a marketing strategy. Having challenged both phases of the nationalistic narrative, I will then explore commemorative culture to instead position 'home' as an entry-point to a transnational history of New Zealand. Through a broad scope which takes three approaches in different chronological periods, I thus hope to illustrate how recent developments in cultural history allow us to rethink 'home' across many facets of New Zealand's past. Far from defining the nation, this concept becomes a powerful way to situate New Zealand within the wider world.

To contextualise my argument, it is necessary to outline the nationalist interpretation of 'home' advanced in early New Zealand cultural history. Keith Sinclair's 1986 *A Destiny Apart: New Zealand's Search for National Identity* best expresses this, contrasting nineteenth century settlers who "referred to Great Britain as 'Home,'" with twentieth century New Zealand residents' "resentment towards [British] 'Homies'".[25] This was a seminal thesis in New Zealand historiography, not least because of Sinclair's innovative application of cultural history methodologies to a New Zealand context. In contrast, earlier social historians like W.H. Oliver had foregrounded demographic patterns. Sinclair's exploration of the concept of 'home,' however, demonstrates how all three cultural themes of this essay became areas of historical focus. He suggests that "the nation is moulded by the place," while commercial cultures temporarily "strengthened imperial bonds," and commemoration constituted "an occasion for national self-assertion".[26] *A Destiny Apart* thus exemplifies how cultural history opens the door

[25] Keith Sinclair. *A Destiny Apart: New Zealand's Search for National Identity*, Wellington, 1986, pp.94, 104.
[26] ibid., pp.7;108;181.

to innumerable new approaches. Sinclair's aggregation of these approaches into a single national identity narrative, however, has been challenged by later cultural historians. Peter Gibbons suggests that nationalistic histories "conceal how national identity is fabricated within… colonisation".[27] This argument can be extended further: not only are the ongoing legacies of cultural colonisation obscured by nationalistic histories, but also the stories of settlers like Courage making themselves 'at home.' *A Destiny Apart* is thus a fruitful starting-point not just in illustrating the methodological innovations of cultural history, but in exploring how recent cultural historians have challenged Sinclair's placement of 'home' within a nationalistic narrative.

The nineteenth century chapter of Sinclair's narrative, which posits that settlers constructed New Zealand in the image of their British 'Homeland,' can be interrogated through an exploration of places like physical homes. These homes sought to recreate Britain but were ultimately unsuccessful. Before arriving here, it was easy for settlers to imaginatively imprint their 'Home' on New Zealand. Surveyor Samuel Cobham's 1840 plan of Wellington, for instance, positioned the city on the Hutt River like London on the Thames.[28] Houses were situated in a grid reminiscent of large European cities.[29] In this way, maps discursively constructed settlers' homes. As Tony Ballantyne suggests, they created "imperial potentiality," which convinced colonists that New Zealand would become like their 'Homeland'.[30] Attempts at actualising this intention, however, were ineffectual. Many settlers arrived with prefabricated 'Manning houses' in an English cottage style, complete with glazed windows.[31] While historians like Ben Schrader suggest that these visually "provided… an imprint of home," a cultural history

[27] Peter Gibbons, 'Cultural Colonisation and National Identity.' *New Zealand Journal of History*, 36, 1, 2002, p.14.
[28] Ben Schrader, *The Big Smoke: New Zealand Cities, 1840 – 1920*, Wellington, 2016, p.53.
[29] ibid.
[30] Tony Ballantyne, *Webs of Empire: Locating New Zealand's Colonial Past*, Wellington, 2012, p.238.
[31] Schrader, p.77.

approach must also consider the discourse around these houses.[32] Contemporary accounts demonstrate that they were, in fact, 'unsettled.' One woman described them as mere "huts and barracks," while another bemoaned that a lack of English furniture made hers "uncivilised".[33] As Conal McCarthy argues, "different discourses create different objects," with this particular discourse creating uncomfortable, unsettled homes.[34] While Sinclair was correct that nineteenth century settlers expected to recreate Britain, their physical homes reveal that this intention was never actualised.

Instead, settlers constructed a distinctly New Zealand conception of 'home.' While McCarthy's model positions houses as the passive products of discourse, they were active agents in this process. As Schrader notes, "the city is… a protagonist" in history, and this holds true for individual homes.[35] Gothic revival houses, for instance, demonstrate how distinctly New Zealand architectural features emerged despite the desire to replicate the British 'Homeland'. Architect B.W. Mountfort built several such houses yet was forced to replace traditional English stone with locally available wood.[36] Similarly, his design for the Governor's residence in Auckland included a non-Gothic arcade in deference to New Zealand's sunnier climate.[37] Out of necessity, therefore, settlers' houses developed on a distinctly New Zealand trajectory. This development shaped the cultural conception of 'home,' by "divorcing [Gothic architecture] from its Roman Catholic origins and giving [it] a democratic cast".[38] Moreover, homes and gardens were also agents in the creation of a uniquely New Zealand domestic routine. While women in Britain rarely took up gardening, settler women did. This encouraged creativity, with Sarah Deans interspersing different tree species to create leafy British flags.[39] The resulting garden

[32] ibid., p.82.
[33] Erin Ford Cozens, "'With a pretty little garden at the back": domesticity and the construction of 'civilised' colonial spaces in nineteenth-century Aotearoa/New Zealand,' *Journal of World History* 25, 4, 2014, pp.520-21.
[34] Conal McCarthy, *Exhibiting Māori: A History of Colonial Cultures of Display*, Wellington, 2007, p.14.
[35] Schrader, p.18.
[36] Barbara Brookes, ed., *At Home in New Zealand: History, Houses, People*, Wellington, 2000, p.7.
[37] ibid.
[38] ibid., p.18.
[39] Raine, p.92.

became a social space for family gatherings.[40] As Katherine Raine argues, gardening thus "provided new roles for [women]".[41] This makes the 'Home'-oriented iconography of Sarah Deans' garden particularly ironic, as its creation and maintenance facilitated a novel New Zealand 'home life'. In another challenge to Sinclair's nationalistic narrative, it emerges that settlers not only failed to recreate their British 'Home', but actually became 'at home' in New Zealand.

Some settlers enthusiastically embraced this development, incorporating Māori culture into their new conception of 'home.' Sinclair disparages such phenomena as "premature nationalism," but physical homes suggests otherwise.[42] Settlers selected Māori words like Matitiki as names for homes, with interiors which imitated Māori art.[43] J.H. Menzies' Rehutai, for instance, had rafters with kowhaiwhai motifs and a koru-embellished fireplace.[44] Historian Anna Peterson denies that this reflects a sense of belonging in New Zealand, characterising it as "European appreciation of Māori art".[45] Considering these houses through Peter Gibbons' lens of cultural colonisation, however, it becomes evident that they were appropriative tools to make settlers feel 'at home.' Just as effectively as violence, whakairo decorations placed Māori culture into Pākehā hands. Settlers like Menzies thus participated in indigenous traditions in order to 'indigenise' themselves and cement their sense of belonging in New Zealand. However, homes were also the sites of genuinely reciprocal interactions between Māori and settlers, which reinforced this sense of belonging while undermining cultural colonisation. Surveyor Samuel Stephens, for instance, noted that the Rangatira Erino "had got his house ready for our reception… and joined us in our meal".[46] This hospitality demonstrates the agency of Māori in inviting settlers to feel 'at home' in New Zealand. As Giselle Byrnes argues, "place is space…

[40] ibid., p.87.
[41] ibid., p.84.
[42] Sinclair, p.46.
[43] Brookes, p.58.
[44] ibid., p.61.
[45] ibid., p.57.
[46] Giselle Byrnes, *Boundary Markers: Land Surveying and the Colonisation of New Zealand*, Wellington, 2015, p.120.

given meaning".[47] While the meaning which nineteenth century settlers ascribed to their houses certainly had British roots, it grew into a distinctly New Zealand conception of 'home'.

Clearly, a more nuanced exploration of place dismantles the nineteenth century side of Sinclair's nationalistic arc. Turning now to twentieth century commercial cultures, cultural history also deconstructs Sinclair's oversimplistic thesis that later New Zealanders rejected Britain as 'Home'. Instead, this imperial connection was employed to convince British consumers that New Zealand products were 'homemade.' As British Colonial Secretary Leopold Amery announced in 1924, "Our goal in this century is that [people] can think imperially in ordinary business".[48] Accordingly, British consumers were told to buy New Zealand products because "there's no place like home".[49] Historian James Belich argues that this commercial positioning of New Zealand within the British 'Homeland' reinforced imperial ties, as "British re-colonial outsourcing created .... 'Greater Britain'".[50] While this thesis is compelling, it is important to note that commodity-based 'recolonisation' – like all cultural colonisation – was not imposed by Britain. Indeed, New Zealand businesses enthusiastically adopted 'Home' rhetoric. Advertisements such as "New Zealand lamb. Produced by Britons for British Homes," blurred the distinction between colony and metropolis.[51] It thus becomes clear that empire shopping reflects Pakeha New Zealanders' own conceptions of their 'home' as culturally British. Sinclair's derision of twentieth century discussion about the British 'Homeland' as "nonsense" is challenged by commercial cultures, which demonstrate how New Zealanders strategically identified themselves as British.[52]

[47] Giselle Byrnes, '"A dead sheet covered with meaningless words?" Place Names and the Cultural Colonisation of Tauranga,' *New Zealand Journal of History*, 36, 1, 2002, p.27.
[48] Jonathan Moore, 'Selling Empire: A Historical Perspective on Selling Foreign Products in Domestic Markets,' *Journal of Historical Research in Marketing*, 8, 2, 2016, p.265.
[49] ibid., p.273.
[50] James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-world, 1783-1939*, Oxford, 1956, p.451.
[51] Felicity Barnes, *New Zealand's London: A Colony and its Metropolis*, Auckland, 2002, p.164.
[52] Sinclair, p.96.

In order to avoid Sinclair's fallacy of oversimplification, however, it must be emphasised that the twentieth century conception of Britain as 'Home' was not mutually exclusive with a sense of belonging in New Zealand. These two 'homes' reinforced each other, with the promotion of New Zealand as British advancing the country. New Zealand's pavilion in the 1924-25 British Empire Exhibition at Wembley had a distinctly British flavour, with a restaurant operated by English catering company Lyons and a 'Māori house' that was quickly removed.[53] This 'British' New Zealand asserted superiority over the exotic exhibits of the dependent colonies, and even over Canada's heavily-criticised butter sculpture of the Prince of Wales with the indigenous Tschantoga people.[54] As such, Wembley was a display of panoptic time, juxtaposing the stages of 'civilisation' side-by-side.[55] New Zealand's 'Home-style' pavilion located the country near the top of this hierarchy, "[expressing] the dominion's role within the 'world order,'" as Felicity Barnes argues.[56] Beyond fostering national pride in a general sense, New Zealand's emphasis on Britain as 'Home' also fostered a specific national identity. New Zealand became a rural British farm, selling British consumers "lamb direct from those sunbathed pasturelands".[57] Social historians like Miles Fairburn rejected this 'rural myth' on quantitative grounds.[58] A cultural history approach, however, highlights its significance: Britain's mythical Arcadian past became New Zealand's national identity.[59] As such, Sinclair's progression from nineteenth century nostalgia for the British 'Homeland' to a twentieth century assertion of New Zealand as 'home' has been deconstructed from both ends. 'Home' has always signified a combination of both places, as explorations of physical homes and commodity cultures demonstrate.

Having established that recent approaches in cultural history undermine Sinclair's nationalist narrative of 'home', it now becomes apparent that this concept – through a cultural history lens

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[53] Barnes, p.140.
[54] ibid., p.142.
[55] Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest*, Oxford, 1995, p.40.
[56] Barnes, p.147.
[57] ibid., p.160.
[58] Miles Fairburn, 'The Rural Myth and the New Urban Frontier: An Approach to New Zealand Social History, 1870-1940,' *New Zealand Journal of History* 9, 1, 1975, p.9. Note that Fairburn's approach is closer to cultural history elsewhere in the article.
[59] ibid., p.6.

– tells a transnational story. Commemorative cultures, beginning with the short-lived Empire Day, reveal that complex constructions of 'home' were common across settler societies. As Brad Beaven and John Griffiths argue, in each colony, "local contexts informed the character of Empire Day."[60] In New Zealand, the holiday merged imperial and local 'homes,' as typical celebrations included the laying of a foundation stone at an Auckland veterans' home.[61] Australia similarly encouraged local businesses to create imperial window displays.[62] While Empire Day commemorations thus demonstrate the peculiarly local nature of each nation's imperial sentiment, it also highlights that this complex relationship to 'Home' was a transnational phenomenon. Indeed, the discourse around commemorations openly acknowledges these similar conceptions of 'home.' On Anzac Day in 1922, for instance, the *Press* proudly described the Empire as a foster home where "the Empress [was] foster-mother of them all."[63] Such emotional metaphors can be understood through emotions history frameworks. Each nations' pride in the imperial 'Home' was not a hegemonic emotional regime, but a group of closely related and fluid emotional communities.[64] As Auckland's Bishop Averill said the same day, New Zealand had earned its place in "the great family of self-governing nations which comprise the British Empire."[65] An exploration of 'home' in commemorative culture thus foregrounds the transnational similarities between New Zealand and other settler societies.

Even after New Zealand's connection to Britain weakened in the late-twentieth century, 'home' continued to hold transnational significance in commemorations. The growing redefinition of 'home' in both New Zealand and Australian war commemoration illustrates this. On Armistice

[60] Brad Beaven and John Griffiths, "The City and Imperial Propaganda: A Comparative Study of Empire Day in England, Australia and New Zealand c. 1903-1914," *Journal of Urban History* 42, 2, 2016, p.390.
[61] ibid., p.393.
[62] ibid., p.388.
[63] Worthy, p.189.
[64] For this concept, see Barbara Rosenwein, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages*, Bristol, 2006.
[65] Scott Worthy, 'A Debt of Honour: New Zealanders' First Anzac Days,' *New Zealand Journal of History* 36, 2, 2002, p.190.

Day in 1993, Australia repatriated an Unknown Soldier in order to "bury… the connection with empire".[66] While outwardly nationalistic, conceptualising this repatriation as an invented tradition reveals its transnational significance. In this light, Australia's decision set a precedent for New Zealand's 2004 repatriation of the Unknown Warrior, which similarly "located his 'home' in New Zealand".[67] Commemorations thus demonstrate that New Zealand's late-twentieth century definition of 'home' as the nation is not unique but reflects a Trans-Tasman pattern. As historian Rowan Light argues, "the Anzac nations [were] defined by this modern relationship."[68] This becomes explicit in the positioning of Gallipoli as a joint 'home' or 'birthplace' for New Zealand and Australia. For Anzac Day in 1990, for instance, both countries broadcasted the documentary *The Boys Who Came Home*, which followed veterans returning to Gallipoli.[69] This calls for an expansion of Amitzai Etzioni's argument that commemoration fosters recommitment within societies.[70] The expression of 'home' performed during Anzac Day commemorations not only reinforced individuals' commitment to New Zealand, but transnationally connected New Zealand to Australia through Turkey. In Peter Gibbons' words, it foregrounds "the world's place in New Zealand".[71] A cultural history approach to 'home' not only disproves Sinclair's hypothesis of the concept's nationalistic development but offers a transnational alternative.

At first glance, 'home' is an inward-looking concept. Early New Zealand cultural historians certainly treated it this way, constructing a nationalistic progression in which 'home' solely signified Britain in the nineteenth and New Zealand in the twentieth century. This essay has shown, however, that newer cultural history approaches challenge both phases of this narrative.

[66] Rowan Light, *Anzac Nations: The Legacy of Gallipoli in New Zealand and Australia 1965-2015,* Dunedin, 2022, p.109.
[67] ibid., p.121.
[68] ibid., p.152.
[69] ibid., p.81.
[70] Amitzai Etzioni, *We Are What We Celebrate: Understanding Holidays and Rituals*, Manhatten, 2004, p.11.
[71] Peter Gibbons, 'The Far Side of the Search for Identity: Reconsidering New Zealand History,' *New Zealand Journal of History*, 37, 1, 2003, p.47.

Constructions of place demonstrate that nineteenth century settlers made themselves 'at home' in New Zealand, while twentieth century commercial cultures reveal strategic references to the British 'Homeland.' While these approaches thus destabilise Sinclair's nationalistic framework of 'home,' commemorative cultures demonstrate that this concept instead tells a compelling transnational story. 'Home' thus provides a rich example of how cultural history changes our understanding of New Zealand's past, opening the door to further re-evaluations.

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Blood and Ink: The Battle Between Historians over Australia's Frontier History

Anneke Hutt

Essay Prompt: Analyse the different historical approaches and methods made by historians writing on Frontier Contact in Australian History.

In 2005, Bain Attwood wrote that to take pride in a nation's past, one must be prepared to accept the bad.[73] He was referring to the heated 'history wars' between historians over Australian frontier contact history in the second half of the twentieth century. These 'history wars' were triggered by the 'dispossession-resistance' historians of the Seventies who sought to end the 'Great Australian Silence'. In response, historians such as Lyndall Ryan and Henry Reynolds began placing Aboriginal experiences at the centre of their histories, arguing for a frontier of conflict. Conservative revisionists such as Richard Broome and Kevin Windschuttle

Fig 7: Aboriginal Lives Matter Protest Fist, used at demonstrations today.
[73] Bain Attwood, *Telling the Truth about Aboriginal History*, Sydney, 2005, p.196.

argued these 'orthodox historians' had exaggerated the death tolls and proposed a counter-history that wiped white settlers of accountability. This resulted in backlash and debate from historians all over Australia, revealing how easily history can become politicised. Through a close examination of the historiography, this essay will reveal the dynamics of the frontier contact 'history wars', and argue that complex histories and reasonable discussion should be prioritised over a historiography of historian-bashing if history is to support Aboriginal reconciliation.

In the late Nineties and early 2000s, there was a war over Aboriginal history that had "serious consequences for both historical understanding and public life".[74] This 'history war' began in the Seventies with a concerted effort to break the 'Great Australian Silence', critiquing narratives of Australian history that failed to address Aboriginal dispossession and described the frontier as an example of "glorious pioneering".[75] These Seventies historians, using a 'dispossession-resistance' approach, described settlement as an invasion and the frontier as a place of "conflict and killing".[76] By doing so, they placed Aboriginal histories at the centre of their narratives. This was a time of a "black renaissance", where historical interest in Aboriginal history led to a growth in understanding and tolerance among white Australians alongside renewed advocacy for reconciliation between the government and indigenous people.[77] Lyndall Ryan and Henry Reynolds built on this movement in the Eighties and Nineties, portraying a more complex but still violent frontier contact history of Aboriginal "dispossession and extermination".[78]

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[74] ibid., p.vii.
[75] Richard Broome, 'Aboriginal Victims and Voyagers, Confronting Frontier Myths', *Journal of Australian Studies,* 18, 42, 1994, p.71; Robert Manne, 'Introduction', in Robert Manne, ed., *Whitewash; on Keith Windschuttle's Fabrication of Aboriginal history*, Melbourne, 2003, p.2.
[76] Bill Thorpe, 'Frontiers of discourse: Assessing Revisionist Australian Colonial Contact History', *Journal of Australian Studies*, 19, 46, 1995, p.44; Broome, pp.70-71.
[77] Henry Reynolds, *Frontier: Aborigines, Settlers and Land*, Sydney, 1987, p.ix; Ryan, Lyndall, *The Aboriginal Tasmanians,* 2nd ed., NSW, 1996, p.xx; A. Dirk Moses, 'Revisionism and Denial', in Robert Manne, ed., *Whitewash; on Keith Windschuttle's Fabrication of Aboriginal history*, Melbourne, 2003, p.10.
[78] Ryan, p.3.

Ryan and Reynolds remain experts in Aboriginal history. Reynolds argued that the Australian frontier was characterised by "persistent racial violence", leading to an estimated 20,000 Aboriginal deaths over 150 years.[79] White settlement was described as a bloody revolution that featured "grossly disproportionate and indiscriminate" killing in response to Aboriginal attacks.[80] Ryan aimed to "demolish the myth of 'the last Tasmanian'" to support surviving Aboriginal Tasmanians in reclaiming their identity.[81] She argued that Aboriginal Tasmanians faced "near-extinction" due to colonial policies, the abduction of women and the shooting of their people.[82] Ryan noted that even in the Nineties, white Tasmanians and the Australian government still regarded Tasmanian Aborigines as "a dead people", to clear themselves of any responsibility for reconciliation.[83] Both Reynolds and Ryan argue for a complex frontier contact history, featuring everything from philanthropic individuals, cross-cultural tolerance, social and economic exchange to violence and warfare initiated by both settlers and Aborigines with different motives and strategies.[84] Reynolds, Ryan and Bill Thorpe all described Aboriginal society as warlike and "a formidable, courageous, and highly mobile resistance movement" that utilised guerrilla warfare.[85] Consequently, Thorpe argues that most interactions between Aborigines and settlers had serious "and often fatal consequences".[86] However, Reynolds often described the conflict as "warfare rather than one-sided slaughter".[87] The revisionists of the late Nineties and early 2000s attacked this thesis of persistent violence as an exaggeration, leading to the climax of the 'history wars'.

[79] Reynolds, pp.viii; 4; 189.
[80] ibid., pp.30, 33.
[81] Ryan, pp.1; 257-260.
[82] ibid., p.257.
[83] ibid., p.255.
[84] Broome, p.72; Mark Gibson, "Henry Reynolds and Aboriginal History: (Post)colonialism and the Claiming of the Past," *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, 1, 1, 1998, p.151; Stuart Macintyre and Anna Clark, *The History Wars*, Melbourne, 2004, p.164, Ryan, p.xxii; Reynolds, pp.83; 191.
[85] Reynolds, p.53; Ryan, pp.4; 122.
[86] Thorpe, pp.36-37.
[87] Gibson, p.150.

According to Thorpe, right-wing revisionist historians of the late Nineties and early 2000s had an agenda to construct "a less painful and more acceptable past for non-Aboriginal Australians".[88] Revisionist historians believed direct factual evidence and government-authorised sources were the only valid sources of evidence, especially regarding death tolls.[89] Notable revisionists included Richard Broome and Keith Windschuttle, who argued that the frontier violence described by other historians was exaggerated and placed too much responsibility on settlers for Aboriginal deaths. Broome argued that previous historians had painted Aborigines as one-sided victims of massacre, failing to note how they were willing to exploit and negotiate with settlers and initiate "protracted battles".[90] Windschuttle attacked and critically examined the footnotes of 'orthodox historians' like Reynolds and Ryan, claiming their argument of a "conscious, wilful genocide" had no empirical foundation.[91] Instead, Windschuttle proposed a counter-history where frontier violence was limited to "rare and isolated" events since Christian settlers would have fostered restraint.[92] Both settlers and Aborigines, Windschuttle contended, were guilty of initiating violence.[93] Broome and Windschuttle both maintained that the Aboriginal death tolls were exaggerated, arguing that unreported deaths should not be included to the extent that they were in Reynolds' and Ryan's calculations, though Broome does support Reynolds' estimate of 20,000.[94] Windschuttle created his own table of deaths, 'revealing' that more British were killed than Aborigines.[95] However, his methods are questionable. Windschuttle claimed Aboriginal population decline was due to introduced diseases and the selling of Aboriginal women, describing Aboriginals as "active agents of their own demise".[96] Windschuttle also argued against Reynolds' and Ryan's 'guerrilla warfare' thesis, boldly claiming that Aborigines were incapable of any organised

[88] ibid., p.35.
[89] Moses, p.13; Keith Windschuttle, *The Fabrication of Aboriginal History: Volume One: Van Diemen's Land 1803-1847*, Sydney, 2002, p.4.
[90] Broome, pp.71-73; 76.
[91] Windschuttle, p.3.
[92] Manne, p.4; Windschuttle, p.197.
[93] ibid.
[94] Broome, pp.73-74.
[95] Manne, pp.4-6.
[96] Windschuttle, pp.2; 386.

resistance movement, only attacking settlers for revenge and plunder.[97] Such polemical revisionist historiography attracted an extensive response from Australian historians as the 'history wars' raged on.

Several historians responded to Windschuttle's "ignorant" book, calling him an "apologist for the British Empire" who implicitly endorsed the policies of the perpetrators.[98] A. Dirk Moses argued that Windschuttle is a denialist who seeks to rewrite history by offering "preposterous counter-explanations" using a "far from convincing chain of evidentiary reasoning".[99] Crucially, Windschuttle rejects historians' use of interpretive frameworks like inference and generalisations to capture Aboriginal experiences when analysing primary sources dominated by the settler perspective, despite deploying the same 'guesswork' when creating his death toll table.[100] Stuart Macintyre and Mark Gibson argue that Windschuttle excusing death tolls as a consequence of illness leads to "an exoneration of responsibility" for white Australians.[101] Historians accused Windschuttle of creating a straw man argument by claiming 'orthodox historians' had a 'genocide thesis', when the argument was for "pervasive but small-scale violence."[102] Reynolds argued against complete genocide, while Ryan and Broome acknowledged that surviving Aborigines were victims of a conscious policy of cultural genocide through forced assimilation.[103] Bain Attwood noted that, even if not true, Aboriginal people believe the term 'genocide' best captures their understanding of their historical experience and, therefore, should not be rejected.[104] According to Bill Thorpe, Broome's argument that Aboriginals were not all victims implies that those massacred were "somehow less brave" than those who fought, which also serves to diminish them.[105] Thorpe argues that frontier

[97] ibid., pp.3, 130, 399.
[98] Manne, p.8; Macintyre and Clark, p.166; Moses, p.14.
[99] Moses, pp.2; 13-15; Manne, p.4.
[100] Attwood, p.118; Windschuttle, p.259; Thorpe, p.42; Reynolds, p.vii; Macintyre and Clark, pp.166-167.
[101] Gibson, p.151; Macintyre and Clark, p.160.
[102] Macintyre and Clark, p.163; Attwood, p.8; Moses, p.17.
[103] Broome, p.77; Ryan, p.255.
[104] Attwood, p.8.
[105] Thorpe, pp.38-39.

relationships need to be understood in their specific context of power, and that instead of the revisionist 'accommodation and cooperation', more accurate terms would include "'uneven negotiation' and 'contested subjection'".[106] Ultimately, Windschuttle's revisionist argument and the ensuing debate it triggered distracted from and damaged the Aboriginal cause for reconciliation.

Frontier contact histories have helped and hindered Aboriginal movements. John Howard's government utilised revisionist histories to reject moves for reconciliation, while Reynolds' work was used as evidence in the Mabo case to recognise native title.[107] Already historians are predicting that the popularity of the revisionist movement will throw into doubt evidence that Australia was founded on bloodshed, damaging any prospects for Aboriginal justice.[108] Revisionists may argue that the 'Great Australian Silence' is a myth, but if historians fail to assert their authority and remain deaf to Aboriginal voices, these 'history wars' could soon lead to the 'Great Australian Indifference'.[109] There will be no reconciliation without acknowledging the shame associated with Australia's controversial past, and that requires complex histories and continued debate.[110]

With historians publishing more histories of Australian frontier contact, there has been a "greater demand for historical truth".[111] Though Thorpe argues the focus should move towards neo-conflict perspectives, historical truth can only be achieved through the publication of multiple complex histories and civilised debates between historians.[112] Despite a historian's best intentions, history can never be truly objective, as illustrated by both sides of the 'history wars'

[106] ibid., p.41.
[107] Ryan, p.256.
[108] Broome, p.74; Attwood, p.7.
[109] Windschuttle, p.415; Manne, p.8; Attwood, p.105.
[110] Moses, p.9; Thorpe, p.45; Macintyre and Clark, pp.144; 158; 169-170.
[111] Attwood, pp.5; 58.
[112] Thorpe, p.44; Broome, p.71.

being accused of adopting a political stance.[113] The brutal 'history wars' over Australian frontier contact reveal how history has become "inescapably political", and begs the question of whether this spells the end for genuine historical debate.[114] Claiming that other historians write 'mythologies' which perpetuate 'black victimhood and white guilt' only widens the division between both sides of the debate and leads to the formation of simple, opposing histories.[115] Instead of wasting precious words attempting to damage reputations through claims of falsifying evidence, historiography should engage with the actual history itself.[116]

It is the duty of historians to assist in the reinterpretation of the past and to adjust world outlooks, and Australia has a "particularly difficult past to confront".[117] The 'history wars' of the second half of the twentieth century concerning Australian frontier contact have resulted in several interpretations and re-interpretations of the nation's colonial past. These differing histories have profoundly shaped the outlooks of politicians and white Australians in particular, not always in the support of reconciliation. What began in the Seventies as an effort to move away from the 'Great Australian Silence' led to the complex histories of Ryan and Reynolds, who argued Aboriginals had suffered at the hands of white settlers. The revisionist movement followed, featuring the scathing attacks and claims of exaggerated death tolls by Broome and Windschuttle. The response was equally as critical but did little to further any moves for reconciliation. To prevent the revisionist movement from completely dismantling the efforts of the Seventies and Eighties, civilised debate and the publication of complex histories must continue so that the Australian government can understand the suffering of the Aboriginal people and recognise the importance of reconciliation.

[113] Attwood, p.84; Moses, p.18; Windschuttle, pp.28; 402; Gibson, p.146.
[114] Attwood, p.6; Windschuttle, pp.402-403; Macintyre and Clark, p.164.
[115] Windschuttle, p.10; Broome, p.77.
[116] Thorpe, p.44; Macintyre and Clark, p.168.
[117] Ryan, p.260; Attwood, p.1.

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The American Pursuit of a Flexible Freedom

Samuel Turner-O'Keeffe

Essay Prompt: 'The meanings and boundaries of freedom have been as contested as the word's definition itself'. Assess the following statement in light of the changing meanings and boundaries of freedom in the United States from the American Revolution to present day.

The contemporary United States is a far cry from its beginning. The country covers ten times the territory, boasts 132 times the population, and enjoys a far richer mixture of cultures and influences than it did upon independence. Yet the ostensibly-perpetual American purpose—the pursuit of freedom—has witnessed the greatest change of all. While early American freedom centred on the exercise of individual liberties by white men free from government tyranny, later interpretations radically challenged this understanding. Racial and sexual boundaries excluding many Americans from freedom were increasingly transcended. Likewise, the growth of the interventionist, 'socially-conscious state' led to increased positive freedoms alongside

Fig 7: The Statue of Liberty, a ubiquitous symbol of American 'freedom and democracy'.

negative freedoms.[119] From this, a vision of an indiscriminate, flexible American freedom prevails today. This contemporary understanding involves the state actively providing some freedoms, while exercising restraint to preserve others, for the benefit of all people. However, this vision has become subject to bitter disharmony and debate, mostly concerning the relative importance of state intervention compared to non-intervention. Consequently, while the American pursuit of freedom now follows a new path, on the horizon its wondrous, shimmering form looks to be a mirage.

The original vision of American freedom differed markedly from its modern counterpart. Upon independence, to be 'free' in America was to enjoy individual liberties free from the threat of government intervention.[120] This concept was drawn directly from the American colonies' experience of oppressive British government.[121] In the mid-eighteenth century, Britain had emerged near-bankrupt from the Seven Years' War, and in pursuit of economic relief chose to levy new taxes and enforce pre-existing trade controls on the colonies.[122] This was highly unpopular amongst colonists. Having no representation in Parliament, the colonies deemed the British measures unlawful, and accused Parliament of tyrannical rule.[123] When Britain responded by sending its troops into colonial cities, locals were exposed to the realities of British brutality, and were roused to defend their liberties.[124] For example, shoemaker George Hewes witnessed the Boston Massacre and was seriously assaulted by a local loyalist, events which encouraged him to participate in the Boston Tea Party and eventually in the War of Independence.[125] During that war, the Declaration of Independence was drafted in 1776,

[119] Eric Foner, *Give me liberty!*, New York, 2010, p.854.
[120] ibid., pp.203-204.
[121] ibid., p.199.
[122] ibid., p.186.
[123] ibid., p.187.
[124] Frederick M. Binder, and David M Reimers., 'People at War: Society During the American Revolution', in Frederick M. Binder and David M. Reimers, eds, *The Way We Lived: Essays and Documents in American Social History*, New York, 2000, p.122.
[125] ibid.

followed by the Bill of Rights in 1791 after conflict ended.[126] Those two documents stressed the sanctity of individual liberty from government repression, considering every man equal and granting freedoms of speech, worship and public assembly.[127] However, these new freedoms were beset by a chilling irony: only white men were afforded them. Voting, property ownership and other basic rights of modern American citizenship were almost completely denied to everyone else.[128] Thus, the original concept of American freedom was truly distinct from its modern edition, not only in its vehement opposition to government intervention on most levels, but also by its complete exclusion of a majority of the population along ethnic and sexual lines.

It was only by the mid-nineteenth century that the United States took its first steps towards modern visions of an indiscriminate American freedom, when the ethnic boundaries confining freedom to whites were challenged. Both the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights failed to abolish slavery, meaning the American slave trade continued to thrive.[129] Southern states in particular depended on slave labour due to the heavy agricultural focus of their economies. To justify this practice, many slaveholders in the South appropriated individualist notions of American freedom.[130] Some Southerners reasoned that enslaving blacks was necessary to free whites from menial labour. Others argued that since slaves were private property, abolition would violate the rights of white slaveholders to hold their property freely.[131] In response, abolitionism spread in the North, challenging those arguments and campaigning for the expansion of American freedom to blacks.[132] Among abolitionist literature, Frederick Douglass' *Narrative* and *What to the Slave is the Fourth of July?* were influential in encouraging many Northerners to oppose slavery. Douglass' works detailed the horrors of his

[126] Foner, *Give me liberty!*, p.202.
[127] ibid., p.278.
[128] ibid., p.288.
[129] ibid., p.331.
[130] ibid., p.425.
[131] ibid., p.240.
[132] ibid., p.467.

own enslavement in Maryland, and deplored the United States for its hypocrisy in preaching the virtues of freedom while simultaneously denying it to so many on racial grounds.[133] This division eventually sparked the American Civil War, from which the Union emerged victorious in 1865.[134] Slavery was outlawed nationwide and eventually freed slaves were made American citizens, extending the boundaries of freedom to blacks.[135] Yet this was largely bombast. Most ex-slaves were denied any compensation for their subjugation, and laws passed in the South during and after Reconstruction (dubbed 'Jim Crow' laws) limited African-American freedom in practice, preventing many blacks from voting or working for reasonable pay.[136] Thus, while the boundaries of American freedom were certainly expanded to include African-Americans in the mid-nineteenth century, this development was mostly in theory. Most legislation simply extended individualism, rather than changing American freedom's fundamental meaning. Nevertheless, a step was taken on the path towards the indiscriminate freedom that is so revered in modernity.

The specific meaning, rather than simply the boundaries, of American freedom was only truly challenged once the Progressive Era emerged (1890-1920) as focus shifted from strict individualism to embracing social welfare. After the Civil War, the United States witnessed the Gilded Age (1870-1890), during which time the country's urban manufacturing industries boomed.[137] However, as Glenda Gilmore notes, the foundation of that boom—a traditional rejection of government interference, in favour of the unrestricted exercise of individual economic freedoms—left some groups vulnerable to exploitation.[138] State non-intervention in

[133] Frederick Douglass and Benjamin Quarles, ed., *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, An American Slave, Written by Himself*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1988, p. 28; Frederick Douglass, "What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July?", in Frederick Douglass and David W. Blight, ed., *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, An American Slave, Written by Himself*, Boston, 2003, p. 59.
[134] Foner, *Give me liberty!*, p.578.
[135] ibid., p. 577.
[136] ibid., p. 692.
[137] ibid., p. 633.
[138] Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore, 'Responding to the Challenges of the Progressive Era', in Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore and Richard Hofstadter, eds, *Who were the progressives?*, Boston, 2002, p.12.

business markets allowed monopolies to develop, which deprived workers of the power to demand reasonable wages and good working conditions.[139] Likewise, the absence of state regulation in the property market—supposedly to preserve the sanctity of private property rights—allowed property owners to exploit poor urban workers by 'crowd[ing] boarders into unhealthy tenements'.[140] Progressives sought to prevent these power abuses.[141] Consequently, thinkers like John Dewey developed the radical concept of 'positive' or 'effective freedoms'; that is, the provision by the government to the populace of the "power to do specific things".[142] This challenged an American freedom previously characterised by mere protection from governmental restraint. Progressivism resulted in the growth of the American Federation of Labor, which demanded better pay for skilled male workers, the abolition of child labour and the introduction of an eight-hour working day.[143] Likewise, the Taft administration oversaw the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment, which authorised Congress to enact a progressive income tax.[144] Granted, these measures were tame in comparison to today, and often excluded groups along ethnic or sexual lines. For instance, all members of the American Federation of Labor were white.[145] Yet the Progressive Era certainly reshaped the meaning of American freedom, pioneering government intervention to combat the excesses of 'unbridled individualism' and bringing it closer to the 'flexible freedom' of modernity.

1930-1940 saw a seismic reshaping of American freedom, as its meaning began to include positive freedoms to far greater degree, and its theoretical boundaries were expanded internationally. Laissez-faire economic practices in the Twenties, which loosely reverted to the Gilded Age's classical liberal conception of American freedom, had encouraged Americans to

[139] ibid.
[140] ibid.
[141] ibid.
[142] Foner, *Give me liberty!*, p.749.
[143] Gilmore, p.9.
[144] Foner, *Give me liberty!*, p.759.
[145] Gilmore, p.9.

spend recklessly.[146] Consequently, by the Great Depression in the 1930s many were rendered unemployed and destitute.[147] In response, President Franklin Roosevelt introduced the 'New Deal'—a set of economic policies and reforms designed to "ensure a basic living standard" for all Americans.[148] This included the development of public work projects, the provision of an unemployment benefit, and the recognition of workers' right to form unions.[149] These changes instituted 'effective freedoms' more emphatically than the Progressive Era, further reshaping the meaning of American freedom to include greater provisions of positive, tangible freedoms by the state. Additionally, alongside these developments came the 'Four Freedoms', a public description of American freedom provided by Roosevelt in his 1941 address to Congress.[150] Notably, while Roosevelt endorsed freedom from want and fear—a natural extension of his own brainchild, the 'socially-conscious state'—he also attached to American freedom an internationalist quality.[151] Arguing for American involvement in the Second World War, Roosevelt suggested that to preserve American freedom, freedom should be protected abroad. In the alternative, an international coalition of unfree state (at that time, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan) could threaten domestic freedoms. [152] This truly transcended the boundaries of American freedom, as what had originally been confined to American white men was now, at least indirectly, being extended to the whole world. Thus, Roosevelt's administration played a tremendous role in bringing American freedom closer to the indiscriminate, flexible freedom of modern times. The incorporation of more government intervention in lives of citizens changed freedom's practical meaning, while the inclusion of people from other nations radically extended its theoretical boundaries.

[146] Foner, *Give me liberty!*, p.822.
[147] ibid., p.865.
[148] Jeffrey A. Engel, 'Introduction', in Jeffrey A. Engel, ed., *The Four Freedoms: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Evolution of an American Idea*, New York, 2015, p.8.
[149] Foner, *Give me liberty!*, p.865.
[150] Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Message to Congress, 1941", pp.20-21.
[151] ibid., pp.5-8.
[152] ibid.

By the 1950s, then, the theoretical boundaries of American freedom had been extended to include a diverse range of people. Yet in reality, prejudice kept freedom out of reach for many Americans.[153] In response, the Civil Rights movement pushed for a new change to the practical meaning of American freedom by encouraging government intervention in social matters to ensure that marginalised groups could access freedoms they were theoretically entitled to. For example, the 1954 Supreme Court decision in *Brown v. Board of Education* overturned the 'separate but equal doctrine' endorsed in *Plessy v. Ferguson*, rendering racial segregation in schools unconstitutional.[154] Yet Southern backlash to this decision meant that integration was not applied in practice, so the government intervened militarily on multiple occasions to enforce it. For instance, in 1957 the Arkansas National Guard was sent to Little Rock Central High School to protect nine African-American students on their journey to class, as white mobs crowded outside the school and threatened the students with violence.[155] Likewise, Jim Crow laws preventing African-Americans (and some whites) from voting—usually by making voting rights contingent on paying a poll tax or passing a literacy test—were scuppered when the state intervened to institute the 1962 Twenty-fourth Amendment and the 1965 Voting Rights Act.[156] Furthermore, Glenda Gilmore notes that while paying women less for the same work had historically been justified as an exercise of unrestrained choice, the Equal Pay Act of 1963 outlawed this practice.[157] Yet the best indicator of this shift in the definition of American freedom was the enactment of the Civil Rights Act in 1964. Here, the government intervened decisively to outlaw all discrimination on racial or sexual grounds.[158] This completely rejected freedom as constituting mere protection from government restraint. Instead, the Act reflected a growing ideological shift during the Civil Rights era, which posited that 'unbridled

[153] Foner, *Give me liberty!*, p.1036.
[154] Frederick M. Binder, and David M Reimers., 'Minorities' Struggles for Equality', in Frederick M. Binder and David M. Reimers, eds, *The Way We Lived: Essays and Documents in American Social History*, New York, 2000, p.219.
[155] ibid., p. 226.
[156] Foner, *Give me liberty!,* p.1047.
[157] Gilmore, p. 11; Foner, *Give me liberty!*, p.1066.
[158] Foner, *Give me liberty!,* p.1066.

individualism sometimes hurt[s] groups of people', requiring government intervention to ensure the provision of positive freedoms.[159]

Of course, the general American trajectory towards modern 'flexible freedom' has been rocky, and conservatism during the Seventies and Eighties certainly slowed such change in the United States. However, despite conservative tendencies to echo nineteenth century individualism when defining American freedom, this period did not witness a complete realignment with such individualism.[160] Arguably, the Nixon and even Reagan presidencies still envisioned a version of flexible freedom, even if far tamer. At the end of the Sixties, widespread white backlash to civil rights catapulted Richard Nixon into the presidency.[161] An outspoken conservative, Nixon's 'New Federalism' pushed for decreased federal power in favour of state government.[162] However, surprisingly his administration did little to reverse changes made during the Civil Rights era, and actually embarked on limited efforts to continue them.[163] Integration of schools proceeded, and Nixon even proposed affirmative action – a radical development – before eventually abandoning the proposal to preserve the support of Southern whites.[164] The 1980 election of Ronald Reagan, however, marked a stronger turn towards conservatism. Specifically, Reagan campaigned on the principles of free market neoliberalism and individual rights, uniting religious voters and libertarians.[165] His administration cut top tax rates to 'liberate the spirit of enterprise', and reduced funding for school lunches, food stamps and low-income housing.[166] Such measures clashed with the general trajectory of American freedom in previous decades (especially compared to the Sixties), prioritising "reduc[ing] the… size of

[159] Gilmore, p. 12.
[160] Foner, *Give me liberty!*, p. 1113.
[161] ibid., p.1083.
[162] ibid., p.1084.
[163] ibid., pp.1084-1085.
[164] ibid., p.1085.
[165] ibid., p.1107.
[166] ibid., p.1113; Ronald Reagan, 'President Reagan Sees a Stronger America, 1985', in Elizabeth Cobbs and Jon Gjerde eds, *Major Problems in American History; documents and essays*, Boston, 2002, p.441.

government and its influence in people's lives".[167] Yet while Reagan's administration marked the sharpest turn towards negative freedoms seen since the Twenties, he still preserved elements of the 'socially-conscious state'. For example, Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid—all 'core elements of the welfare state'—remained untouched.[168] Thus, while both Nixon and Reagan certainly advanced individualist freedoms, American freedom still remained loosely flexible, as limited government provision of 'effective freedoms' continued.

Thus, from 1990 onwards, the United States has generally embraced an indiscriminate, flexible American freedom: a freedom to be provided to all, through both state intervention and restraint. However, the degree to which the state should intervene or restrain itself to produce freedom has been subject to ferocious debate. On one hand, Reagan-era conservatism persisted throughout the Nineties, as even the Democratic Clinton administration encouraged 'government at all levels… to grow smaller', minimising spending on social programmes and instead protecting 'the "sanctity" of the free market'.[169] Yet, the Bush administration drastically escalated government surveillance over American citizens after 9/11, and during the Obama presidency Congress passed a new healthcare bill that required businesses to provide healthcare insurance to their employees, and authorised government healthcare subsidies for low-income people.[170] Eric Foner describes these Obama-era reforms as "the most far-reaching piece of domestic social legislation since the Great Society".[171] Debate over this issue—the appropriate balance that flexible freedom should strike—has contributed to unprecedented partisanship in the United States, influencing Trumpism, Antifa and the general abandonment of the political centre. Thus, while the vision of American freedom has certainly changed since independence,

[167] Reagan, p.441.
[168] Foner, *Give me liberty!*, p. 1113.
[169] Eric Foner, *The Story of American Freedom*, New York, 1998, p.324.
[170] Foner, *Give me liberty!,* p.1207.
[171] ibid.

modern understandings of the term are certainly not homogenous, increasingly straddling the outskirts of the 'flexible freedom' framework.

Overall, freedom in the United States has experienced monumental change. Beginning by protecting white men from government restrictions, and thus activating their individual liberties, American freedom's theoretical boundaries and practical meanings have been successively reshaped. More and more Americans—including African Americans, women, immigrants and other minorities—have been included within freedom's boundaries. Likewise, the endorsement of the 'socially-conscious state', which eagerly intervenes to provide positive freedoms to the populace has led American freedom away from its sole adherence to classical liberal small-scale government. Yet while American freedom now straddles this flexible balance between state provision of positive freedoms and state self-restraint to activate negative freedoms, ferocious disharmony persists over where that balance should be struck. Depressingly, while America may seem to be on the path towards a new, exciting freedom at present, on closer inspection the nation's internal divisions appear to make that a speculative pipe dream.

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A Historic Moment or Ongoing Event? Assessing when the Civil Rights Movement Begins and Ends

Jake Eagar

Essay Prompt: When did the American Civil Rights Movement begin and end? Explain and justify your answer

The Civil Rights Movement is one of the most defining and significant events in American history. It was a period where African Americans and their allies pushed for racial, legal, economic, and social equality. Although there have been many defining moments within the movement, such as the Montgomery Bus Boycott and 1968 Trenton Riots, scholars have debated when the Civil Rights Movement began and when it finished. This essay argues that the movement began with the Great Migration of 1915, as this was the first time African Americans collectively took action against oppression. This resistance would steadily grow over the coming decades, culminating in widespread grassroots activism during the Sixties which

Fig 7: "Freedom Now" Badge, printed by CORE (Congress of Racial Equality), c.1960.

marked the peak of the Civil Rights Movement. Finally, this essay will argue that the Civil Rights Movement has not ended, as true equality has not yet been achieved.

The Great Migration marked the beginning of the Civil Rights Movement and was a catalyst for future social change. From 1915 to 1918, approximately 450,000 to 500,000 black Southerners migrated from the racist southern states to northern states in search of a better life, a move that has been described as an "exodus."[173] Approximately 90% of the African American population lived in the South prior to 1910.[174] By 1930, this had dropped to only 75%.[175] Although reasons to move out of the South differed between individuals, there were common themes that motivated black Southerners to move. One of the main reasons for moving was for a better working life. In the South, black workers had little bargaining power in workplaces due to racist Jim Crow laws, which restricted employee rights and enabled white company owners to discriminate. The industrial revolution in the North offered higher wages and better working conditions for low-skilled jobs that were disproportionately filled by black workers due to limited immigration during World War One.[176] The second reason black Americans left for the North was for political rights. By heading north, African Americans could participate in political activities.[177] Oppressive Jim Crow laws meant that for Southern black activists, change was more likely if they pushed for it from the North where their voice mattered more. This "Great" northward Migration signalled the start of the Civil Rights Movement, as it was the first time large numbers of African Americans made a collective effort to improve their lives. Although individual immigration to the North existed long before 1915, it was not a mass movement. Black workers used emigration as a form of nonviolent protest against racist institutions in the

[173] Eric Arnesen, *Black protest and the great migration; a brief history with documents,* Boston, 2003, pp.1-2.
[174] History, Art & Archives, U.S. House of Representatives, 'World War I and Great migration,' n.d.
[175] Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, 'Historical Census statistics on Populations Totals by Race, 1799-1990', *US Census Bureau*, September 2002, pp.113-115.
[176] Ibid, p.7.
[177] Isabel Wilkerson, 'The Long-Lasting Legacy of the Great Migration', *Smithsonian Magazine,* 2016.

South, signalling the beginning of a much larger movement we now call the Civil Rights Movement.

Although migrating North did not live up to the hopes and expectations of many black Southerners, their quality of life tended to improve once they reached the northern cities. Many black agricultural workers from the South could retrain into waged factory jobs with better pay and more stable contracts. Cities like New York, Chicago and Cleveland saw their African American population increase by up to 40% between 1910 and 1920.[178] Much of this increased population were living in overcrowded ghettos due to discriminatory housing regulations. As a result of these living conditions, a distinctly black culture emerged. A new form of black expression developed through art, music, fashion and theatre, giving these migrants a sense of identity and community not felt in the South. These communities also fostered bottom-up political organisations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), which became highly active in the 1920s.[179] Organisations such as the NAACP played a critical role in the long-term Civil Rights Movement, as they had the resources and experience to organise local movements. Through the Great Migration into Northern cities, black identity and culture developed more than it ever did in the South. This helped unify African Americans and trigger a new, larger wave of political activism in the American Civil Rights Movement.

The peak of the Civil Rights Movement was not until the Sixties, when bottom-up organising and grassroots action were at an all-time high. In the words of Jeanne Theoharis and Komozi Woodard, the Civil Rights Movement was a "web of local struggles," instead of a movement

[178] National Public Radio, 'Great Migration: The African-American Exodus North - An Interview with Isabel Wilkerson,' 2010.
[179] Library of Congress, 'The Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Long Struggle for Freedom - The Segregation Era (1900-1939),' n.d.

dominated by few leaders, which is what the master narrative tends to depict.[180] From 1910 onwards, the movement was continuously growing. The increasing number of African Americans with social influence contributed to this heightened activism. Booker T. Washington (1856-1915) advocated for a slow racial integration process, while W.E.B. Du Bois (1868-1963) called for protesting and black nationalism.[181] While internal conflicts about how to best approach the Civil Rights Movement existed within the black community, these conflicts sparked discussion, and action soon followed.

The mid-1950s saw the beginning of the Civil Rights Movement's peak. New government legislation and Supreme Court decisions such as *Brown v Board of Education* in 1954 helped revitalise the hopes of racial equality. This landmark case set the precedent that segregation was unconstitutional, and that racial equality was the only legal option. Grass-roots activism also thrived in the Fifties, with the Montgomery Bus Boycott being a prime example of this. From December 1955 to December 1956, black Montgomery residents boycotted the public transport system to protest against segregation. It was successful, with the Supreme Court ruling in *Browder v Gayle* that Alabama laws segregating buses were unconstitutional. These landmark decisions catapulted the movement into the Sixties. Internal pressure through mass protests and external pressures from overseas governments forced the federal government to enact significant changes to progress racial equality. The movement arguably reached its peak during the 1963 March on Washington, where Martin Luther King Jr. delivered his "I Have a Dream" speech.[182] More than 200,000 protestors came together to fight for freedom and to persuade John F. Kennedy's administration to introduce more racially progressive bills. This march can be credited with catalysing the introduction of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 1965

[180] Jeanne Theoharis, Komozi Woodard and Charles Payne, *Groundwork: Local Black Freedom Movements in America,* New York, 2005, p.3.
[181] Ferris State University, 'Civil Rights Era,' n.d.
[182] Stanford University, The Martin Luther King Jr. Research and Education Institute, 'March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom,' n.d.

Voting Rights Act.[183] These are two of the most critical pieces of legislation towards achieving racial equality, which is why this period can be considered the peak of the Civil Rights Movement.

Many scholars argue that the Civil Rights Movement ended after the Sixties, however, I argue that the Civil Rights Movement is still ongoing. When black activists began pushing for equality in 1915 during the Great Migration, they did so with the end hope of complete racial equality. Martin Luther King Jr., a voice for the movement, stated in his 1963 "I Have a Dream" speech that all men are created equal and should be treated as such.[184] King and his fellow demonstrators wanted not just legal equality but *societal equality*, as although equality under the law was progressing, societal racism was still the norm.

While legal equality for African Americans arguably exists today, the social and economic consequences of America's discriminatory past leaves societal equality something still to be achieved—strengthening the argument that the Civil Rights Movement has not ended. Liz Mineo, a writer for the Harvard Gazette, notes that the economic disparities which existed for African Americans during the reconstruction era still exist today. Mineo explains that white households tend to have roughly ten times as much wealth as black households, mainly thanks to higher incomes and inheritance.[185] In many other areas of society, black people are still disadvantaged. A 2001 study by the US Department of Justice found that 16.6% of the black adult population had spent time in prison, compared to only 2.6% of white adults.[186] This disparity is primarily due to the disproportionate level of policing in black areas compared to

[183] Ibid.
[184] National Public Radio, 'Transcript of Martin Luther King's 'I Have a Dream Speech,' updated January 10, 2022 (accessed February 13, 2022).
[185] Liz Mineo, 'Racial wealth gap may be a key to other inequities', *The Harvard Gazette,* 2021.
[186] Thomas P. Bonczar, 'Prevalence of Imprisonment in the U.S. Population, 1974-2001', *U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics,* 2003.

white areas, resulting in more arrests of black people for petty crimes white citizens often get away with. These higher incarceration rates have significant repercussions for black communities, including more single-parent households and fewer opportunities for social advancement.[188] Issues such as these resonate with the disparities called out during the peak of the Civil Rights Movement. This can only lead us to conclude that the Civil Rights Movement has not ended, as the goals people set out to achieve at the beginning and peak of the movement have not yet been reached.

So, if the Civil Rights Movement has not yet ended in the United States, where to from here? Analysis of racial disparity within America shows that more needs to be done to address persisting issues the African American population has wanted to fix since the Sixties, such as disproportionate incarceration rates and household wealth. The reasons why these issues persist are mixed. Some issues are caused by societal stereotyping, while others are due to a lack of government action. Nonetheless, young black people and the rest of the American population should not forget the efforts many people before them made to push for equality. Jeanne Theoharis, Komozi Woodard and Charles Payne argue that as the amount of people alive who were active in the Civil Rights Movement diminishes, the master narrative becomes more important as fewer individual experiences are shared.[189] The master narrative, which states that the success of the movement was largely due to the leaders such as Martin Luther King Jr., discredits the contribution local organisers made to the national movement. Americans today must listen to the lived experiences of local organisers, instead of just listening to the master narrative, which Renee Romano and Leigh Raiford claim is instilled by the government.[190] Once Americans do, they will learn that change has never come easily—it is a slow struggle, but

[188] ibid.
[189] Jeanne Theoharis, Komozi Woodard and Charles Payne, p.4.
[190] Renee Romano and Leigh Raiford, *The Civil Rights movement in American memory,* Athens, Georgia, 2006, p.17.

success is always possible. Americans will also learn that you cannot rely on others to push for change; sometimes, you must fight for it yourself. By knowing this, Americans today are reminded that although progress still needs to be made fifty years on from the peak of the movement, change is possible and will come with persistence.

In conclusion, the Civil Rights Movement has been a long series of successes and failures in pushing for racial equality in the United States. I have argued that the Civil Rights Movement began with the Great Migration of 1915, as this was the first collective action African Americans took to better their lives against discrimination. The movement then hit its peak in the Fifties and Sixties, where landmark legal cases were settled and legislation was introduced. Significant progress was made during these decades towards racial equality. Finally, the Civil Rights Movement is still ongoing, as the goals initially set for the movement have not yet been achieved due to persisting societal inequality. To claim that the movement has ended is to argue that social and institutional equality has no more room to progress, which is evidently untrue. This means that young people must look back at the last generation and see how they fought for equality. They must carry the torch of racial progress, as freedom does not come easy, but it evidently does come with persistence.

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II: Making the Strange *Familiar*

'... a world by it self': Global London in the Early-Eighteenth Century – Max Skerjl-Rovers

Bloodshed and Matrydom? Engaging with the motivations behind the 1916 Easter Rising– Elinor Graham

Sermons to *Malleus Malficarium*: Understanding Christian Faith and Society – Grace Baylis

The Tools of Transmission: Sacred Texts in light of the Orality/Literacy Debate – Holly Bennett

'…a world by it self': Global London in the Early-Eighteenth Century

Max Skerjl-Rovers

Essay Prompt: In what ways is it plausible to see early eighteenth-century London as a 'global community constituted by shipping'?

During the early-eighteenth century, London transformed from an English and European city into a global one. The crucial determinant of this globalisation was shipping: throughout the 1700s, a formidable merchant and military navy both brought the world to London, and placed London in the world. London's status as a 'global community constituted by shipping' is apparent in a number of respects. Firstly, London's orientation toward the globe, rather than solely its home-state or region, was visible in the realm of commerce, with the city's merchants presiding over a globe-spanning network of trade, and its port serving as a world entrepôt. Constituent with this international trade, London was increasingly a city which consumed globally. Shipping supplied Londoners with commodities—whether to eat, drink, wear or

Fig 8: An early-eighteenth century schooner, upon which London's connection with the globe rested.

furnish their homes with—from all corners of the globe. Finally, London's media, cultural, and intellectual spheres all demonstrated cognisance of, and reinforced, the notion that theirs was a global, maritime city.

The statement that early-eighteenth century London was a 'global community constituted by shipping' must be contextualised. For one, 'global community' does not here carry the meaning of a hyper-diverse population. Though eighteenth-century London did have a foreign-born contingent—mostly Europeans, but also Africans, Indians, and others—it remained predominantly the home of those born in the British Isles. Rather, this essay is interested in 'global community' as matter of orientation. That is to say, a city whose economic, political, cultural and intellectual world encompassed not just its immediate nation or region, but the globe as a whole. This essay argues that to a degree unmatched by any other urban centre of the age, early eighteenth-century London was such a city. Two further contextual points must be made. First, London is reckoned to have been the largest city in Western Europe in 1700, and by the 1730s possibly the largest in the world, with a population of around 600,000.[192] Second, one of London's key points of distinction from other European cities was its multiplicity of functions. As Fernand Braudel notes, "To speak of London is to speak of three or four cities at a time: the City was the economic capital; the king, Parliament and high society were all in West-minster; downstream was the Port of London and the poorer districts; and on the south bank was the suburb of Southwark, with its narrow streets and its theatres".[193] While London's global commerce is the particular focus of this essay, from Whitehall and Westminster the city also ruled over a trans-oceanic empire, which David Hancock suggests increased fivefold

[192] Nuala Zahedieh, *The Capital and the Colonies: London and the Atlantic economy 1660-1700*, Cambridge, 2010, p.20; David Hancock, *Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735-1785,* Cambridge, 1995, p.86; Peter Earle, 'The Economy of London, 1660-1730', in Patrick O'Brien, ed, *Urban Achievement in Early Modern Europe: Golden Ages in Antwerp, Amsterdam and London*, Cambridge, 2001, pp. 83-84.
[193] Fernand Braudel, *The Perspective of the World,* trans. Siân Reynold, London, 1984, p.365.

between 1655 and 1763.[194] This further illustrates that London was indeed a 'global community constituted by shipping'.

During the early 1700s London became a world entrepôt, exporting English manufactures and commodities around the globe, and importing a global array of goods for domestic consumption or re-export to Europe and the colonies. By 1690, London was Amsterdam's equal as a trading centre, and would surpass it in the first half of the eighteenth century.[195] George Rude suggests that throughout the eighteenth century, London was "…the largest centre of international trade, the largest ship-owner and the largest ship-builder in the world".[196] The number of Londoners working within international trade is alone evidence of a city enmeshed in global economic networks. According to Miles Ogborn, by 1703 there were more than 12,000 seafaring Londoners who worked in the international trades, and several thousand more who undertook coastal voyages.[197] Nuala Zahedieh suggests that in the late-seventeenth century, "Perhaps 10 per cent of the City's 20,000 or so householders were merchants, and it contained 93 per cent of the 1,829 active overseas merchants listed in Lee's *London Directory* of 1677, many of whom had at least a flutter in the colonial trades".[198] Ralph Davis estimates that by 1700, one quarter of London's inhabitants depended directly on employment in port trades.[199] Alongside those sailors and merchants, London also possessed most of the nation's merchant fleet. In 1702, from a total English merchant marine tonnage of 323,000, about one half was London-owned.[200] The frenetic hub of this world was London's port, which stretched along the Thames

194 Hancock, p.25.
195 Earle, p.85.
196 George Rude, *Hanoverian London: 1714-1808,* London, 1971, x.
197 Miles Ogborn, *Global Lives: Britain and the World, 1550-1800,* Cambridge, 2008, p.143.
198 Zahedieh, p.23.
199 Walter Minchinton, 'Editor's Introduction', in Walter Minchinton, ed, *The Growth of English Overseas Trade in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,* London, 1969, p.49.
200 Robert Bucholz and Joseph Ward, *London: a social and cultural history, 1550-1750,* Cambridge, 2012, p. 87.

east of London Bridge. Robert Bucholz and Joseph Ward estimate that from 1722 to 1724, London handled over 80% of England's imports, 67% of its exports, and 87% of its re-exports.[201]

Looking at this trade more closely, it is clear that Europe—London's 'region'—remained important to the city's commerce during the early-eighteenth century. What stands out, however, is that it was becoming steadily less important as the century drew on. English overseas trade figures compiled by Ralph Davis show that between 1699 and 1701, the average annual value of imports from Europe, including Turkey and North Africa, was £3,986,000, while imports from West Africa, America, and the East—'the globe'— totalled £1,863,000.[202] At the start of the eighteenth century, then, the value of global imports was 50% that of regional imports. Between 1722 and 1724, however, the value of imports from Europe only marginally rose to £3,733,000, while global imports jumped to £2,645,000—70% of the value of regional imports.[203] This suggests that while most of London's mercantile fortunes and voyages were previously made around the North Sea or Mediterranean, they were increasingly being pursued in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans—that is to say, globally. Moreover, imports are only one side of the story. London also shipped goods out during the 1700s, with England's trade balance remaining, according to Braudel, "….in surplus for virtually the entire century".[204] Again, it is apparent that global markets were increasingly important to the export trade during the early-eighteenth century. The American colonial population (including the West Indies and Newfoundland, but excluding slaves) grew from 55,000 to 538,000 between 1650-1730, with Zahedieh arguing that in the late-seventeenth century "…contemporaries valued the colonies at least as much as markets for English manufactured goods as sources of supply, and in fact the export sector both grew as fast as the much-vaunted re-export sector and proved to be the most

[201] Ibid.,p.89.
[202] Ralph Davis, 'English Foreign Trade, 1660-1700', in Walter Minchinton, ed, *The Growth of English Overseas Trade in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,* London, 1969, p.79.
[203] Ralph Davis, 'English Foreign Trade, 1700-1774', in Walter Minchinton, ed, *The Growth of English Overseas Trade in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,* London, 1969, pp.119-120.
[204] Fernand Braudel, *The Wheels of Commerce,* trans. Siân Reynold, London, 1982, p.218.

profitable branch of trade".[205] Regarding re-exports, by the early-eighteenth century 30% of exports leaving London were re-exports of American and Eastern products bound for the European market.[206] Clearly, for many in early eighteenth-century London—merchants, sailors, porters, and countless others—life and livelihood depended on these patterns of exchange and transportation. As Jerry White observes, "The lifeblood of London trade, and so of eighteenth-century London itself, flowed through the River Thames".[207] Furthermore, during the early-eighteenth century this trade increasingly played out on a global, rather than solely domestic or regional stage. Whether in its counting houses, ships, docks, or manufacturing depots, commercial London certainly appears to have been a 'global community constituted by shipping.'

London's world of consumption was, inevitably, closely linked to its trade. What early eighteenth-century Londoners ate and drank further indicates a city which was functioning on a global rather than national or regional scale. Daniel Defoe, writing in 1730, notes that while the gentry might consume the choicest of "the Wine, the Spice, the Coffee and the Tea", it was the "the mean, middling and trading People" who bought the coarser bulk of such goods.[208] In 1699-1701, London imported 22 million pounds of tobacco, and in 1700, 24,000 tons of sugar.[209] Though much of this would be re-exported, Anne McCants argues that in England and Wales, tea, tobacco and sugar were all items of "mass consumption" by the 1730s.[210] Moreover, the receptacles from which tea, for instance, would be sipped were increasingly of global origin. Imports of Chinese porcelain into London reached their peak between 1720 and 1740, with Lorna Weatherill's analysis of London inventories from the period showing that 62% of 1725

[205] Bucholz and Ward, p.87; Zahedieh, p.15.
[206] Ogborn, p.112.
[207] Jerry White, *A Great and Monstrous Thing: London in the Eighteenth Century,* Cambridge, 2013, p.167.
[208] Daniel Defoe, *A Plan of the English Commerce,* 2nd ed., London, 1730, p.103.
[209] Ogborn, pp.117-18.
[210] Anne McCants, 'Exotic Goods, Popular Consumption, and the Standard of Living: Thinking about Globalization in the Early Modern World', *Journal of World History,* 18, 4, 2007, p.443.

inventories contained at least one item of china.[211] If a Londoner desired coffee, it could be had at one of 124 coffeehouses which, by 1737, lay within the City's walls, or at one of 60 within Greater London.[212]

The coffeehouse was also where Londoners could catch up on the world's news, for it is apparent that the city's media, cultural, and intellectual spheres were both cognisant of, and reinforced, the notion that theirs was a 'global community constituted by shipping.' Newspapers and magazines helped to bring the world into global perspective for early eighteenth-century Londoners. Indeed, as Robert Bucholz and Joseph Ward contend, "It could be argued that this steady diet of information about affairs beyond England helped create the cosmopolitan mind-set of what was fast becoming a world city".[213] In 1702, London's first daily—*The Daily Courant*—went to press, and by 1709 it had been joined by sixteen other papers which published two or three days of the week.[214] Bucholz and Ward suggest that by 1712, 70,000 copies of newspapers were being sold weekly.[215] If we consider the fact that many of these would be read by multiple people, it is clear that London was increasingly a city in the know. Alongside London's newspapers were its essay magazines, a notable example of which was Joseph Addison and Richard Steele's *The Spectator* (1711-1712, and 1714). Time and again, the pages of *The Spectator* reveal a community which sought knowledge and news from around the globe. *Spectator* No. 1 advertised the recently published *'The Complete Geographer'*. No. 11 retold the tale of *Inkle and Yarico,* featuring a young London man who, bound for the West Indies, instead comes ashore in North America, becomes romantically involved with an indigenous woman, and then sells her into slavery. No. 69 described the globe-spanning array of people to be found in the Royal Exchange, answering with that famous line: "I am a Dane, Sweed, or Dutch-Man

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[211] Lorna Weatherill, *Consumer Behaviour and Material Culture in Britain, 1660-1760,* 2nd ed., London, 1996, pp.86-88.
[212] White, p.175.
[213] Bucholz and Ward, pp.173-74.
[214] White, p.253.
[215] Bucholz and Ward, p.171.

at different times, or rather fancy myself like the old Philosopher, who upon being asked what Country-man he was, replied, That he was a Citizen of the World".[216]

Books, too, played a role in London's global outlook. Particularly fascinating are texts which invert Londoner's gaze, imagining how the metropolis might appear to the wider world. For instance, Tom Brown, in his 1700 *Amusements serious and comical, calculated for the meridian of London,* casts a made-up Indian in the role of visiting observer, who wanders about this city that is "…a World by it self".[217] Sixty years later, in his *The Citizen of the World; or, Letters from a Chinese Philosopher,* Oliver Goldsmith mined a similar vein, imagining what a Chinese philosopher in London might write of the city in his letters home. Such texts show a literary culture keenly aware of, and readily exploring, its increasingly global situation. The activities of bodies such as the Royal Society also evidenced the acquisition and consumption of 'global knowledge' in early eighteenth-century London. As John Houghton wrote in 1699, "Nothing can be in any country but one or another is apt to bring some account home; and especially here in England since the Royal Society was founded who are always enquiring what is done abroad, and telling all the travellers they meet with what they should enquire after".[218] In 1694, the Society published *An Account of Several Late Voyages & Discoveries to the South and North*, which reproduced four seventeenth century voyage diaries, alongside details of the flora, fauna and inhabitants of locations ranging from the South Pacific to Hudson Bay. Through works such as this, Londoners could encounter the world without leaving the metropolis. A similar effect was achieved by maps and globes, with English cartographers focusing from the late-seventeenth century on "large-scale charts of remote, relatively little-visited regions", rather than mapping trade routes and aristocratic estates.[219]

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[216] *Spectator*, No. 1; *Spectator*, No. 11; *Spectator*, No. 69.
[217] Thomas Brown, *Amusements Serious and Comical, Calculated for the Meridian of London,* London, 1700, p.18.
[218] Zahedieh, p.26.
[219] Hancock, p.34.

In commerce, consumption, media and culture we can see, in early eighteenth-century London, the emergence of a 'global community constituted by shipping.' Though Europe would continue to be of crucial importance to London during the early-eighteenth century, it was increasingly just the nearest neighbour of a world city. The significance of shipping to this phenomenon cannot be overstated. It was ships that carried English exports to the world, and brought the world's commodities home. Ships underpinned not only the wealth of London's merchants, but the livelihoods of thousands of others in the city. It was ships that carried back the information printed in London's newspapers, magazines and books, and which made possible the charting of its global maps. Although the elements of 'global community' outlined here—world entrepôt, global consumer (both physically and intellectually), and imperial capital—were not unique to London, their convergence in this one place was. In the early-eighteenth century, London was a city with its gaze fixed on the world—operating not on a national or regional stage, but a global one.

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Bloodshed and Martyrdom? Engaging with the Motivations Behind the 1916 Easter Rising

Elinor Graham

Prompt: '[W]e may make mistakes in the beginning and shoot the wrong people; but bloodshed is a cleansing and sanctifying thing'. (Patrick Pearse, quoted by Roy Foster). Analyse the motivation of Pearse and his collaborators in undertaking the Easter Rising.

The Easter Rising was a transformative event in modern Irish history, heralding the start of the revolutionary period and the eventual establishment of an independent Irish state. This complex legacy makes questions of martyrdom and political violence central to the historiography of the Rising. Due to this, debate continues on the motivations of the leading figures who planned the Easter Rising; the seven men of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) military council who signed the Proclamation of the Republic, headed by their provisional president Patrick Pearse. This essay

Fig. 9: A gold Celtic Harp on green background, one of the symbols flown by the Irish Republican Brotherhood during the Easter Rising.

examines their choice to stage a rising in the context of the cultural, social, and political climate of 1916 Ireland using physical force. Ultimately, I argue that the motivation of Pearse and his collaborators to act on Easter Monday 1916 stemmed from the range of radical political and ideological stances they espoused. These culminated in a shared vision for a culturally Irish, socialist republic they believed could only be born through revolutionary action.

The desire to realise the dream of an Irish Ireland was a foundational motivation for the leaders of the Easter Rising. The cultural nationalism of the late-nineteenth century Celtic Revival was a "revolution of the mind" for Pearse and his colleagues.[221] The Celtic Revival provided them with the core of their nationalist language and imagery, and helped them recover the memory of a free and Gaelic Ireland. Importantly, all but one of the Rising's leaders were members of the Gaelic League, an officially apolitical organisation that nevertheless established the idea of a separate Irish nation in the minds of nationalists through its efforts to promote the Irish language.[222] Pearse himself spoke of the importance of the Gaelic League in awakening the nationalist consciousness and as an educationalist wrote extensively on the need to resist the anglicising forces of the school system—which he dubbed 'the murder machine'.[223] Home Rule was seen as insufficient for this purpose, offering little of the cultural autonomy prioritised by the Gaelic League.[224] Instead, Pearse argued a

[221]D. George Boyce, '1916, Interpreting the Rising', in D. George Boyce and Alan O'Day, eds, *The Making of Modern Irish History: Revisionism and the Revisionist Controversy*, London, 1996, p.171; R. F. Foster, *Modern Ireland 1600–1972*, London, 1988, p.456.
[222] Brian Ó Conchubhair, 'The Culture War: The Gaelic League and Irish Ireland', in in Thomas Bartlett, ed., *The Cambridge History of Ireland: Volume 4, 1880 to the Present*, Cambridge, 2018, p.219; Boyce, p.170.
[223] Charles Townshend, *Easter 1916: The Irish Rebellion*, London, 2006, p.50; Ruth Dudley Edwards, *Patrick Pearse: The Triumph of Failure*, Dublin, 2006, p.205.
[224] Alvin Jackson, *Ireland 1798–1998: War, Peace and Beyond*, Malden, 2010, p.200; Foster, p.455; Farrel Moran, p.65.

separate Irish state should work to revitalise the Gaelic language and culture through education, "placing all his hopes" in an independent Ireland.[225] Additionally, literature from "the destroyed Gaelic past" supplied the Rising's leaders a rationale for their use of force, exemplified in the wording of the Easter Proclamation.[226] In the Proclamation, the people are identified as the "children" of Ireland, a notion evocative of the goddess Mother Éire.[227] Some historians have argued that over time, this image of Ireland has contributed to making violence a pervasive feature of Irish nationalism, as the feminine personification demands "acts of redemptive violence and self-sacrifice" in the face of her violation and subjugation.[228] Therefore, a vision of an Irish Ireland motivated the leaders of the Easter Rising to act, while the popular cultural image of Ireland manifested in feminine form bestowed a moral imperative to take up arms.

The accuracy of the cultural nationalist's Ireland, however, has been questioned. Ruth Dudley Edwards, for example, states that Pearse "died for a people that did not exist", and employs his romanticisation of the past to demonstrate self-delusional tendencies.[229] This assertion has proven influential, and if true, undermines the basis of the nationalism which drove Pearse and his collaborators in 1916.[230] Róisín Ní Ghairbhí, however, contends that this view "owes… little to historical fact", ignoring the intellectually-rigorous ways Pearse engaged with Gaelic literary tradition.[231]

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[225] Dudley Edwards, p.50.
[226] Boyce, p.170.
[227] ibid., p.171.
[228] ibid, pp.86; 171; Farrel Moran, p.91.
[229] Dudley Edwards, p.343.
[230] Róisín Ní Ghairbhí, 'A People that did not Exist? Reflections on Some Sources and Contexts for Patrick Pearse's Militant Nationalism', in Ruán O'Donnell, ed., *The Impact of the 1916 Rising: Among the Nations*, Dublin, 2008, p.164
[231] ibid., pp. 178; 183.

Significantly, this disagreement is based less in the actual events of 1916 and more in a philosophical question of Irish nationhood undoubtedly informed by the individual historians' world-view. Regardless, the Celtic Revival's intellectual awakening was a necessary antecedent to the Easter Rising, providing an important motivation for mounting violent insurrection to restore a culturally Irish nation through force.

Another key aspect of the motivation behind the Easter Rising lies in the role of James Connolly and his socialist politics. A leader of Irish socialism, Connolly shared in the Marxist ideology that would soon give rise to the Bolshevik Revolution.[232] While it is perhaps unsurprising that Connolly would participate in violent revolutionary action, what prompted him to take up the nationalist cause must be questioned. Contrary to the argument of D. George Boyce that Connolly's new nationalism eclipsed his socialism, Joe Lee maintains that Connolly viewed an independent Irish state as the means to establishing socialism in Ireland.[233] Roy Foster echoes Lee, suggesting that although nationalism took primacy, Connolly still acted in the belief that the Rising would "light a fuse across Europe".[234] The latter stances are supported by the ways Connolly and Pearse were able to fuse their ideologies together, so that "the national cause was wholly indistinguishable from the class struggle".[235] Connolly's vision for a socialist Irish republic echoed that of the late leading Fenian John O'Mahony, and he could find within the Ireland of old a socialist model in the Gaelic landholding system[236]. Moreover, despite the general conservativeness of the Irish Volunteers,

[232] Ann Matthews, 'Vanguard of the Revolution? The Irish Citizen Army 1916', in Ruán O'Donnell, ed., *The Impact of the 1916 Rising: Among the Nations*, Dublin, 2008, p. 35; Dudley Edwards, p.222.
[233] Boyce, p.170; J. J Lee, *Ireland 1912–1985: Politics and Society*, Cambridge, 1989, p.20.
[234] Foster, p.478
[235] Moran Farrel, p.81
[236] Brian Sayers, 'Easter 1916 and the Fenian Tradition', *Journal of Irish Studies*, 33, 1, 2018, pp.63–71; Diarmaid Ferriter, *The Transformation of Ireland*, New York, 2005, p.157.

leaders of the Rising like Éamonn Ceannt were familiar with Marxist theory and following the 1913 lockout, Pearse was receptive to a "cautious socialism".[237] Pearse never subscribed to a particular socialist doctrine, but his sudden interest in James Fintan Lalor suggests he considered how socialist theory could be incorporated into nationalism. In poems like 'The Rebel', Pearce combined the mystic nationalism of Aisling poetry with themes reminiscent of contemporary socialist songs.[238] This fusion of socialism and nationalism is also evident in the Easter Proclamation, primarily written by Pearse with the influence of Connolly and perhaps Thomas MacDonagh. Guaranteeing the people's right to own Ireland, the Proclamation echoes socialist doctrine and is reminiscent of the 1914 constitution of Connolly's Irish Citizens Army.[239] This directly contradicts the idea that Connolly somehow neglected his international socialist origins in favour of an exclusively nationalist cause, as well as the notion that the Rising was largely defined by a conservative elements. Consequently, it must be recognised that socialism remained at the core of Connolly's politics in the lead up to Easter 1916 and that among other nationalist leaders there existed "currents of radicalism" which placed socialism within their agenda for undertaking the Rising.[240]

A further motivation behind the Easter Rising was Pearse and his collaborators' separatist republican aspirations. Certain revisionists, such as Conor Cruise O'Brien, propound that since Home Rule was going to be implemented following the war there

[237] Matthews, p.35; Townshend, p.112; Fearghall McGarry, 'A Land Beyond the Wave: Transnational Perspectives on Easter 1916', in Niall Whelehan, ed., *Transnational Perspectives on Modern Irish History*, New York, 2005, p.175
[238] Matthews., p.44; Dudley Edwards, p.254; Ní Ghairbhí, p.183.
[239] Jackson, p.203; Matthew Kelly, 'Radical Nationalisms', in Thomas Bartlett, ed., *The Cambridge History of Ireland: Volume 4, 1880 to the Present*, Cambridge, 2018, p.60.
[240] ibid., p.37.

was no need for a rising.[241] Such a stance is formed retrospectively and assigns an undue degree of certainty to the fate of the Home Rule bill, something which was neither universally welcomed nor felt at the time. Home Rule had always been "an interim measure" for many advanced nationalists, with their ultimate goal being separation.[242] This stance is nowhere more pronounced than in the ideological godfather of the Rising, the veteran Fenian Thomas Clarke, who revived the Irish Republican Brotherhood to purposely foment revolution and was considered by British authorities to be "the centre of revolutionary activity in Ireland".[243] It was Clarke who first committed to a rising before the war ended and symbolically was the first to sign the Proclamation. Indeed, his influence caused the Easter Rising to be labelled as a Fenian rebellion.[244] His priority, as well as that of his "right-hand man" Séan MacDiarmada, was always the violent establishment of an Irish republic.[245] Similarly incompatible with John Redmond's imperialist Home Rule was the anti-colonial tone espoused by the cultural nationalists like Pearse and MacDonagh, which neo-Fenianism efficiently absorbed until many were convinced that cultural autonomy would only be realised in a republic.[246] Moreover, though Home Rule was theoretically law, both World War I and the Ulster Crisis had seriously jeopardised this, causing the process to be delayed. This risked the prospect of partition, and created a precarious political climate in which "there was no telling what the future would bring".[247] Together, this seriously undermined nationalist faith in constitutional means of achieving independence, and expectations were further dampened as the war dragged

[241] Moran Farrel, p.9.
[242] J. C. Beckett, *The Making of Modern Ireland*, London, 1966, p.436.
[243] Ferriter, p.129; Dudley Edwards, p.311.
[244] Moran Farrell, p.75; Jackson, p.204.
[245]Dudley Edwards, p.320; Ferriter, p.139.
[246] Moran Farrel, p.53.; Kelly, p.59.
[247] Alan O'Day, *Irish Home Rule: 1867-1912*, Manchester, 1998, p.261.

on and Home Rule became "a cheque continually post-dated".[248] In the nascent years of the Irish free state, nationalist historians promoted a determinist retelling of the Rising and minimised the destabilising impact World War I and the Ulster Crisis had on Home Rule in order to stress the continuity of the separatist tradition.[249] This narrative is not supported on closer inspection, however, as at least Pearse, MacDonagh and Joseph Mary Plunkett had all been constitutional nationalists prior to 1913.[250] Pearse even gave a speech in support of Home Rule at a rally in March 1912, though he simultaneously warned that physical force would be necessary if the British government failed to grant it.[251] Therefore, the leaders of the Rising who were not from the outset republicans underwent a political shift under the assumption that Home Rule would never materialise and instead a more radical answer for Ireland's future was required. As a result, the revolutionary genealogy of the Easter Rising is fixed within a republican political tradition, with the desire to lay the foundations of an Irish republic being a significant motivation behind it.

Pearse and his colleagues' motivation to use physical force in their pursuit of an Irish republic originates from an increasingly militarised culture where arms were normalised as a means to achieving political ends. Many historians later reflected on the significance of political violence within the Rising in the context of the Troubles, as the IRA adopted Pearse as their "spiritual father" and employed his rhetoric to justify their activities.[252] In particular, revisionists have stressed the undemocratic

[248]Fearghall McGarry, 'Revolution 1916–1923', in *The Cambridge History of Ireland: Volume 4, 1880 to the Present*, Cambridge, 2018, p.262.
[249] R. F. Foster, *The Irish Story: Telling Tales and Making It Up in Ireland*, London, 2001, p.41.
[250] Townshend, p.35; 95.
[251] Ferriter, p.23.
[252] ibid., p.146.

nature of the IRB plot.[253] Yet, as previously examined, the peaceful pursuit of independence had dubious success by 1916 and Ireland's constitutional relationship to Westminster arguably "prohibited democratic politics".[254] In such circumstances, certain historians maintain "the moral right of those beset to fight back".[255] Furthermore, though the Rising is often accused of having introduced "the gunman mystique" to Irish nationalism, this was arguably done by the arming of the Ulster Volunteer Force in the wider context of a European "cult of discipline, training, and mastery of arms" in the build up to World War I.[256] This brought armed struggle into the realm of possibility and prompted the Irish Republican Brotherhood to covertly initiate the founding of the Irish Volunteers through MacDiarmada and Ceannt in a meeting with Eoin MacNeill.[257] With a significant number of Irish men engaging with various volunteer forces in 1913-1914, threatening political violence was not perceived to be so radical a position, with unionists, constitutional nationalists and separatists alike demonstrating their willingness to use force to ensure Home Rule.[258] Volunteering proved a decisive moment for Joseph Mary Plunkett, the main strategist of the Rising, in his journey from constitutional to separatist nationalism.[259] Pearse also became radicalised in 1913, and it was in referring to the Ulster Volunteer Force in an *Irish Freedom* article that he described violence as "a cleansing and sanctifying thing".[260] Pointing to the prominence of such imagery in Pearse's writings, as well as those of Plunkett and MacDonagh, contemporaries and later historians alike have

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[253] Boyce, p.171.
[254] Ferriter, p.138.
[255] Peter Berresford Ellis, '1916: Insurrection or Rebellion? Making Judgements' in Ruán O'Donnell, ed., *The Impact of the 1916 Rising: Among the Nations*, Dublin, 2008, pp. 187-200, p.188.
[256] Moran Farrel, p.9; Foster, *Modern Ireland*, p.467.
Fitzpatrick, David, 'Militarism in Ireland' in Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jefferey, eds, *A Military History of Ireland*, Cambridge, 1996, p.382.
[257] Foster, *Modern Ireland*, p.477; Dudley Edwards, pp.177-178.
[258] ibid., p.385; Fitzpatrick, p.383.
[259] Dudley Edwards, p.247.
[260] Foster, *Modern Ireland*, p.477; Fitzpatrick, p.385.

sometimes argued that leaders of the Rising—particularly Pearse—were motivated by an abnormal obsession with bloodshed.[261] For others, these themes can be located in the prevailing trends within contemporary nationalist literature. The notion of bloodshed having purifying properties, for example, was certainly 'unusual', but the sentiment that "there are many things more horrible than bloodshed; and slavery is one of them" was commonplace in nationalist rhetoric.[262] Similarly, even Pearse's comments that the Earth's heart required "the red wine of the battlefields" (described as "deranged" by his biographer) reflect a conceptualisation of war as invigorating typical of many European intellectuals of the era.[263] Furthermore, historians that read Pearse's fascination with the legendary warrior-prince Cú Chulainn as revealing of his propensity for hero-worship and consequent valorisation of armed struggle often fail to acknowledge Pearse's recognition of his dedication to protecting innocents.[264] Consequently, it becomes necessary to separate out rhetoric from reality. In practice, Pearse could not tolerate suffering and may never have even fired a shot during the Easter Rising—facts inconsistent with a pathological diagnosis.[265] Therefore, the leaders' motivations in taking up arms likely stem from a viewpoint which saw weapons as legitimate tools to realising political aims in the absence of viable democratic options more than any particular enthusiasm for violence.

Finally, the leaders of the Easter Rising were immediately motivated by the need for a symbolic display to galvanise nationalist sentiment. It is widely accepted that the

[261] Thomas Hennessy, *Dividing Ireland: World War One and Partition*, London, 1998, p.123; Townshend, p.23.
[262] Townshend, p.40.
[263] Dudley Edwards, p.245; Lee, p. 27.
[264] Foster, *Modern Ireland*, p.458; Dudley Edwards, p.98; Ní Ghairbhí, p.182.
[265] Dudley Edwards, pp.245-246.

Rising was always militarily doomed, and this is often used to argue that the leaders had intended to be martyred for their cause.[266] History, however, often seems inevitable with the benefit of hindsight and the leaders had no such certainty. Moreover, such a narrative often obscures the role of other leaders in favour of Pearse.[267] Instead, some members of the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood military council had hoped for limited tactical success, with Plunkett proposing that they could hold out for three months and Connolly expecting to awaken a proletariat revolution that would come to their aid.[268] Similarly, Clarke and MacDiarmada planned for "a principled and heroic gesture" that would inspire the masses.[269] It was thought by MacDonagh that this display alone might guarantee Ireland a seat at the table in post-war peace negotiations.[270] Gesture, however, was certainly prioritised over military strategy by Pearse, his dedication to poetics even frustrating the then relatively unknown Michael Collins.[271] Retrospectively, the rhetoric and poetic works of Pearse offer compelling evidence for a cult of blood-sacrifice, wherein the deaths of the leaders themselves rather than a rising could be seen as an offering to the nationalist cause.[272] This interpretation was popularised in nationalist circles immediately following the event, notably by W. B. Yeats' 'The Rose Tree'. It was also a convenient narrative for de Valera's government, whose support for the idea of a blood-debt owed to those who fought for a republic exemplified in the placement of *Death of Cuchulainn* in the General Post Office.[273] Yet, "poetry is not history", and neither are statues.[274]

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[266] Jackson, p.200.
[267] McGarry, 'Revolution 1916–1923', p.263.
[268] Townshend, p.100.
[269] McGarry, 'Revolution 1916–1923', p.263.
[270] Thomas Hennessey, *Dividing Ireland: World War One and Partition*, London, 1998, p.126.
[271] Townshend, p.98; Foster, *Modern Ireland*, p.482.
[272] Lee, p.25; Ní Ghairbhí, p.161.
[273] Berresford Ellis, p.189; John Turpin, 'Nationalist and Unionist Ideology in the Sculpture of Oliver Sheppard and John Hughes, 1895-1939', in *The Irish Review*, 20, 1, 1997, pp.73-74.
[274] Berresford Ellis, p.189.

Pearse certainly imbued death for a nationalist struggle with an aura of holiness in his writings, seen in his forging together Cú Chulainn's death for Ulster and Christ's crucifixion.[275] Furthermore, this sanctification of nationalism also recurs throughout Plunkett and MacDonagh's work.[276] This makes the suggestion that Pearse's Cú Chulainn-Christ analogy was a pioneering analysis in comparative literature unsatisfactory, but neither does it prove that blood-sacrifice and martyrdom were the express intention of the Rising's leaders.[277] Instead, Pearse and his colleagues were likely capable of considering both possible outcomes of blood-sacrifice and military success, reconciling themselves to the likelihood of execution as leaders of a failed rising while still not acting in the sole pursuit of martyrdom.[278] This explanation is supported by Pearse's final letter to his mother, wherein it is clear that he had anticipated greater military success with German aid.[279] When this did not materialise and MacNeill's countermanding order undermined support within the Irish Volunteers, any hope of victory was likely gone. Yet this realisation "did nothing to halt the psychological imperative to go forth".[280] Clearly, an unsuccessful rising was preferable to none at all.[281] Therefore, the immediate motivation behind staging the Easter Rising was the desire for an inspiring assertion of Irish nationhood—but if in the process Ireland demanded a blood-sacrifice, the leaders were willing to offer themselves up.

[275] Boyce, p.168; Moran Farrel, p.92.
[276] Dudley Edwards, pp.104-105.
[277] Ní Ghairbhí, p.182.
[278] James Heaney, 'Chesterton, Pearse, and the Blood Sacrifice Theory of the 1916 Rising', *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review*, 103, 411, 2014, pp.312-314.
[279] Townshend, p.107; Hennessey, p.126.
[280] Jackson, p.200; Moran Farrel, p.99.
[281] McGarry, 'Revolution 1916 – 1923', p.263.

In conclusion, the motivations of Pearse and his collaborators for undertaking the Easter Rising originated in the cultural, social, and political landscape of 1916 Ireland and manifested in their vision for a "Gaelic, free and equal Ireland".[282] This vision was heavily informed by the cultural nationalism of the Celtic Revival espoused by MacDonagh, Ceannt, Pearse, MacDiarmada and Plunkett, as well as to a lesser extent Connolly's socialist theory. Though Clarke and MacDiarmada were already firm advocates of republicanism prior to the Ulster Crisis, the destabilising consequences this and World War I had for Home Rule radicalised former tactical moderates such as Pearse, MacDonagh and Plunkett. In the militarised politics that followed, violence—or at least the threat of it—became legitimate means to further their agenda. Finally, the desire for a symbolic display of Irish nationalism was prioritised by several of the leaders over military success, and many reconciled themselves with their likely demise in the language of blood-sacrifice.

[282] Boyce, p.171.

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Sermons to *Malleus Malficarum*: Understanding Christian Faith in Medieval Society

Grace Baylis

Essay Prompt: What were the most important elements of Christian faith for ordinary medieval people? To what extent was magic and witchcraft an important aspect of their faith system?

In medieval Europe, the overwhelming majority of people subscribed to Christianity.[284] However, this does not necessarily mean that ordinary people perfectly followed the Catholic Church's teachings. This essay argues that the laity primarily depended on Christianity to protect themselves from hardship, both on Earth and after death. But when additional assurances were needed, laypersons often turned to

Fig 10: A sprig of Belladona, or Deadly Nightshade. Belladona was regularly used by laypersons with prayer to treat common ailments. It was also believed to be used by witches to make a "flying ointment".

[284] Carol Lansing, 'Popular Belief and Heresy', in Carol Lansing and Edward D. English, eds, *A Companion to the Medieval World*, Chichester, 2009, pp.280-281.

alternative faith-based magic rituals for further protection. While these practices were certainly unsanctioned in the eyes of the Catholic Church, the presence of heretical magic or witchcraft has been exaggerated by clerical sources. To prove my argument, I will first explain why the afterlife was a primary concern for the laity. Anxious to shorten their potential time in Purgatory, many religious practices were only important to the extent they benefitted one's soul, with practices able to provide the most direct benefits being particularly important. Additionally, many other important religious practices entreated God or saints to intervene on Earth. These practices were especially important given popular fear of the Devil. After defining 'magic', I will then explore how the laity used faith-based magic rituals to provide further protection in their daily lives. Crucially, heretical magic was not part of mainstream faith, and its prominence was exaggerated by the Catholic Church.

In medieval Europe, the overwhelming majority of people subscribed to Christianity.[285] However, this does not necessarily mean that ordinary people perfectly followed the Catholic Church's teachings. This essay argues that the laity primarily depended on Christianity to protect themselves from hardship, both on Earth and after death. This argument serves as a framework for understanding which religious practices were most important to the laity. Laypersons often turned to faith-based magic rituals for further protection, although the presence of heretical magic or witchcraft has been exaggerated by clerical sources. To prove this, I will first explain why the afterlife was a primary concern for the laity. This essay will then argue that many religious practices were only important to the extent they benefitted one's soul,

[285] Carol Lansing, 'Popular Belief and Heresy', in Carol Lansing and Edward D. English, eds, *A Companion to the Medieval World*, Chichester, 2009, pp.280-281.

before showing how practices with the most direct benefits were particularly important. Next, this essay will contend that many other important religious practices essentially entreated God or saints to intervene on Earth. These practices were especially important given popular fear of the Devil. This essay will then define magic and explore how the laity used faith-based magic rituals for further protection in their daily lives. Finally, this essay will argue that heretical magic was not part of mainstream faith, and its prominence was exaggerated by the Church.

The afterlife was a foremost concern for the laity. Nearly all Christians feared that, after death, their soul would spend time in Purgatory: only saints might go directly to Heaven. Conversely, God's mercy would save all penitents, even the late and insincere.[286] The horrors of Purgatory were prominent in the lay imagination for several reasons. First, laypersons were surrounded by sources describing Purgatory, from sermons to common devotional books that recounted people's visions of the afterlife.[287] Moreover, these sources evoked grotesque imagery that certainly made a lasting impression. For example, some accounts reported souls in Purgatory being suspended by meat hooks through their sexual organs; in others, souls were forced to drink scalding filth.[288] Understandably, most medieval people were concerned about hastening their soul's passage through Purgatory. Many important religious practices reflect this.

[286] Eamon Duffy, *The Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England, c.1400-c.1580*, Yale, 1992, p.341.
[287] ibid., p.338.
[288] ibid., p.339.

The laity considered many religious practices worthwhile only to the extent they benefitted their soul. For example, most people confessed and received communion once a year, and frequently delayed doing so until Holy Week.[289] Annual confession was the minimum standard required of Catholics after the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215.[290] Most people did not seem concerned about confessing or receiving communion beyond what was strictly required for salvation. This also seems to be true in the case of sermons. Sermons were the primary vehicle for clergymen to communicate Catholic teachings to the laity.[291] They appear to have been highly popular among laypersons too. Beth Barr, for example, cites fifteenth-century French records which claim thousands of townspeople attended particular sermons. Similarly, fifteenth-century autobiography *The Book of Margery Kempe* describes how people ran to hear a sermon by a notable preacher.[292] However, most laypersons did not attend sermons out of devotional zeal—in fact, many clergyman suspected their lay audiences were more entertained by novel theatrics than a sermon's actual meaning.[293] Rather, the laity likely attended sermons because they conveyed liturgical knowledge essential for salvation. Since the Council of 1215, parish priests were required to assess confessors on their basic liturgical knowledge.[294] Sermons were designed to help the laity meet these greater demands. For example, preachers were encouraged to use familiar examples laypersons would remember, and sermons delivered in vernacular languages became increasingly common by the late Middle Ages.[295] The laity likely engaged with sermons because they were an entertaining and

[289] ibid., p.93.
[290] ibid., p.54.
[291] Ronald J. Stansbury, *A Companion to Pastoral Care in the Late Middle Ages (1200-1500)*, Leiden, 2010, p.24.
[292] Beth Allison Barr, 'Medieval Sermons and Audience Appeal after the Black Death', *History Compass*, 16, 9, 2018, p.3.
[293] Stansbury, p.29.
[294] Duffy, pp.54; 61.
[295] Stansbury, p.29; Duffy, p.79.

accessible way to access essential knowledge. While some laypersons may have been particularly devout, most engaged with religion as much as was necessary to ensure salvation.

The laity particularly valued religious practices that directly benefitted their souls. This is evidenced by two key examples. The first is the practice of indulgences. Indulgences were incredibly popular once they became widely offered in the twelfth century, appealing to devout and lapsed Catholics alike.[296] Their popularity was a result of the lay belief that indulgences would reduce a soul's time in Purgatory.[297] This was actually a misunderstanding—Purgatory was really a timeless state—but this example shows how the laity prioritised practices which directly benefitted their souls.[298] Like indulgences, rituals around the time of death were also important to the laity because of their direct impact on the soul. Crucially, one's deathbed marked the final opportunity to repent their sins. Accordingly, the laity were highly concerned with being able to receive the last Sacrament so they could die in a state of grace.[299] Likewise, nearly all late medieval wills made provisions for funerary doles to the poor and bequests to the deceased's parish church.[300] These provisions were meant to settle the deceased's spiritual debt, necessary to prevent their soul being detained in Purgatory.[301] These practices were important to all Catholics, likely because of a sense of urgency around the time of death. This urgency was particularly acute for the significant proportion of Catholics who seemingly ignored their absolution until their deathbed. Indeed, medieval preachers consistently urged laypersons to take steps

[296] Bernard Hamilton, *Religion in the Medieval West*, London, 2003, pp.108-109.
[297] ibid.
[298] ibid.
[299] Duffy, pp.310-311.
[300] ibid., pp.356-359.
[301] ibid., pp.355-356.

towards salvation while they were healthy, rather than waiting until their final hour—the mere fact preachers considered such warnings necessary suggests that many people *did* procrastinate with such matters.[302] Overall, religious practices which had a direct and urgent benefit for one's soul were particularly important to the laity.

Alongside their concern about the afterlife, laypersons were also concerned with improving their Earthly lives. This is clear in many popular religious practices. Votive Masses, where laypeople paid priests to say Mass for their own private intentions, are one such example.[303] Bernard Hamilton claims medieval people believed Mass was the most powerful form of intercession which could be offered to God.[304] Votive Masses were extremely popular, showing many laypersons desperately sought divine assistance in their private lives. Another example is the cult of saints.[305] It was popular to invoke the saints in hope of a miracle, either from the saint themselves or as a result of the saint's prayers to God.[306] For illustration, Ronald Hutton compares saints to pagan deities: both kinds of figures were patrons of particular activities, so people could give them intense devotion in times of particular need.[307] While this devotion may have taken a communal form, Eamon Duffy argues that this was ultimately a quasi-contractual practice: people principally invoked the saints because they expected a miracle in return.[308] Moreover, some of the most committed devotees were the sick who were most desperate for a miracle.[309] Other obvious examples of the laity

[302] ibid., p.342.
[303] Hamilton, p.99.
[304] ibid.
[305] ibid.
[306] ibid., p.100.
[307] Ronald Hutton, 'How Pagan Were Medieval English Peasants?', *Folklore*, 122, 3, 2011, p.242.
[308] Duffy, pp.184-189.
[309] ibid., p.198.

seeking divine assistance include blessing rites and the cult of relics.[310] However, this concern can also be seen in less obvious examples. For instance, many laypeople attended Mass almost daily.[311] At first glance, this seems more motivated by pious devotion than by a desire for assistance. However, Duffy contends that laypersons believed seeing the Host would bring blessings, suggesting that such practices *were* at least partly motivated by the desire for divine assistance.[312] Ultimately, seeking miracles to improve laypeople's daily lives was a key motivation for following many important Christian practices.

The importance of seeking divine assistance was likely amplified by fears about the Devil's influence. Bernard Hamilton claims blessing rituals and exorcisms were explicitly aimed at dispelling the Devil.[313] Yet, perhaps all practices that invoked divine help may be understood in the same way. While the Devil's influence was not the focus of clerical teachings, the laity found it a compelling explanation for their own misfortunes.[314] Laypeople regularly faced natural disasters and epidemics which they had no control over.[315] Hamilton suggests the laity interpreted these acts as evidence of the Devil's power, and therefore sought protection from God.[316] This aligns with the laity's use of religious practices. It also imbues these practices with particular importance because divine assistance was the only way to combat the Devil's influence. This heightened importance may explain why the laity were willing to turn to faith-based magic rituals for further assistance.

[310] Hamilton, pp.99-101.
[311] Duffy, p.99.
[312] ibid., p.112.
[313] Hamilton, p.99.
[314] ibid., pp.99-100.
[315] ibid.
[316] ibid.

For more protection in their daily lives, laypeople also used faith-based rituals which the Catholic Church condemned as magic. Before exploring evidence for this, it is first useful to define magic. Recent medieval scholars usually prefer using definitions of magic from the Middle Ages, rather than applying modern definitions.[317] Even when following this approach, it is difficult to find a substantive definition for magic.[318] Valerie Flint defines magic as "human beings exercising control over nature with the assistance of supernatural forces".[319] This definition seems to include Christian miracles even though clerical authorities clearly distinguished miracles from magic, making Flint's definition somewhat anachronistic.[320] Instead of seeking a substantive definition, magic might be best understood simply as a label used by the Church to refer to non-sanctioned practices that invoked supernatural forces. Notably, this definition allows for some rituals which draw on Christian elements to be considered magic: the difference between miracle and magic is merely whether the Church disapproves of such rituals.

According to this definition, there is strong evidence to suggest the laity used faith-based magic rituals. Karen Jolly categorises magic rituals by intended outcome: healing, protection, divination, occult knowledge and entertainment.[321] The first three categories of magic were the most common among laypeople, and many rituals belonging to these categories used Christian elements.[322] For example, healing magic

[317] David J. Collins, 'Magic in the Middle Ages: History and Historiography', *History Compass*, 9, 5, 2011, p.416.
[318] Karen Jolly, 'Medieval Magic: Definitions, Beliefs, Practices', in Bengt Ankarloo and Stuart Clark, eds, *Witchcraft and Magic in Europe, Volume 3: The Middle Ages*, Bloomsbury, 2001, p.11.
[319] Valerie J. Flint, 'A Magic Universe', in Rosemary Horrox and W. Mark Ormrod, eds, *A Social History of England, 1200-1500*, Cambridge, 2006, p.340.
[320] ibid., p.349.
[321] Jolly, p.29.
[322] ibid., pp.30; 44; 53.

typically combined herbal remedies with Christian prayers.[323] Likewise, protective amulets were often empowered by placing them under the altar during Mass.[324] These magic rituals seem very similar to the 'orthodox' religious practices described previously: both draw on divine power for assistance in one's everyday life. Despite the Church officially condemning magic, laypeople likely did not distinguish between faith-based magic rituals and official religious practices. This is shown by the *Ars Notoria*, a magic handbook that incorporates Christian prayers. Copies of the text have been found with other devotional works, and a fourteenth-century monk bemoaned how easily the book could be mistaken for a legitimate Christian text.[325] Interestingly, medieval clerical authorities seemed reasonably tolerant of faith-based magic rituals. For instance, punishments for those convicted of magic were not uniform, and a charge of magical practice often had to be combined with charges of treason or heresy to merit a severe penalty.[326] Flint interprets this as proof that most accusations of magic, though credible, were not given serious weight.[327] The Church may have disapproved of all magic, but faith-based magic rituals were commonplace among the laity.

In contrast, heretical magic was probably less common than clerical sources suggest. 'Heretical magic' refers to the occult magic described previously by Jolly—which might involve the invocation of demonic spirits—as well as witchcraft.[328] Witchcraft was a distinct concept of magic; witches were believed to have renounced Christianity and

[323] ibid., p.36.
[324] ibid., p.46.
[325] Flint, p.347; Catherine Rider, 'Magic and Superstition', in R. N. Swanson, ed., *The Routledge History of Medieval Christianity, 1050-1500*, London, 2015, p.242.
[326] Flint, p.345.
[327] ibid.
[328] Jolly, p.58.

sold their soul to the Devil in exchange for power.[329] The most prominent surviving sources on heretical magic are hostile sources, such as punitive laws, inquisitorial records and sermons.[330] Particularly from the thirteenth century, these sources portray heretical magic as an organized sect intent on destroying humanity.[331] However, Carol Lansing cautions that hostile sources must be critically considered to avoid historiographical errors.[332] For instance, Lansing contends that the Church had strong incentives to fabricate alternative organised groups to consolidate their own power and identity.[333] Additionally, these sources often reveal how stereotypes shaped persecutions. For example, the *Malleus Malficarum*—a fifteenth century handbook on witchcraft—portrayed women as inherently corruptible and therefore claimed all witches were women.[334] While some women were tried for witchcraft in the late Middle Ages, this does not prove witchcraft was prominent given witch trials were largely based on stereotypes.[335] Admittedly, there are some non-hostile sources of heretical magic which survive—Jolly, for example, identifies handbooks which describe how the practitioner could force demons to do their bidding.[336] Yet, there is little proof that heretical magic was particularly common, and certainly no proof of organised demonic sects. Ultimately, the majority of magic practiced by the laity was based in Christian faith.

[329] Rider, p.273.
[330] Jolly, p.21.
[331] ibid., p.23; Anita Obermeier, 'Witches and the Myth of the Medieval Burning Times', in Stephen J. Harris and Bryon L. Grigsby, eds, *Misconceptions About the Middle Ages*, New York, 2008, p.220.
[332] Lansing, p.279.
[333] ibid., pp.277; 285.
[334] Obermeier, p.255.
[335] ibid.
[336] Jolly, p.23.

In conclusion, the medieval laity's faith seemed rather pragmatic: laypeople focused on direct benefits to themselves and their souls, rather than religious introspection. Purgatory was a particularly great concern, given the vivid language it was described with, but everyday hardships were also a concern because they were believed to be caused by the Devil. The most important religious practices were those which could protect the laity on Earth and after death. Laypeople were also willing to use faith-based magic rituals for similar purposes, and did not necessarily distinguish between magic rituals and religious practices. While the Catholic Church disapproved of all magic, it did show a reasonable degree of tolerance towards practitioners of faith-based magic.

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The Tools of Transmission: Studying Sacred Texts in Light of the Orality/Literacy Debate

Holly Bennett

Essay Prompt: What light does the transmission of sacred texts cast on the debate surrounding the relationship between orality and literacy?

The debate surrounding the relationship between orality and literacy is a complex dialectic, but one thing most scholars agree upon is that this relationship appears in a unique form in almost every different context. As such, claims about the nature and impact of, and the relationship between, orality and literacy are of limited use without qualification in specific case studies. This essay explores whether examining the transmission of sacred texts, in a variety of cultural and historical contexts, can shed

Fig 11: The Black Madonna of Częstochowa, Poland. Courtesy of Anna Hamling, "The Power of an Image", think.iafor.org.

any light on the relationship between orality and literacy. By doing so, it also provides the opportunity to test out different facets of the orality/literacy debate. In some cases initial universal assumptions concerning orality and literacy have proven correct, but the majority of this discussion attests to the stunning diversity of the forms in which the relationship between orality and literacy has played out. Sacred texts provide a unique genre of case study as they are often the most significant form of text in any given culture or society, meaning that great attention is given to their preservation over time. They are also a form of text often continues to see features of oral transmission and oral culture even within cultures that are considered 'literate'.

A central argument put forth by Rosalind Thomas in response to scholars of orality and literacy such as Jack Goody, Ian Watt and Walter Ong is that it is misleading and even incorrect to view literacy as either a "single phenomenon" or an "autonomous mechanism of change".[338] If literacy is to be viewed as a tool, the assumption that it has a universal effect or any inherent characteristics is clearly naive; "tools can have very different effects, depending on when they are used, for what purposes, and by whom".[339] The same can assumedly be applied inversely to orality. Debates surrounding orality and literacy, according to Thomas, have built up the case for regarding the effects or implications of literacy as "heavily dependent on whatever society is using it".[340] In other words, the effects of literacy are far from inherent or universal. Rather, they are entirely determined by cultural context and dictated by existing systems of politics, customs and beliefs.[341] These factors create such a complex

[338] Rosalind Thomas, *Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece,* Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 97.
[339] Thomas, *Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece,* p. 97.
[340] Ibid., p. 22.
[341] Ibid., p. 22.

and even contradictory plurality of implications that they can only be truly understood on a case-by-case examination, which is what this essay shall explore.

Susan Naquin's study of the transmission of White Lotus sectarianism in Late Imperial China provides two interesting case studies for examining the relationship between orality and literacy. As an unorthodox and non-state sanctioned factional religion, White Lotus religion was preserved through both oral and written transmission. The doctrine was based on sacred books produced in the Late Ming, and those who "owned and could read and understand these texts acquired considerable religious authority".[342] This textually-based religious authority, combined with sustained persecution by Ch'ing authorities who confiscated and destroyed scriptures, made the preservation, study, and reproduction of these sacred texts paramount.[343] However, as Naquin identifies, this scriptural basis of White Lotus religion was utilised in practice in very different ways according to the specific sect. Scriptures were integral to the 'sutra recitation' sects' practice and transmission of religious doctrines.[344] Conversely, the 'Trigram' sects relied on oral forms of transmission, with little use of written texts.[345] The impacts this divide in the transmission and practice of a single religion and set of sacred texts had provides a unique opportunity to test the validity of claims concerning the features of oral and literate cultures.

For the sutra recitation sects, written transmission remained central. Even though

[342] Susan Naquin, 'The Transmission of White Lotus Sectarianism in Late Imperial China', in *Popular Culture in Late Imperial China*, ed. David Johnson, Andrew J. Nathan, and Evelyn S. Rawski, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985, p. 259.
[343] Naquin, 'The Transmission of White Lotus Sectarianism in Late Imperial China', p. 259.
[344] Naquin, 'The Transmission of White Lotus Sectarianism in Late Imperial China', p. 260.
[345] Ibid., p. 274.

rituals could be simplified for the sake of the non-literate and the oral transmission of chants was used, authority and the continuation of practice was derived from the scriptures. Sect members met regularly in congregations to "engage in the ritual recitation of scriptures", creating strong horizontal community ties.[346] These sects attracted "relatively literate followers", and joining a sutra sect meant having the opportunity to see and hold these sacred texts, learn to read and chant them, and even make handwritten copies.[347] Naquin notes that chains of transmission were sometimes picked up even after years of hiatus, so long as one was literate and possessed a copy of the scriptures.[348] One aspect of the sutra recitation sects that bears interest is that these largely literate, written-transmission reliant sects were far more congregational than the primarily orally transmitted practices of the Trigram sects. Despite many sects having access to sacred scriptures in written form, the practice of coming together and chanting scriptures aloud was a foundational aspect of these sects, and can be viewed as the continuation of oral culture and forms within a society considered 'literate'. Adam Fox has argued, in response to the Fifties school of historiography that placed literacy and orality in a dichotomy, that "in practice, most societies are characterised by a dynamic series of interactions between spoken and written forms of communication and record".[349] Far from being antithetical, with cultures moving from orality to literacy in linear, progressive manner, careful study of how sacred texts were transmitted within White Lotus sects reflects the true messiness of the relationship between orality and literacy.

[346] Ibid., p. 260.
[347] Ibid., p. 263.
[348] Ibid., p. 270.
[349] Adam Fox, *Oral and Literate Culture in Early Modern Britain 1500-1700,* New York, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 9.

Notably, the level of written transmission for some sutra recitation sects was impacted by a scarcity of books, funding, and the presence of government persecution. In some cases, these sects wereforced to rely on memorising excerpts from the scriptures for their practice, and passing on sect doctrine via oral transmission.[350] This move from relying on primarily literate modes to primarily oral modes necessitated stylistic adaptations for rituals and chants. The need for memorisation led to the condensing, simplifying and even rhyming of scriptural excerpts. This again reflects a key feature of oral transmission: the significance of memory and the use of rhyming as a device to aid memorization.[351] A group in Shantung, driven by the desire to include believers that were poorer and less literate, held assemblies that allowed participation simply by kneeling with a stick of incense while others around them chanted the sutras.[352] Other groups relied on song sheets to facilitate income, make up for a lack of true scriptures, and to make religious practice more accessible to those who were less literate.[353] This practice exemplifies a point made by Keith Thomas, that within these mixed cultures of both literate and oral, those unable to read or write still participated by drawing on the services of others for access to the written word.[354] Even within the seemingly highly literate culture of the sutra recitation sects, participation could still be achieved and sacred texts still transmitted to the non-literate, bridging the gap between any "supposed divide between exclusively literate and illiterate groups".[355]

For the Trigram sects, transmission played out in different and more peculiar ways—

[350] Naquin, 'The Transmission of White Lotus Sectarianism', p. 271.
[351] Fox, *Oral and Literate Culture,* p. 18.
[352] Naquin, 'The Transmission of White Lotus Sectarianism', p. 273.
[353] Ibid., pp. 272-274
[354] Keith Thomas, 'The meaning of literacy in early modern England', in Gerd Baumann, ed., *The written word: Literacy in transition,* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1968, p. 106.
[355] Thomas, 'The meaning of literacy in early modern England', p. 107.

generally through vertical, direct, teacher-to-pupil links, reliant on the teacher's memorisation and oral transmission of the meditational chants.[356] Worship in the Trigram sects was more private and spread out due to this mode of transmission, as opposed to the congregational style of the sutra recitation sects. Assemblies were infrequent, and "horizontal ties between members were weak".[357] This immediately questions the assumption that primarily oral cultures are characterised by community and lack individual sensibility, as the Trigram sects relied primarily on oral transmission yet remained largely private and isolationist.[358] Trigram sects are also distinct for relying very little on written texts, with Naquin noting that "very few books were used by these Trigram sects".[359] Similar to the minority of poorer and more persecuted sutra recitation sects forced to rely on memorisation and oral transmission, the meditational chants of the Trigram sects were shortened from the original scriptures to short couplets, that "usually consisted of no more than fifty characters". According to Naquin, "the majority were even shorter and thus easier to remember". Most rhymed, had lines of seven characters each, and contained "parallel grammatical structures that could also serve as aids to memory".[360] Naquin argues that "for sects without the more formal and detailed discussions of doctrine found in religious scriptures, the chants used in meditation rituals were an important source of continuity, but they also clearly encouraged a simplified understanding of the religion". The nature of oral transmission and reliance on memory, in other words, significantly altered the form of the original sacred text as it was transmitted.

[356] Naquin, 'The Transmission of White Lotus Sectarianism', p. 274.
[357] Ibid., p. 274.
[358] Thomas, *Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece,* p. 26.
[359] Naquin, 'The Transmission of White Lotus Sectarianism', p. 280.
[360] Ibid., p. 276.

The evolution of the original sacred scriptures of the White Lotus religion into orally transmissible, easily remembered chants and sutras is also argued to have substantially altered the original *content* of the text. Naquin notes that "once an oral tradition was established, there was a tendency for portions to be lost, lines mixed up, and characters misunderstood or changed".[361] Variations in the two most common chants reflect this. Naquin noted that variations in individual characters "shifted emphasis" but did not drastically change meaning.[362] However, when lines were dropped altogether, as with the popular eight character mantra, "significant ideas could be lost".[363] "A preference for the simplest form, one that was easily remembered and likely to appeal to the greatest number of people, did lead to the reduction of the religious doctrine to a few key ideas and a few simple practices", at least outside of the core of the tradition.[364] This conclusion is echoed by Jack Goody and Ian Watt, who contend that the social pressures surrounding oral transmission, along with the shortcomings of oral modes of transmission, often result in content becoming "transmuted in the course of being transmitted".[365] The reshaping of the original text through oral transmission facilitated significant changes in both form and content, and these changes occurred not just because oral transmission allowed them to occur, but also because of the need for easy communication and memorisation that oral transmission created. Some scholars argue oral transmission is 'unstable', as it "depend[s] on the many fallible links in a human chain, all of whom have to remember accurately and pass on the tradition for it to be preserved".[366] Orality is also argued to

[361] Ibid., p. 285.
[362] Ibid., p. 285.
[363] Ibid., p. 285.
[364] Ibid., p. 285.
[365] J. Goody and I. Watt, 'The consequences of literacy', in J. Goody, ed., *Literacy in Traditional Societies,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1968, p. 33.
[366] Thomas, *Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece,* pp. 106-108.

encourage homeostasis, with cultural content constantly being changed and adapted to fit the needs of the present.[367] The changes that occurred within the scripture of the orally dependent Trigram sects, as opposed to the textually based sutra recitation sects, seems to prove some of these generalisations surrounding oral culture. As we shall see, however, these generalisations are still far from universal.

Donald S. Lopez's study of the transmission of Buddhist sacred texts within Tibetan monk culture provides a second case study to potentially illuminate aspects of the orality/literacy debate. Lopez travelled to India in 1979 to the Tibetan monasteries of Ganden and Drepung, intending to gain access to sacred Buddhist texts and translate and record them for Western posterity.[368] In his sessions with a lama, in the traditional manner of Tibetan culture, Lopez was treated to long oral explanations and commentary on the written text, to the point that the transcribed commentary of the lama was far longer than the translated text itself.[369] Lopez struggled with his translation as he was forced to negotiate between the oral tradition of the Buddhist monks, that placed highest value on the spoken word, and the literate culture of the Western academy, that located authority and value in the written word.[370] This essential dichotomy, when extrapolated, exemplifies the fact that the written transmission of 'literate' cultures is not innately superior. Rather, its value is dictated according to cultural context. Furthermore, the continuance of key tenets of 'oral culture' further attests to the fact that orality and literacy are not two separate spheres.

[367] Goody and Watt, 'The consequences of literacy', p. 31.
[368] Donald S. Lopez Jr., ed., *Curators of the Buddha: The Study of Buddhism Under Colonialism*, University of Chicago Press, 1995, pp. 268-271.
[369] Lopez Jr., *Curators of the Buddha,* pp. 277-279.
[370] Ibid., pp. 278-280.

In actuality, orality and literacy exist concurrently, in a dynamic, complex relationship highly specific to the social group concerned.

Within Buddhist monasteries, the spoken word and the oral transmission of sacred texts from teacher to student is still highly valued, despite easy access to written forms of these texts. Donald Lopez asserts that without the "precious oral commentary" of the lama, most of his purpose in recording and translating the scriptures would be lost.[371] The written text itself, seemingly the far more accurate form of transmission according to theories of Goody, Watt, and Rosalind Thomas, is valued far less in Tibetan Buddhist culture than the oral communication and explication of it. In this sense, literacy and the written transmission it enables is only superior to oral transmission if dictated by the culture within which it operates. A basic assumption of Buddhist belief is that the essential meaning, essence, or dharma that originates from the Buddha can be preserved only via oral transmission from teacher to student, through an "endless elaboration of commentary".[372] Oral transmission, therefore, remains not only the more culturally valuable form, but the more historically viable. The lama's oral commentary carried with it the "unspoken claim" to know the true intent of the ur-speaker—in this case the Buddha himself—and the true meaning is only achieved through this "long chain of interlocking conversations" between teachers and students.[373] Reading a text is viewed as insufficient; "one must receive oral instruction upon it from a teacher who has in turn received such instruction in the past", and the centrality of hearing the words "from the mouth of the teacher" is

[371] Ibid., p. 277.
[372] Lopez Jr., *Curators of the Buddha,* p. 282.
[373] Ibid., p. 281; Goody and Watt, 'The consequences of literacy', p. 29.

evident everywhere".[374] This implies that access to the past teachings is gained through the oral transmission of teachers, carrying on an unbroken chain of human transmission—the written texts are still significant, but in a distinctly secondary manner. Far from true meaning and historical accuracy being accessible only through written transmission, Tibetan culture viewed these things as accessible primarily via oral transmission. This example does not necessarily disprove the alleged shortcomings of oral transmission Western-centric studies have identified, but it does reframe them in an interesting manner. Placing the veracity and authority of a text in the oral transmission and explication of it, and in the person-to-person links across time, helps prove that the prevalent understanding of the superiority of written documents for their accuracy and authority is not necessarily a universal truth, but a culturally defined notion. The understandings of history put forth by Goody and Watt, and the impact literacy has on history and the formation of cultural content, have little meaning in the cultural context of the Tibetan Buddhists.[375]

A third opportunity to examine the orality/literacy debate in the light of the transmission of sacred texts comes with the modes of transmission and communication surrounding the Bible in Oliver Cromwell's England. The growing proliferation of both literacy and print across the seventeenth century in England has been argued to have diminished the practices of oral culture such as memorization, making it far "less necessary".[376] Yet others such as Keith Thomas have argued that in early modern England, "oral communication remained central," and memorisation in

[374] Lopez Jr., *Curators of the Buddha,* p. 279.
[375] Goody and Watt, 'The consequences of literacy', p. 34.
[376] Peter Sherlock, 'The Reformation of Memory in Early Modern Europe', in Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwarz, eds., *Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates*, Fordham University Press, 2010, p. 31.

particular remained a crucial aspect of practice within specifically religious contexts.[377] Despite reliance on written sacred texts such as the Bible and the Prayer Book, people were still expected to "learn their articles of belief by heart and to listen to spoken sermons".[378] Speech was still considered more "direct and persuasive" than the written word, and among preachers, many considered it bad form to depend on written sermons: instead, "he was supposed to trust it to his memory".[379] This further speaks to the idea, already touched upon with the Tibetan lamas, that for sacred texts and the religious beliefs they held, oral modes remained preferred even in the midst of growing literacy. Even in a culture deemed largely literate by most standards, sacred texts such as the Bible continued to be memorised. The need to truly *know* a text by heart, as dictated by a specifically religious context, saw the continued reliance on memory and oral communication, and we see a prime example of this in the case of Oliver Cromwell.

John Morrill's examination of Oliver Cromwell's letters during 1638 reveals an impressive amount of scriptural content. Cromwell repeatedly quoted from the Bible at length in exegetical discussions, through which he contextualised and reaffirmed his current experiences within the Word of God. Most interestingly, John Morrill interprets Cromwell's letters to conclude that Cromwell was "quoting from memory".[380] Notably in Cromwell's case, he has gained knowledge of multiple editions of the Bible through "relentless and repeated rereading"; his memory is not simply rote repetition, but true knowledge and secure recollection of this sacred text.[381] This shows

[377] Thomas, 'The meaning of literacy in early modern England', p. 113.
[378] Ibid., p. 113.
[379] Ibid., p. 113.
[380] John Morrill, 'How Oliver Cromwell Thought', in *Liberty, Authority, Formality: Political Ideas and Culture, 1600-1900: Essays in Honour of Colin Davis*, ed. John Morrow and Jonathan Scott, Charlottesville, Imprint Academic, 2008, p. 76.
[381] Morrill, 'How Oliver Cromwell Thought', p. 76.

us that both the medieval notion of memory, as has been expertly explored by Mary Carruthers, and the functional use of memory often attached to primarily oral cultures, has persisted here in a significant way within a highly literate society. The status of sacred texts, and the significance of gaining true knowledge of these sacred texts, allowed key features of orality to remain central among highly literate men such as Cromwell. What is interesting is that the persistence of these oral features is seemingly linked to the specific status of these texts as sacred. Unlike any secular text, Morrill reflects on the notion held by Cromwell and his contemporaries that to learn, memorise and meditate upon scripture at length was very necessary for the devout and pious. Doing so was essential, because it allowed the Word of God to "transubstantiate within" oneself.[382] That is, knowledge and memorisation of the Bible was not only necessary for public appearance, but for one's individual participation in and benefit from religion.

The reciprocal and symbiotic relationship between orality and literacy that scholars such as Fox, Thomas and Mary Carruthers have stressed is also evident in the quasi-ritual of the great Army Prayer Meetings of 1647-9. Officers both read their Bibles and "let the scriptures they knew by heart swirl around in their minds", until a connection could be found between the sacred text and their own current situation.[383] What followed was an oral "exploration and explication of that connection", through which God's will could be discovered through spoken debate based in scripture.[384] This practice is reminiscent of Rosalind Thomas' discussion of Greek oral culture, in which she recalibrated the impact of literacy on Greek society and recentred the continued

[382] Ibid., p. 77.
[383] Morrill, 'How Oliver Cromwell Thought', p. 73.
[384] Ibid., p. 73.

significance of orality.[385] These prayer meetings reflect to a limited extent the central argument of Thomas that literacy does not necessarily replace or subsume orality, orality-to-literacy is not necessarily a linear, progressive continuum, and that literacy's supposed impact and value is entirely dependent on context. The oral nature of prayer meetings and evidence that a strong memory of full biblical passages was common among these officers shows that even in a highly literate culture, when it came to sacred texts, reliance on aspects of oral culture, memorial culture, and oral transmission remained high. Again, this is linked to the notion that true and secure knowledge was a necessary requirement of devout and pious religious practice, and this knowledge could not be gained by reading alone. Even within a context that did not necessitate the memorisation of texts, scriptures continued to be memorised for a variety of reasons, and it is undoubtedly the sacred status of these texts that produced this continuance of oral culture.

The fourth and final case study to be considered here is that of Germanic Black Madonnas from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries. Monique Scheer notes these Black Madonnas—figures, statues and paintings of the Madonna and Christ child with dark skin—were highly revered partially on the basis of their colour. These objects and images count as non-written sacred texts, rich with religious significance and meaning that has been transmitted and transformed over time. On a basic level, Black Madonnas reflect the significance of images and pictorial texts even in a culture with levels of literacy. Many scholars argue the importance of visual communication within apparently 'literate' societies attests to the mixed nature of orality and literacy,

[385] Thomas, *Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece,* pp. 101-113.

challenging the notion of a dichotomy between oral and literate.[386] Pictures and images were "most proper for contemplation" and would be "better kept in mind" than simple text, whilst also providing devotional focus and communicating textual information to any who could not read. [387] Black Madonnas therefore functioned both as texts that communicated specific religious information, as well as an object to direct devotional focus for worshippers.

Jan Vansina's theory of how images function within oral tradition is undoubtedly reflected in the function of Black Madonnas that Scheer uncovers. Images are argued to "make abstract notion concrete by use of analogy". More precisely, images can express "complex relationships, situations, or trains of thought in a dense, concrete form", able to be grasped immediately and palpably by the viewer.[388] Scheer explores how the blackness of these Madonnas was not necessarily viewed literally in an ethnic sense, but perceived in a multivocal sense to connote age, Eastern provenance, and authenticity that was linked to the miraculous power of Mary.[389] Black Madonnas were not interpreted literally but more as a visual metaphor or analogy that conveyed the image's claim to authenticity (as an ancient remnant of Mary herself) and therefore the image's status. These statues and images continued to be revered and read as sacred texts, with a complex, multivocal meaning that could be instantly and concretely expressed to audiences visually. At the same time, the meaning of these images was explicated and added to over time. Scheer demonstrates this with the 1726

[386] Fox, *Oral and Literate Culture,* p. 25; Thomas, 'The meaning of literacy in early modern England', pp. 97-103; Thomas, *Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece,* p. 18.
[387] Fox, *Oral and Literate Culture,* p. 25; Mary Carruthers, *The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2nd edn, 2008, p. 276.
[388] Jan Vansina, *Oral Tradition as History,* Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1985, p. 138.
[389] Monique Scheer, 'From Majesty to Mystery: Change in the Meanings of Black Madonnas from the Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries', *American Historical Review,* 107.5, 2002, pp. 1430-1435.

sermon of Father Benedikt Frumb, whose interpretation of the colour of a Black Madonna is argued to have augmented the significance of the blackness over time, linking it not only to provenance but to metaphorical statements concerning Mary's grief, powerful love, and humility.[390]

The persisting centrality of a non-written sacred text within an increasingly literate world, and the ways in which oral, written and visual communication are shown to interact in the case of the Black Madonnas, helps to shed further light on the notion that far from existing in a dichotomy, orality and literacy continue to exist in a complex, interwoven manner. Yet Scheer also explores the loss of their true meaning over time, and this speaks to aspects of non-written transmission. The Black Madonnas, as unwritten texts, cannot convey much—if any—concrete information across time, context and audience. As already discussed, Black Madonnas were at one point understood "primarily allegorically", with a rich and layered multivocality of meaning that could encompass origin, provenance, legitimacy, authority, and religious and emotional metaphors concerning Mary.[391] Yet over time, this multivocality was eventually subsumed by the narrowing of the meaning of their skin tone to the singular aspect of racial origin. The blackness of their skin lost its nuanced meaning, and came to be viewed as an enigma by scholars applying ahistorical notions of race and ethnicity to these objects.[392] Just as oral transmission facilitates fluid and changeable meaning across time according to the specific cultural context (this is also true of written texts, though perhaps to a lesser extent), so too does the changing meaning of the Black Madonna,

[390] Scheer, 'From Majesty to Mystery', p. 1421.
[391] Ibid., p. 1436.
[392] Scheer, 'From Majesty to Mystery', p. 1437.

neither fully oral nor truly literate, reflect this multivocal characteristic of non-written transmission.[393]

Scholars argue that there are "radical differences between oral culture (based upon memory) and literate culture (based upon writing)", and these differences have been understood as both distinct and universal.[394] 'History' itself is often framed as incapable of existing without writing and literacy, and this societal progression has been viewed as a linear movement from a distinctly oral culture to a distinctly literate one.[395] The transmission of a variety of sacred texts as explored here attests to a few general conclusions concerning this debate. Undoubtedly, oral and literate cultures both could, and often did, exist "side-by-side", impacting each other and interweaving in a reciprocal, somewhat symbiotic manner.[396] The case studies of the White Lotus, Buddhist lamas and Cromwell's England highlight the fact that oral culture persisted within highly literate contexts. Indeed, the devotional desire to gain true knowledge and understanding of sacred texts guaranteed the proliferation of aspects of oral cultures within literate societies. Most pointedly, this discussion of sacred texts and their transmission ultimately illuminates the central theory, already reached by many scholars, that the impacts of orality and literacy, and any sense of a dichotomy or hierarchy between the two can perhaps never be understood on a universal or theoretical level. There is almost nothing "intrinsic" about either oral or written communication; distinctions, hierarchies and characteristics of the relationship

[393] Goody and Watt, 'The consequences of literacy', p. 48.
[394] Carruthers, *The Book of Memory,* p. 18.
[395] Goody and Watt, 'The consequences of literacy', p. 27.
[396] Ian Worthington, *Voice into Text: Orality and Literacy in Ancient Greece,* Brill Academic, 1997, p. vii.

between these two modes of communication are entirely locally dependent, and vary widely from culture to subculture.[397]

This essay has explored four unique case studies of the transmission of sacred texts to better illuminate the debates surrounding the relationship between orality and literacy. The study of White Lotus sectarianism provides a unique opportunity to view the transmission of the same set of sacred texts through both primarily written and primarily oral means. The impact of oral transmission in this specific case initially corroborates the claims of Jack Goody, Ian Watt and Rosalind Thomas concerning the shortcomings of orality. However, the second case study of Tibetan Buddhist texts both attests to the continuance of oral cultural forms within 'literate' cultures, as well as suggesting that these claims surrounding orality are far from universal. Rather, they are directly affected and dictated according to specific cultural context. The discussion of Cromwell's and his contemporaries' beliefs and behaviours surrounding biblical scriptures further attests to more nuanced arguments by scholars like Adam Fox and Keith Thomas. Key features of oral culture continued to persist in an increasingly literate early modern England, and key features of memorial culture continued specifically in connection to sacred texts. Finally, the discussion of Black Madonnas, a sacred text neither wholly oral nor literate, demonstrates that understandings of the significance images and pictorial texts hold in oral cultures can also be applied to literate cultures, and are not exclusive features of orality. Furthermore, the instability of meaning across time is again capable of being reconceptualized within this highly singular cultural context. In summation, these case studies certainly shed light on the debate surrounding the relationship between orality and literacy. They help to

[397] Goody and Watt, 'The consequences of literacy', p. 29.

corroborate the generalised conclusion that the characteristics, effects and implications of orality and literacy are neither inherent nor universal, and should not be understood in the highly theoretical and Western-centric manner scholars such as Thomas have critiqued. Aspects of this debate have been shown to crop up somewhat randomly across geographical and temporal location, and can be both proven and contradicted equally within different cultural contexts, decrying any notions of a universal outlook or general inherent characteristics. The desire to truly qualify universal theoretical claims about the nature and impact of orality and literacy, and the relationship between the two, is perhaps one that will forever be frustrated.

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