



HISTERIA!

PAST PRESENT FUTURE

2024-2025

Waipapa Taumata Rau University Of Auckland.

Histeria! 2024-2025

PAST. PRESENT. FUTURE.

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

Editorial Preface: Rose Madeleine Kenilworth Thomas and Suzie Lloyd.....4

Waimaria Mark

History 227: Waitangi: Treaty to Tribunal.....12

Object Analysis: Te Rā

Lili Penina Brown

History 308: African American Freedom Struggles: USA 1900-2000.....20

Remembering the Civil Rights Movement: The Antonym of 'Forgetting' or a Bend Towards Justice

Caeden Tipler

History 107: Titiro Whakamuri: Histories of Aotearoa New Zealand.....33

Honouring a Whakapapa of Activism: Why the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination is an important day of commemoration in Aotearoa.

Kaakatarau Te Pou Kohere

History 715: Topics in the History of War and Peace.....40

The Struggle Never Ends: Colonial Projections in Aotearoa - New Zealand History

Kate Thompson

History 371: Atlantic Revolutions.....64

Networks of Resistance: The movement of people and information in Saint-Domingue

Emmanuel Ko

History 239: Medieval Cultures: Faith, Power, Identities.....79

Mapping Faith: The Hereford Mappa Mundi as a window into Medieval Mentalities

Connor Noble

History 339: Medieval Cultures: Faith, Power, Identities.....86

Belief, Religion, and Magic in Medieval Worlds

Maya Zolotar

History 309: Bloodlands: Global Warfare.....99

The Case Against the Bipolar-Proxy Understanding: East Asia 1945-55.

Angela Black

History 210: Health, Medicine and Society.....109

Fighting Beyond Empire: Analysing the extent to which the early twentieth-century infant welfare movement was simply a movement to promote breeding for Empire.

Emily Klaver

History 270: Ireland Since 1798.....119

The Banshee in the Attic: Designing (and Controlling) the Irish Woman Through State Policy in Mid-Twentieth Century Ireland, c.1930-1970.

Sabine Edmonds

History 108: Rise and Fall of the USA.....134

To Capture a Word like Freedom: Change and Conflict in Visions of American Freedom, 1775-1865.

Maia Hunter

History 107: Titiro Whakamuri: Histories of Aotearoa New Zealand.....143

“Lest We Forget”: But Whose Stories Do We Remember?

All essays were submitted for assessment during the 2024 academic year. As such, they have passed through Turn It In plagiarism detection software, and are confirmed to be in line with the University of Auckland’s policies on Academic Integrity.

All rights belong to the individual authors.

Cover image by ©R.M.K.Thomas

*Published April 2025, University of Auckland Waipapa Taumata Rau
Auckland, New Zealand.*

Editorial Preface

Hā ki roto, hā ki waho,

Mihi ki ngā atua,

Aio ki te ao.

Welcome to *Histeria!* The official University of Auckland Waipapa Taumata Rau student made history magazine. Here you will find fascinating essays written by talented and insightful history students, with differing levels of experience. As editors, Suzie and I set out to make this issue engaging and thought provoking, while supporting creative and empathetic prose about important historical topics. We, therefore, decided to name this issue: Past, Present and Future, to remind readers of the value of history as a method for navigating time and space.

For me, 2025 seems like a historic year already. Anyone who participated in the School Strike for Climate will remember the many demands for change made by tangata whenua, activists and academics alike, and yet here we are experiencing another ‘hottest summer on record’ and a government intent on rolling back efforts to acknowledge Māori rights to Tino Rangatiratanga.

With this in mind, this issue of *Histeria!* prioritised history that spoke to historic connections to the environment.

We also asked writers to send us a short bio about themselves and their interests, so that our readers may consider each essays’ subjectivity and the wider contexts of the authors. Our focus has been on platforming inclusivity and solidarity for the people and ecologies of the past.

Another new feature we have added to this issue of *Histeria!* is imagery. We decided one way to make the magazine more engaging would be to punctuate each essay with artwork. These images are designed to give readers time to pause, breathe and imagine their connection to living in the past, present and future.

It has been a pleasure working alongside Suzie on this project, and I hope you will enjoy each essay as much as I did. Ngā mihi aroha ki a koutou.

He manu kai o te miromiro,

Nōna te ngahere,

He mahu kai o te matauranga,

Nōna te ao.

Rose Madeleine Kenilworth Thomas

*

The essays chosen for this year's edition of *Histeria!* range in their scope, scale, and geographic focus. Our authors' styles also demonstrate the many different ways that students might engage in history and history-writing, from traditionally academic analyses to personal narrative-like prose; consequently, we have chosen to structure this edition of *Histeria!* thematically rather than in ascending stage order, and have asked our authors to write titles for their pieces. Our hope is that not only will this create a strong cohesive collection, it will also demonstrate to our readers that engagement with complex ideas is not limited to a particular level. Whether you are a first-year student in a Stage One course, or an honours student writing Graduate papers, your history-work can still be in conversation with scholarship and the wider world, and effectively consider 'chunky' topics that are important to you. We direct

readers to the contents page if they wish to navigate to exemplars for specific courses or stages.

The authors in this edition successfully consider the past not only in terms of ‘what happened,’ but also with regards to its implications for us now, and in the future. Careful consideration of the lives of historical subjects is a core component of history writing. So too, is recognising that the past is dynamic rather than static: we cannot pick it up and put it back down after we have finished playing with it. History is at once the record(s) of past events and people, and the relationships that we have to them.

Waimaria Mark opens this year’s issue with a moving analysis of Te Rā, an approximately 200 year old customary Māori sail that is believed to be the oldest of its kind still in existence. Mark reflects on the profound effect Te Rā’s exhibit at Auckland War Memorial Museum had on her, as a piece of physical history that connects her with the lives of her ancestors. As well as its personal significance, Te Rā is an example of how Indigenous knowledge and expertise has been, and continues to be, devalued by colonial power structures, of which the British Museum (which still ‘owns’ the sail) has long been a part of and struggled to redress. Mark argues that Te Rā challenges colonial narratives of Māori as unsophisticated and helpless, and the sail’s existence is a testament to the skill and expertise of Pacific voyagers.

Moving across the Pacific to the United States of America, **Lili Penina Brown’s** essay on the Civil Rights Movement contends with the nature of memory and its relationship to contested historical interpretations. Brown explains how the legacy of the Civil Rights Movement is subject to significant debate, due to competing ideas on what it

means to 'remember' the movement and its achievements. Different remembrance practices privilege certain interpretations of the movement, and tend to be heavily aligned with contemporary political motivations. Debates around Martin Luther King Jr. are particularly contentious, as politicians habitually cherry-pick choice quotes or comments to help bolster policy decisions that often do not match King's original vision for racial justice. It is not enough for us to simply 'remember' the past; doing justice in the present requires honouring the full history of anti-racist movements' aspirations and goals.

Caeden Tipler's opinion piece pulls this thread of justice back to Aotearoa New Zealand, as they consider how our history of racial discrimination and anti-racist activism sits within a wider international context of protest. Tipler argues that New Zealand's cultural relationship to racism has tended to be predicated on a perceived distance from racial discrimination, which perpetuates ignorance towards our colonial past. The International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (IDERD) is immensely relevant to Aotearoa New Zealand because of the connected histories of New Zealand and apartheid-era South Africa, and parallels between the maltreatment of Māori and Black South Africans under settler-colonial governments and their legacies. For decades, activists have drawn on this history to demonstrate how racial discrimination and apartheid are not confined to the past, but persist in many nations including Aotearoa New Zealand, Israel and Palestine. Tipler's piece highlights the value of comparisons between national and international histories, to highlight the interconnectedness of anti-racist struggles across time and space.

New Zealand history writing over the decades has struggled to reconcile the reality of anti-Māori discrimination with a comfortable image of a 'New Zealand' identity, though many historians have tried. In his superlative graduate-level essay on the New

Zealand Land Wars, **Kaakatarau Te Pou Kohere** explores how historians have been invested in tracing the creation of the 'nation' and a distinct national identity. This style of remembering war, he argues, tends to obscure realities or speaks to an agenda of 'settling' them so that the nation can 'move on.' Te Pou Kohere argues that we cannot 'settle' the past—doing so drowns out the continued impact the past has on the present. Instead of trying to create a single narrative about the Wars, we must unpick the tangled threads of colonisation, expropriation, and exploitation that led to the Wars and define their aftermaths.

Kate Thompson also grapples with the complexity of anti-colonial resistance in history in her essay on the Haitian Revolution 1791-1804. Thompson situates the Revolution within the wider flows of the 'Atlantic world,' and traces the complex knots of intra- and intercultural communication and exchange that developed a heightened culture of resistance amongst enslaved peoples in the French colony of Saint Dominque. Thompson argues that this led to a wide-spread revolutionary movement across the island. Through careful consideration of both culturally-specific forms of knowledge and international networks of information, she argues that the Revolution was the result of decades of on-the-ground resistance informed by specific cultural values and contexts, and influenced by transnational calls for liberation which spread across the Atlantic world.

The importance of considering cultural specificity is further developed by **Emmanuel Ko**, in their analysis of the Hereford Mappa Mundi, the largest surviving map from the medieval period. The map is less a depiction of the physical world than it is an artistic expression of a medieval worldview. Ko moves through the core elements of the map, explaining how each piece symbolises the centrality of Christian life to many medieval Europeans, and how Christian stories and biases were used to depict far off places

and woven into the fabric of the universe. The Hereford Mappa Mundi illustrates our world in a way that the mythical and biblical were indivisible from its geography, which reminds us as historians to be alert to the cultural differences between us and past peoples.

Connor Noble explores how our temporal distance and our reliance on limited source material means that we are blocked from gaining a full understanding of the past. Noble's insightful essay on the relationship between religion and magic amongst the medieval laity demonstrates that interdisciplinary tools can help bridge the gaps in the archives, which were often written by church elites and did not include lay perspectives. Prescriptive notes on ideal clerical practice did not necessarily leave much room for a lay-person's interpretation of a Christian life, which would often blend religion and folklore together. Indeed, the importance of including the experiences of ordinary people in scholarship cannot be overstated; our understanding of the past will always be flawed if we do not recognise the agency and complex internal lives of those that have been rendered invisible across time.

Maya Zolotar brings us back up closer to the present once again, and continues the idea of agency with a compelling refutation of the concept of 'proxy wars' in regards to post-1945 conflicts in the Cold War era. Zolotar argues that the dominant bipolar model that is used to explain the Cold War is grossly insufficient. It over-emphasises the influence of the United States of America and the Soviet Union as 'superpowers' while obscuring the complex politics of specific East Asian nations including Korea and Vietnam; it denies the agency of these East Asian actors to define their own interests, motivations, and goals. Notably, this bipolar-proxy model is most common in traditional political science analyses, and does not work when applied to historical questions. Here, Zolotar highlights a crucial element of doing history: when historical

analysis is at its best, it highlights (rather than obscures) the inherent complexity of the past, and the multiplicity of peoples' motivations.

Angela Black has a similar throughline in her thoughtful piece on British women and the twentieth-century infant welfare movement. As Black explains, historians tend to agree that the infant welfare movement was primarily motivated by a eugenic sense of imperial duty to 'breed for Empire'– but to focus on this dimension alone is inaccurate and overly simplistic. Rather, mothers and other advocates of infant welfare were deeply concerned with the wellbeing of children *as children*, and they mobilised contemporary anxieties around 'good breeding' to garner state support for better housing conditions and healthcare for families. The infant welfare movement was intertwined with ideas about imperial supremacy, and it coexisted with real concerns about poverty and child suffering, and a determination to improve things for mothers and children in need. Historians must navigate both truths with care.

Indeed, many popular narratives about the past and present are limiting, precisely because they imagine our existence as 'singular'. **Emily Klaver's** essay is a perceptive exploration of the impact that nationalist policy in Ireland in the mid-twentieth century had on the prescribed rights and roles of women. The 'ideal Irish woman' was defined in very limited moral terms, based on the increasing role of the traditionalist Catholic church in Irish society and government; thus, women's freedoms were highly restricted and their morality was policed. Importantly, it was not necessarily the outright intention of the nationalist project to restrict women's freedoms in this way. The internal logic of the traditionalist project meant that everyone had their role to play in constructing the nation– and women's role was that of moral domesticity. While Irish nationalism was based on ideas of 'freedom,' this freedom was highly gendered rather than universal.

Sabine Edmonds' essay on liberty in America also grapples with the boundaries of freedom. 'Freedom' is a highly contested concept, both in history and in historical writing. It is dynamic and culturally-specific, and in the US Civil War 1861-1865, the Northern and Southern states defined freedom along different sociopolitical and hierarchical lines such as racial difference and economic power. Edmond argues that the Civil War can be understood as a contest between these two different notions of freedom; the Northern ideal of ownership of self and economic mobility, and the Southern ideal of ownership and upwards gain through the utilisation of property—which included enslaved African American people. In other words, the freedom of white Southern plantation owners depended on the unfreedom of enslaved Black people. The post-Civil War political environment was dominated by the ratification of the Northern ideal in law, with the abolition of chattel slavery in 1865. However, the American economy continued to rely on the relative unfreedom of Black labourers throughout reconstruction and into the twentieth century. As Edmonds emphasises, debates around the boundaries of freedom continue to remain incredibly relevant today, and it is important to trace how and why its definitions change over time.

To close out the edition, **Maia Hunter** brings us back to Aotearoa New Zealand with an important piece on commemoration, that asks what historical stories we like to tell, and which ones we tend to forget. Hunter argues that commemorative practices in New Zealand are primarily centred on World War One. Many historians have pointed to Gallipoli and its aftermath as a central moment in the development of a specific 'New Zealand' identity, and Anzac Day has remained a lightning rod for patriotism well into the twenty-first century. Other commemorative days for other wars have not been so widely recognised. Hunter points out that Rā Maumahara, the day of commemoration for the New Zealand Land Wars, has not been embraced as a pillar

of national pride. Indeed, as Te Pou Kohere describes in his essay, these wars tend to be an uncomfortable memory, one that many would rather leave alone or 'settle'. Hunter encourages us to consider what the impact of this selective remembrance is on how we relate to the past, present, and future.

It has been a joy and a privilege to work with Rose and our authors on this project. We would like to thank each author for their hard work and trust in us, as well as the History staff who nominated these essays and have provided support throughout the process. Tēnā rawa atu koe ki a koutou katoa, me ngā mihi mō ngā tau kei mua i te aroaro.

Suzie Lloyd

Waimaria Mark*History 227: Waitangi: Treaty to Tribunal*

Ko Taupiri te maunga

Ko Waikato te awa

Ko Tainui te waka

Ko Ngaati Tiipa te hapuu

Ko Ngaa Tai e Rua te marae

Noo Te Puuaha o Waikato ahau

I am an Arts student majoring in Māori Studies and Psychology. Although I'm not a history major, I took History 227 to deepen my understanding of Te Tiriti o Waitangi. Just as Te Rā carried my tuupuna across Te Moana-nui-a-Kiwa, my culture and whaanau guide me on my journey through university. *Whaowhia te kete mātauranga*, my passion lies with my people, and I feel privileged to learn and share our knowledge.

Kia Whakatōmuri te haere whakamua

I walk backwards into the future with my eyes fixed on the past.

Waimaria Mark

This Māori whakatauki (proverb) speaks about Māori perspectives of time, with the past, present and future being intertwined.¹ It is also a fitting place to begin a



Figure 1. When I look at Te Rā, I am instantly taken back to the times before. I imagine Te Rā unfurling on a waka, guiding my ancestors across the vast Pacific ocean.

discussion about the extraordinary history of Te Rā, a 200-year-old customary Māori sail, and how its journey home represents the revival of Māori voyaging and cultural knowledge.

Observation

My visit to Te Rā was surreal. I felt connected to my ancestors, as if I had transcended time. Although I observed Te Rā for just thirty minutes, the experience had a profound impact.

¹ Lesley Rameka, 'Kia whakatōmuri te haere whakamua: "I walk backwards into the future with my eyes fixed on my past",' *Contemporary Issues in Early Childhood*, 17, 4, 2016, p. 387.

Learning about its journey through the curation at the museum in Tāmaki added to this sense of connection. The exhibition offered a multisensory experience, transporting visitors to another era of Māori voyaging and weaving technology. Ambient music, ocean soundscapes and subtle blue lighting mimicked the open ocean, weaving visitors into the very fabric of Te Rā's story. Seeing its journey from the hands of my ancestors, to the hands of the coloniser, and now its return home, affirmed the importance of knowing where you come from.

Te Rā embodies a profound narrative that transcends time, rekindling the connection between Aotearoa today and Aotearoa yesterday. While its original creators remain unknown, Te Rā's physical characteristics highlight the technological sophistication and ingenuity of its weavers. Constructed from Harakeke, the sail is made up of thirteen panels joined together by a complex zig-zag pattern known as pūareare. Kāhu and kererū feathers adorn its top and matairangi (pennant flag). The muke (harakeke fiber) loops racing its edges retain remnants of kākā feathers, and two even bear traces of dog hair.

Discussion

Every line in Te Rā tells a story and opens a window into the history of Māori voyaging. Titiro whakamuri, kōkiri whakamua - let us look to the past to embark into the future with Te Rā.

The roots of Māori and Pacific voyaging stretch back to our ancestors, who sailed vast oceans on waka hourua (double-hulled canoes). Without modern instruments, guided only by the sea, sky and distant lands, their journeys were deliberate and precisely planned. We know that these journeys were planned



Figure 2. The notched feathers and intricate zig-zagging pūareare pattern expertly controlled airflow, allowing Te Rā to harness the wind with precision. This craftsmanship reflects the advanced engineering knowledge and ingenuity of the weavers who created it.

because they were successful. Their success is evident in Māori oral traditions.² One legend tells of Kupe, a Māori explorer who pursued the giant octopus, Te Wheke o Muturangi.³ What began as a journey of necessity to help his people, turned into a great expedition that led to the discovery of Aotearoa. This affirms that Māori were careful observers, adapters and innovators. Damon Salesa refers to this concept

as ‘native seas’, a vast network with Pacific peoples flourishing through shared knowledge, resources and kinship.⁴ The ocean was not a barrier, but an integrated part of their world – a highway of connection.⁵

This rich tradition of voyaging ultimately laid the foundation for Te Rā, whose origins remain shrouded in mystery. Woven sometime between 1770 and 1800, Te

² NZ History, ‘Pacific voyaging and discovery.’

³ Isaac Te Awa, ‘Kupe’, *Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa*.

⁴ Damon Salesa, *An Indigenous Ocean: Pacific essays*, Wellington, 2023, p. 63.

⁵ National Library, ‘Pacific Navigation.’

Rā bears witness to an era of exploration beyond Polynesia. Although little is known about Te Rā, its existence is proof of Māori voyaging traditions and expertise.⁶ It reaffirms the validity of Indigenous knowledge, dispelling colonial narratives that framed Māori as passive drifters and exotic beings who enjoyed playing on the water. In reality, Māori were ahead of their time. Māori were among the world's greatest navigators, marine scientists, astronomers and boat-building engineers.⁷

The return of Te Rā and the tireless efforts made behind the scenes to get it home signals a growing recognition that for Indigenous peoples everywhere, these museum artifacts are not mere objects. They are living connections to our ancestors, narratives, and esoteric knowledge. Te Rā is more than a sail; it is a testament to a sophisticated voyaging life, a reminder of our past, and a guide for our future.

⁶ Royal Society Te Apārangi, 'Whakaarahia Anō te rā kai hau! raise up again the billowing sail! Revitalising cultural knowledge through analysis of Te Rā, the Māori sail.'

⁷ Haki Tuaupiki, 'Research into ancestral sea voyaging', *News and Opinion: University of Waikato*, 17 February 2022.

List of Figures

Fig 1. [Waimaria Mark], Private Collection, Auckland War Memorial Museum, [19/03/2024]

Fig 2. British Museum Oc,NZ.147, 'Te Rā the sail', (n.d.), [22/03/2024].

Bibliography

Manatū Taonga – Ministry for Culture and Heritage, 'Pacific voyaging and discovery,' *NZ History*, available at <https://www.nzhistory.govt.nz/culture/encounters/polynesianvoyaging>.

National Library of New Zealand, 'Pacific Navigation,' available at <https://www.natlib.govt.nz/schools/tuia-matauranga/voyaging-through-nz-histories/pacific-navigation>.

Rameka, Lesley, 'Kia whakatōmuri te haere whakamua: "I walk backwards into the future with my eyes fixed on my past",' *Contemporary Issues in Early Childhood*, 17, 4, 2016, p. 387.

Royal Society Te Apārangi, 'Whakaarahia Anō te rā kai hau! raise up again the billowing sail! Revitalising cultural knowledge through analysis of Te Rā, the Māori sail,' available at <https://www.royalsociety.org.nz/revitalising-cultural-knowledge-through-analysis-of-te-ra-the-maori-sail>.

Salesa, Damon, *An Indigenous Ocean: Pacific essays*, Wellington, 2023, pp. 1-382.

Te Awa, Isaac, 'Kupe,' *Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa*, available at <https://www.collections.tepapa.govt.nz/topic/10732>.

The British Museum, 'Sail (RA); canoe: British museum,' available at https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/object/E_Oc-NZ-147.

Tuaupiki, Haki 'Research into ancestral sea voyaging,' *News and Opinion: University of Waikato*, 17 February 2022, available at <https://www.waikato.ac.nz/news-opinion/media/2022/research-into-ancestral-sea-voyaging>



Lili Penina Brown*History 309: African American Freedom Struggles: USA 1900-2000*

Kia ora. My name is Lili and I feel privileged to be included in the 2025 edition of Histeria! I was born in the United Kingdom but was raised in West Auckland. I am Samoan, Scottish, Welsh and English, and very much consider Aotearoa to be my home! Studying law, I am constantly reminded of history's manifestations in the present. My piece on remembrance encapsulates where my passions in history lie - in acknowledging and learning from the past in order to create progress and strive towards justice.

Remembering the Civil Rights Movement: The Antonym of 'Forgetting' or a Bend Towards Justice?

Lili Penina Brown

An issue with remembrance is that it tends to situate struggles in the past. We remember the soldiers who fought in WWI by honouring their service on ANZAC Day. This is undeniably of value in a post-World War One society. Yet, even though the War ended over a century ago, the event sparks debate on remembrance each year. It is no wonder, then, that in our present climate, which many would agree is not 'post-racial', the memory of the Civil Rights Movement is a site of conflict. Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi's proposal that the "antonym of 'forgetting' is not remembering, but justice" rings true when examining memories of the Civil Rights Movement because they are so heavily contested. Whether through the recent endeavours to alter the 'master narrative' or through the consistent appropriation and utilisation of its history for political purposes, the movement's legacy is not served by simply "remembering". This is not to say that remembrance is not necessary to realise justice; rather, as Maria Stepanova states, "Memory brings the past and present into confrontation in the search for justice."¹

¹ Linda Kinstler, 'The Altar of Oblivion: On Maria Stepanova's "In Memory of Memory",' *LA Review of Books*, 2021.

Before examining how the Civil Rights Movement is remembered, it must be acknowledged that memories are always contested. How could they not be when, as Pierre Nora stated, “Memory is life... It remains in permanent evolution”.² Thus, there is no one answer to how the movement should be remembered. This is quite evident from responses to references to the movement in popular culture. The 2002 film *Barbershop* was met with criticism from civil rights activists for its conversations surrounding Rosa Parks and Martin Luther King Jr. One of the characters described King as a “ho”, and claimed “Rosa Parks ain’t do nothin’” but sit down in the Montgomery Bus Boycott.³ Reverend Al Sharpton, claimed the film degraded King and Parks’ memory and legacies.⁴ The 2013 film *The Butler*, which depicted the life of an African American butler to the President, brought its own controversies. While one review labelled it “powerful and moving” and “the most important movie ever made about the civil rights movement,” another claimed it could “encourage a degree of complacency” and appealed to “white liberals” by “downplaying black resistance.”⁵ The responses to these modern references to the Civil Rights Movement and its key figures alludes to Yerushalmi’s suggestion by highlighting the precarious nature of

² Leigh Raiford and Renee Christine Romano, ‘Introduction; The Struggle over Memory,’ in Leigh Raiford and Renee Christine Romano, eds, *The Civil Rights Movement in American Memory*, Georgia, 2006, p. xiii.

³ *ibid.*, p. xi.

⁴ *ibid.*, p. xii.

⁵ Peniel E. Joseph, ‘A Civil Rights Professor Reviews Lee Daniels ‘The Butler’, *IndieWire*, September 16, 2013; Ron Briley, ‘The Civil Rights Movement as We’d Like to Remember it’, *History News Network*.

“remembering”. If memory is contentious, how can we claim that the way we remember is equal to not forgetting?

While it is important to acknowledge that memories are contested, we must also establish that sites of memory are not valueless. A multitude of memorials have paid tribute to the efforts of the Civil Rights Movement and the suffering that racism in the United States has inflicted. The National Memorial for Peace and Justice, opened in 2018, contains a striking depiction of the number of counties in which a lynching took place. Yet, buildings that housed the Confederacy can be seen in the middle of the memorial, and in Alabama, the home of the memorial, the governor affirmed the protection of Confederate monuments the very same year.⁶ It may be said, then, that the issue is not simply the sites themselves but the society in which they exist. Bryan Stevenson, the founder of the Equal Justice Initiative organisation behind the memorial, stated that creating this site of memory was a means of liberating America from its brutal history.⁷ Thus, situated in a state in which there is still a Confederate Memorial Day, the memorial does not merely serve to remember this racist past; it strives to bring this memory to justice.

Due to the contested history of the Civil Rights Movement, “remembering” is a difficult task. The master narrative of the movement is often unreflective of what took

⁶ Campbell Robertson, ‘A Lynching Memorial is Opening. The Country has Never Seen Anything Like it,’ *The New York Times*, 25 April 2018.

⁷ *ibid.*

place, and in part, this has been informed by the state's sanctioning of its representations. The movement can be "held up as a shining example of the successes of American democracy," and thus, there is interest in shaping the memory of it to serve political and ideological agendas.⁸ There has also been a recurrent tendency within scholarly analyses of the Civil Rights Movement to overlook the ordinary people and politics involved in the movement. Instead, there is a focus on "the actions of charismatic leaders or government officials" and on "dramatic and transformative events."⁹ For example, the Black Panthers were characterised by anger and violence, and thus the extensive work they did within the Civil Rights Movement has often been neglected, despite how they involved "young black men and women... to partake in the work of social justice."¹⁰ Therefore, "remembering" is limited by the scope of the master narrative, and many voices are forgotten, though the dominant story may not be. Regarding this master narrative, it seems that, as Yerushalmi proposes, "remembering" in this dominant sense is not the antonym of 'forgetting' the Civil Rights Movement because these memories do not reflect the true experiences of it. Rather, the opposite of forgetting would be acknowledging the importance of grassroots politics and ordinary people and interrogating how these

⁸ Raiford and Romano, p. xvii.

⁹ Robyn Ceanne Spencer, 'Inside the Panther Revolution: The Black Freedom Movement and the Black Panther Party in Oakland, California,' in Jeanne Theoharis and Komozi Woodard, eds, *Groundwork: Local Black Freedom Movements in America*, New York, 2005, p. 300.

¹⁰ *ibid.*, p. 314.

governing memories have been constructed. This is, of course, an act of remembering, but one that goes towards realising justice for those people who are often forgotten and the aspirations they espoused for the future.

Martin Luther King Jr. has been a key figure in this dominant memory. He has come to be recognised as a symbol of “brotherhood and interracialism,” and it has been forgotten that he saw these in “the context of a structural transformation of society.”¹¹ Charles Payne argues that his “I Have a Dream” speech remains popular because “it does not suggest that social change is going to cost anybody anything.”¹² Martin Luther King Jr. Day is a key example of an act of remembrance that falls short of ensuring that the actual aims of the Civil Rights Movement are honoured. The holiday was passed by Ronald Reagan in 1983 despite his long-standing opposition to it.¹³ Claybourne Carson acknowledges the importance of the holiday in generating wider interest in King, but suggests that “many will find themselves uneasy participants” in honouring a “carefully cultivated image of King.”¹⁴ The complexity of King and his life has been “smoothed and polished beyond recognition.”¹⁵ In turn, the holiday forgets what he truly stood for in the Civil Rights Movement - “fundamental

¹¹ Charles Payne, ‘Debating the Civil Rights Movement: The View from the Trenches’ in Steven F. Lawson and Charles M. Payne, eds, *Debating the Civil Rights Movement, 1945-1968*, Lanham; Md, 1998, p. 133.

¹² *ibid.*

¹³ Jonathan Eig, *King: The Life of Martin Luther King*, London, 2023, p. 537.

¹⁴ Claybourne Carson, ‘Martin Luther King Jr.: Charismatic Leadership in a Mass Struggle,’ *The Journal of American History*, 74, 2, 1987, p. 448.

¹⁵ Eig, *King*, p. 539.

change” and the end of “materialism, militarism, and racism.”¹⁶ This is a clear example of how “remembering” does not always equate to not forgetting when the construction of memories does not adequately reflect the past, especially with contentious history. As Payne highlights, there is a tendency to “construct our memories in ways that make us feel good” at the risk of obscuring “much of what the movement was trying to say.”¹⁷ Martin Luther King Jr. Day is a glimpse into how the act of “remembering” does not always adequately honour the past, nor does it stride nearer to justice.

This is not to say that all those who observe Martin Luther King Jr. Day are acting with intentional ignorance. However, we must acknowledge and discuss how the sanitised memories of the movement that the day presents have consistently been used to exploit the aims and agendas of those involved. In fact, from the inception of the holiday, Hajar Yazdiha argues that Reagan “turned the political defeat into a legacy-making opportunity,” giving him the ability to “ward off claims that he’s racist” and curate a particular vision of King as “colourblind.”¹⁸ This is a common use of King’s memory amongst Conservatives in the United States, such as Christopher Rufo, who “makes references to King’s “colourblindness” while raging against race-conscious

¹⁶ Eig, *King*, p. 539.

¹⁷ Payne, *Debating the Civil Rights Movement*, p. 135.

¹⁸ Andrew Lawrence, ‘His Dreams have been Weaponised into his Nightmare’: How Martin Luther King Jr’s Words have been Co-opted,’ *The Guardian*, 2024.

policies.”¹⁹ Furthermore, politicians such as Ron DeSantis have invoked King to promote policies such as book banning, and the former governor of Arkansas claimed that King “would hate the Black Lives Matter Movement.”²⁰

This misappropriation of King’s legacy has made him a “contested site of memory.”²¹ It exposes the vulnerability of memories to exploitation, supporting Yerushalmi’s proposition that “remembering” is not necessarily the antonym of forgetting when memories are moulded to fit an agenda. Using King’s name to perpetuate policies and ideologies that go against his aims in the Civil Rights Movement is weak evidence of his legacy not being forgotten. In fact, this supposed remembrance may serve to blur his true agenda and aid in a wider disregard of the memories of the movement. As Carson states, were King still alive today, he likely would have been an “unpopular social critic” and spoken of ending poverty and “building a just social order.”²² Striving for these aims in the search for justice would surely be a better way of ensuring his legacy is not forgotten than merely calling on his memory.

The emptiness of simply “remembering” is the greatest evidence supporting Yerushalmi’s proposal. Almost 60 years after King’s assassination, many of the issues targeted by the Civil Rights Movement remain. There have certainly been milestones

¹⁹ Lawrence, ‘His Dreams have been Weaponised.’

²⁰ *ibid.*

²¹ *ibid.*

²² Carson, ‘Martin Luther King Jr,’ p. 454.

of progress, such as Barack Obama's 2008 election as President and the appointment of a Black attorney general in 2009. However, these moments led to "premature media pronouncements of a new 'post-racial' America."²³ Behind this progress, the remnants of the Jim Crow system and new "political and economic conditions to reproduce and maintain inequities" persisted.²⁴ The juxtaposition between memories of the movement and reality in the United States is striking. In 2015, the movie *Selma* was received with praise and critical acclaim, depicting the campaign around the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965. Simultaneously, this legislation was being undermined by a Supreme Court decision in 2013 that struck down protections for minority voters in states with a history of discrimination.²⁵ Chief Justice John Roberts claimed that "racial discrimination in voting had been eliminated", but a Justice Department report in 2015 highlighted "significant instances" of "violations of the Constitution in the treatment of African Americans."²⁶ This emphasised that America had not, in fact, "moved past the racial divisions and inequalities of the Civil Rights" era.²⁷ The wealth gap in the United States signifies a similar pattern, with the income gap between white and black households similar to that of the 1970s.²⁸ The emptiness of remembrance is further symbolised by the streets named after Martin

²³ Yohuru Williams, *Rethinking the Black Freedom Movement*, London, 2015, p. 109.

²⁴ *ibid.*

²⁵ *ibid.*, p. 120.

²⁶ *ibid.*, p. 121.

²⁷ *ibid.*

²⁸ Ta-Nehisi Coates, 'The Case for Reparations', *Atlantic Monthly*, 313, 5, 2014, p. 60.

Luther King Jr., in which “poverty and segregation rates remain much higher than local and national averages.”²⁹

From the multitudes of evidence on the disparities between white and black Americans and the continued racism that still exists, it becomes harder to perceive “remembering,” of which sites and symbols are widespread, as the antonym of forgetting. Rather, as Yerushalmi suggests, justice is the true antonym because it works to serve the people and ideas of the Civil Rights Movement. In a society where many of the movement's goals have not been achieved, not forgetting is not simply memorialising or invoking ideas and people; it must be endeavouring to realise these goals.

As of 2023, almost 1000 streets have been named after Martin Luther King Jr. in the United States of America. The highest number of these streets can be found in Georgia, King’s home state.³⁰ As of 2022, Georgia joined other Republican states to “ban schools from teaching “divisive” academic concepts about racism”, with its Governor referring to critical race theory and its teaching on structural racism as indoctrination.³¹ It is this juxtaposition between “remembering” the Civil Rights

²⁹ Eig, *King*, p. 539.

³⁰ Chloe Mayer, ‘The Nine States That Don’t Have a Street Named After Martin Luther King Jr.’, *Newsweek*, 2023

³¹ Sharon Bernstein, ‘Georgia Becomes Latest US State to Ban ‘Divisive’ Concepts in Teaching About Race’, *Reuters*, 2022.

Movement and simultaneously working against its legacy that underscores Yerushalmi's proposition.

Perhaps there is a symbolic significance in walking down a street named after a Civil Rights leader. There certainly is in the construction of the National Memorial for Peace and Justice. Yet, the fact that the Memorial's home state of Alabama's has been ranked as one of the most unequal states in American is a sobering reminder of the complacency that "remembering" can provide.³² Progress has undeniably been made in the decades since the Civil Rights Movement, but its "underlying philosophical arguments... remain unaddressed."³³ Remembering the movement is essential to addressing its aims, but memories are fragile and can only assist so much. Instead, the end goal of fulfilling these aspirations is what makes our memories of the movement so valuable, for, as King once said, "The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends towards justice."³⁴

³² Sustainable Development Goals, 'Rankings for USA states,' n.d.

³³ Williams, *Rethinking the Black Freedom Movement*, p. 133.

³⁴ *ibid.*, p. 135.

Bibliography

Bernstein, Sharon, 'Georgia Becomes Latest US State to Ban 'Divisive' Concepts in Teaching About Race,' Reuters, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/us/georgia-becomes-latest-us-state-ban-divisive-concepts-teaching-about-race-2022-04-28/>.

Briley, Ron, 'The Civil Rights Movement as We'd Like to Remember it,' *History News Network*, <https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/153221>.

Carson, Clayborne, 'Martin Luther King Jr.: Charismatic Leadership in a Mass Struggle,' *The Journal of American History*, 74, 2, 1987, pp. 448-45.

Coates, Ta-Nehisi, 'The Case for Reparations,' *Atlantic Monthly*, 313, 5, 2014, pp. 54-71.

Eig, Jonathan, *King: The Life of Martin Luther King*, London, 2023.

Sustainable Development Goals, 'Rankings for USA states,' n.d., available at <https://us-inequality.sdgindex.org/rankings>.

Joseph, Peniel E., 'A Civil Rights Professor Reviews Lee Daniels 'The Butler',' *IndieWire*, September 16, 2013.

Kinstler, Linda, 'The Altar of Oblivion: On Maria Stepanova's "In Memory of Memory",' *LA Review of Books*, 2021, <https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/the-altar-of-oblivion-on-maria-stepanovas-in-memory-of-memory/>.

Lawrence, Andrew, 'His Dreams have been Weaponised into his Nightmare': How Martin Luther King Jr's Words have been Co-opted,' *The Guardian*, 2024, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/jan/15/martin-luther-king-jr-politicians-legacy>.

Mayer, Chloe, 'The Nine States That Don't Have a Street Named After Martin Luther King Jr.', *Newsweek*, 2023, <https://www.newsweek.com/martin-luther-king-day-street-names1774031#:~:text=Almost%20%2C000%20streets%20across%20the,of%20Columbia%2C%20and%20Puerto%20Rico.>

Payne, Charles, 'Debating the Civil Rights Movement: The View from the Trenches,' in Steven F. Lawson and Charles M. Payne, eds, *Debating the Civil Rights Movement, 1945-1968*, Lanham; Md, 1998.

Raiford, Leigh and Renee Christine Romano, 'Introduction; The Struggle over Memory,' in Leigh Raiford and Renee Christine Romano, eds, *The Civil Rights Movement in American Memory*, Georgia, 2006, pp. xi-xxiv.

Robertson, Campbell, 'A Lynching Memorial is Opening. The Country has Never Seen Anything Like it', *The New York Times*, 25 April 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/25/us/lynching-memorial-alabama.html>.

Spencer, Robyn Ceanne, 'Inside the Panther Revolution: The Black Freedom Movement and the Black Panther Party in Oakland, California,' in Jeanne Theoharis and Komozi Woodard, eds, *Groundwork: Local Black Freedom Movements in America*, New York, 2005, pp. 300-317.

Williams, Yohuru, *Rethinking the Black Freedom Movement*, London, 2015.

Caeden Tipler

History 107: Titiro Whakamuri: Histories of Aotearoa New Zealand

Caeden is a history, law, and communications student. They are passionate about using history as a tool to understand the present world. Outside of history, they're a journalist and radio show host for our student radio station, 95bFM.

Honouring a whakapapa of activism: Why the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination is an important day of commemoration in Aotearoa.

Caeden Tipler

The International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (IDERD) is a day that was created to honour anti-apartheid activists in South Africa. It is also a day that has significance to anti-apartheid protests in Aotearoa, from the Springbok tour protest of 1981 to pro-Palestine and Māori-led protests today. The IDERD takes place on the 21st of March and marks the date in 1960 when anti-apartheid protestors were massacred by police officers in South Africa. A total of sixty-nine unarmed civilians were killed while peacefully protesting.¹ The anniversary is now honoured across the world as part of ongoing efforts to end racial discrimination.²

South African apartheid has a prevalent place in our own history. It compelled many Pākehā to confront racism abroad but also at home for the first time. The more specific events of the 21st March 1960, became relevant to us when protestors here also faced police brutality for protesting the apartheid.³ However, for us it was 21 years later, in 1981, during the Springbok Rugby Tour. Anti-tour protestors, under the banner Halt All Racist Tours (HART), were a collection of students, religious leaders, Māori, racial minorities, anti-government protestors and others who resisted

¹Ahmed Yussuf, 'From a massacre in apartheid South Africa to 'feel good' multiculturalism: The dark history of Harmony Day,' *ABC*, 21 March 2023.

² *ibid.*

³ Merata Mita, *Patu!*, 1983.

the Springboks, an apartheid South African rugby team who were touring here. During these protests, police arrested 2000 people and batoned hundreds. Some were maimed for life.⁴

For Māori, apartheid South Africa hits even closer to home. Descendants of the Māori Battalion were present at HALT organisational hui. They described to anti-tour activists how Māori soldiers experienced apartheid firsthand when their ship was docked in Cape Town en route to Europe. Māori soldiers were barred from going into town with Pākehā due to local apartheid laws and were forced to stay on the ship. Put simply by one Māori activist, “The South Africans treated us like dogs.”⁵ In Merata Mita’s *Patu!* (1983) Māori activists draw connections between apartheid South Africa and how Māori are treated here. The anti-apartheid struggle was comparable to ongoing Māori struggles for self-determination.⁶ The anti-tour protests had come off the back of a new era of Māori activism. Notably the Māori language petition in 1972, the Māori Land March in 1975, and most recently the Haka Party Incident of 1979. Māori activists used the anti-tour momentum to challenge Pākehā to include Māori in their anti-racist fights. As Hone Kaa put it, “What tactics should it use to now face the issue of racism at home.”⁷ Many Pākehā believed that Aotearoa had the world’s best race relations, but the tour had busted this myth wide open.

⁴ Mita, *Patu!*

⁵ *ibid.*

⁶ Geoff Chapple, *When the Tour Came to Auckland*, Wellington, 2013, Chapter 2.

⁷ *Patu!*

In many ways, IDERD and the legacy of anti-apartheid activism continue to be honoured by anti-racist activists in Aotearoa— except activists today are protesting apartheid in Israel/Palestine.⁸ United Nations Special Rapporteur Michael Lynk compared the two directly in his report on Palestine, stating, “Apartheid is not, sadly, a phenomenon confined to the history books on Southern Africa.”⁹ There are even parallels in the activist response to apartheid. Students in 2024 are leading encampments, rallies, and marches across Aotearoa to protest university ties to Israel.¹⁰ This mirrors a strong student involvement in anti-apartheid activism in the early 1980s,¹¹ even when faced with institutional backlash.¹²

Similarly, the role of church leaders in supporting Māori today parallels church leaders’ involvement in the anti-apartheid movement. In 1981 individual church leaders would express their support for HALT, attending and speaking at protests as well as promoting anti-racist ideals to their denominations.¹³ In 2024, church leaders signed an open letter calling for proposed anti-Māori legislation to be scrapped ahead

⁸ United Nations, ‘Israel’s occupation of Palestinian Territory is ‘apartheid’: UN rights expert,’ 25 March 2022.

⁹ *ibid.*

¹⁰ Caeden Tipler, ‘Auckland students protest for Palestine w/ Student Justice for Palestine,’ *95bFM*, 10 October 2024.

¹¹ *Patu!*.

¹² Nina Brown, ‘Student Arrested in Campus Palestine Protest’, *Critic*, 10 October 2024.

¹³ *Patu!*.

of nationwide hikoi for the same cause.¹⁴ This pro-Palestine and Māori activism proves the legacy of IDERD remains relevant to communities in Aotearoa.

Commemorating the history behind this day, and its origins in anti-apartheid activism and violent state backlash, can help us understand activism movements in Aotearoa today. IDERD also shows how understanding our own history can include understanding the relevance in events that may seem isolated from us. For example, a 1960 massacre against peaceful protestors in South Africa can still have consequences sixty years later in a completely different part of the world.

¹⁴ Unknown Author, 'Treaty Principles Bill: 440 Christian leaders sign open letter asking MPs to vote no,' *Radio New Zealand*, 9 September 2024.

Bibliography

Chapple, Geoff, *When the Tour Came to Auckland*, Wellington, 2013.

Brown, Nina, 'Student Arrested in Campus Palestine Protest', *Critic*, 10 October 2024, available at <https://www.critic.co.nz/news/article/11460/student-arrested-in-campus-palestine-protest->.

Mita, Merata, *Patu!*, 1983.

Unknown Author, 'Treaty Principles Bill: 440 Christian leaders sign open letter asking MPs to vote no,' *Radio New Zealand*, 9 September 2024, available at <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/527412/treaty-principles-bill-440-christian-leaders-sign-open-letter-asking-mps-to-vote-no>.


Tipler, Caeden, 'Auckland students protest for Palestine w/ Student Justice for Palestine,' *95bFM*, 10 October 2024, available at <https://95bfm.com/bcast/auckland-students-protest-for-palestine-w-student-justice-for-palestine-10-october-2024>.

United Nations, 'Israel's occupation of Palestinian Territory is 'apartheid': UN rights expert,' 25 March 2022, available at <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1114702>.

Yussuf, Ahmed, 'From a massacre in apartheid South Africa to 'feel good' multiculturalism: The dark history of Harmony Day,' *ABC*, 21 March 2023, available at <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-03-21/harmony-day-apartheid-south-africa-sharpeville-massacre/102110328>.



©R.M.K.Thomas.



©R.M.K.Thomas.

Kaakatarau Te Pou Kohere

History 715: Topics in the History of War and Peace

Ko Hikurangi te maunga,

Ko Waiapu te awa,

Ko Ngati Porou te iwi.

Ko Matukuterua nga maunga,

Ko Manukau te Moana,

Ko Ngati Te Ata – Te Waiohua te iwi.

My name is Kakaatarau Te Pou Kohere, I am a descendant of Ngati Porou, Ngati Te Ata, Tuhoe, and Kai Tahu with a very privileged relationship with my whanau and whakapapa. History has been written a plenty, and I've been lucky enough to be shown how to read it, so here I am having a go at writing.

The Struggle Never Ends: Colonial Projections in Aotearoa - New Zealand History

Kaakatarau Te Pou Kohere

*"I have agreed with my colleagues that there is no intention to issue a directive across the Public Service relating to **names** or **communication** used by **government departments**."*¹

- *Nicola Willis, Public Service Minister on the subject of the Coalition's English First policy for the use of Te Reo Māori in public service.*

What is a war by any other name? There can be no doubt history is made every day. It is a product of construction, experience, broadcasting, prose, and liminality between memory and memorandum. It also forms the consistent rhythm of life. Written, spoken, recorded, felt, forgotten, lost and found, is the contestation of ideas, theories, lives, and battles that writhe from pen to paper, with every keystroke undebarrd by thwarting critiques and the press of schedules. Bravely and boldly, opinions clash and mesh in the procreation of vision and thought, the practice of duty to those gone and of those who must remember them. As people remember, so too does our planet. As roots of foreign trees and grasses quicken in the womb of the Earth Mother, the historical process is illustrative of what bears fruit in soils watered with blood. The development and establishment of capital-driven colonisation, or the careful

¹ Ethan Manera, 'PSA criticises coalition Government's English first policy, says mixed messages 'confusing', *New Zealand Herald*, July 8 2024.

litigation of community, duties and obligations to each other and the whenua itself. From the shores of Mandalay to the mesas of Venezuela, the history of war has implicit consequences for the living, both in times of war and in war's wake. New Zealand is no different. Aotearoa is no different.

Community and capital, in equal measure, have been transformed, pulped, filleted, and packaged into the brands and products taken from paddocked fields in the Waikato, the sheep-scattered ranges of Te Tairāwhiti, the fjords and valleys of Te Waipounamu, and the hillocks and dales of Te Tai Tokerau. Under the shade of mānuka and kauri, on blackening waves of hatred and the freshening winds of market investment, the backdrop of New Zealand's war stories, histories, and experiences are sown by scholars in our universities, by concrete monuments and memorials stationed across the islands of Te Moana Nui a Kiwa.² These stories, histories and experiences also underscore the bitterness of the political skirmishes that ripple across these islands to this day. What are these wars by any other name? The so-called New Zealand Wars provide a foundation for analysing the tendency to prioritise narratives of nationalisation and civic identification in the academic histories of Aotearoa.³ They also underscore the contested nature of these historical projects.

From W.H. Oliver to Tony Ballantyne, the wars of Pākehā expropriation have been consistently framed, positively or negatively, as intrinsic, underpinning elements

² Te Pou Herenga Taonga - Heritage New Zealand, 'Albert Barracks Wall (University of Auckland Campus),' *Heritage.org.nz*; Te Pouhere Taonga - Heritage New Zealand, 'One Tree Hill Obelisk: One Tree Hill summit, One Tree Hill, Auckland,' *Heritage.org.nz*.

³ That is, the creation of a national civic identity.

to the foundations of the New Zealand state. Indeed, the violent seizure and destruction of Māori lands for capitalist enterprise follows the variety of Marxist readings of the wars, from Keith Sinclair to Matt Wynyard.⁴ All the while, writers such as Judith Binney, James Belich, and Aroha Harris have eagerly interwoven the histories of tangata whenua as vital to understanding these conflicts, both from New Zealand Anglo-centric perspectives and those of and from Te Ao Māori. Across maunga and over awa, with pū repo⁵ and tūpara⁶, this essay strives to explore how the wars fought in Aotearoa in the nineteenth century contributed to the colonial project and how the history of these wars contributed to nationalising regional and whānau identities.

*“Most of New Zealand’s **human history is shrouded** in preliterate time. When does **legend become fact, tradition change into history?**”⁷*

- Keith Sinclair⁸

Before diving into the national template, one must acknowledge the whakapapa⁹ of

⁴ Keith Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand*, Auckland, Revised edition, 2000, pp. 135-153; Wynyard, Matt, ‘Plunder in the Promised Land: Māori Land Alienation and the Genesis of Capitalism in Aotearoa New Zealand,’ in Avril Bell, Vivienne Elizabeth, Tracey McIntosh and Matt Wynyard, eds., *A Land of Milk and Honey? Making Sense of Aotearoa New Zealand*, Auckland, 2017, pp. 15-22.

⁵ Pū repo - cannon.

⁶ Tūpara - Double barrelled gun reminiscent of a shotgun common during the period of conflict over the mid 19th century.

⁷ Sinclair, *A History*, p. 14

⁸ *ibid.*

⁹ Whakapapa is genealogy, a line of descent from ancestors down to the present day. It is the layers of relationships between all objects and subjects, linking people, places, and chronological spaces to all other living things, to the earth and the sky, tracing the universe back to its origins.

New Zealand historiography, the framing and development of the 'nation', and the historical understanding of the 'New Zealand Wars' within these concepts. Peter Gibbon's 'Cultural Colonization and National Identity' broadly defines tendencies across the spectrum of New Zealand histories: from the early musings of E.G. Wakefield's theories of systemic colonisation to the Pākehā contextualisation of Māori and colonisation, from W.H. Oliver to Keith Sorenson, Keith Sinclair to Michael King, James Belich to Te Aroha Harris, and the myriad of local, hapū, and regional historians, there have been broad strokes of socio-cultural development in the presentation of the wars.¹⁰ Who was fighting whom in the so-called New Zealand Wars? For what reasons? Were they New Zealand's wars or something different?

Tony Ballantyne establishes that right up to the later nineteenth century, the discussion on the origins of the Māori people was of intense interest to a race-conscious¹¹ Victorian intelligentsia framing the initial British understanding of Māori as being simultaneously 'savage' and of exhibiting an immense potential to become 'civilised'^{12,13}. The wars fought in the middle of the century were thus presented by these same Victorians as a result of the races meeting, of settler interests overriding those of native sovereignty, and as an inevitable consequence of Social Darwinism, all the while propagating the ideologies and interests of the prejudiced colonial

¹⁰ Peter Gibbons, 'Cultural Colonisation and National Identity,' *New Zealand Journal of History*, 36, 1, 2002, pp. 5-17.

¹¹ Read: Obsessed

¹² Read: Made as British as possible.

¹³ Tony Ballantyne, *Webs of Empire: Locating New Zealand's Colonial Past*, Vancouver, 2015, pp. 13-49.

moneyed classes of the time.¹⁴ By the 1910s, Anglo-centric narratives of ‘first ships’ and ‘early settlers’ authored by historians, amateur and ‘official’ alike, coagulated, scabbing over the wounds of war-torn Māori communities.

These Anglo-centric historical endeavours implied a ‘wastelands’ narrative that chiselled away the significance of Māori to the histories of these islands. This was despite an outward appearance by many of these historians of recognising Māori mythologies and narratives as imperative to the mythic substantiation of a conceptual ‘settler New Zealand’.¹⁵ The names of the wars themselves have evolved with the evolution of perspectives and politics over time. These wars (for a time named the ‘Māori Wars,’¹⁶ in line with British practice) were described as an inevitability and, in Max Herz’s translated work, were filled page after page with details of the exploits of Māori leaders, who were racialised as a martial warrior class in the process.¹⁷ James Cowan’s first use of the name ‘New Zealand Wars’ in his famous 1922 history of these conflicts contributed to an almost patronising understanding of the “equality” between Māori and early settlers. Early Pākehā were derided as brash, opportunistic and avaricious, and the Māori as possessing an overly proud, “swaggering” bravado, while having little understanding of “his” opponent.¹⁸ Cowan asserts that both Māori

¹⁴ Ranginui Walker, *Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou: Struggle Without End*, Auckland, 1990.

¹⁵ Chris Hilliard, ‘Colonial Culture and the Province of Cultural History,’ *New Zealand Journal of History*, 36, 1, 2002, pp. 82-97.

¹⁶ Without a macron.

¹⁷ Max Herz, *New Zealand: the Country and the People*, a translation of *Das heutige Neuseeland: Land und Leute*, London, 1912.

¹⁸ James Cowan, *The New Zealand Wars: A History of the Maori Campaigns and the Pioneering Period*, Wellington, 1955, p. 1-6.

and Pākehā must have been humbled by the experience of these conflicts, which helps in part to explain the rise of a new set of wartime mythologies, focussed on mutually destructive camaraderie. Cowan's *New Zealand Wars* presented the conflicts as a furnace of struggle producing a new, mature national identity, that simultaneously connected the Pakanga Whenua to the performance of New Zealand troops in the second Anglo-Boer War and during the First World War.

Both of these latter conflicts were mourned and memorialised in 1920s New Zealand at the time of Cowan's writing.¹⁹ Unsurprisingly, these same martial events form the basis of a New Zealand national identity and national history, first pursued by Keith Sinclair and later underlined by Michael King when he demarcated separate 'national cultures' for Māori and Pākehā. Danny Keenan's *Ngā Pakanga Whenua o Mua* raises the key point that Māori histories have largely been buried under the weight of these colonial and Pākehā-centred national writings. As Keenan writes: "The 'Land Wars' is the term most preferred by Māori because, far from being monocausal, the land was always the most important issue into which many other issues flowed."²⁰ The expropriation and alienation of Māori from our whakapapa, our social relationships with the whenua, reified with the mutual exploitation of both land and the people on it.

¹⁹ Kynan Gentry, *History, Heritage, and Colonialism: Historical Consciousness, Britishness, and Cultural Identity in New Zealand, 1870-1940*, Manchester, 2015.

²⁰ Danny Keenan, *Wars Without End: Ngā Pakanga Whenua o Mua/New Zealand's land wars - a Māori Perspective*, Wellington, Revised edition, 2021, pp. 23-40.

With the 1970s came the Waitangi Tribunal, which provided a legislative, material interest in recording, debating, and clarifying the history of Treaty of Waitangi Breaches. The place of the Wars in Aotearoa was again hotly debated as a matter of public policy and political material interests.²¹ 1985 saw an extension of the Tribunal's jurisdiction to 1840, from when Te Tiriti was signed. The 1980s and 1990s saw historians such as Judith Binney and James Belich expand upon the Māori experience of the wars, as well as their consequences for Māori as people through the lionising of the warrior prophets, Te Kooti Rikirangi and Titokowaru.²²

The Waitangi Tribunal as an institution complicated the making of history in these islands. Tipene O'Reagan noted the contradictory tensions between historians and lawyers as professional vocations and vocational professions and their approaches to history, at times diametrically opposed in purpose.²³ These tensions are further exacerbated by the unique specificities of tikanga-a-iwi, oral histories, the context²⁴ of pakiwaitara, waiata, moteatea, geographically specific cultural relations of different hapu and their whenua that were stolen or kept, and their relations with the Crown, hostile or cooperative. They are further complicated by the ever-changing character of these historical and contemporary relationships. There is a moving

²¹ Tipene O'Reagan, *New Myths and Old Politics: The Waitangi Tribunal and the Challenge of Tradition*, Wellington, 2014.

²² Judith Binney, *Redemption Songs: A Life of Te Kooti Arikirangi Te Turuki*, Wellington, 2013; James Belich, *I Shall Not Die: Titokowaru's War, 1868–1869*, Wellington, 2015.

²³ O'Reagan, *New Myths and Old Politics*.

²⁴ Older compositions referencing ancestors, feats and events of Māori antiquity are often reused and applied to more contemporary issues, both historically and today.

evolution of how New Zealand national histories have been written over more than a century and a half in line with the demographic, cultural, and political movements in the colony, dominion, and national histories. There is a moving evolution of Māori histories, anchored in Māori thought, life, and praxis. Even to this day, the character of the Anglo-centric and settler-centric colonial narratives is little understood across the general population due to immense cultural anchors holding memory tight, and the very real political motivations of maintaining the character of a unitary New Zealand state.²⁵

These collective narratives and histories linger just under the waves of public discussion, peaking only at the insistence of Māori narratives either being carried by Pākehā historians with an interest or what few Māori publish and break into the aurongo hāpori.²⁶ It is within these complex interactions that we must explore the nationalisation of the Pakanga Whenua and their mobilisation as New Zealand histories, as part of the colonial project.

*“The tale of two treaties, we might say, swept through the **country**. Simultaneously **unsettling** the historical and constitutional foundations of the **nation**, and **resettling** them on a basis that was both old and new.”²⁷*

²⁵ Vincent O'Malley and Joanna Kidman, 'Settler colonial history, commemoration and white backlash: remembering the New Zealand Wars,' *Settler Colonial Studies*, 8, 3, 2017, pp. 298-313.

²⁶ Social feeling, literally translated. Used here in the same vein as Zeitgeist.

²⁷ Faculty of Law, University of Wellington, 'Professor Bain Atwood: Historicising the Treaty of Waitangi,' *YouTube*, 04:31-04:42.

- Professor Bain Atwood.

Within a national framework, the New Zealand Wars are implicated as foundational to the creation of New Zealand. The colonial administration, first foreign and now rooted and flowering, must be considered as a distinctly partitioned process. The New Zealand Wars, thus, should also be seen as fertiliser—a catalyst for the exponential growth of the New Zealand state, both necessary yet regrettable, a millstone around the necks of one culture, whose consequences are carried by all. William Pember-Reeves, writing of the failures of Māori in *The Long White Cloud* conceptualised the wars within a racial, colonial narrative.²⁸ Waikato and Taranaki, in which ingenious but ultimately racially deficient Māori were defeated due to their own failures, rather than the success of British regulars, colonial militias and ‘friendly Māoris’, are the basis for the successful supplanting of kanuka and kauri with yew and oak. They were trivial affairs, made inglorious and determinable by the weight of Empire.

W.H. Oliver, in segments like ‘Fruits of Victory’ in *A Story of New Zealand*, and James Belich’s *The New Zealand Wars*, ‘The Dominant Interpretation’, also provide a means of conceptualising a stage-ist developmental cycle from frontier to colony to nation; decades and cultural shifts moving away from Victorian racial theory in practice, to carrying the spirit and legacies rippling in Pember-Reeves’ and Edward Tregear’s wake.²⁹ Keith Sinclair, too, follows through with the segmentation of A

²⁸ William Pember Reeves, *The Long White Cloud: Aotearoa*, Australia, first published 1898, pp. 200-210.

²⁹ W.H. Oliver, *A Story of New Zealand*, New York, 1960; James Belich, *The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict*, Auckland, 2013, pp. 311-336; Ballantyne, *Webs of*

History of New Zealand, and the broadcasting³⁰ of co-optive, parasitic growths grasping at primordial trees. A teleological story of supplantation that not only kills the native that the vine parasitises but, when the parasite finally strangles its host, leaves behind something altogether new rather than leaving the host and parasite dead. The New Zealand state was borne from this process, canopies of lush native communities chopped, timbered and tinderred in the fires of interdependent, interactive, and international nodes of colonial relations between peoples, places, institutions and times are structured along historical narratives.

Māori history is created from hapū, iwi, and whanau narratives as a super-structure to interact with businesses, institutions, faiths, and communities, latched together as a facade of first Anglophone, then British-New Zealand, and finally, a more amalgam New Zealand national history. The notion of distinct and linear periods is divided along themes such as contact, settlement, and conquest across the geographies of the archipelago, emulsifying, refining, and condensing many distinct individual, local and regional narratives.³¹

The placement of the New Zealand Wars in Sinclair's chapters 'The White Man's Anger', Oliver's 'Fruits of Victory' and Belich's 'Getting On' provides an economy-centric and private interests-based understanding of the broader colonisation of New Zealand.³² The New Zealand Wars present as a basis for the material dispossession

Empire, pp. 13-49.

³⁰ In the agricultural sense.

³¹ Sinclair, *A History*.

³² Sinclair, *A History*, pp. 135-153.

of Māori in the interests of the early colonial gentry, administration and capitalists, the nationalisation of these complex histories providing a basis for historical amalgamation. Tony Ballantyne threads the agency of the colonised into the process, reminding his readers of the complexity of the colonial-indigenous relationships in *Webs of Empire*.³³ Where Te Tiriti o Waitangi provides a convenient negotiation of this antagonism, Claudia Orange argues that the notion of two treaties which has swept through our national histories provides an underlying narrative to the disruption, disagreements, and antagonisms of the New Zealand Wars, without which these wars cannot be understood.³⁴ The British colonial administration, given a legal foothold by Te Tiriti o Waitangi, is primarily seen as the seed from which New Zealand as a nation grew, be it defined as monocultural, bicultural, or multicultural. In these narratives, the New Zealand Wars present as contests of sovereignty and racial tension, but also as a nation-forming enterprise of dialectical materialism. Te Tiriti is presented as a primer for conflict, despite being a means of negotiating conflict itself. The Wars and Te Tiriti provide an underlying thread of connection to both harmonious relations and combative associations between the indigenous and colonial, whether a native cession of sovereignty or a bi-national partnership with woes and extirpations. The frontier-to-nation framework carves deep furrows into the landscape of New Zealand history from which historians struggle to escape. It

³³ Ballantyne, *Webs of Empire*.

³⁴ Claudia Orange, *Te Tiriti o Waitangi/The Treaty of Waitangi 1840*, Wellington, 2017.

presents as a most polite fiction of an agreeable nature that ensnares, seduces and proliferates.

W.H. Oliver provides a means of understanding this utopian desire framed within the Waitangi Tribunal process itself. He argues that, "The shape, if not the terminology, of this historical scheme is millennialist. There is a fleeting golden age of promise, a fall from grace, a recovery from the fall, and the timeless principles of truth persisting through denial and adversity... What was lost in the past through the fall is being recovered for the future by the movement towards justice which the Tribunal embodies."³⁵ The nation was unsettled by the wars, but its existence is not threatened by unearthing the skeletons of its foundations. Rather, studying them is now held up as a 'new' duty that we owe the younger generation to understand its existence. In these historical processes, the victims, casualties, targets, savages, the people of this period from Te Taitokerau, Te Tai Tonga, Te Tai Uru, and Te Tairāwhiti, are all subjected to these renegotiations of history, whether as aggressors, guerrillas or fanatics. In almost none of these histories are they remembered as ancestors, as kin, let alone as agents of their own existence with their own contexts, relationships, motives and obligations, both to their ancestors and to us, their descendants.³⁶ The bones in the closet are sacrifices that must be remembered as martyrs of a New

³⁵ Oliver, W.H., 'The future behind us,' in Andrew Sharp and Paul McHugh, eds., *Histories, Power and Loss: Uses of the Past - A New Zealand Commentary*, Wellington, 2001, p. 13.

³⁶ Aroha Harris, 'Theorise this: We are what we write,' *Te Pou Here Kōrero*, 3, 2009, pp.83-90.

Zealand national future, resettling them on a basis that is both old and new.³⁷ The bones that cannot rest are those of our ancestors, mobilised as intrinsic to a national identity, while these complex interconnected personalities, lives, and communities can only be remembered selectively as part of the nationalising project.

“We are what **we write**: we are **our stories, our histories, our pasts**.”³⁸

- Aroha Harris

The nation's lifeblood is selective memory, and New Zealand historians, whether Māori or Pākehā, have largely remained trapped in this national narrative. To this day, the determinist approach of popular histories is not to write the history of the people who live in the state we know as New Zealand, but rather to write a national history of New Zealand.³⁹ Those preparing the *whare korero* of a national history weave post-colonial *tukutuku*, explaining a past to justify changes in the present but only as far as comfort allows. Principles and narratives must be upheld; otherwise, legal jurisdiction is questioned emphatically, callously, and rigorously, without care for the consequences or matter of fact.⁴⁰

³⁷ Keri Mills, 'The Bones in the Closet: Colonial Violence in Pakeha Family History,' in Angela Wanhalla, Ryan Lyndall and Camille Nurka, eds., *Aftermaths: Colonialism, Violence and Memory in Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific*, Dunedin, 2022, pp. 49-58.

³⁸ Harris, *Theorise this*, p. 1.

³⁹ Giselle Brynes and Catherine Coleborne, 'Editorial Introduction: The utility and futility of 'the nation' in histories of Aotearoa New Zealand,' *New Zealand Journal of History*, 45, 1, 2011, p. 3.

⁴⁰ Te Ao with Moana, 'Finlayson called a 'Māori loving C', slams Act's Treaty referendum,' *Te Ao Māori News*, March 25 2024.

The tendency of nationalist projection, both critical and colonising, remains hewed and chiselled by bifurcating adzes or are woven together by strands of muka and hemp. Within parliament, both Te Pāti Māori today and the National party of the last decade determined that Te Ao Māori is of and for New Zealand.⁴¹ In their own ways, both argue that it is an intrinsic part of the national character. Despite contested views on what Aotearoa-New Zealand should look like, this contest can be seen within the spirit of James Cowan's, Keith Sinclair's, Michael King's, James Belich's, and Aroha Harris's notions of New Zealand nationalisms. Whether it is as an extension of Anglo-Saxon dominion, uniquely New Zealand-ish—a bicultural partnership—or as a fundamentally Māori country, none of these histories can escape the gravitational pull of nationhood.

The construction of the historical nation is predicated on stages ranging from William Pember Reeves' choice selection of 'Navigators' with the anglicisation of both Nova Zeelandia and to the nationalisation of Te Ao Māori under Belich and King's bicultural models, that assert the establishment of a New Zealand identity, whether British or bi-cultural.⁴² The Wars, whether they come from Māori voices or present the character of the Māori people cannot help but fit iwi, hapū and whānau that fought in the Wars within the liminal space between reality and fabrication, as New Zealanders within the constructed history of New Zealand, yet before the New

⁴¹ Te Pāti Māori, 'Te Pāti Māori is the assertion of our mana motuhake and our liberation.'

⁴² Pember Reeves, *Long White Cloud*.

Zealand that exists now.⁴³

As ancestors fighting for our future as descendants, yet also descendants of their own forebears who negotiated, welcomed, and navigated a complex, international, regional-specific history, the New Zealand Wars, Ngā Pakanga Whenua, Te Riri o Te Pākehā, are but names arising from our disparate contexts. And yet the overwhelming, uproarious connection across Te Ao Māori, across rivers, mountains, forests, and plains, is that of a capitalist colonial state. The interconnectedness of the national construct is present in our pasts, projected there by our present. It is intrinsically linked, the struggles and battles of yesteryears littering our shared landscapes and city skylines. From the barracks wall and Old Government House that cast a shadow across the lawns and courtyards of the University of Auckland to the overgrown remnants of pā at Pukemaire, Rangiriri, Te Ranga or Rangiaowhia, our shared spaces in Aotearoa echo silently with the memories of the past. The deafening roar of a nation exerting its existence drown out any appreciation of the contrapuntal interactions that shaped notions of unique character across this place and its peoples. Drowning out the creaks of a vehicle of expropriation, exploitation and attempted cultural extermination. Drowning out the voices whose histories are only whispered at bedsides, in the trickle of water down the rocks, in the shade of mānuka and kauri, in the roots of the earth where their bones

⁴³ Jacob Pollock, 'Cultural Colonisation and Textual Biculturalism,' *New Zealand Journal of History*, 41, 2, 2007, pp. 180-198; Atholl Anderson, Judith Binney, and Aroha Harris, *Tangata Whenua: A History*, Wellington, 2015.

lie.

The concept of the New Zealand Wars themselves, a travesty of history, built off the ideals of amputating, assimilating, and amalgamating the complex interactions between super-cultures, families, material realities, and the fires of systems hungry for resources and bodies as fuel for the fires of civilisation. The New Zealand Wars must be considered not merely as a historical recount and analysis of the past but as a self-encompassing and self-justifying narrative created from a constantly moving present, and projecting itself across the historical landscape, as a flag draped across coffin.

*Ko wai to **ingoa**? I ahu mai koe i whea? What is your **name**? From whence do you hail?*

As a descendent of Porourangi on my mother's side, with Hikurangi as my mountain, Waiapu as my Awa and Ngati Porou as my iwi, it would be remiss of me not to establish a definitive alternative to the metastasised New Zealand national myth. Monty Soutar expands upon overarching goals and motives, emphasising the agency of Ngati Porou in the conflicts from 1865 to 1872 on the East Coast; these wars fought not for the Crown, but with the Crown within the context of communal, kin-based social structures that maintain continuity despite material, cultural, and legal challenges to this day. Mokena Kohere, as described by his grandson, my ancestor, Reweti Kohere, sought and maintained sovereignty fighting against fellow Ngāti

Porou.⁴⁴ Where a nationalised history can incorporate these motivations within the wider national narrative, they cannot adequately explain the complexities and motivations of iwi leaders like Kohere, or Uncle Monty's (Monty Soutar's) own tipuna, Rapata Wahawaha. Furthermore, as a descendant of Hua Kaiwaka, with Te Pane o Mataaho as my mountain, with Te Manukanuka o Hoturoa as my sea, and Ngati Te Ata - Te Waiohau as my iwi, the history of loss and devastation in the scouring of Waikato and the destruction of our settlements north of the Mangatāwhiri river should not only be mobilised as a means of negotiating settlements and litigating reparations, but precisely as means of remembering my people, their connection to the whenua, and why it persists to this day.

My Tuhoetanga, my Kai Tahutanga, my lines of descent to Ireland, Scotland, Australia and the United States all materially contributed to my existence, just as the histories, stories, myths, and social constructions contribute, brick by brick, and bone by bone to the reification of the New Zealand state. Where my lifeblood cannot be separated from that of my ancestors, the convenience and comfort of the national story must extinguish and delineate itself consistently from its own complexities to continue to exist in any recognisable form. It is a totality of contradiction, the contradictory totality of the nation that projects itself into our histories. The idea of the nation is made to cannibalise the narratives, lives, societies, and communities of

⁴⁴ Monty Soutar, 'Ngāti Porou leadership: Rāpata Wahawaha and the politics of conflict: "Kei te ora nei hoki tātou, me tō tātou whenua",' Doctoral Thesis, Massey University, 2000; Reweti Kohere, 'Hauhau Rising on the East Coast,' in *The Story of a Maori Chief*, Wellington, 1949.

those it claims as citizens, precursors and progeny alike until those willing to mobilise the idea of nation for self-interest, whether to invade the Waikato or profit off the exploited and downtrodden, is itself cannibalised by the narrative created.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ *Radio New Zealand*, 'Treaty Principles Bill: Māori translators pen letter over 'deeply flawed translations,' July 3 2024.

Bibliography

Anderson, Atholl, Judith Binney, and Aroha Harris, *Tangata Whenua: A History*, Wellington, 2015.

Ballantyne, Tony, *Webs of Empire: Locating New Zealand's Colonial Past*, Vancouver, 2015.

Belich, James, *The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict*, Auckland, 2013.

Belich, James, *I Shall Not Die: Titokowaru's War, 1868–1869*, Wellington, 2015.

Binney, Judith, *Redemption Songs: A Life of Te Kooti Arikirangi Te Turuki*, Wellington, 2013.

Byrnes, Giselle, and Catherine Coleborne, 'Editorial Introduction: The utility and futility of 'the nation' in histories of Aotearoa New Zealand,' *New Zealand Journal of History*, 45, 1, 2011, pp. 1-13.

Cowan, James, *The New Zealand Wars: A History of the Maori Campaigns and the Pioneering Period*, Wellington, 1955.

Faculty of Law, University of Wellington, 'Professor Bain Atwood: Historicising the Treaty of Waitangi,' *YouTube*, available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aDgG6mN5yFk>.

Gentry, Kynan, *History, Heritage, and Colonialism: Historical Consciousness, Britishness, and Cultural Identity in New Zealand, 1870-1940*, Manchester, 2015.

Gibbons, Peter, 'Cultural Colonisation and National Identity,' *New Zealand Journal of History*, 36, 1, 2002, pp. 5-17.

Harris, Aroha, 'Theorise this: We are what we write,' *Te Pou Here Kōrero*, 3, 2009, pp.83-90.

Herz, Max, *New Zealand: the Country and the People*, a translation of *Das heutige Neuseeland: Land und Leute*, London, 1912.

Hilliard, Chris, 'Colonial Culture and the Province of Cultural History,' *New Zealand Journal of History*, 36, 1, 2002, pp. 82-97.

Keenan, Danny, *Wars Without End: Ngā Pakanga Whenua o Mua/New Zealand's land wars - a Māori Perspective*, Wellington, Revised edition, 2021.

Kohere, Reweti, 'Hauhau Rising on the East Coast,' in *The Story of a Maori Chief*, Wellington, 1949.

Mills, Keri, 'The Bones in the Closet: Colonial Violence in Pakeha Family History,' in Angela Wanhalla, Ryan Lyndall and Camille Nurka, eds., *Aftermaths: Colonialism, Violence and Memory in Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific*, Dunedin, 2022, pp. 49-58.

Manera, Ethan, 'PSA criticises coalition Government's English first policy, says mixed messages 'confusing',' *New Zealand Herald*, July 8 2024, available at <https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/psa-criticises-coalition-governments-english-first-policy-says-mixed-messages-confusing/7M3JC7YQPNAKTBF6MJDEELTWJI/>

Oliver, W. H., *A Story of New Zealand*, New York, 1960.

Oliver, W.H., 'The future behind us,' in Andrew Sharp and Paul McHugh, eds., *Histories, Power and Loss: Uses of the Past - A New Zealand Commentary*, Wellington, 2001, pp. 9-30.

O'Malley, Vincent, and Joanna Kidman, 'Settler colonial history, commemoration and white backlash: remembering the New Zealand Wars,' *Settler Colonial Studies*, 8, 3, 2017, pp. 298-313.

Orange, Claudia, *Te Tiriti o Waitangi/The Treaty of Waitangi 1840*, Wellington, 2017.

O'Reagan, Tipene, *New Myths and Old Politics: The Waitangi Tribunal and the Challenge of Tradition*, Wellington, 2014.

Pember Reeves, William, *The Long White Cloud: Aotearoa*, Australia, first published 1898.

Pollock, Jacob, 'Cultural Colonisation and Textual Biculturalism,' *New Zealand Journal of History*, 41, 2, 2007, pp. 180-198.

Radio New Zealand, 'Treaty Principles Bill: Māori translators pen letter over 'deeply flawed translations,' July 3 2024, available at <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/political/521201/treaty-principles-bill-maori-translators-pen-letter-over-deeply-flawed-translations>.

Sinclair, Keith, *A History of New Zealand*, Auckland, Revised edition, 2000.

Soutar, Monty, 'Ngāti Porou leadership: Rāpata Wahawaha and the politics of conflict: "Kei te ora nei hoki tātou, me tō tātou whenua",' Doctoral Thesis, Massey University, 2000.

Te Ao with Moana, 'Finlayson called a 'Māori loving C', slams Act's Treaty referendum,' *Te Ao Māori News*, March 25 2024, available at <https://www.teaonews.co.nz/2024/03/25/finlayson-called-a-Māori-loving-c-slams-acts-treaty-referendum/>.

Te Pāti Māori, 'Te Pāti Māori is the assertion of our mana motuhake and our liberation,' <https://www.maoriparty.org.nz/>

Te Pou Herenga Taonga - Heritage New Zealand, 'Albert Barracks Wall (University of Auckland Campus),' *Heritage.org.nz*, available at [https://www.heritage.org.nz/list-details/12/Albert%20Barracks%20Wall%20\(University%20of%20Auckland%20Campus\)](https://www.heritage.org.nz/list-details/12/Albert%20Barracks%20Wall%20(University%20of%20Auckland%20Campus))

Te Pouhere Taonga - Heritage New Zealand, 'One Tree Hill Obelisk: One Tree Hill summit, One Tree Hill, Auckland,' *Heritage.org.nz*, available at <https://www.heritage.org.nz/list-details/4601/Listing>

Walker, Ranginui, *Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou: Struggle Without End*, Auckland, 1990.

Wynyard, Matt, 'Plunder in the Promised Land: Māori Land Alienation and the Genesis of Capitalism in Aotearoa New Zealand,' in Avril Bell, Vivienne Elizabeth, Tracey McIntosh and Matt Wynyard, eds., *A Land of Milk and Honey? Making Sense of Aotearoa New Zealand*, Auckland, 2017, pp. 15-22.



©R.M.K.Thomas.

Kate Thompson*History 371: Atlantic Revolutions*

My name is Kate Thompson, and I am in my final year of my double degree – a Bachelor of Global Studies and a Bachelor of Arts majoring in Global Politics and Art History. History has been a passion of mine for a long time, spurred on by my Year 13 History class and my wonderful and enthusiastic teacher. While not technically a part of my degree, I use every elective I can to take a history paper and also incorporate it into my politics major. History is such an important subject, especially in the current global political climate – understanding and awareness of our past helps deal with present and future issue.

Networks of Resistance: The movement of people and information in Saint-Domingue.

Kate Thompson

The eighteenth-century Atlantic world was marked by the constant movement of people and ideas, shaping American colonies and the lives of the enslaved people who inhabited them. Nowhere was this more evident than in Saint-Domingue, where local and trans-imperial flows of information played a vital role in fostering resistance leading up to the Haitian Revolution (1791-1804). Despite colonial France's efforts to control the spread of knowledge, enslaved populations developed mobile networks of communication where information was constantly circulating. These Pan-African Atlantic communities relied on oral traditions, religious practices, and covert networks to share revolutionary ideas. This sharing of knowledge extended beyond a local level, as information from across the Atlantic world reached the shores of Saint-Domingue through trans-imperial flows of people. News of abolitionist movements, revolutionary events and rumours of freedom, brought by mobile populations such as sailors, ignited hopes and fuelled rebellion. This essay will explore how both local exchanges and trans-imperial currents of information and people contributed to a culture of resistance in Saint-

Domingue, ultimately shaping the revolution that defied global systems of slavery and transformed the Atlantic World.

The local flow of information and movement of enslaved people across Saint-Domingue were deeply interconnected and played a critical role in spreading ideas and organising resistance before and during the Haitian Revolution. Despite the limitations imposed by literacy laws and colonial controls, enslaved people found alternative methods to share knowledge. Black cultural traditions favoured direct human contact and speech, and this oral culture quickly transmitted news across the French colony.¹ Although enslaved people left few written records, historians like David Geggus have pieced together evidence from colonial documents. Geggus' *The Haitian Revolution: A Documentary History* offers a wealth of evidence in the form of reports, correspondence, and newspapers that aid current understandings of local flows of information and people.² Whilst these records are produced from a colonial perspective, they offer important insights into suspected information networks and the constant movement of the enslaved people, helping historians reconstruct how these flows contributed to resistance.

¹ Julius Scott, "The Suspense Is Dangerous in a Thousand Shapes": News, Rumor, and Politics on the Eve of the Haitian Revolution,' in Julius Scott and Marcus Rediker, eds., *The common wind; Afro-American currents in the Age of the Haitian Revolution*, London, 2018, pp. 76-77.

² David Patrick Geggus, ed., 'Slave Resistance,' in *The Haitian Revolution: A Documentary History*, Indianapolis, 2014.

Geggus identifies weekly markets as key sites for this local information exchange. Thousands would gather on Sundays, offering a space where enslaved individuals, typically isolated on plantations, could meet and share news.³ In a 1785 'Report of the Chamber of Agriculture,' colonial officials expressed concerns about the insubordination sparked by these urban gatherings.⁴ Planters' anxieties reveal how these urban spaces fostered the development of a shared culture among enslaved people as they exchanged information about plantation conditions, strikes, and revolutionary ideas.⁵ Information regarding the French Revolution and the prospect of Black emancipation were the most coveted in these spaces.⁶ Despite low literacy rates amongst these enslaved populations, it only took one literate person to then spread this revolutionary rhetoric orally, causing these ideas to travel rapidly across the colony.⁷ This connection between local exchanges and broader revolutionary currents shows how Saint-Domingue was not an isolated island but engaged in larger trans-Atlantic flows of information.

Religious practices, particularly Vodou, played a similar role to markets in fostering solidarity and resistance among enslaved populations. Vodou rituals connected communities across the island, serving as both spiritual gatherings and

³ Geggus, 'Slave Resistance,' p. 15.

⁴ *ibid.*, p. 17.

⁵ Janet Polansky, *Revolutionaries Without Borders: The Call to Liberty in the Atlantic World*, New Haven and London, 2015, p. 141.

⁶ Scott, 'The Suspense Is Dangerous,' pp. 77-78.

⁷ Polansky, *Revolutionaries Without Borders*, p. 151.

covert organisational meetings where sovereignty was visualised and enacted.⁸ An early description of Vodou, penned by colonial lawyer Moreau de Saint-Méry, stresses the secrecy of these meetings to ensure that the circulation of revolutionary ideas and strategies remained confined to those in attendance.⁹ Geggus also highlights how Vodou contributed to the belief that amulets could protect individuals in battle, fostering a sense of invincibility among these communities and further uniting them in their collective resistance.¹⁰ Planter Drouin de Bercy's fears of Vodou's supposed mission to incite the "ruin and destruction of the whites" point to the planter class's recognition of Vodou's power to unite the enslaved.¹¹ While likely exaggerated by de Bercy's fear of resistance, these records nonetheless reveal that Vodou provided not just spiritual guidance but a revolutionary framework that reinforced collective resistance.

The mobility of key figures also contributed significantly to the spread of resistance in Saint-Domingue. The activities of an individual named Dom Pedro were chronicled extensively in the correspondence of a judge from Petit Goâve. Dom Pedro is described as "extremely dangerous," travelling from "plantation to plantation dominating the minds of blacks...(informing) them that they would soon

⁸ Kathryn M. de Luna, 'Sounding the African Atlantic,' *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 78, 4, 2021, p. 588.

⁹ Geggus, 'Slave Resistance,' p. 21.

¹⁰ *ibid.*, pp.15-16.

¹¹ *ibid.*, p.23.

be free.”¹² Pedro’s movements demonstrate circumstances where individuals used their mobility to generate a culture of expectation, encouraging enslaved people to resist punishment and anticipate their freedom.¹³ This expectation of freedom was essential in creating an environment ripe with resistance and revolution in Saint-Domingue. Dom Pedro was likely considered a maroon, a term used by Europeans to describe people who had escaped plantation slavery. The movement of maroons not only facilitated the exchange of information but also provided enslaved populations with tangible examples of successful resistance and autonomous survival. Runaway advertisements in colonial newspapers document maroons who were hidden by enslaved people across several plantations, like Nerestan Mozambique.¹⁴ The sheltering and protection of Mozambique reflects the deep networks of support and communication among the enslaved. Through markets, religious gatherings, and maroonage, local flows of information and people engendered a culture of resistance in Saint-Domingue. These localised networks did not stand alone but were interconnected with larger Atlantic currents of revolution, shaping local struggles and transforming the eighteenth-century Atlantic world.

¹² Geggus, ‘Slave Resistance,’ p.25.

¹³ *ibid.*

¹⁴ *ibid.*, p. 33.

Trans-imperial flows of information were crucial in shaping the eighteenth-century Atlantic world, contributing to an existing culture of resistance among enslaved populations, particularly in Saint-Domingue. This exchange of ideas, news, and rumours helped ignite revolutionary aspirations across the colonies. Revolutionary and abolitionist ideas did not remain confined to colonial powers in Europe. Existing frameworks of resistance among Black and enslaved communities were reinterpreted and given further life when they mingled with ideas that crossed imperial borders. The dissemination of such ideas was neither uniform nor uncontested, as rumours and varying interpretations of events became widespread across the Atlantic world. While these rumours were sometimes based on fragmented or inaccurate information, they were vital in shaping resistance among enslaved people, whose hopes for freedom often hinged on far-off news and whispers of change. Regardless of the truth behind the information, its circulation was essential in building an anticipatory culture of resistance that fed the growing revolutionary sentiment across Saint-Domingue.

In the early 1770s, news of Lord Mansfield's ruling in favour of James Somerset, an enslaved individual from Virginia, spread rapidly across the Atlantic, sparking hopes for emancipation amongst enslaved populations in America.¹⁵ Similarly, news of the American Revolution (1775-1783) spread hopes of freedom

¹⁵ Geggus, 'Slave Resistance,' p. 33

across the Atlantic world. Enslaved populations on coastal plantations near Charleston passed word that the coming conflict may “help the poor Negroes.”¹⁶ Although these hopes were ultimately unfulfilled, the American Revolution continued the intellectual spread of revolutionary ideals of liberty and resistance.¹⁷ Spain was another imperial power whose actions amplified the spread of emancipatory hopes in the late eighteenth century. In 1789, the Spanish government tentatively introduced reforms in an effort to limit the absolute power of slaveholders.¹⁸ News of these reforms quickly reached the ears of the enslaved populations in Spanish colonies and spread into neighbouring French territories.¹⁹ The interconnected nature of the island of Hispaniola, divided between Spanish Santo Domingo and French Saint-Domingue, facilitated the rapid dissemination of these reforms, prompting the spread of revolutionary news and ideas.

The French Revolution (1789) had the most profound impact on the Atlantic world, and news of key events such as the storming of Bastille and the Declaration of the Rights of Man quickly crossed the ocean.²⁰ Despite attempts by King Louis XVI to dismantle the press in Saint-Domingue, news of French revolutionary decrees was impossible to suppress.²¹ The revolutionary ideals of liberty and

¹⁶ Geggus, ‘Slave Resistance,’ p. 33.

¹⁷ *ibid.*, p.81.

¹⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁹ *ibid.* p. 81.

²⁰ John D. Garrigus, *A Secret Among Blacks: Slave Resistance before the Haitian Revolution*, Cambridge, 2023, p. 155.

²¹ Polansky, *Revolutionaries Without Borders*, p. 147.

equality resonated deeply with the enslaved populations of Saint-Domingue, and these populations greatly anticipated that the revolution would cross the Atlantic and bring them their freedom.²² A crucial moment in this trans-Atlantic exchange of information occurred in 1790 when debates over the rights of free persons of colour in the National Assembly were misinterpreted in Saint-Domingue.²³ Rumour spread among enslaved populations that a decree from the French king granted them three days of freedom each week.²⁴ Colonial authorities viewed demands surrounding this false decree as unimportant, causing the enslaved communities to blame their masters for impeding the freedom granted to them by the king.²⁵ The outcry caused was a crucial element in the buildup to the Haitian revolution, illustrating how the complex and often fragmented transmission of information could be just as powerful as the content itself.

In 1791, this anger, anticipation, and growing revolutionary fervour culminated in a significant uprising on the northern sugar plantations of Saint-Domingue.²⁶ This event marked the beginning of the Haitian Revolution. Reports of the rebellion quickly spread across the Atlantic, reaching Jamaica within two weeks. The addition of new verses to folk songs by enslaved people in Jamaica, referencing the events

²² Polansky, *Revolutionaries Without Borders*.

²³ *ibid.*, p. 149.

²⁴ *ibid.*, p. 151.

²⁵ *ibid.*, p. 151.

²⁶ Garrigus, *A Secret*, p. 145.

in Saint-Domingue, further underscores the trans-imperial nature of information flows in the Atlantic.²⁷ The rapid spread of revolutionary news across the Atlantic world played a decisive role in shaping resistance movements, linking the local struggles of Saint-Domingue to broader trans-imperial currents.

The constant movement of people across the Atlantic was another critical factor in shaping resistance and revolution in Saint-Domingue. Vessels carried more than just cargo; they carried sailors, merchants, free people of colour, and enslaved individuals, all of whom contributed to the exchange of ideas and the spread of revolutionary news across Europe, Africa and the Americas.²⁸ These mobile populations were essential to what Laurent Dubois has called an “integrated intellectual space,” where ideas of resistance, revolution, and anti-slavery sentiment circulated freely.²⁹ Ports became critical hubs where mobile populations interacted, spreading revolutionary ideology, anti-slavery sentiments, and news of rebellion. These interconnected networks of trans-imperial movement catalysed the Haitian Revolution and shaped the broader Atlantic world into a space of ideological exchange and resistance against imperial powers.

The Atlantic slave trade, which forcibly relocated millions of Africans across the Atlantic, reflects how the trans-imperial movement of people diffused a culture

²⁷ Polansky, *Revolutionaries Without Borders*, p. 146.

²⁸ Laurent Dubois, “An Enslaved Enlightenment: Rethinking the Intellectual History of the French Atlantic,” *Social History*, 31, 1, 2006, p. 6.

²⁹ Dubois, “An Enslaved Enlightenment,” p. 7.

of resistance. Enslaved Africans brought with them their home cultures, knowledge, and previous encounters with resistance and slavery.³⁰ These people were not passive recipients of their fate; they actively sought ways to resist their enslavement, even before they reached the shores of the Caribbean. The runaway advertisement of an enslaved individual, who attempted to swim to the shores of Saint-Domingue after jumping off a ship bound for the Plymouth colony, embodies this pre-existing spirit of resistance.³¹ The action of this individual captures the determination of the enslaved to escape colonial oppression, and it is emblematic of existing defiance against slavery.

As the largest and most profitable slave colony in the French Empire, Saint-Domingue was particularly susceptible to constant flows of people, information and ideas. In 1788, more than seven hundred ships called on the colony, carrying almost twenty thousand sailors.³² These sailors were instrumental in the spread of revolutionary news, transmitting stories of resistance and rebellion from Europe, the Americas, and other parts of the Caribbean.³³ Sailors often developed a sense of solidarity with the enslaved populations because of the oppressive conditions they themselves experienced aboard ships, subject to the whims of their shipmasters

³⁰ Laurent Dubois, "The Revolutionary Abolitionists of Haiti," in Richard Bessel, Nicholas Guyatt and Jane Redall, eds, *War, Empire and Slavery, 1770-1830*, London, 2010, p. 45.

³¹ Geggus, *A Secret*, p. 34.

³² Polansky, *Revolutionaries Without Borders*, p. 139.

³³ Dubois, "An Enslaved Enlightenment," p. 6.

and brutal discipline.³⁴ Working side by side with enslaved people in ports and on docks, sailors were inclined to share their knowledge of abolitionist campaigns and news of the French Revolution, stoking the flames of rebellion among the enslaved.³⁵ This transfer of information was a crucial factor in the development of resistance in Saint-Domingue, as oppressed populations were exposed to revolutionary rhetoric, adapting it to their own aspirations for freedom.

The revolutionary news that spread through these trans-imperial networks was not limited to the working class or enslaved populations. Free people of colour and individuals of mixed race also played a pivotal role in the dissemination of revolutionary ideas. One of the most significant figures in this regard was Vincent Ogé. Ogé was a wealthy free man of colour from Saint-Domingue who happened to be in France during the early French Revolution.³⁶ While his primary concern was the political rights of wealthy, land-owning *gens de couleur* rather than the emancipation of the enslaved, his advocacy was emblematic of how revolutionary rhetoric crossed the Atlantic.³⁷ After being unsuccessful in Paris, Ogé travelled back to Saint-Domingue, passing through London and Charleston before covertly entering Cap Français.³⁸ There, he led a short-lived but highly symbolic rebellion,

³⁴ Scott, 'The Suspense Is Dangerous,' p. 92.

³⁵ Dubois, "An Enslaved Enlightenment," p. 9.

³⁶ Garrigus, *A Secret* p.155.

³⁷ *ibid.*

³⁸ Scott, 'The Suspense Is Dangerous,' p.116.

advocating for the rights of free people of colour.³⁹ Although Ogé's rebellion was ultimately crushed, his actions contributed to the broader revolutionary fervour on the island, showing how trans-imperial figures like him helped to shape cultures of resistance.

The Haitian Revolution was not an isolated event but the culmination of decades of resistance shaped by the continuous movement of people and ideas across the Atlantic world and Saint-Domingue. Through markets, Vodou practices and maroonage, local networks of communication fostered a culture of resistance among the enslaved populations of Saint-Domingue. These local efforts were inextricably linked to broader currents of revolutionary ideas flowing from Europe and America. Trans-imperial networks, which transported news of emancipation and revolution through sailors, merchants, and free people of colour, ignited and sustained the hopes of enslaved communities. The interconnected nature of local and trans-imperial information flows illustrates how the eighteenth-century Atlantic world was a dynamic space. Ideas of resistance and liberation were not confined to European intellectual circles but were adapted and weaponised by oppressed populations across the Atlantic. Saint-Domingue was deeply embedded in these wider networks, and local struggles were transformed into a revolutionary movement that reshaped the political landscape of the Atlantic world. A defiant

³⁹ Scott, 'The Suspense Is Dangerous,' p.116.

battle against slavery, this revolution saw the new world's first successful slave uprising and birthed the first independent Black state in the New World. Ultimately, the Haitian revolution demonstrates the crucial role that both local and trans-imperial flows of people and information played in creating a culture of resistance that shaped the eighteenth-century Atlantic world.

Bibliography

de Luna, Kathryn M., 'Sounding the African Atlantic,' *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 78, 4, 2021, pp. 581-616.

Dubois, Laurent, 'An Enslaved Enlightenment: Rethinking the Intellectual History of the French Atlantic,' *Social History*, 31, 1, 2006, pp. 1-14.

Dubois, Laurent, 'The Revolutionary Abolitionists of Haiti,' in Richard Bessel, Nicholas Guyatt and Jane Redall, eds, *War, Empire and Slavery, 1770-1830*, London, 2010, p. 44-60.

Garrigus, John D., *A Secret Among Blacks: Slave Resistance Before the Haitian Revolution*, Cambridge, 2023.

Geggus, David Patrick, ed., 'Slave Resistance,' in *The Haitian Revolution: A Documentary History*, Indianapolis, 2014, pp. 15-34.

Polansky, Janet, *Revolutionaries Without Borders: The Call to Liberty in the Atlantic World*, New Haven and London, 2015.

Scott, Julius, "'The Suspense Is Dangerous in a Thousand Shapes': News, Rumor, and Politics on the Eve of the Haitian Revolution,' in Julius Scott and Marcus Rediker, eds., *The Common Wind; Afro-American Currents in the Age of the Haitian Revolution*, London, 2018, pp. 76-117.

Emmanuel Ko*History 239: Medieval Cultures: Faith, Power, Identities*

My name is Emmanuel, and I am currently a third-year BA/LLB student. As someone who has a preference for contemporary history, my expertise in medieval history was confined to an undying love for castles and chivalric romance. To my surprise, History 239 revealed that the medieval era was not merely a time when knights in shining armour rode on horseback into the sunset. Instead, the medieval era was one of depth and complexity, with intricate social and political systems that defined individuals from birth. The piece below focuses on a late 13th-century artefact titled the Hereford Mappa Mundi, emphasising its illustration of medieval mentalities concerning geography, history, and the peoples of the earth. I hope that my work instils a passion for the medieval era, or at least for castles.

Mapping Faith: The Hereford Mappa Mundi as a window into Medieval Mentalities.

Emmanuel Ko

The Hereford Mappa Mundi is an artefact that illustrates the medieval European mindset of the late 13th-century world.¹ Although it takes the form of a map, it serves as a geographically arranged encyclopaedia, offering a unique glimpse into European medieval understandings of geography, history, and the diversity of the earth's peoples.² In its entirety, the map reveals the centrality of Christianity in medieval life, where distorted proportion, biblical history, and the diversity of God's creations converge to emphasise the importance of living a Christian life.³



The Hereford Mappa Mundi. Image taken 2007, retrieved from UNESCO.org.uk.

The map's arrangement and layout utilises the T-O diagram that originated in the Roman Empire and combines it with medieval Christian theology, subordinating

¹ Paul Harvey, *Mappa Mundi: The Hereford World Map*, London, 1996, p. 1.

² *ibid.*, p. 7.

³ Evelyn Edson, *The World Map, 1300-1492: The Persistence of Tradition and Transformation*, Baltimore, 2007, p. 21.

geographical accuracy to emphasise the importance of Christian sites.⁴ Asia, Europe, and Africa are pictured through an eastern orientation, as the East was considered the location of humanity's creation.⁵ The Garden of Eden appears at the upper edge of the world, drawn with impenetrable walls and surrounded by a ring of fire. Here, geographical accuracy is subordinated to convey the downfall of humanity. The holy city of Jerusalem is also placed in the centre of the map, emphasising its importance as the site of Christ's life. Its importance is further conveyed through its distorted proportion. This can be seen through the large stable representing Bethlehem, where Christ was born, or the large cross at Golgotha, where Christ was crucified. Although Jerusalem and Judea are geographically small, their symbolic importance within medieval life meant that scale could be diminished to incite introspection in the viewer and encourage them to reflect upon the importance of Christ in their lives. Accordingly, important or well-known regions are relatively small in size, as seen in Africa, where space is taken up by illustrations of strange creatures instead of place names.⁶ Thus, although the map is not entirely indifferent to the understanding of geographic spatial relationships of the time, these understandings were transformed by embedding the importance of Christian beliefs and values within the map.⁷

⁴ Edson, *The World Map*, pp. 11-13.

⁵ *ibid.*, p. 20.

⁶ *ibid.*, p. 24.

⁷ *ibid.*, p. 15.

The geographical elements are the structure on which historical events are presented on the map.⁸ Historical events and sites portrayed on the map serve to convey the medieval Christian belief that Christ would return once all of humanity had been converted.⁹ Here, the influence of the Four Empires theory can be seen on the map.¹⁰ This theory was inherited from the Roman Empire and suggested that world history was a succession of four great empires that started in the East with Babylon, moving down towards the West and the end of the world.¹¹ The placement of the Garden of Eden at the top of the map not only symbolises humanity's downfall but also the start of human history.

As the viewer moves their eye down the map, the biblical Old Testament story of the Israelites is laid out, from Noah's ark to Christ's crucifixion.¹² Relatively contemporary sites like the Cathedral of Santiago de Compostela, placed on the westernmost edge of the world, emphasise the far-extending spread of Christianity and the imminence of the last judgment.¹³ Although secular history is also pictured on the map, like Troy and other sites visited by Alexander the Great, it is clear that the map shows greater interest in biblical rather than secular history.¹⁴ The majority of historical events on the map are biblical, emphasising the spread of Christianity

⁸ Edson, *The World Map*, p. 22.

⁹ *ibid.*, p. 23.

¹⁰ *ibid.*

¹¹ *ibid.*

¹² *ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

¹³ *ibid.*, p. 23.

¹⁴ *ibid.*

and conveying to the viewer that the Last Judgment is near. As the viewer sets their eyes back on the top of the map, the image of the last judgment serves as a culmination of the history that is told.¹⁵ The viewer is reminded that the end is near, and they must persevere through living a Christian life. Thus, the map's emphasis on biblical history reveals the heavily Christian mentalities it sought to convey through its end-time narrative.

Named sites outside of Europe and the Mediterranean are replaced with illustrations and descriptions of exotic peoples to fill empty space.¹⁶ Concentrated around the southern rim of Africa, strange creatures are presented with various abnormalities.¹⁷ These illustrations are taken from a Greek work from the third century CE, which Medieval Christians appropriated by embellishing it with moral lessons.¹⁸ Here, Evelyn Edson suggests that the creatures with physical abnormalities emphasise the diversity of God's creations.¹⁹ However, when interpreting the map as a whole, these strange creatures more clearly serve to convey the superiority of a Christian life. The map's othering of non-European peoples reveals its more nefarious purpose of portraying non-Christians as uncivilised. Thus, the illustrations and descriptions of exotic peoples clearly reveal the Church's intention to promote

¹⁵ Edson, *The World Map*, p. 22.

¹⁶ *ibid.*, p. 24.

¹⁷ *ibid.*, p. 25.

¹⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁹ *ibid.*

cultural, social, and religious superiority, further justifying the benefits of living a Christian life.

Ultimately, the Hereford Mappa Mundi gives contemporary audiences a unique window into the medieval mind. Through its distorted proportions, emphasis on biblical history, and presence of exotic peoples, it reveals the centrality of Christianity within European medieval mentalities.

Bibliography

Edson, Evelyn, *The World Map, 1300-1492: The Persistence of Tradition and Transformation*, Baltimore, 2007.

Harvey, P. D. A., *Mappa Mundi: The Hereford World Map*, London, 1996.

“Mappa Mundi.” Mappa Mundi Exploration | Mappa Mundi Hereford. Accessed August 15, 2024, available at <https://www.themappamundi.co.uk/mappa-mundi>

Connor Noble*History 339: Medieval Cultures: Faith, Power, Identities*

My name is Connor Noble and I am currently coming towards the end of my bachelors degree in History along with Classics and Ancient History. In Classics and Ancient History I am particularly interested in Roman late republican history but in History I have a broader interest and have enjoyed learning about the discipline across a range of subjects and periods. In relation to this essay though, I have particularly enjoyed learning about the medieval period and gaining an understanding of the different ways we can consider the lives of people across all levels of society.

Belief, Religion, and Magic in Medieval Worlds

Connor Noble

The medieval period was defined by its prominent attitudes of belief in religion and magic, and their perception and interpretation across medieval worlds. Historians have taken different scholarly approaches to shed light on these beliefs, by taking into account the context of medieval worlds, by hosting ideas of other disciplines into their work, and by considering the mentalities of both the laity and the role of the clergy. The attempts of these historians reveal that we can begin to understand the medieval mentality of belief around religion and magic; however, the problems of source material and our anachronistic position prevent us from ever gaining a truly thorough understanding of these mentalities.

Historians have attempted to shed light on the religious and magical beliefs of ordinary medieval people by considering the changing context of their worlds. The Christian world of Medieval Western Europe was not static and, as Valerie J. Flint describes, could adjust its cosmology for magical practice, with the potential to incorporate the 'good' magic of miracles.¹ This example suggests the flexibility of the religious space of the medieval period and its adaptability to fit traditional lay beliefs. David J. Collins recognises a shift among historians of this topic towards

¹ Valerie J. Flint, 'A Magic Universe,' in Rosemary Horrox and W. M. Ormrod, eds, *A Social History of England, 1200-1500*, Cambridge, 2006, pp. 349, 354.

finding a “slippery definition” for magic in its changing shape across time and cultures, highlighting it as an approach to understanding beliefs and practices.² This demonstrates the applicability of the non-static viewpoint to the definitions applied to medieval worlds and the objective of searching for a definition for magic. John H. Arnold takes this wider and discusses how thinking about belief should be linked to the “social, political, economic, and cultural worlds” these beliefs work within.³ A fitting example of this is provided by Karen Jolly, who defines magic as changing “systems of thought,” as she uses the context of the intellectual turn following the twelfth-century to highlight changing definitions for magic and a growing link to popular religion.⁴ This link reveals the association between belief and practice and the world they take place in. From this, we can understand how historians apply an understanding of historical context to their approaches.

Considering interdisciplinary definitions and approaches has helped historian’s better understand religious and magical belief and practice. Arnold points out the number of contributions to understanding religion provided by sociology and anthropology, his ‘tools’ for thinking about belief reflecting Clifford Geertz’s idea of religion as a cultural system.⁵ In her discussion on magic and superstition, Catherine

² David J. Collins, ‘Magic in the Middle Ages: History and Historiography,’ *History Compass*, 5, 9, 2011, p. 410.

³ John H. Arnold, *Belief and Unbelief in Medieval Europe*, London, 2005, p.12.

⁴ Karen Jolly, ‘Medieval Magic: Definitions, Beliefs, Practices,’ in Bengt Ankarloo and Stuart Clark, eds, *Witchcraft and Magic in Europe, Volume 3: The Middle Ages*, London, 2001, pp. 3, 20-22.

⁵ Arnold, *Belief*, pp. 6, 17.

Rider employs anthropologist Keith Thomas' definition of magic, and his argument that much of Christian ritual can be labelled magic, to show attitudes towards "overlaps" in the relationship between religion and magic.⁶ While Rider points out this may have anachronistic problems, this implementation directly demonstrates the use of the ideas of other disciplines to shed light upon religious and magical beliefs.⁷ Reactions to disciplines within history can also be used to better understand the religious worlds of ordinary people. Carol Lansing critiques deconstructionist and post-revisionist scholarship, in which she notes the habit to portray heretics as sympathetic. She used her own case study of Brother John the Hermit to demonstrate this as while he was persecuted, his practice of religion was still motivated by extortion.⁸ Lansing's example shines light on the complex motives behind individuals' religious practice. The consideration of both the effectiveness and flaws of other historians has helped find new approaches to looking at this subject matter.

By treating the laity as a group that had their own agency and desires, historians have been able to shed light on ordinary people's participation in belief. As Natalie Zemon Davis points out, it is important not to consider the laity "passive

⁶ Catherine Rider, 'Magic and Superstition', in R. N. Swanson, ed., *The Routledge history of medieval Christianity 1050-1500*, London, 2015. pp.267-268.

⁷ *ibid.*

⁸ Carol Lansing, 'Popular Belief and Heresy', in Carol Lansing and Edward D. English, eds, *A Companion to the Medieval World*, Chichester, 2009, pp.286-288.

receptacles.”⁹ From this premise, historians such as R. N. Swanson have shown that ordinary people ‘could construct their own acceptable Christianity’ as they wanted things from the clergy, such as crop blessing, “instruction, and a good example,” leading to a demand for priestly services following 1215, and changing the role of the priest.¹⁰ Similarly, lay people began to use penance differently, confessing both venial and mortal sins.¹¹ This treatment of the laity as an autonomous group reveals more about ordinary medieval people’s participation in their faith as well as their influence on the operations of their religious system.

This approach also reveals how lay people thought and felt about both religion and magic. Bernard Hamilton explains that lay people could easily become bored or disinterested at services but that the majority were interested in the elevation of the host.¹² Additionally, Arnold considers the growing lay interest in the saints as they act as a figure “who cared for them.”¹³ These examples demonstrate what the laity were often interested in and why. Furthermore, both these historians also recognise that the lay often turned to folkloristic medicine when the power of the saints or sacraments were not sufficient, highlighting that for them, both religious and folklore magic were considered under one banner.¹⁴

⁹ Arnold, *Belief*, p. 19.

¹⁰ R. N. Swanson, *Religion and Devotion in Europe, c.1215-c.1515*, Cambridge, 1995, pp. 241-242.

¹¹ Bernard Hamilton, *Religion in the Medieval West*, London, 2003. P. 92.

¹² *ibid.*, pp. 90-92.

¹³ Arnold, *Belief*, pp. 80-85.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, p. 96.; Hamilton, *Religion in the Medieval West*, p. 96.

Historians have attempted to understand the religious beliefs of ordinary people by considering the role of the clergy and exploring the power dynamic between the church and laity. Ronald J. Stansbury explores the role of the clergy in the growing context of “pastoral care” and the particular importance of preaching as the “primary vehicle” of teaching Catholic values to the laity.¹⁵ Stansbury reflects on the work of Alan of Lille who considered sermons a “pastoral tool” and adapted his sermon techniques so the clergy may give better instruction for the laity or the “flock.”¹⁶ This reveals the use of the sermon by higher members of the church to educate the lay in a specific way. The focus on the ‘pastoral’ and the ‘flock’ imagery in Stansbury’s work reflects this idea of ordinary people being led by the clergy and church.¹⁷

Other historians focus more on the power relationship between the groups. Along with a wider context, Arnold discusses how religion should be discussed with consideration to power and, as Swanson argues, Christian practice and belief “ruled people’s lives” through its moral impositions and “disciplinary and penitential structure.”¹⁸ Further, Hamilton discusses the restriction of lay people owning bibles by the Synod of Toulouse, reflecting elite control of lay knowledge.¹⁹ These

¹⁵ Ronald J. Stansbury, *A Companion to Pastoral Care in the Late Middle Ages (1200-1500)*, Boston, 2010, pp. 24-28.

¹⁶ *ibid.*

¹⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁸ Arnold, *Belief*, p. 6.; Swanson, *Religion and Devotion*, pp. 91-92.

¹⁹ Hamilton, *Religion in the Medieval West*, pp. 76-77.

examples highlight the ways in which the laity were not in full control of their belief, but were influenced by the power structure of instruction. Similar to a consideration of a wider context, this demonstrates how historians have taken the role of the clergy and instruction of the church to help understand the religious beliefs of the laity.

The approaches taken by these historians to illuminate religious and magical practice and belief reveal that we can come to a thorough understanding that belief was genuinely felt in popular religious and magical mentalities. Importantly, historians have shown that the medieval world was one in which religion and magic coexisted in many ways. To come to an understanding of a world of religious and magical belief, we must, as Swanson shows, assess religion “in its own terms.”²⁰ For example, Flint describes that for both the laity and clergy the “supernatural” was something that was just a part of the world they lived in.²¹ Hamilton discusses that the existence of an afterlife was just a matter of fact for people.²² These descriptions highlight the prominence of faith in the medieval period and that there is one thing we can be sure of in considering popular mentalities: belief was rampant. Swanson backs this up by highlighting that even if there was scepticism in the church, atheism would not have appealed to many due its irrationality, as “God was necessary” to

²⁰ Swanson, *Religion and Devotion*, p. 313.

²¹ Flint, ‘A Magic Universe,’ p. 340.

²² Hamilton, *Religion in the Medieval West*, p. 85.

meet the pressures and questions of the world.²³ From the foundations of medieval religious mentalities beliefs, of any degree, were real and felt.

We are also able to gain some insight into popular religious belief through the mentalities of Christian authorities, although this has its limitations. The conception of magic in the Middle Ages is difficult to gain a thorough understanding of, as people had changing mentalities and motives around them. For example, Lansing highlights that accusations of heresy were often 'in the eye of the beholder,' not objective but a matter of personal opinion.²⁴ This reveals that decisions were being made individually with regard to their own understanding of beliefs. However, historians have shown that magic was often used to label people outside convention and a means of exclusion by church authorities.²⁵ Considering this, we can begin to understand the popular mindsets of elite members of the church. Given that historians have shown the lack of separation between folkloric magic and religion for the laity, we should be careful to consider the differences between church elite and laypeople's beliefs and mentalities.²⁶ Additionally, these exercises of religious belief among the church elite make it difficult even to understand their own mentalities, as motives had space to vary. From this, we can begin to see the

²³ Swanson, *Religion and Devotion*, p. 339.

²⁴ Lansing, 'Popular Belief,' pp. 281-282.

²⁵ Jolly, 'Medieval Magic,' pp. 6-7.

²⁶ Hamilton, *Religion in the Medieval West*, p. 96.; Arnold, *Belief*, p.96.

difficulties of gaining a truly thorough understanding of religious and magical mentalities, particularly from elite perspectives and sources.

The issues of source material and their baggage prevent us from ever gaining a truly thorough understanding of popular religious and magical mentalities. Arnold discusses how sources only leave us with “traces of the past,” of which their survival and preservation are often indicative of being kept by “dominant powers.”²⁷ Our sources on magic and its perception are restricted by the context they are found in, limiting the picture we can build from them. Written source materials such as Caesarius of Heisterbach’s *Dialogue on Miracles* reveals the issue of clergy-written sources. While Caesarius’s story of a woman who became paralysed as a result of misusing the body of Christ for the sake of her garden uses a lay person as an example what it reveals is Caesarius’s own concern with creating a narrative that conveys the danger of misusing the sacraments, limiting what we can learn about lay experience from this source.²⁸

Rider describes the uses of different sources on magic such as theological treatises, which were often too academic or designed to suppress not to tell us about genuine lay beliefs, but also includes “descriptive” sources, like chronicles, literature, and archaeology, which can be used alongside other sources to “gain some sense”

²⁷ Arnold, *Belief*, pp. 21-22.

²⁸ Caesarius of Heisterbach, ‘The Body and Blood of Christ, vol.2’, in Henry von Essen Scott and C. Swinton Bland, eds, *The Dialogue on Miracles, Volume 2*, London, 1929, pp. 115-116.

of magical mentalities.²⁹ This demonstrates the ability to combine sources to gain a more extensive understanding; however, it also reveals that we still cannot build a complete picture. Further, sources such as archaeological evidence are also limited by their context in what they can reveal. From Rider's example, remnants such as grave goods may reveal amulets associated with magic but what we can gather about its use in practice may be false.³⁰ These various issues highlight the impossibility of ever having a thorough understanding of true mentalities concerning magic belief.

Additionally, as we are studying the subject of religion and magic out of its time we are both mentally and physically removed from the thought processes of medieval people. Not only are we removed from much of the source material, but as Rodney Needham points out we have to understand the concept of belief in terms of "translation from one culture to another."³¹ We are mentally removed from the time period and, therefore, cannot truly develop a thorough understanding of how people popularly thought about religion and magic. While we can construct understandings of practices and what they may mean on a wider social level or to specific social groups, we cannot know how they fit into people's mental constructions of the world. Considering the magical practice of verbal charms, Jolly

²⁹ Rider, 'Magic and Superstition,' p. 268.

³⁰ *ibid.*

³¹ Arnold, *Belief*, p. 20.

describes what we can learn from them, such as the association between spoken word and power, but also reveals the difficulty in piecing together how people would go about performing these practices, as the sources leave out what the practitioner would have just known.³² This may reveal something about attitudes, as we can learn that for some these practices would have been internalised, but our inability to recreate these practices highlights our separation from the period. Our ability to fully comprehend medieval mentalities is restricted by our distance.

To conclude, historians have shed light on the religious and magical practices and beliefs of ordinary medieval people through academic practice and direct consideration of the people of the time. This essay has shown this by looking at how historians use the context of the wider world to define magic and religion and its changes, and how historians use multiple scholarly viewpoints to refine their understandings, by not taking ordinary people homogeneously under the control of the church, and also by examining the role of the church in shaping lay beliefs. It is unlikely that we will ever have a thorough understanding of religious and magical beliefs. While we can identify the existence of belief and the ways religious elite considered magic and religion, we are robbed of a complete image by the limiting factors of our sources, and are unable to ever fully reconstruct the genuine mentalities and practices of the past. However, as the practice of these historians

³² Jolly, 'Medieval Magic,' p. 30.

have shown, we can continue to refine our definitions of religion and magic to better understand it through every revision.

Bibliography

Arnold, John H., *Belief and Unbelief in Medieval Europe*, London, 2005.

Caesarius of Heisterbach, 'The Body and Blood of Christ, vol.2', in Henry von Essen Scott and C. C. Swinton Bland, eds, *The Dialogue on Miracles, Volume 2*, London, 1929, pp.105-127.

Collins, David J., 'Magic in the Middle Ages: History and Historiography', *History Compass*, 5, 9, 2011, pp.410-422.

Flint, Valerie J., 'A Magic Universe', in Rosemary Horrox and W. M. Ormrod, eds, *A Social History of England, 1200-1500*, Cambridge, 2006, pp.340-355.

Hamilton, Bernard, *Religion in the Medieval West*, London, 2003.

Jolly, Karen, 'Medieval Magic: Definitions, Beliefs, Practices', in Bengt Ankarloo and Stuart Clark, eds, *Witchcraft and Magic in Europe, Volume 3: The Middle Ages*, London, 2001, pp.3-71.

Lansing, Carol, 'Popular Belief and Heresy', in Carol Lansing and Edward D. English, eds, *A Companion to the Medieval World*, Chichester, 2009, pp.276-292.

Rider, Catherine, 'Magic and Superstition', in R. N. Swanson, ed., *The Routledge history of medieval Christianity 1050-1500*, London, 2015, pp.265-276.

Stansbury, Ronald J., *A Companion to Pastoral Care in the Late Middle Ages (1200-1500)*, Boston, 2010.

Swanson, R. N., *Religion and Devotion in Europe, c.1215-c.1515*, Cambridge, 1995.

Maya Zolotar*History 309: Bloodlands: Global Warfare*

Kia ora! My name is Maya Zolotar and I am an international student from the United States studying History and Politics at UoA. I am passionate about the Cold War, its cultural significance, and comparing the lenses through which different disciplines and countries look at the past. When I was younger, I never expected to be so passionate about history, but University gave me a new love for learning and uncovering information. History – and the world as a whole – has always been very complex, and I hope to never stop picking up new perspectives and details.

The Case Against the Bipolar-Proxy Understanding: East Asia 1945-55.

Maya Zolotar

In her 2024 lecture regarding the Cold War period, Professor Maartje Abbenhuis argues that ‘proxy war’ is the wrong term to explain the wars of the Cold War, as that term is insufficient in and of itself to explain any conflict in the post-1945 period.¹ This argument—and the nuanced analysis that comes with it—is critical to understanding the history of the Cold War: the argument refutes the typical, political science-aligned conception of the period as a bipolar world order. Ultimately, an examination of some of the conflicts frequently labeled as ‘proxy wars’ reveals the flaws in the dominant understanding: it is oversimplified, narrow, denies agency, and is, simply put, incorrect.

Central to the dominant understanding of the period is the concept of a ‘bipolar’ world order. Mark Yeisley defines this concept as a system of international power wherein “two states control the majority of power with weaker states aligning with one or the other.”² In her discussion of the Cold War, Abbenhuis highlights the factors that lead the Cold War to be understood in its dominant way: due to the destructive power of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union and United States, despite their immense

¹ Maartje Abbenhuis, ‘Lecture 23: New World, New Peace, New Wars: after 1945’, HISTORY 309, University of Auckland, 2024.

² Mark O. Yeisley, ‘Bipolarity, Proxy Wars, and the Rise of China,’ *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, 5, 4, 2011, p. 75.

ideological tensions, could not directly go to war with each other for fear of causing incomprehensible destruction.³ Because, then, they could not directly go to war, Yeisley sees 'proxy warfare' (wherein both superpowers took opposing sides in a smaller conflict) as a way that powers in the bipolar system engaged in conflict with one another without risking the destruction a direct war would bring.⁴ There is no universal agreement on which wars are proxy wars, and not every aspect of a political scientist's view of the era is problematic— a great ideological rift between great powers did exist, and they did provide support to local conflicts to further their aims.

The problem in this understanding of the Cold War is, as Abbenhuis highlights, the concept of the proxy war, and the implications for the 'bipolar' understanding that comes with debunking proxy war ideas. Painting smaller conflicts as proxy wars in a bipolar system oversimplifies them and denies agency to the non-superpower parties involved— and the concept of a 'bipolar world' ignores China's powerful and influential role separate from the Soviet Union. This essay will use the term 'bipolar-proxy model' to collectively refer to ideas that depict the world order of the time as solely dominated by the United States and Soviet Union, and paint some or all of the discussed conflicts as wars between American and Soviet proxies.

³ Abbenhuis, 'New World, New Peace, New Wars.'

⁴ Yeisley, 'Bipolarity,' p. 79.

Foreign affairs scholar Glyn Ford identifies the Korean War as the “first proxy war of the Cold War.”⁵ Although this designation of ‘first’ is not uncontested, it marks the first Cold War ‘proxy’ conflict in which superpowers made military commitments.⁶ The Korean War thus provides a look into how a ‘proxy war’ is conceptualized. The Republic of Korea (ROK) in the South, led by Syngman Rhee, received backing and military support from Western powers, while the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the North, led by Kim il-Sung, received similar support from global Communist powers, notably Beijing and Moscow.⁷ With this surface-level understanding, then, the Korean War can be conceived of as a proxy conflict; each superpower funded and supported a local player in a war split on the same ideological lines as the overall Cold War.

This conception is wrong, however, because the true situation is much more complex. Like many such conflicts during the post-World War II period, the Korean War started as a revolution, in the wake of Japanese imperial rule.⁸ The stakes for the Korean people were much deeper than serving as proxies for a global superpower faceoff. Despite the neat boxes a bipolar-proxy view might like to put them in, both Syngman Rhee and Kim il-Sung actively avoided serving as American or Soviet

⁵ Glyn Ford, *Talking to North Korea: Ending the Nuclear Standoff*, London, 2018, pp. 50-51.

⁶ Yeisley, ‘Bipolarity,’ p. 80; Paul Thomas Chamberlin, *The Cold War’s Killing Fields: Rethinking the Long Peace*, Oxford, 2018, pp. 104-105.

⁷ Ford, *Talking to North Korea*, pp. 50-51.

⁸ Chamberlin, *The Cold War’s Killing Fields*, pp. 106-107.

puppets– each had their own goals for the future of Korea.⁹ While on the surface the Korean War fits perfectly into the idea of a proxy war within a bipolar world order, when explored in depth, the Cold War was not the reason the conflict took place and neither leader was a superpower’s puppet. This speaks to the significance of Abbenhuis’ argument: looking beyond a surface-level understanding of the Korean War reveals the conflict was much more complicated, thus the conception of a ‘proxy war’ is an oversimplification. To understand the Cold War world through the bipolar-proxy lens is to fail to acknowledge its complexity.

The politics behind great power intervention in the Korean War were also much more complicated than an American-Soviet rivalry, as a North Korean victory was much more in the direct interests of Mao than Stalin. Later in the Cold War, Khrushchev would express that the Soviets were reluctant to help Kim in the War, instead telling him to defer to Mao.¹⁰ This role of Mao, then, makes clear a noticeable problem in the bipolar-proxy understanding: with the prominent role that China played, a bipolar conception becomes disingenuous. Ford calls China Stalin’s “surrogate second front in Asia,” indicating that in a bipolar-proxy understanding of the Cold War, China plays the role of a Soviet proxy.¹¹ In a 1972 politics publication, Eric Forman even uses the Chinese Civil War as an example in his discussion of how

⁹ Chamberlin, *The Cold War’s Killing Fields*, p. 118.

¹⁰ *ibid.*

¹¹ Ford, *Talking to North Korea*, p. 48.

proxy warfare works.¹² But, just like the Korean War, the Chinese Civil War hardly qualifies as a proxy war. It was a conflict born nearly twenty years before it received external funding.¹³ And, just as Rhee and Kim were not puppets, Mao was equally not one. Mao made a tactful decision to align himself with Stalin at one point, but he actively modified Soviet ideology to suit China's unique context.¹⁴ So, just like in the case of Korea, the Chinese Civil War also does not fit the bipolar-proxy conception of a proxy war. In addition, if it were a proxy war, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s victory would be a victory for the Soviet Union– and yet, it was much more significant than that, as China would go on to become a very prominent player in the Cold War world in and of itself. China and Maoist ideology would go on to inspire numerous similar revolutions during the Cold War period.¹⁵ This puts China less in a position as a Soviet proxy and more in the position of a superpower itself, exposing large cracks in the bipolar basis of political theory surrounding the Cold War.

It was China, not just Mao, that was influential in this way; in Vietnam, the Guonmingdang inspired the Viet Nam Quoc dan Dang (VNQDD), the opponents of Ho Chi Minh's Maoist-aligned communist party.¹⁶ The war in Vietnam that became a major part of Western, particularly American, political consciousness in the 1960s is

¹² Eric M. Forman, 'Civil War as a Source of International Violence,' *The Journal of Politics*, 34, 4, 1972, p. 1148

¹³ Lorenz M. Lüthi, *Cold Wars: Asia, The Middle East Europe*, Cambridge, 2020, p. 119.

¹⁴ Lüthi, *Cold Wars*, p. 120; Chamberlin, *The Cold War's Killing Fields*, p. 57.

¹⁵ *ibid.*, p. 55.

¹⁶ Pierre Asselin & Henk Schulte Nordholt, 'Cracking down on Revolutionary Zeal and Violence: Local Dynamics and Early Colonial Responses to the Independence Struggle in Indochina and the Indonesian

often painted as a proxy war, but its origins lie in the first Indochina War– another conflict that may appear to be a proxy war on the surface but is much more complex when delving deeper.¹⁷ The First Indochina War saw Vietnamese communists led by Ho Chi Minh oppose a Western capitalist force– a joint force of French attempting to reassert colonial rule upon the region, and Americans mobilized by the fear of communism.¹⁸ But, if the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was even motivated primarily by communism is up for debate.¹⁹ Nationalism played a major role in their actions, as did anti-imperial and postcolonial attitudes. While one could call the DRV Soviet puppets due to their role as Communists during the Cold War, Ho Chi Minh had recently replaced an actual puppet leader: Emperor Bao Dai, loyal to Japan.²⁰ And, when taking into account the fact that the DRV fought against the French aiming to repossess them as a colonial holding, painting the First Indochina War as a proxy war of Capitalism against Communism becomes entirely antithetical to what the anti-imperial conflict was truly about.

While DRV leaders were aware of their position within a global Cold War context, The DRV specifically saw the threat as an imperialist one, and even made

Archipelago, 1945-1947,' in Thijs Brocades Zaalberg & Bart Luttikhuis, eds., *Empire's Violent End: Comparing Dutch, British, and French Wars of Decolonization, 1945-1962*, London, 2022, p. 76; Lüthi, *Cold Wars*, p. 145.

¹⁷ Jeremy Black, *Military Strategy: A Global History*, London, 2020, p. 231.

¹⁸ Chamberlin, *The Cold War's Killing Fields*, p. 159.

¹⁹ Lüthi, *Cold Wars*, p. 138.

²⁰ Asselin & Nordholt, "Cracking Down on Revolutionary Zeal," p. 78.

tactful, carefully considered decisions when it came to asking for outside help.²¹ For a conflict so concerned about freedom from imperialism and self-determination, any conception that paints the DRV as a blind puppet used by the Soviet Union to further global communism is a gross misunderstanding. Proxy war is an insufficient term to describe the First Indochina War, and applying that argument to the war at all reveals not just how incorrect, but how disrespectful the bipolar-proxy understanding is.

The common theme across case studies in Korea, China, and Vietnam, is a lack of ascribed agency. In each case, the local leaders, leaders that a bipolar-proxy view would paint as puppets, had much more complex motives tied into their respective local histories and contexts. In each case, careful consideration went into deciding how much leaders wanted to play along with the aims of superpowers. These are just three examples; the Cold War was a lengthy period with numerous 'proxy wars,' each more complicated than the bipolar-proxy model would frame them. Abbenhuis' argument is key to understanding the cracks in the bipolar-proxy understanding. Each investigation of a 'proxy' war not only reveals how the designation falls short, but also dismantles other parts of bipolar-proxy conceptions. The Korean War was not a proxy war because it is far more complicated; understanding that points to how a bipolar-proxy model oversimplifies complex events. For similar reasons, the Chinese Civil War was also not a proxy war. China even went on to become a superpower in

²¹ Chamberlin, *The Cold War's Killing Fields*, p. 163; Alec Holcombe, *Mass Mobilization in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 1945-1960*, Honolulu, 2020, pp. 208-209.

and of itself, a development that calls into question the entire idea of a bipolar world order. The First Indochina War was so inherently rooted in self-determination that not only is the proxy war designation incorrect, it is antithetical to the core of the conflict. Understanding the local complexities in Vietnam leads to a greater understanding of how disrespectful the bipolar-proxy view's denial of agency is.

The absence of complexity in Cold War narratives is not universal; Lorenz Lüthi emphasizes the agency of the powers that would be painted as 'proxies' and Chamberlin challenges the bipolar-proxy view by emphasizing the violence that occurred in the world during the Cold War's so-called 'long peace.'²² Thus while the bipolar-proxy understanding is the most popular in political science circles, it is not the only view. In highlighting the failings of the bipolar-proxy model, Abbenhuis establishes the rift between political science and historical understandings of the Cold War. History is inherently complicated. When it is simplified down to fit a theory, its true character is erased.

²² Lüthi, *Cold Wars*, p. 4; Chamberlin, *The Cold War's Killing Fields*, p. 2.

Bibliography

Abbenhuis, Maartje, 'Lecture 23: New World, New Peace, New Wars: after 1945,' HISTORY 309, University of Auckland, 2024.

Asselin, Pierre, & Henk Schulte Nordholt, 'Cracking down on Revolutionary Zeal and Violence: Local Dynamics and Early Colonial Responses to the Independence Struggle in Indochina and the Indonesian Archipelago, 1945-1947,' in Thijs Brocades Zaalberg & Bart Luttikhuis, eds., *Empire's Violent End: Comparing Dutch, British, and French Wars of Decolonization, 1945-1962*, London, 2022, pp. 71-95.

Black, Jeremy, *Military Strategy: A Global History*, London, 2020.

Chamberlin, Paul Thomas, *The Cold War's Killing Fields: Rethinking the Long Peace*, Oxford, 2018.

Glyn Ford, *Talking to North Korea: Ending the Nuclear Standoff*, London, 2018.

Forman, Eric M, 'Civil War as a Source of International Violence,' *The Journal of Politics*, 34, 4, 1972, pp. 1111-1134. .

Holcombe, Alec, *Mass Mobilization in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 1945-1960*, Honolulu, 2020.

Lüthi, Lorenz M, *Cold Wars: Asia, The Middle East Europe*, Cambridge, 2020.

Rawnsley, Gary D, "The Great Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea': How Beijing sold the Korean War,' *Media, War & Conflict*, 2, 3, 2009, pp. 285-316.

Yeisley, Mark O., 'Bipolarity, Proxy Wars, and the Rise of China,' *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, 5, 4, 2011, pp. 75-91.

Angela Black*History 210: Health, Medicine and Society*

After six years, Angela has recently completed a law and arts conjoint, majoring in history and economics. This year she is starting a graduate role at a law firm and excited to put to use many of the skills she gained studying one of her greatest passions - history. Through her history degree and her work for the Auckland History Initiative, Angela has learned to critically analyse available sources, evaluate differing perspectives and embrace ambiguity, setting her up well for a career in the courtroom. In her spare time, Angela enjoys staying active as a keen tramper and social sport participant.

Fighting Beyond Empire: Analysing the extent to which the early twentieth-century infant welfare movement was simply a movement to promote breeding for Empire.

Angela Black

The beginning of the twentieth-century saw what historians have come to call the infant welfare movement sweep across Britain, the United States and other Western nations alike. The movement was marked by increased concern over infant mortality and health. It involved new laws to improve conditions of infancy and childbirth, as well as increased education for mothers and the promotion of “scientific motherhood,” which can be broadly defined as “the belief that women required expert scientific and medical advice to raise their children healthfully.”¹ While historians agree on the existence of such a movement in the early twentieth-century, there is some debate as to what the key motivations of the movement’s advocates were. One explanation is that the movement was intended to promote the idea of “breeding for Empire,” sparked by pronatalist and eugenic concerns over the quality and quantity of a population fighting in various wars for the nation and empire. This essay will assess the extent to which such claims are accurate. Ultimately, it will argue that although

¹ Rima Apple, ‘Constructing Mothers: Scientific Motherhood in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries’, *Social History of Medicine*, 8, 2, 1995, p. 1.

concerns over national efficiency were prevalent and likely contributed to the infant-welfare movement, it is overly simplistic to argue the movement's sole aim was to promote breeding for Empire. Many advocates of infant welfare in the early twentieth-century were aiming to promote and garner state support for causes which had long affected mothers and children.

To be sure, there is strong evidence that pronatalist concerns surrounding the importance of a healthy population for the building of empire contributed to the early twentieth-century infant welfare movement. As early as the mid nineteenth-century, the idea that a large and healthy population was required for imperialistic purposes was present in popular discourse; in 1858, for example, priest Charles Kingsley referred to "one of the noblest of duties" as being to help increase the English race given that "about four-fifths of the globe cannot be said to be as yet in any wise inhabited or cultivated."² It is therefore unsurprising that census data showing high infant mortality rates and low birth rates at the beginning of the twentieth-century caused widespread alarm.³ These concerns were exacerbated by a poor military performance in the Boer War of 1899-1902, as well as epidemics of infant diarrhoea during the summers of 1898-1900.⁴ Meanwhile, important figures in the public health service continued to make the link between infant health and Empire. In 1907, Medical

² Anna Davin, 'Imperialism and Motherhood', *History Today*, 5, 1978, p. 10.

³ Apple, 'Constructing Mothers,' p. 176.

⁴ Davin, 'Imperialism and Motherhood,' p. 5.

Officer of Health for Marylebone, Alexander Blyth noted “great concern to the nation that a sufficient number of children should annually be produced,” and stressed that the importance of preserving infant life was “even greater now than it was before the decline in birth rate.”⁵ It therefore appears that the importance of promoting breeding for Empire at least contributed to the infant welfare movement of the early twentieth century.

However, while the idea and language of breeding for Empire was certainly prevalent in the lead up to and during the infant welfare movement, the lack of popular support for eugenic policies suggests any claim that the infant welfare movement was solely to promote breeding for Empire is overstated. Eugenics, in its strictest sense, promoted sterilisation and detention of those deemed hereditarily unfit in order to produce a strong imperial race.⁶ It did win some support during the Boer War, when high proportions of recruits were failing to meet army standards.⁷ However, as noted by Dorothy Parker, attempts by eugenicist health reformers to influence policy-making in the early twentieth-century were met with opposition, including in the space of infant-welfare.⁸ In 1912, the Medical Officer of Health for Liverpool condemned supporters of eugenics, calling them “Malthusian cranks.”⁹ In

⁵ Davin, ‘Imperialism and Motherhood,’ p. 11.

⁶ Dorothy Porter, “‘Enemies of the Race’: Biologism, Environmentalism, and Public Health in Edwardian England’, *Victorian Studies*, 34, 2, 1991, p. 162.

⁷ *ibid.*, p. 161.

⁸ *ibid.*, p. 163.

⁹ *ibid.*, p.165.

1917, the Eugenics Education Society did have an exhibit at London Baby Week, a key event within the infant welfare movement; however, the exhibit received barely a passing comment by the organisers of Baby Week in their final report.¹⁰ Ultimately, advocates in the infant welfare space pushed a pronatalist rather than strictly eugenicist agenda.¹¹ While this point does not rule out the influence of the idea of breeding for Empire on the infant welfare movement, it does reveal that other factors, separate from the creation of a large and healthy race, also motivated advocates of the infant welfare movement.

Indeed, a detailed investigation into the organisation of the 1917 London Baby Week reveals that promoting breeding for Empire was not the sole motivator for all advocates of infant welfare.¹² As historian Linda Bryder expertly demonstrates, although the middle- and upper-class women who assumed leadership of this event utilised war rhetoric, they were not simply aiming to promote the breeding of the nation's infants. Instead, they were looking to raise awareness of and encourage state support for issues surrounding women's and children's welfare.¹³ These women used Baby Week to advocate causes about which they had long been passionate, including substandard housing, inadequate working-class incomes and the plights of

¹⁰ Linda, Bryder, 'Mobilising Motherhood: The 1917 National Baby Week,' *Medical History*, 63, 1, 2019, p. 11.

¹¹ Porter, "'Enemies,'" p. 170.

¹² Bryder, 'Mobilising Motherhood.'

¹³ *ibid.*, p. 2

unmarried mothers and illegitimate children.¹⁴ For example, Dorothea Irving, an executive member of the Baby Week Council, had long been running educational evenings on the effects of bad housing conditions on infants.¹⁵ Such education continued during Baby Week, when a room from a slum dwelling was reconstructed and displayed alongside an identical room which had been “made habitable by the exercise of thrift and ingenuity.”¹⁶ It therefore appears that for Irving, and other organisers of Baby Week, the infant-welfare movement was about more than just promoting breeding for Empire. While war rhetoric abounded during the week, the organisers commandeered this language to raise awareness and gain support for causes which had long been affecting women and children.

The organisers of the 1917 Baby Week in London were not the only ones in the early twentieth-century advocating infant welfare for reasons beyond promoting breeding for Empire. The infant welfare movement also swept through the United States, where the creation of the Children’s Bureau in 1912 saw issues of infant welfare enter government.¹⁷ According to historian Molly Ladd-Taylor, large numbers of men failing army physicals also generated a lot of anxiety in the United States.¹⁸ Chief of the Children’s Bureau, Julia Lathrop, took advantage of this anxiety to gain

¹⁴ Bryder, ‘Mobilising Motherhood,’ npp. 15-18.

¹⁵ *ibid.*, 16.

¹⁶ *ibid.*, p. 11.

¹⁷ Molly Ladd-Taylor, *Mother-Work: Women, Child Welfare, and the State, 1890-1930*, Urbana, 1995, p. 74.

¹⁸ *ibid.*, p. 89.

support for her child health campaign.¹⁹ However, Lathrop was in fact herself against the war. She and the other heads of the Children's Bureau were instead promoting infant welfare for reasons more closely aligned to those of the London Baby Week organisers.²⁰ Lathrop had spent over twenty years living at Hull-House, a settlement house for the poor in Chicago, where she saw the effects of poverty on women and children.²¹ Additionally, many of the members of the Children's Bureau, including Lathrop, had family members who had died in infancy.²² As such, in publishing and distributing child-rearing literature, the Children's Bureau aimed to provide women with up-to-date-knowledge of child care, believing this would lead them to "demand better health care, food and housing."²³ Notably, the fact that these child-rearing manuals became best sellers before the war had properly taken off suggests mothers were genuinely seeking them out to improve the welfare of themselves and their families.²⁴ In other words, both the Children's Bureau and those reading their publications were in fact concerned with the welfare of women and children, not the lack of recruits for war.

To conclude, the infant welfare movement of the early twentieth-century was to some extent motivated by the belief that a larger and stronger population was

¹⁹ Ladd-Taylor, *Mother-Work*, p. 84.

²⁰ *ibid.*

²¹ *ibid.*, p. 78.

²² *ibid.*, p. 82.

²³ *ibid.*, p. 83.

²⁴ *ibid.*, p. 84.

needed to fight for their Empire. In Britain, ideas surrounding the importance of a nation's population for imperial growth had been present in popular discourse since the mid nineteenth-century. Infant mortality, diarrhoea epidemics and humiliation in the Boer War therefore appeared to threaten the nation. Meanwhile, in the United States, large numbers of men failing their army physicals during World War I caused great anxiety. However, the failure of the eugenics movement to gain popular traction, and focus instead on pronatalist policies, suggests it is overly simplistic to claim that the infant welfare movement was solely intended to promote breeding for Empire. Instead, several groups, including the organisers of Baby Week in London and the Children's Bureau in the United States, took advantage of the anxiety created by war to raise awareness for and promote state support on issues which had long plagued mothers and children, such as inadequate housing. Ultimately, therefore, the infant welfare movement was only to some extent a movement to promote breeding for Empire. It was also a movement fought *beyond* Empire, by women aiming to genuinely promote and gain popular support for better conditions for mothers and children.

Bibliography

Apple, Rima, 'Constructing Mothers: Scientific Motherhood in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,' *Social History of Medicine*, 8, 2, 1995, pp. 161-178.

Bryder, Linda, 'Mobilising Motherhood: The 1917 National Baby Week,' *Medical History*, 63, 1, 2019, pp. 2-23.

Davin, Anna, 'Imperialism and Motherhood,' *History Today*, 5, 1978, pp. 9-66.

Ladd-Taylor, Molly, *Mother-Work: Women, Child Welfare, and the State, 1890-1930*, Urbana, 1995.

Porter, Dorothy, "'Enemies of the Race": Biologism, Environmentalism, and Public Health in Edwardian England,' *Victorian Studies*, 34, 2, 1991, pp. 159-178

Emily Klaver*History 270: Ireland since 1798*

Emily Klaver is a third-year arts student in Music and English Literature. Inspired by the works of great writers such as Virginia Woolf and Patti Smith, she has a penchant for cultural histories, particularly the artistic and literary movements that emerged from twentieth-century cities. Her fascination lies in how urban spaces, as cultural incubators, contributed to the immense social and political reform that defined the industrial twentieth-century. As such, she often explores the intersections between culture, the self, and the state, with a particular focus on how women's experiences were influenced by—and helped to shape—these cultural shifts.

The Banshee in the Attic: Designing (and Controlling) the Irish Woman Through State Policy in Mid-Twentieth Century Ireland, c.1930-1970.

Emily Klaver

Just a decade on from the formation of the Irish Free State, the 1930s saw the first of several attempts by the Irish government to control and contradict women's freedoms. While Irish women won the vote in 1922, the several-decades following were marred by restrictive policy and a distorted social perception of womanhood. In terms of Irish history, the period of 1930-1970 is significant for several reasons. Firstly, after winning independence from the British Empire in 1922, the 1930s was a period of both reformation and regression for Ireland's national identity. Irish independence also saw the Catholic church expand in power, after being oppressed under British rule. Such were the conditions that modern Irish womanhood was founded on, and such are the conditions that this essay takes interest in: who was the ideal Irish woman, how was she created, and how did she change throughout this period?

Catholic Influence on State Policy

The early to mid-twentieth century saw the Catholic church become an inextricable

presence in Irish life.¹ The devotional revolution during the previous century meant that organised religion was emphasised as a central part of Irish nationhood.² Alongside this more vigilant approach to religion was an increase in the church's influence (and control) over Irish life.³ High mass attendance created an opportunity for the church to invigilate religious education which, in turn, created significant hegemony within the population.⁴ This was, evidently, a sound strategy. Catholic morality, or what was named 'public morality,' seemed, for the majority of Ireland, to align with the version of morality they had learnt.⁵ Therefore, the government was essentially free to write Catholic morality into the law, while being met with little disapprobation (although, this is not to say there was none).⁶ As a result, the church's influence in this time was both more prevalent and more profound in shaping the Irish experience than ever before.⁷

The question of how the church influenced policy has been one of keen interest for historians. In his writing on the 1937 revision of the Irish Constitution, Roger Sawyer grapples with one particular appendage—that, for all citizens, the freedom of

¹ Daithí Ó Corráin, 'Catholicism in Ireland, 1880–2015: Rise, Ascendancy and Retreat,' in Thomas Bartlett, ed, *Cambridge History of Ireland: Volume 4, 1880 to the present*, New York, 2018, pp. 726–764.

² Emmet Larken, 'The Devotional Revolution in Ireland, 1850–75,' *The American Historical Review*, 77, 3, 1972, p. 1.

³ *ibid.*

⁴ Evelyn Mahon, 'Women's Rights and Catholicism in Ireland,' *New Left Review*, 0, 166, 1987, p. 54.

⁵ *ibid.*

⁶ Caitriona Beaumont, 'Women, Citizenship and Catholicism in the Irish Free State, 1922–1948,' *Women's History Review*, 6, 4, 1997, p. 571.

⁷ *ibid.*

conscience and religious practice should be conditional on an adherence to the aforementioned “public order and morality.”⁸ As Sawyer interjects, the definition of “public ... morality” is a tenuous one.⁹ Indeed, the belief that there can be any single “public ... morality” is certainly contentious, and the belief that there could, in a predominantly Catholic Ireland, be an entirely secular “public ... morality” is perhaps even more litigious.¹⁰ As written by G. W. Hogan, the Irish free state was only “formally nonsectarian”; although Irish policy during this time was not created explicitly on the basis of Catholic ideology, the high demographic of Irish Catholics and the significant ties between the church and Irish nationalism meant that the church and state were effectively inseparable.¹¹ Catholic notions of traditional femininity were, therefore, firmly ingrained in what was considered to be (in the post-independence era) the consummate Irish woman.

The Angel of the House: Modelling Irish Womanhood Post-Independence

As Irish life placed an increasing emphasis on traditionalism, the nation’s model of womanhood saw a new design. In accordance with the Catholic conception that women should be “complementary” to men, the role of the woman in 1930s Ireland

⁸ Roger Sawyer, *‘We Are But Women’: Women in Ireland’s History*, London, 1993, p. 102.

⁹ *ibid.*

¹⁰ *ibid.*

¹¹ G. W. Hogan, ‘Law and Religion: Church-State Relations in Ireland from Independence to the Present Day,’ *The American Journal of Comparative Law*, 35, 1, 1987, p. 50.

was (more than before) within the domestic sphere.¹² While certain aspects of women's lives saw greater liberation—such as in political franchise—the general assertion of women as domestic creatures had become more austere.¹³ In other words, while the ideal of the Irish woman as 'the angel of the house' was not new, this era saw it enforced within both social and legislative channels. Regardless of their function with the Irish Catholic narrative, the lives of Irish women from the 1930s were kept extremely narrow. Excluded from the public sphere, women were expected to be subservient and, to some degree, hidden.¹⁴ This model seemed to propose women as icons of a new Ireland—objects who could be venerated (or despised)—rather than individuals who could, themselves, contribute to society in a meaningful way.

There was a widely used narrative (created by the Catholic church) that, through a 'return' to traditionalism, the nation could revert to its Gaelic roots.¹⁵ Maryann Valiulus exposes this myth in her article "Neither Feminist Nor Flapper: The Ecclesiastical Construction of the Ideal Irish Woman". She writes that "the construction of the ideal Irish Catholic woman, which church leaders claimed was in keeping with the tradition of the ancient Gaelic State, in reality took its lead more from

¹² Mahon, 'Women's Rights and Catholicism in Ireland,' p. 56.

¹³ *ibid.*

¹⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 53-56.

¹⁵ Maryann Valiulus, 'Neither Feminist Nor Flapper: The Ecclesiastical Construction of the Ideal Irish Woman,' in Mary O'Dowd and Sabine Wichert, eds., *Chattel, Servant or Citizen? Women's Status in Church, State and Society*, Belfast, 1995, p. 168.

papal encyclicals.”¹⁶ In other words, the traditionalism imposed upon Irish women in twentieth-century Ireland was, above all, a Catholic invention. It is important to note that the idea of traditionalism as something restorative was one that pandered to Irish nationalism. The desire for identity was one that supplanted all else.¹⁷

Women in traditional roles also held the important responsibility of cultural replication; as the caregiver, the woman was to instil good Irish values in the next generation, making her both a valuable tool and a terrible threat to the nation.¹⁸ Historian Daithí Ó Corráin writes that “once women were able to access alternative sources of power through the workplace and public life, a central pillar of the Church’s ideological control was removed.”¹⁹ Valiulis furthers this point, writing, “any attempt by women to leave their domestic confines would wreak havoc not only on the home but on the nation as well.”²⁰ Fear of this “havoc” was perhaps what led the Irish public to elect Fianna Fáil and Eamon de Valera, despite the fact that Irish nationalism was, originally, a fairly progressive movement.²¹ As Sawyer notes, de Valera offered “a bastion of sound traditional values.”²² The culture of traditionalism that emerged post-independence was a reaction to the instability that the nation had endured for

¹⁶ Valiulis, ‘Neither Feminist Nor Flapper,’ p. 168.

¹⁷ Brian Girvin, ‘The Republicanisation of Irish Society, 1932-48’, in J. R. Hill, ed., *A New History of Ireland: VII, Ireland 1921-1984*, New York, 2003, p. 138.

¹⁸ Ó Corráin, ‘Catholicism in Ireland,’ p. 742.

¹⁹ *ibid.*

²⁰ Valiulis, ‘Neither Feminist Nor Flapper,’ p. 169.

²¹ Mary Cullen, ‘Women, Emancipation, and Politics, 1860-1984’, in J. R. Hill, ed., *A New History of Ireland: VII, Ireland 1921-1984*, New York, 2003, p. 871.

²² Sawyer, ‘We Are But Women’, p. 101.

several centuries prior and is what bound the Irish woman so tightly to the nation's identity.²³ By confining women to the home, they would become, for a confused nation, a source of equanimity.²⁴

In any regard, the lives of Irish women in the mid-twentieth century were defined, not by what they were, but by what they were *supposed* to be. Evolving ideas of home were well represented by the image of the domestic woman. This sentiment is maybe best expressed in the plain words of Valiulis: "the ideal Irish Catholic woman was pure and good."²⁵ Following the 1932 election and Fianna Fáil's rise to power, 1935 saw "the sale and importation of birth control devices" written into the Criminal Act.²⁶ That same year, de Valera's government introduced legislation that barred women from the workplace.²⁷ Later, the 1937 constitution rather explicitly stated women's place as "within the home," and placed a complete ban on divorce.²⁸ These policies would govern the lives of Irish women for decades. Married women could not work in the public sector until 1973; contraception was not legally available in Ireland until the Family Planning Act of 1978; marital rape was not criminalised until 1990, and it was not until 1996 that divorce was finally legalised.²⁹

²³ Sawyer, 'We Are But Women', p. 101.

²⁴ *ibid.*

²⁵ Valiulis, 'Neither Feminist Nor Flapper,' p. 153.

²⁶ Beaumont, 'Women, Citizenship and Catholicism,' p. 571.

²⁷ Sawyer, 'We Are But Women', p. 101.

²⁸ *ibid.*, p. 104.

²⁹ Cullen, 'Women, Emancipation, and Politics,' pp. 885-887.

It is worth noting that the enforcement of traditional family structures specifically relied on policy that controlled the lives and bodies of women—not of men. While men were integral to upholding the other ‘side’—economics, politics, public life—policy did not infringe on their freedoms nor was their manhood contingent on their compliance.³⁰ Women were, therefore, positioned as central to the Irish identity in a way that men were not. It was “more than just a glorification of motherhood,” Valiulis writes—it was “a sanctification of the cult of domesticity.”³¹ Women’s actions, their proclivities, and their transgressions stood as the central interests of this “cult”; what women were, and more importantly, what women could and could not be, were subject to control.³²

Sex, Sin, and Shame: Family Planning and a Culture of Control

Just as women’s purity was revered, women’s *impurity* was rebuked. As put by Clara Fischer in “Gender, Nation, and the Politics of Shame,” women’s bodies had the “capacity to be harbingers of a failure to live up to the new national identity.”³³ In cases where Ireland’s ideal woman was *only* an ideal, policy was in place to correct—or conceal—women’s indiscretions. Well before the dawn of Irish independence was the invention of one of the nation’s greatest shames: the Magdalene Asylums, or the

³⁰ Valiulis, ‘Neither Feminist Nor Flapper,’ p. 170.

³¹ *ibid.*

³² *ibid.*

³³ Clara Fischer, ‘Gender, Nation, and the Politics of Shame,’ *Signs*, 41, 4, 2016, p. 834.

Magdalene Laundries.³⁴ In the spirit of their namesake, Mary Magdalene, the asylums began as a philanthropic mission for women, by women.³⁵ However, by the 1930s, the asylums had become institutions for containing and punishing female transgression.³⁶ Women in these asylums were subjected to difficult, physical work and were, in every way, stripped of their dignity.³⁷

The asylums were just one way the state censored female transgression. Another was in the suppression of the Carrigan Report. In 1930, the government enacted and appointed the Carrigan committee to address some of the issues faced by women in Irish society.³⁸ The committee eventually produced the Carrigan Report, which included suggestions on how the nation should broach various issues—prostitution, child abuse, the age of consent, contraception—in the post-independence era.³⁹ While their recommendations did not all pass through parliament, the Carrigan Report brought attention to women's issues, many of which would be addressed (to the extremes) in later legislation.⁴⁰ This included, most notably, the 1935 ban on contraception. The Carrigan Report is contentious, however, for the way in which it was suppressed.⁴¹ Very few of the Committee's findings were

³⁴ Cullen, 'Women, Emancipation, and Politics,' p. 828.

³⁵ *ibid.*

³⁶ Fischer, 'Gender, Nation, and the Politics of Shame,' p. 827.

³⁷ *ibid.*

³⁸ Finola Kennedy, 'The Suppression of the Carrigan Report: A Historical Perspective on Child Abuse,' *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review*, 89, 356, 2000, p. 354.

³⁹ *ibid.*, pp. 354-356.

⁴⁰ *ibid.*, p. 359.

⁴¹ Kennedy, 'The Suppression of the Carrigan Report,' pp. 358-362.

made available to the public and, as Finola Kennedy points out in “The Suppression of the Carrigan Report: A Historical Perspective on Child Abuse,” we have no way to know to what extent public opinion was based in crude, uninformed logic.⁴²

Moving into the 1960s, the bare bones of second-wave feminism began to emerge in Ireland.⁴³ While there were small improvements in state policy, there had been palpable shifts in public opinion.⁴⁴ 1967 saw birth control introduced under the guise of a “cycle regulator.”⁴⁵ While these cycle regulators were not supported by the church, they were not as objectionable as contraceptive pills so took up a sort of morally grey area.⁴⁶ While this was a significant stride in terms of Irish women’s access to contraception, it is important to realise that these cycle regulators were generally only accessible to women from the middle-class (or higher), and were only ever prescribed to married women.⁴⁷ For single women, the stigma surrounding contraceptives and sexuality were very much still alive.⁴⁸

At large, legislation sought to enforce what Valiulis describes as “the traditional Madonna/Eve split”; women were either ‘good’ or ‘bad,’ morally intact or fallen.⁴⁹ And, while women’s transgressions were punished, they were even more so concealed.

⁴² Kennedy, ‘The Suppression of the Carrigan Report,’ p. 362.

⁴³ Laura Kelly, ‘The Contraceptive Pill in Ireland c.1964–79: Activism, Women and Patient–Doctor Relationships’, *Medical History*, 64, 2, 2020.

⁴⁴ *ibid.*

⁴⁵ *ibid.*

⁴⁶ *ibid.*

⁴⁷ *ibid.*

⁴⁸ *ibid.*

⁴⁹ Valiulis, ‘Neither Feminist Nor Flapper,’ p. 170.

There was a real sense of importance in upholding the Irish ideal within the public sphere, and as such, the nation's shames were relegated to secrecy.⁵⁰ Like the fictional archetype of the madwoman in the attic, female transgressors in Ireland were too confined to an attic-like place— somewhere where they could not be seen, heard, or understood by the public. Whether this be within the institution of marriage and motherhood, or someplace more severe, such as the Magdalen Laundries, women who could not (or would not) surmount the expectations upon them were granted no place in Irish society.

Freedom in Ireland was not freedom for all. The period of 1930-1970 saw a redefinition of Irish nationhood through the enforcement of a traditional femininity. This era witnessed the enactment of laws that not only fortified patriarchal structures but also intensely subjected women to institutionalised control and shame. The influence of the Catholic Church in early to mid-twentieth century Ireland left an indelible mark on the nation's social fabric and was instrumental in shaping gender roles and policies post-independence. In framing the Irish woman within the narrow confines of domesticity, she became a piece of Irish nationhood. While twentieth century Ireland centred upon the rapture of liberation, it was not until its end when Irish women too enjoyed the glory of independence. And while the Irish woman was

⁵⁰ Girvin, 'Republicanisation,' p. 138.

almost mythically entwined with this liberation, she herself was not yet a full citizen, and Irish nationhood was not yet a piece of her.

Bibliography

Beaumont, Caitriona, 'Women, Citizenship and Catholicism in the Irish Free State, 1922-1948,' *Women's History Review*, 6,4, 1997, pp. 563-585.

Cullen, Mary 'Women, Emancipation, and Politics, 1860-1984,' in J. R. Hill, ed., *A New History of Ireland: VII, Ireland 1921-1984*, New York, 2003, pp. 827-891.

Fischer, Clara, 'Gender, Nation, and the Politics of Shame,' *Signs*, 41, 4, 2016, pp. 821-843.

Girvin, Brian, 'The Republicanisation of Irish Society, 1932-48,' in J. R. Hill, ed., *A New History of Ireland: VII, Ireland 1921-1984*, New York, 2003, pp. 127-160.

Hogan, G. W., 'Law and Religion: Church-State Relations in Ireland from Independence to the Present Day,' *The American Journal of Comparative Law*, 35, 1, 1987, pp. 47-96.

Kelly, Laura, 'The Contraceptive Pill in Ireland c.1964-79: Activism, Women and Patient-Doctor Relationships,' *Medical History*, 64, 2, 2020, pp. 195-218.

Kennedy, Finola, 'The Suppression of the Carrigan Report: A Historical Perspective on Child Abuse,' *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review*, 89, 356, 2000, pp. 354-363.

Larken, Emmet, 'The Devotional Revolution in Ireland, 1850-75,' *The American Historical Review*, 77, 3, 1972, pp. 625-652.

Mahon, Evelyn, 'Women's Rights and Catholicism in Ireland,' *New Left Review*, 0, 166, 1987, pp. 53-77.

Ó Corráin, Daithí, 'Catholicism in Ireland, 1880- 2015: Rise, Ascendancy and Retreat,' in Thomas Bartlett, ed, *Cambridge History of Ireland: Volume 4, 1880 to the present*, New York, 2018, pp. 726-764.

Sawyer, Roger, 'We Are But Women': *Women in Ireland's History*, London, 1993.

Valiulis, Maryann, 'Neither Feminist Nor Flapper: The Ecclesiastical Construction of the Ideal Irish Woman,' in Mary O'Dowd and Sabine Wichert, eds., *Chattel, Servant or Citizen? Women's Status in Church, State and Society*, Belfast, 1995, pp. 168-178.



Sabine Edmonds*History 108: The Rise and Fall of the USA*

Sabine is a second-year LLB/BA student who loves broad-scale history. She is interested in untold narratives and how societal attitudes change over time. Sabine has a morbid obsession with US politics and enjoys incorporating this into historical study. Her secret love is Ancient Roman political history. Outside of university, she loves her elderly cat, making travel plans, and forcing her friends to listen to her rants on current affairs.

To Capture a Word like Freedom: Change and Conflict in Visions of American Freedom, 1775-1865.

Sabine Edmonds

“Freedom has always been a terrain of conflict,” Eric Foner writes.¹ Like hot metal under the blacksmith’s hammer, freedom has been shaped by a never-ending series of dissenting opinions to accommodate centuries of societal development. The notion of freedom moulded around the Market Revolution in the United States at the turn of the 18th century, sending the Northern and Southern states down opposing paths. By 1861, the contrasts in Northern and Southern freedom were so stark that they could no longer co-exist under the same governance. From the American Civil War 1861-1865 came a new vision of freedom. This new concept of freedom held convictions of the right to freedom by birthright, colourblind freedom and equality for all races before the war. This would set a foundation upon which future marginalised groups would confront systemic unfreedom as the Abolitionists did for enslaved Americans, changing the socio-political landscape of the United States forever.

Foner’s theory of freedom’s meanings and boundaries being shaped by conflict is exemplified by the Revolutionary War and the transformative definitions of freedom which emerged from it. The definitions of freedom set out by the Founding Fathers through the establishment of the United States are the integral foundation

¹ Eric Foner, *The Story of American Freedom*, 1st edition, New York, 1999, p. 15.

which later debates over freedom have continually referred to, producing countless interpretations. The Revolutionary period's definition of freedom as "a communal right to political self-determination," self governance and the glorification of small producers is rooted in political clashes between the British government and the States.² Increasing economic restrictions on the States, such as the Stamp Act of 1765, along with tyrannical behaviour by the British, escalated into the Revolutionary War. George Robert Twelves Hewes, for example, describes being moved to revolutionary action by the "usurpation and tyranny of Great Britain" after witnessing multiple violent atrocities committed by British soldiers in Boston.³ Revolutionaries rebelled against the British aristocratic social hierarchy, which fuelled imperial power and, by extension, British tyranny in the United States. The Declaration of Independence sets out this vision, stating that "all men are created equal" and that all men have an unalienable right to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." Evidently, the meaning of freedom for white Americans in the revolutionary period was their newfound communal freedom from imperial rule and every man's ability to achieve his purpose rather than the British model of living the life one is born into.

The boundaries of such a seemingly expansive definition of freedom are an integral note. From its birth, the definition of American freedom was divided along

² Foner, *The Story of American Freedom*, p. 17.

³ Alfred F. Young, 'George Robert Twelves Hughes (1741-1840) A Boston Shoemaker and the Memory of the American Revolution', in Frederick M. Binder and David M. Reimers, eds., *The Way We Lived: Essays and Documents in American Social History*, Vol. 1, 4th edition, New York, 2000, p. 125.

lines of sex and race. Women, for example, were notably excluded from the liberty achieved through independence as highlighted in Abigail Adams' letters to her husband John Adams, where she accuses the founding fathers of hypocrisy as they oppress women while proclaiming the United States a land of freedom and equality.⁴ Native and African peoples further faced the harshest exclusion from revolutionary liberty. Native Americans faced the negative result of American expansionism, which the British had attempted to contain, and enslaved Africans were now at the will of a government more dependent on slavery than Britain, which would withdraw from the slave trade in 1807. These foundations were transformed upon until the Civil War, when notions of equality, personal liberty and economic freedom would experience a revival.

As the newly established United States headed into the 19th century, the Market Revolution transformed the nation, polarising the North and South so fiercely that their definitions of freedom became irreconcilable. Urban centres developed along the Eastern Seaboard. Improved rail networks created an efficient goods transportation system concentrated in the North. Factories created a working class and a producer class, now producing unprecedented commodities to be distributed domestically and internationally. The South was less modernised by the new market.

⁴ Charles Francis Adams, *Familiar Letters of John Adams and His Wife Abigail During the Revolution*, Boston, 1875, in Frederick M. Binder and David M. Reimers, eds., *The Way We Lived: Essays and Documents in American Social History*, Vol. 1, 4th edition, New York, 2000, pp. 124-125.

Their biggest change was an increase in demand for raw materials like cotton. These were produced through enslaved labour on plantations, leading to the Westward Expansion. Native Americans were deported from their ancestral lands so planters could turn their fertile land into plantations.⁵ Slave-holders who took advantage of this market boom to create vast enslaved cotton empires skyrocketed their wealth, and developed a cohesive economy with the North.

Thus, the meanings of freedom diverged geographically. In the industrial North, freedom was defined by one's ownership of self, the ability to enjoy the fruits of one's labour, and economic mobility. Alternatively, the plantation economy dominated Southern social structure. Planters held a vast amount of power within Southern society, putting planters at the top of the hierarchy while slaves occupied the mass bottom of the order. In response to anti-slavery rhetoric, planters began to advocate slavery as a net good rather than a necessary evil.⁶ This meant that freedom, distinctly white and male, was rooted in one's ability to own property and achieve economic success through the utilisation of that property. For white planters, that property included enslaved human beings, and thus white Southern freedom operated on Black unfreedom. This paradoxical dichotomy persists throughout the narrative of American freedom, across boundaries of race, class and sex. The conflicting interests

⁵ Walter Johnson, 'Human Property Bought and Sold,' in Frederick M. Binder and David M. Reimers, eds., *The Way We Lived: Essays and Documents in American Social History*, Vol. 1, 4th edition, New York, 2000, p. 250.

⁶ Binder & Reimers, *The Way We Lived*, p. 246.

of Southern plantation elites, Northern free-soil advocates, and the more radical Abolitionists clashed in the lead-up to the Civil War, creating vividly differing definitions of freedom.

The ideological relationship between the inherent unfreedom in slavery and white Southerners' definitions of freedom is exemplified in the suppression of the Abolition movement. The Gag Rule of 1836 postponed all petitions on slavery without the opportunity for Abolitionists to present their case. As an undeniable breach of the Constitution's First Amendment, this law marks a restrictive shift in the boundaries of freedom since the Revolutionary Era. Without a looming empire, economic freedom through the slave trade had vastly overtaken concern for basic civil protections against the government.

Freedoms defined in the Constitution like Freedom of Speech and Freedom to Assemble were taken from Abolitionists who performed peaceful demonstrations and published pamphlets. Further, Abolitionists experienced significant violence, including the burning of Abolitionist literature, disruption of Abolitionist meetings, arson and murder. Pennsylvania Hall was destroyed in 1838, when anti-Abolitionists threw rocks through the windows of the hall holding Abolitionist meetings and later burnt the hall to the ground. The Abolitionist movement posed a meaning of freedom that brought enslaved Americans within its boundaries by birthright, giving them the right to pursue their personal ambitions without being at the mercy of any other

person. Ultimately, this contrast in perspective, described by confederate soldiers as “the bonds of tyranny” and a threat to “inestimable and boundless rights,” would fuel secession as the Lincoln-led government opposed expansion of slavery.⁷ The universalist definition of freedom which dominated after the Civil War was, then, set by Abolitionists rather than the Founding Fathers, despite the universalistic language of the founding documents.⁸

From the bloody haze of the Civil War came a new birth of freedom. The efforts of Abolitionist activists to force slavery into focus resulted in the direct address of slavery as the key issue of American freedom. Birthright citizenship and a colourblind legal system became critical attributes of American freedom as a result of the antislavery struggle, the work of which would be revived in the 1960s when Black Civil Rights re-emerged into the forefront of the American consciousness.⁹ Through revolutionising the establishment of a slavery state in the American Revolution, or the many laws created to uphold the slave economy in the United States throughout the early 19th century, slavery was an issue ruled on in no uncertain terms. The grassroots impact of abolition set a precedent for American freedom as being wrestled for by excluded groups, setting the stage for the oncoming Women’s Suffrage movement. From the communal liberty of independence, to the economic

⁷ James M. McPherson, *What They Fought For, 1861-1865*, Baton Rouge, 1994, p. 9.

⁸ Foner, *The Story of American Freedom*, p. 10.

⁹ *ibid.*, p. 11.

prosperity of the Market Revolution, past the universal birthright decided in the civil war, the meanings and boundaries of freedom in the United States continue to develop. The vitality of these debates are unfaded by time. In the current polarised American political climate, it is crucial that we continue to trace how definitions and inclusions of freedom change.

Bibliography

Adams, Charles Francis, *Familiar Letters of John Adams and His Wife Abigail During the Revolution*, Boston, 1875, in Frederick M. Binder and David M. Reimers, eds., *The Way We Lived: Essays and Documents in American Social History*, Vol. 1, 4th edition, New York, 2000, pp. 124-125.

Foner, Eric, *The Story of American Freedom*, 1st edition, New York, 1999.

Johnson, Walter, 'Human Property Bought and Sold,' in Frederick M. Binder and David M. Reimers, eds., *The Way We Lived: Essays and Documents in American Social History*, Vol. 1, 4th edition, New York, 2000, pp. 247-254.

McPherson, James M., *What They Fought For, 1861-1865*, Baton Rouge, 1994.

Young, Alfred F., 'George Robert Twelves Hughes (1741-1840) A Boston Shoemaker and the Memory of the American Revolution,' in Frederick M. Binder and David M. Reimers, eds., *The Way We Lived: Essays and Documents in American Social History*, Vol. 1, 4th edition, New York, 2000, pp. 113-123.

Maia Hunter*History 107: Titiro Whakamuri: Histories of Aotearoa New Zealand*

I'm Maia and, unsurprisingly, I'm passionate about history. Years of making my brother watch Horrible Histories and my endless patience for historically (in)accurate war movies are indicative of this. I also love film and music, reading, and I can't stay in a city without visiting at least one art gallery. I study law and love to write and talk (fittingly), and the art that I spend so much time-consuming influences both the way I write and how I speak. The easiest way of getting to know me is by looking at my Letterbox. That says enough.

“Lest We Forget”: But Whose Stories Do We Remember?

Maia Hunter

25 April, 1915, marked the landing of 30,000 Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) troops at Gallipoli Peninsula. 25 April, 2024, marks the 109th year that Aotearoa New Zealand has commemorated Anzac Day and the 2,799 New Zealanders who lost their lives at Gallipoli.¹

Hosted at the Auckland War Memorial Museum, the annual Dawn Service reflects the significance that the Auckland community attributes to Anzac Day. Nationally and locally, New Zealanders have made the choice to honour and remember the soldiers who fell at Gallipoli for 109 years. For this reason, the famous line “lest we forget” from Rudyard Kipling’s poem *Recessional* has become firmly associated with Anzac Day remembrance.² Yet, it raises an interesting question: whose histories do we choose to commemorate, and whose do we allow ourselves to forget?

28 October is our national day of commemoration for Te Pūtake o te Riri, He Rā Maumahara – the New Zealand Wars.³ How many of us Aucklanders are aware of

¹ Katie Pickles, ‘New Lessons on Old Wars: Keeping Complex Story of Anzac Day Relevant in 21st Century,’ *RNZ*, 24 April 2023.

² Rudyard Kipling, *Recessional*, 1897.

³ Dylan Owen, ‘28 October and the New Zealand Wars,’ 2019, National Library.

this? Why is Rā Maumahara not bestowed the same significance in our community as Anzac Day?

History is how we understand the past, a window into it. A window that has been built and framed to present specific stories to New Zealanders. Our commemoration of Anzac Day is an example of this. In 1916, on the first anniversary of the Dardanelles campaign, the Auckland Board of Education issued a letter to schools that asserted the “importance of the day and what it means to New Zealand.”⁴ The letter had Auckland students peek through a historical window that emphasised New Zealand’s place within the British Empire. It framed Anzac Day as standing for the “loyalty of the colonies ... and the freedom and liberty of the Empire.”⁵

“Freedom and liberty” under the British Empire is not a representative illustration of Aotearoa’s colonial history. Our patriotic sentiment toward Gallipoli that surfaces every 25 April should not obscure how the colonial empire has continuously undermined and assaulted Māori nationhood. Rā Maumahara should offer an important reminder of this. Atholl Anderson, Judith Binney, and Aroha Harris contend that the New Zealand Wars “scarred New Zealand permanently and left a strong sense of injustice among all of the iwi affected.”⁶ Particularly, the Waikato

⁴ ‘Anzac Day. Celebrations in Schools, Children’s Keen Interest,’ *New Zealand Herald*, 53, 16202, 12 April 1916, p. 9.

⁵ Rose Young, ‘The first Anzac Day,’ *Auckland War Memorial Museum - Tāmaki Paenga Hira*. 2016,

⁶ Atholl Anderson, Judith Binney, and Aroha Harris. *Tangata Whenua: A History*, Wellington, 2015.

tribes endured the raupatu – the confiscation of their fertile land, and thus their resources.⁷ Lest we forget this.

It would be misleading to claim that Anzac Day only commemorates Pākehā histories. Early in the First World War, pejorative colonial attitudes towards Indigenous peoples restricted Māori soldiers to garrison duty.⁸ However, the desperation at Gallipoli saw the contribution of a Māori Contingent, who hold an important place among the soldiers we commemorate on Anzac Day.⁹ But which Māori are we commemorating; whose stories are we uplifting?

Māori from Waikato-Tainui were more resistant to fighting alongside the British Army in the First World War.¹⁰ The forceful dispossession of their land in the aftermath of the New Zealand Wars was justified by accusing Waikato Māori of rebelling against the Crown. Come 1915, Waikato Māori—a people with their own King and whose country had been taken from them—were raided and arrested for refusing to fight for their coloniser’s version of “King and Country.”¹¹

Danny Keenan condemns 25 April as a “triumphal national day that erased our colonial past.”¹² While Anzac Day is certainly significant on a national and local scale, it is crucial to consider whose histories are being represented in our commemorations.

⁷ Anderson, Binney, and Harris, *Tangata Whenua*.

⁸ Manatū Taonga – Ministry for Culture and Heritage, ‘Māori Contingent at Gallipoli,’ *NZ History*, 2020.

⁹ *ibid.*

¹⁰ ‘Manatū Taonga – Ministry for Culture and Heritage, ‘Māori objection to conscription,’ *NZ History*, 2020.

¹¹ *ibid.*

¹² Danny Keenan, ‘The problems that remain with our telling of the New Zealand Wars,’ *Stuff*, 2019,

Rā Maumahara is a long way off from receiving the same recognition as Anzac Day, but our historical perspective and awareness is something that all New Zealanders can improve upon without delay. Because lest we forget the New Zealand Wars. Lest we forget the raupatu and its generational impact on Waikato Māori. Lest we forget.

Bibliography

Anderson, Atholl, Judith Binney, and Aroha Harris, *Tangata Whenua: A History*. Wellington, 2015.

‘Anzac Day. Celebrations in Schools, Children’s Keen Interest,’ *New Zealand Herald*, 53, 16202, 12 April 1916, p. 9.

Keenan, Danny, ‘The problems that remain with our telling of the New Zealand Wars,’ *Stuff*, 4 July 2019, available at <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/education/113955468/the-problems-that-remain-with-our-telling-of-the-new-zealand-wars>.

Kipling, Rudyard, *Recessional*, 1897.

Manatū Taonga – Ministry for Culture and Heritage, ‘Māori Contingent at Gallipoli,’ *NZ History*, 2020, available at <https://nzhistory.govt.nz/war/maori-in-first-world-war/native-contingent>.

Manatū Taonga – Ministry for Culture and Heritage, ‘Māori objection to conscription,’ *NZ History*, 2020, available at <https://nzhistory.govt.nz/war/first-world-war/conscientious-objection/maori-objection>.

Owen, Dylan, ‘28 October and the New Zealand Wars,’ National Library, 2019, available at <https://natlib.govt.nz/blog/posts/28-october-and-the-new-zealand-wars>.

Pickles, Katie, ‘New Lessons on Old Wars: Keeping Complex Story of Anzac Day Relevant in 21st Century,’ *RNZ*, 24 April 2023, available at <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/on-the-inside/488601/new-lessons-on-old-wars-keeping-complex-story-of-anzac-day-relevant-in-21st-century>.

Young, Rose, 'The first Anzac Day,' 2016, *Auckland War Memorial Museum - Tāmaki Paenga Hira*, available at <https://www.aucklandmuseum.com/discover/collections/topics/the-first-anzac-day>.

-Fin.