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INTRODUCTION

By Caitlin Abley

Regardless of whether they are studying the French Revolution, Mao Zedong, or medieval women, all History students become closely acquainted with one question over the course of their studies: ‘What are you going to do with your degree?’ This query emerges at family dinners, over the counter at part-time jobs, at catch-ups with friends from school, and with inquisitive strangers at bus stops. Alongside the ability to think critically and write fluently, History students must also learn how to justify their chosen field. In the age of neoliberalism, universities have become increasingly transactional environments. Students have become customers, exchanging large sums of money in return for a well-paid job at the end of their degrees. This model is antithetical to the study of History, which for centuries has been a realm in which students have sought knowledge for knowledge’s sake. As History students face growing pressure to prove the usefulness of their degrees, it is worth taking a moment to think about why we study the past, and what would happen if we didn’t.

In the process of editing this collection of exemplary student essays, I was struck by a passage quoted by Stage III student Caitlin Thomas in her essay on historical memory in Post-Mao China. In his book *Memory and History in East and Southeast Asia*, Gerrit W. Gong writes:

‘A nation’s history is not merely a recounting of its past. What individuals and countries remember and what they forget and why are telling indicators of current values, perceptions, even aspirations.’¹

¹ Gerrit W. Gong, *Memory and History in East and Southeast Asia*, Washington, D.C., 2001, p.26.

Our understanding of the past has an enormous impact on how we conduct ourselves in the present. In 2016, the term “post-truth” was chosen as the Oxford Dictionary’s Word of the Year. We are currently experiencing a world in which fact and truth are contested concepts; the study of History matters now more than ever. Historians can chart the past and explain to the public how we got to our current political, economic, social, and environmental climate. In the first essay in this collection, Stage I student Ashley Rutter writes about the “knitting” together of the social fabric of the United States. This metaphor transfers to the study of History in general. Historians examine how the past has been knit together; in doing so, we can identify the dropped stitches—the mistakes made—and hopefully use this information to improve the present.

The essays collected here demonstrate both the diversity of subjects taught within the discipline of History and the depth of knowledge achieved by its students. The collection opens with **Ashley Rutter’s** aforementioned essay on the development of American identity from 1776-1950. Rutter questions the veracity of Louis Brandeis’ claim, ‘Liberty has knit us together as Americans’, and presents a comprehensive survey of U.S. History through the metaphor of knitting. Rutter examines the experiences of Native Americans, women, and African Americans through the lens of ‘liberty’ and discovers the limits of freedom in America.

KDee Aimiti Ma’ia’i puts forth a sophisticated piece of work examining the intersection of understandings of race and civilisation in the United States of America and Aotearoa. This comparative study looks at the ways in which colonisers constructed ethnocentric, racialized hierarchies, and how Māori and Native American communities engaged with these colonial frameworks with agency and nuance in the face of colonialist goals of assimilation, integration, and at times, extinction.

At Stage II, **Emma O’Donnell** examines the place of samurai in the Tokugawa period, during which they were separated from their lands, forced to move to castle towns, and reformed as warrior-bureaucrats. O’Donnell engages with the idea that samurai suffered from “psychological poverty”, caused by increasing wants, as opposed to a decline in real income. O’Donnell concludes that samurai’s unpreparedness for modernisation, systematic exclusion from modern society, and an unnecessarily rigid social system ultimately ensured the fall of the Tokugawa regime.

Scott Yang comprehensively investigates the attempts made between the third and fifth centuries to unite the Catholic Church under one orthodox faith. Yang argues that the zealous beliefs of different religious sects made attempts at unity increasingly difficult, as various religious leaders sanctioned the use of coercive force for the sake of reforming non-conformists. Yang explores the brutal consequences of the paternalistic approach taken by Early Christians who employed violence in order to save the souls of dissenters.

Hugo Carnell's work on the eleventh-century Norman expansion from Normandy into Italy provides an excellent example to students writing primary source essays. Carnell analyses the *Deeds of Count Roger*, composed by the Benedictine monk Geoffrey Malaterra, interrogating the primary source for what it can tell readers about the Norman expansion and about the man who wrote it. Carnell uses the *Deeds* to examine the importance of individual leadership and cultural unity within the process of expansion.

At Stage III, **Caitlin Thomas** delves into the complex notion of historical memory. Thomas looks at the use of historical memory by the Post-Mao Chinese Communist Party, specifically in their Patriotic Education Campaign. Thomas examines the ways in which the CCP used historical memory to provide legitimacy, to develop nationalism, and to solidify power. This essay is a thought-provoking piece of work which encourages readers to consider the power of history in shaping political and social landscapes.

Eloise Sims deftly tackles historiographical debate in her essay on the 'White Australia' policy of 1901. Sims examines the perks and pitfalls of employing a transnational approach to studying this policy, looking at the circulation of ideas in the United States and throughout the British Empire which lead to restrictive immigration legislation within Australia. Sims tracks the spread of 'white man's anxiety' across the world, and unpacks the policy from a global perspective.

Beth Maynard writes an accomplished piece of work on capital, society, and the American national imagination in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era (GAPE). Maynard argues that this period, which ran from the mid-1870s to the end of World War I, saw the emergence of the United States as both "modern" and a "nation". Maynard presents an

exemplary examination of the notion of modernity, an elusive concept which comes up frequently in History courses.

At Honours level, **Kim Moore** demonstrates how subjectivity can be invited into history. He introduces his essay on Māori sporting engagement in post-WWII New Zealand with an anecdote from his own past. Moore engages with historiographical debate over whether sport was a site of assimilation, or a realm in which Māori culture and tradition were preserved. He draws from the magazine *Te Ao Hou* to gain insight into the importance of sport in maintaining tradition and Māoritanga in the second half of the twentieth century.

The essays gathered here can be used as models for students striving for excellence. Beyond this, they serve as excellent examples of why we study History—to gain insight into the experiences of humans across time and across the globe, and to hopefully gain empathy and understanding in the process.

HISTORY 108 | RISE AND FALL OF THE USA

By Ashley Rutter

A Stitch in Time Saves Nine: Liberty and America's 'Knitting', 1776 – 1950

In 1915 Louis Brandeis commented, ‘liberty has knit us closely together as Americans.’² This knitting analogy captures the complexity of forging an American identity and definition of freedom. Like America’s identity, knitting was pioneered by men, includes a variety of stitches and patterns, is multicoloured, and involves the intertwining of multiple threads. However, knitting can be difficult. Mistakes are easily made, such as a dropped stitch or missed knot. These mistakes have varying degrees of severity—the first can lead to the unravelling of one’s work, while the latter decreases its aesthetic appeal. Eric Foner understood liberty’s limits, writing in 1998 that ‘the boundaries of freedom have been as contested as the words definition itself.’³ Subsequently, the neglect and oppression of women, Native Americans and African Americans were dropped stitches in America’s knitting, which later resulted in the unravelling of America’s identity. The ostracism and mistreatment of these groups in events such as the American Revolution, slavery, Civil War, immigration and migration to the suburbs, left “ugly knots” in

² Eric Foner, *The Story of American Freedom*, New York, 1998, p.20.

³ *Ibid.*

America's history. In this essay, I will play on Brandeis' knitting analogy. I will argue for the absence of a universal definition of freedom, and maintain that while freedom and liberty united Americans, their acquisition resulted in an even greater division amongst and between white Americans and other ethnic groups.⁴

The American Revolution knitted white male Americans together under a unified cause of obtaining freedom from British subjugation.⁵ At the outset of the Revolution, 'the existence of marked class distinctions' were clearly visible.⁶ However, British taxes, trade regulations and stationing of troops in North America offended colonialists, uniting them in events such as the Boston Massacre of 1770, the Boston Tea Party in 1773, and the tarring and feathering of John Malcolm in 1774.⁷ The Revolution also temporarily unified white Americans and African Americans, indicating the first multicoloured thread in America's knitting. Lord Dunmore's 1775 Proclamation promised freedom to any slave who fought for Britain, forcing America to promise the same so as to prevent the loss of their labour-force.⁸ Approximately 5,000 African Americans served America in state militia, the Continental Army, and the Navy.⁹

While the prospect of freedom united Americans, the intent to limit freedom's acquisition subsequently divided them. Lord Dunmore's Ethiopian Regiment encouraged the enlistment of more than 800 slaves, creating disparity between African Americans and white slave owners.¹⁰ Division also occurred between Patriots, fighting for independence, and Loyalists, who opposed the cause.¹¹ The exclusion of women, evident through Abigail Adams' letter 'Remember the Ladies', and Native Americans, who are only mentioned on account of Patriot's dressing up to disguise themselves, indicates the boundaries and contested definitions of freedom.¹² At the conclusion of the Revolution,

⁴ Jeffrey A. Engel, *The Four Freedoms: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Evolution of an American Idea*, New York, 2015, p.1.

⁵ 'People at War: Society During the American Revolution', in Frederick M. Binder and David M. Reimers, eds., *The Way We Lived: Essays and Documents in American Social History*, Vol. 1, 4th ed., New York, 2000, p. 112.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid; Eric Foner, *Give Me Liberty: An American History*, New York; London, 2006, pp. 186-188.

⁸ Foner, *Give Me Liberty*, p.207.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ 'People at War', in Binder and Reimers, eds, *The Way We Lived*, p. 112.

¹² Ibid., pp.112-129.

American freedom consisted of mere plain and purl stitches: freedom extended to white American men alone.

Liberty for white Americans meant loss of liberty for Native Americans and African Americans; a dropped stitch in America's knitting. After the Revolution, Patriots believed their freedom included the freedom to obtain Native land.¹³ Thomas Jefferson wrote that driving Native Americans from Ohio would 'add to the Empire of Liberty an extensive and fertile country.'¹⁴ Comparatively, Native Americans defined freedom as the right to defend their independence and retain possession of their lands.¹⁵ Subsequently, the lack of a universal definition of freedom resulted in differing interpretations and enforcements of freedom. White enforcement of their freedom led to disunity and conflict between Native Americans and white Americans and highlighted freedom's contested boundaries. The freedom achieved in the Revolution would not include Native Americans, leaving a hole in America's identity.

The Civil War of 1850-1865 questioned the morality of slavery and divided Americans, leaving an "ugly knot" in America's history.¹⁶ The Declaration of Independence defined freedom as the right to 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.'¹⁷ However, while African Americans interpreted this as freedom from slavery and oppression and freedom to equal opportunity, white Southern Americans interpreted it as freedom to continue slavery. In his narrative and Fourth of July address, escaped slave Frederick Douglass highlighted the hypocrisy of America's constitution and fictitious reputation as an "Empire of Liberty".¹⁸ Douglass believed freedom was multifaceted and required emotional, physical and intellectual freedom.¹⁹ The Civil War, while debating the definition of freedom and morality of slavery, also questioned the right for Southern states to continue slavery. This debate divided the North and South and condemned and isolated African Americans as the root cause of the War. Loss of liberty for African Americans through slavery and racial prejudice was another dropped stitch. The consequences of this

¹³ Foner, *Give Me Liberty*, p.237.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp.237-238.

¹⁶ James M. McPherson, *What They Fought For, 1861-1865*, Baton Rouge, 1994, p.9.

¹⁷ Frederick Douglass and David W. Blight, ed., *Narrative of Frederick Douglass, An American Slave*, London, 2006, p. 167.

¹⁸ Ibid, pp.1-69, 146-171.

¹⁹ Ibid., p.64.

error came to fruition during the 1960s Civil Rights Movement and resulted in the unravelling of America's identity and what it meant to be "American".

From the Era of Reconstruction to the end of World War I, America experienced a social and economic revolution.²⁰ By the 1900s, America had established itself as a global industrial power with immigrants compelled by the idea of 'American freedom' flooding into America to provide "free labour".²¹ Between 1840 and 1914, approximately 40 million people immigrated to America, adding a new thread to America's identity.²² One would assume the congregation of different ethnicities in the workplace would knit these communities together. However, racial stigma and segregated areas of living ensured these communities remained divided. Despite this, America offered immigrants freedom of economic opportunity, worship, and equality before the law, as well as freedom from oppressive social hierarchies and religious persecution.²³ American freedom also encompassed the consumer culture of the early 1900s.²⁴ Anzia Yezierska's novel, *Bread Givers*, recognises consumer freedom through the character of Marsha, who attempts to "Americanize" herself through consumerism.²⁵ Comparatively, Marsha's siblings labour to achieve their "American-ness"—yet another indication of the lack of a universal definition of freedom.²⁶

America's booming economy was not without its boundaries, with the Progressive Era marking the need to resolve issues caused by industrialisation, immigration, urbanisation and government corruption.²⁷ During the Progressive Era, women began to "knit" themselves into the framework of America's identity and definition of freedom. With participation during the war and increasing opportunities for female employment, women started to achieve freedom of independence. Traditionally, female job opportunities were restricted to the domestic sphere and were reserved for young, unmarried white women and mature African American women.²⁸ However, the economic boom provided work for females of a variety of ages and ethnicities, including factory work for immigrant women,

²⁰ Foner, *Give Me Liberty*, p.627.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid., p.729.

²³ Ibid., pp.730-731.

²⁴ Ibid., p.732.

²⁵ Anzia Yezierska, *Bread Givers*, New York, 1925, p.6.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Foner, *Give Me Liberty*, p.738.

²⁸ Foner, *Give Me Liberty*, p.734.

and office and telephone operator jobs for white Americans.²⁹ By 1920, a mere 15% of female employees were working in the domestic sector.³⁰ The increasing presence of females in the workforce kindled desire for access to birth control. Birth control advocate and social reformer Emma Goldman said in a speech, ‘I demand freedom for both sexes . . . freedom of action, freedom in love and freedom in motherhood.’³¹ The growing feminist movement also saw a push for women’s suffrage, of which was achieved nationally in 1920 and encouraged solidarity amongst women.³² Despite gender discrimination, women were able to achieve economic independency as evident through the experiences of Yeziarska’s protagonist, Sara.³³ Women had accumulated the skill of knitting and were adamant to be included in America’s identity—they fought for women’s rights to be a part of American freedom.

During the 1930s and 1940s, popular songs such as “My Blue Heaven” evoked desire for home ownership and contributed to the creation of the American Dream.³⁴ However, the Great Depression of 1929, coupled with America’s involvement in World War II, halted private home building.³⁵ Postwar, the construction of suburbia commenced, with homeownership coming to symbolise freedom from Communism and the ills of American society. The 1920s saw the population of cities outnumber the population of rural areas, resulting in congestion and violence.³⁶ With immigrants and African Americans making up a large percentage of city inhabitants, white Americans began to desire their own private oasis—a home in the suburbs. While suburban life “knitted” white, middle to upper class communities together, some women felt trapped by the domesticity of the lifestyle.³⁷ Despite this perceived loss of freedom, white migration to the suburbs highlighted the lack of freedom Native Americans, African Americans and immigrants had over their own lifestyles. This lack of freedom divided Americans by further reinforcing a “them versus us” mentality.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid., pp.734-735.

³¹ Ibid., p.747.

³² Ibid., pp.753-754.

³³ Yeziarska, pp.155-297.

³⁴ ‘Moving to Suburbia: Dreams and Discontents’, in Frederick M. Binder and David M. Reimers, eds., *The Way We Lived: Essays and Documents in American Social History, Vol. 2*, 4th ed., New York, 2000, p. 213.

³⁵ ‘Moving to Suburbia’, in Binder and Reimers, eds., *The Way We Lived*, p. 213.

³⁶ Foner, *Give Me Liberty*, p.627.

³⁷ ‘Moving to Suburbia’, in Binder and Reimers, eds., *The Way We Lived*, p. 229.

When African Americans began to seek suburban housing, white Americans sought to prevent the intertwining of the African Americans' black thread with their own "lily white" thread.³⁸ Instead, the colours were to be knitted on different rows, with the black row being more poorly executed. Instead of swimming pools, neatly trimmed gardens and colourful houses, African Americans were met with lower value housing in less desirable areas.³⁹ While some African Americans chose to live in predominantly African American suburbs, others attempted to integrate for better quality, but to no avail.⁴⁰ Their efforts generated "white flight" and led to the deterioration of the neighbourhood.⁴¹

Louis Brandeis' interpretation that 'liberty has knit us closely together as Americans' holds some truth, with the American Revolution knitting together white male Americans of differing social classes with African Americans in military service.⁴² During the Progressive Era, women were also knit together through women's suffrage. Despite this, I believe Eric Foner presents a more realistic view of freedom by acknowledging that 'the boundaries of freedom have been as contested as the words definition itself.'⁴³ The freedom achieved in the Revolution consisted of plain and purl stitches: extending only to white male Americans. Exclusion of Native Americans and African Americans was a dropped stitch that left a sizable hole in America's identity. Immigration added a new thread to America's identity, complicating its definition of freedom. Similarly, during the Progressive Era, women challenged freedom's definition and successfully knitted their way into American freedom, proving the contested nature of freedom's boundaries. Finally, white American desire to exclude African Americans from suburban freedom led to the segregation of white and black threads. To conclude, while the prospect of freedom united Americans, intent to limit freedom's acquisition divided them. Had Brandeis been correct, conflict, dropped stitches and ugly knots would have been mended accordingly, paying homage to the adage 'a stitch in time saves nine'.

³⁸ Ibid., p.231.

³⁹ Ibid., pp.231-232.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p.232.

⁴¹ Ibid., p.232-233.

⁴² Foner, *The Story of American Freedom*, p.20.

⁴³ Ibid.

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HISTORY 111 | RACIAL HISTORIES

By KDee Aimiti Ma'ia'i

How did understandings of race and civilization intersect in USA and Aotearoa New Zealand?

Race and civilisation intersected throughout two key arenas within New Zealand and the United States of America. One arena saw the relocation and consolidation of colonial and indigenous identities and inter-group understandings, while the other saw the processes of, and reactions to, assimilation, integration and dilution of indigeneity. Race both informed colonial desires for cultural expansion, and provided a context for indigenous populations to interact with the introduction of external conceptions of civilization. New Zealand and the United States of America existed within a dualistic realm that was hinged upon the racial understandings of indigeneity and colonialism. This essay therefore seeks to complicate the position of race and civilization, in order to locate the nuances of colonial-indigenous relations.

Understandings of race and civilization, within the colonial arena, were hinged upon the formation of an ethnocentric, racialised hierarchy—a framework that enabled a consolidation of colonial self-purported superiority, and the perpetuation of indigenous inferiority. The formation of this hierarchy enabled and dictated the process that made “submissive” indigeneity and dominant “coloniser” groupings possible, thus informing their civilising missions. Ronald T. Takaki notes that the ‘westward advance of the

frontier [was viewed as] the movement from savagery to civilization'.¹ By understanding 'savagery' as Native American, and 'civilization' as European, colonists sought to situate themselves at the pinnacle of humanity, in turn locating indigeneity beneath them.² This approach was similarly utilised throughout New Zealand and can be seen through nineteenth century missionary projects, such as those of Rev. Samuel Marsden. Marsden sought to situate Māori within his own understandings, and defined civilization along religiously charged lines.³ By viewing Māori as inferior due to their spiritual temperament, Marsden, and others like him, reinforced the pervasive racial hierarchy that dictated the balance of power. Moloney highlights this process as a 'construction . . . of the savage "Other" [and] the civilized self'.⁴ By encountering and negotiating new environments and communities, Europeans not only created a negative representation of indigeneity, but also diffused the idea of a superior "us".⁵ The demonization of indigeneity and the proclamation and consolidation of a dominant coloniser, therefore solidified and justified, the platform on which their civilising missions occurred.⁶

Just as colonial forces sought to locate and recentre their conceptions of racial identities, Māori and Native American communities also encountered unequivocal and all-encompassing difference due to colonial intervention, and similarly sought to locate themselves within the new framework. For example, the introduction of muskets, European religion, and the waning dominance of traditional Māori forms of social control had a large impact on inter-tribal relations, and significantly altered the social and political structures of Māori personal identification and inter-tribal affiliations.⁷ This position however, is not an absolute. Judith Binney notes that many Māori resisted settler attempts to infiltrate the ideas of moral and religious inferiority, and instead remained steadfast in their own identities.⁸ This notion can be seen through missionary accounts of Māori reactions to settlers in the early nineteenth century. One missionary wrote after an

¹ Ronald Takaki, *A Different Mirror: A History of Multicultural America*, Boston, 1993. p. 48.

² Ibid.

³ John Rawson Elder, ed., *The Letters and Journals of Samuel Marsden, 1765 – 1838*, Dunedin, 1932, pp.60, 130.

⁴ Pat Moloney, 'Savagery and Civilization: Early Victorian Notions', *New Zealand Journal of History*, 35, 2, 2001, p.154.

⁵ Ibid., p.153.

⁶ Takaki, p.42.

⁷ Judith Binney, 'Christianity and the Maoris to 1840: A comment', *NZ Journal of History*, 3, 1963, pp.153-156.

⁸ Ibid., p.144.

encounter with a Māori man, 'when I asked him the reason why he should never mind me—he said—because he was a native—and had got a native heart & his native heart would do very well till he died'.⁹ An attempt to consolidate and re-locate the indigenous position can similarly be seen through the shifting gender roles within Native American communities, most notably Cherokee women, where the influence of European gender roles pervaded traditional social structures.¹⁰ Just as the colonial forces sought to redefine their position within their respective expansions, Māori and Native American communities similarly engaged in a parallel process of recentering, relocating and reconfiguring their communal identities in the face of colonial intervention.

The renegotiation of colonial and indigenous racial identities enabled the implementation of varied ideals of civilization. Civilization, as informed by the racialised understanding of indigeneity, was an end goal that settler states attempted to achieve via the vehicle of assimilation and integration. For colonisers then, civilization meant at best dilution, at worst extermination, of racial indigenous difference.¹¹ Rev. Samuel Marsden in New Zealand and the missionaries in USA that opposed Cherokee removal, for example, had a distinct view that while inferior, Native American and Māori communities were civilisable.¹² For those that prescribed to this white lens view of indigenous populations, there was room for coexistence so long as Māori and Native Americans were willing to dilute and integrate.¹³ Indigenous cultural, spiritual and economic difference therefore had to be diluted in order to integrate into colonial conceptions of civilisation. Other colonial missions, however, employed what Belich has called a black lens dominated consideration of indigenous populations.¹⁴ For them, the purported idea of subjugation and, at times planned, extinction of Māori and Native American cultural conceptions and demographic existence was inevitable.¹⁵ The acquisition of indigenous land signalled an

⁹ Binney, p.149.

¹⁰ Theda Perdue, 'Cherokee Women and the Trail of Tears', in Vicki L. Ruiz and Ellen Carol DuBois, eds, *Unequal Sisters: A Multicultural Reader in U.S. Women's History*, 3rd ed., New York, 2000, pp.93-104.

¹¹ M. P. K. Sorrenson, 'How to Civilize Savages: Some Answers from Nineteenth-Century New Zealand', *New Zealand Journal of History*, 9, 2, 1975, pp.97-110.

¹² Elder, ed., *The Letters and Journals of Samuel Marsden*, pp.60, 130; 'Christian Missionaries Oppose Removal, 1830', *The Missionary Herald*, 27 March 1830, pp.80-84, in James J. Lorence, *Enduring Voices: Document Sets to Accompany The Enduring Vision, A History of the American People Volume 1: To 1877*, Boston, 2000, pp.188-189.

¹³ James Belich, *Making Peoples: A History of the New Zealanders*, Auckland, 1996, pp.19-22.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

attempt of colonial forces to detribalise and destabilise Native American and Māori communities with the aim of reducing their capacity for independence and autonomy.¹⁶ The movement of Cherokee tribes onto ill-equipped reservations is emblematic of this determined attempt to foster an indigenous dependence.¹⁷ This is not to perpetuate the fatal impact narrative that suggests that indigenous populations had no choice but to succumb to the pervasiveness of colonisation—to do so would be reductive and anachronistic.¹⁸ However, it remains important to acknowledge the assimilationist and integrationist techniques that colonial projects in New Zealand and USA engaged in.

The indigenous arena of agency and nuance existed in response to the assimilationist and integrationist intentions of the expanding colonial project. The capability and susceptibility of Māori and Native American communities to engage with civilising missions in order to enact beneficial outcomes for their communities is therefore an integral thread of the indigenous experience. It remains important to contextualise indigenous populations into the modes of adaptation and resistance that they inhabited. Many Native American figures, such as William Wash and the women of Cherokee, sought to straddle the divide between the disparate conceptions of civilisation.¹⁹ David Lewis notes that indigenous communities were able to engage, and at times master, the contexts of two distinct cultures—colonialism and indigeneity—without ‘being immobilized by the process’.²⁰ They therefore opted to exist within both realms, rejecting and adapting colonial civilisation where they saw fit. This nuanced framework was also utilised by many Māori in order to divert the pervasion of colonial entities and structures. For example, Claudia Orange notes that ‘in the years of early contact, Maori were the dominant partner’. They engaged with new commercial procedures in order to foster a mutually beneficial relationship that secured their fiscal autonomy.²¹ Later in the colonial project, groups such as The Māori Women’s Welfare League and figures such as Apirana Ngata and Te Rangi Hīroa similarly sought to engage with the Pākehā dominated systems

¹⁶ Sorrenson, p.99; Takaki, pp.79-70.

¹⁷ Takaki, pp.80-93.

¹⁸ James Belich, ‘Myth, Race and Identity in New Zealand’, *New Zealand Journal of History*, 31, 1, 1997, p.11.

¹⁹ Albert L. Hurtado and Peter Iverson, eds, *Major Problems in American Indian History*, Lexington, 1994, pp.406-408, 410-13.

²⁰ David Rich Lewis, ‘Reservation Leadership and the Progressive-Traditional Dichotomy: William Wash and the Northern Utes, 1865-1928’, in Albert L. Hurtado and Peter Iverson, eds, *Major Problems in American Indian History*, Lexington, 1994, p.424.

²¹ Claudia Orange, *An Illustrated History of the Treaty of Waitangi*, Wellington, 2004, p.5.

to rejuvenate the indigenous experience.²² Belich notes that ‘adaption was regularly mistaken for adoption’.²³ It is therefore necessary to complicate indigenous inter-relations with their colonisers. By engaging with colonial structures, Māori and Native American actors were not abandoning their traditional practices, beliefs or social structures, but rather engaging in the new colonial template with agency and nuance.²⁴

Understandings of race and civilisation throughout New Zealand and the USA were multifaceted and complex. Played out in the arenas of indigeneity and colonialism, Māori and Native American communities and European missionaries and settlers were engaged in a process aimed at recentering and relocating their communal identities, a process that dictated inter-communal relations. Colonial actors created a racialised hierarchy that enabled the subsequent civilising missions and, in doing so, required indigenous actors to relocate and solidify their position within the new frameworks of civilisation. Māori and Native American communities engaged with the colonial frameworks with agency and nuance in the face of colonialist goals of assimilation, integration, and at times, extinction. Race and civilisation therefore occupied an influential space throughout the creation of a ‘modern’ New Zealand and United States of America.

²² Aroha Harris, *Hīkoi: Forty Years of Māori Protest*, Wellington, 2004, pp.10-31.

²³ Belich, p.11.

²⁴ This is not to suggest that the indigenous experience was one of engagement and agent-based adaptation in isolation. Victimhood indeed remains an integral thread to understand and consider. However, to discuss indigeneity without considering agency and interaction is to present an unbalanced and reductive representation of Māori and Native American communities.

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HISTORY 242 | EARLY MODERN JAPAN 1600-1868

By Emma O'Donnell

It has been suggested that the samurai suffered from “psychological poverty” (caused by increasing wants) more than they suffered from a decline in real income. Do you agree? Why/why not?

Although in the Tokugawa period, samurai indeed suffered from a declining income, there is sufficient evidence to indicate they had the capacity to adapt to this. Rather, their poverty was psychological. The samurai failed to adapt to an economic system which was being dominated by lower status groups. The samurai would have been able to live effectively in this new economy, albeit with some sacrifices; however, their pride and self-importance meant they could not watch the inferior status groups impose their economic power over them, and so chose to engage with a consumerism which they could not afford nor adapt effectively to. This increasing “psychological poverty” and disenfranchisement on the part of the samurai, and the rigid class distinction, eventually contributed to the Meiji Restoration.

The eventual economic situation of samurai in Tokugawa Japan was keenly linked to the warring states period. Prior to the Tokugawa shogunate, samurai had been landed warrior-farmers, able to wage war, and then return for the planting and harvesting seasons.¹ Samurai's independence and power was feared by the unifying Tokugawa government,

¹ Shinzaburo Oishi, ‘The Bakuhan System’, in Chie Nakane and Shinzaburo Oishi, eds, *Tokugawa Japan: The Social and Economic Antecedents of Modern Japan*, trans. Conrad Totman, Japan, 1990, p.17.

and so the samurai were separated from their lands, forced to move to castle towns, and reformed as warrior-bureaucrats.² This was effective in rendering samurai dependent on their superiors, and removing them from their traditional base of economic power and identity.³ The movement of samurai from their land to castle towns left space for peasants to become economically and socially powerful in their place.⁴ Their inability to work, or be a landed upper-class, left merchants and peasants to dominate the economy.⁵ Despite their high status, samurai were increasingly disenfranchised by a society where wealth was becoming highly significant.⁶ As we will see, the samurai's existence as a high status—but economically weak—group had a hand in the eventual Meiji Restoration.

The vast majority of evidence indicates that mid and upper level samurai's income (those that earned over 100 *koku*) decreased, but this loss could have easily been mitigated by minor changes in their lifestyle. Samurai were ensured a rice stipend (*koku*) by the government, which fluctuated positively or negatively depending on rice yield in any given period.⁷ They were also subject—especially in later years when the shogunate was economically struggling—to the “borrowing back” of up to half of their stipend, which could last for several years at a time.⁸ Also, if rice prices declined, but consumer goods—which were reliant on the growing currency economy dominated by the merchant and peasant groups—progressively rose, samurai would have to pay more for consumer goods than they could realistically afford.⁹ Although the majority of evidence concludes that this had a negative impact on a samurai's real income, they had the potential to mitigate this loss through simple lifestyle changes.¹⁰ It is generally concluded that samurai's economic existence at this time was characterised by increasing want.¹¹ However, their

² Michael P. Birt, ‘Samurai in Passage: The Transformation of the Sixteenth-Century Kanto’, *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, 11, 2, 1985, p. 374; Chie Nakane, ‘Tokugawa Society’, in Chie Nakane and Shinzaburo Oishi, eds, *Tokugawa Japan: The Social and Economic Antecedents of Modern Japan*, trans. Conrad Totman, Japan, 1990, p.214.

³ Birt, p.374.

⁴ Eiko Ikegami, *The Taming of the Samurai: Honorific Individualism and the Making of Modern Japan*, London, 1995, p.168; Yamakawa Kikue, *Women of the Mito Domain: Recollections of Samurai Family Life*, trans. Kate Wildman Nakai, Tokyo, 1992, p.156.

⁵ Nakane, p.214.

⁶ Katsu Kokichi, *Musui's Story: The Autobiography of a Tokugawa Samurai*, trans. Teruko Craig, Arizona, 1998, p.xvii.

⁷ Kozo Yamamura, ‘The Increasing Poverty of the Samurai in Tokugawa Japan, 1600-1868’, *The Journal of Economic History*, 31, 2, 1971, p.383.

⁸ Susan B Hanley., ‘A High-Standard of Living in Nineteenth Century Japan: Fact or Fiction?’, *The Journal of Economic History*, 43, 1, 1983, p.185.

⁹ Ikegami, p.175.

¹⁰ Yamamura, p.383.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p.402; Kokichi, p.xvii.

“poverty” was more complicated than this. It was the result of an obligation to appear dominant over the “lower” classes which had begun to redefine the standards of wealth; a general taste for luxury items; debt cycles; and their estrangement from a complex economic system.

The first explanation for mid to upper samurai’s growing “poverty” was their increasing desire to live up to their high social status. The economic system shifted to accommodate the growing consumerism of the peasant and merchant classes, who defined the ‘standard of living’ at the time.¹² Samurai, who retained their pride despite their increasing social and economic unimportance—supported partly by a government which understood that social respect for samurai was necessary for continued state protection—were uncomfortable with the visible domination of the lower status groups.¹³ Mid-level samurai often felt obliged to buy high-quality clothing, weapons, and to keep multiple servants and horses in order to appear above these groups.¹⁴ Although originally the shogunate forced samurai to keep a certain number of servants and horses—which could be used to argue that samurai did not have a choice but to spend this much—eventually this proclamation was made void.¹⁵ It only offers another example of the perceived social obligation of the samurai to keep up appearances. However, as noted above, the samurai’s declining income was not able to accommodate this excess.¹⁶ Samurai above 100 *koku* were not allowed to engage in side jobs, and so they were unable to subsidise their incomes to accommodate their spending habits.¹⁷ Although alternate attendance was occasionally used for these means, as they would receive extra *koku*, oftentimes this budget was spent on fine clothing and gifts which were necessary for this service, and those who used it still often lived well over their means.¹⁸ Mid to upper level samurai in this period were subject to economic domination by the “lower” status groups, which exacerbated their spending habits. However, it would be an incredible oversimplification to claim this was the only cause of their “psychological poverty”.

¹² Yamamura, p.393.

¹³ Birt, p.369; Ikegami, pp.175-176.

¹⁴ Kikue, p.156; Kokichi, p.xvii.

¹⁵ Yamamura, p.396.

¹⁶ Yamamura, p.402; Kokichi, p.xvii.

¹⁷ Kikue, p.157.

¹⁸ Kikue, p.165; Constantine N. Vaporis, ‘Samurai and Merchant in Mid-Tokugawa Japan: Tani Tannai's Record of Daily Necessities (1748-54)’, *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 60, 1, 2000, p.226.

Mid-level samurai's "psychological poverty" was more complex than simply a group with greater wants than means, but was based partly in their disenfranchisement from the monetary system. The belief that samurai had to be "above" money and materiality; an increasingly complex economy, characterised by a confusing multi-monetary system, erratic tax and interest rates, and the biannual payment of stipends; and their education as Confucian military philosophers ensured they often struggled to keep their own accounts.¹⁹ Although there was an obvious attempt by some to change their spending habits—there was evidence of samurai engagement with work traditionally done by servants, the pawning of their best swords and kimono, reducing staff, or only hiring workers by the hour or the day—the inability of the vast majority to keep household budgets, alongside a declining income and lack of self-control, often meant they continued to struggle.²⁰ This was exacerbated by their ability to take out loans, which ensured they were not obliged to live within their means.²¹ Once this process began, it was incredibly difficult to stop; up to half of their stipend could go into paying off a prior loan, so they would be obliged to take out another one for their current expenses.²² Merchants, as they profited off this relationship, would often refuse to re-negotiate the terms of loan repayments in order to help samurai out of this cycle.²³ Mid to upper level samurai's ignorance of the monetary system, debt cycles, high living, pride, and inability to counteract this excess spending through extra employment created the perfect storm for an increasing "psychological poverty".

Although it is often argued that those who received 100 *koku* or less lived in poverty, it was more accurately a subsistence living. The vast majority of samurai earned less than 100 *koku*—making up around 20,000 of the samurai population.²⁴ If they had a large enough family, this would not cover the expenses to feed them, let alone buy other household necessities.²⁵ However, the primary difference between the lower samurai, compared to the upper, was their potential to take on side employment—which, despite their limited subsidies, often gave them the capacity to live debt-free.²⁶ Such jobs

¹⁹ Vaporis, p.226.

²⁰ Ibid., p.226; Kokichi, p.xvii.

²¹ Kikue, p.166.

²² Hanley, p.185; Vaporis, p.217.

²³ Vaporis, p.227.

²⁴ Kokichi, p.xii.

²⁵ Kikue, p.153.

²⁶ Ibid., pp.157-158; Yamamura, p.398.

included toy making, umbrella mending, carpentry, to name a few.²⁷ They were also given 300 *tsubo* of land to work, which would further subsidise their income through foodstuffs, and they were exempt from “borrowing back”.²⁸ Together, these acted as a balm to their relative poverty.²⁹ Although they were certainly not well off—they often lacked education, were obliged to do the work of servants, pay obeisance to higher ranking samurai, and had similar incomes and lives as low ranking peasants—they had the capacity to live without debt.³⁰ There was the case of a man (and later his wife) who lived on only 0.45 *koku* a month (or 5.4 *koku* a year).³¹ Although they were obliged to live in their friends’ home and constantly preserve resources, they still lived an effective subsistence lifestyle.³² That is not to say they did not suffer great hardship and stress—the most basic of these incomes, where a stipend went towards rent, a cook, a maid, clothing, and food—still required a subsidiary job or a loan for remaining expenses.³³ These lower income households were considered poor at the time. However, the definition of their poverty included expenses for keeping up the appearance of wealth, which warps conclusions regarding their actual economic well-being.³⁴ Although incredible self-control and frugality was required, there was the potential for low income samurai to live comparatively effectively on a combination of stipends, subsidies, and side jobs.

However, many low income samurai were unwilling to engage with this subsistence lifestyle. Despite their place as the lowest ranking even among the samurai, their continued belief in their pride and entitlement buoyed their expensive taste and drive to appear wealthy and significant.³⁵ Some would live beyond their means by buying clothing or weapons, soliciting prostitutes, or buying in excess—and they continued to do so even after they had no potential for future employment, and thereby no capacity to live debt-free.³⁶ Similar to the upper classes, they also struggled with frugality and budgeting—one

²⁷ Ibid., p.157; Kokichi, p.xiv.

²⁸ Ibid., pp.157-158.

²⁹ Ibid., p.158; Yamamura, p.398.

³⁰ Marius B. Jansen, ‘The Ruling Class’, in Marius B. Jansen and Gilbert Rozman, eds, *Japan in Transition: From Tokugawa to Meiji*, Princeton, 1986, p.74.

³¹ Kikue, p.161-2.

³² Ibid.

³³ Yamamura, p.398.

³⁴ Kikue, pp.156-158.

³⁵ Ikegami, p.176; Jansen, p.74.

³⁶ Kokichi, p.xvii.

samurai saved 3 ½ ryo over 3 months, and then spent it all on a sword.³⁷ They often could not avoid the temptation of low-brow living, and often disregarded traditional samurai way, and engaged with such acts as drunkenness, laziness, illegality, and inappropriate behaviour.³⁸ So although low income samurai had the potential to live a subsistence lifestyle, they chose not to for similar reasons as their upper class counterparts.

The progressive economic and social disenfranchisement of the samurai contributed to the Meiji Restoration. As the Tokugawa regime ‘never created direct connections between hard work, economic success, and social honor’, it ensured there was a progressive pressure applied by the lower classes and samurai for such a system.³⁹ This eventually contributed to the loosening of status distinction which was a precursor to the overthrow of the samurai class in the Meiji Restoration.⁴⁰ Anger among lower income samurai towards their visibly economically and socially superior counterparts also contributed heavily to this; many of these samurai went on to gain importance and power after the Meiji Restoration.⁴¹ That the samurai’s held high social status but no economic wealth—combined with their pride, and inability to gain economic power—caused substantial enough resentment among the samurai to ensure the eventual downfall of Tokugawa society.⁴² The progressive social, political and economic decline of the samurai classes created discontent among social classes which the Tokugawa regime was unable to endure.

The Tokugawa era was one of incredible social and economic change. Although samurai’s real income did change in this period, it was to such an extent that they could have adapted. However, the samurai class’s initial alienation from their land, the inability of upper samurai to subsidise their income, and the obligation of the lower to augment off the peasant and merchant groups, ensured that “lower” status groups could dominate the evolving and modernising economy. The obligation of samurai to purport their social importance and pride meant they did not accept this stagnation of their wealth, and undermining of their social status—and so they continued to engage with luxury and

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid., p.xiv.

³⁹ Ikegami, p.362.

⁴⁰ Ikegami, pp.360-362; Jansen, p.75

⁴¹ Jansen, p.79.

⁴² Yamamura, p.403.

excess which was no longer realistic for them. Samurai's fervent unpreparedness for modernisation, systematic exclusion from adapting to it, and an unnecessarily rigid social system, ensured the eventual fall of the Tokugawa regime.

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HISTORY 243 | BODY AND BLOOD: RELIGIOUS CULTURES AND CONFLICTS, c.50 – c.1650 CE

By Scott Yang

Why did early Christians believe that it was important to achieve unity and why did their efforts to achieve it sometimes result in violence?

Saint Augustine, writing about pagans, Jews and heretics in an *enarratio* reminded his Christian faithful that whether ‘they wanted or not, they are brothers (*velint nolint, frates sunt*) . . . Let them say: “we do not have anything to do with you”. But we actually have a lot to do with you: we must confess one Christ in one body; we must be under one head’.¹ This quote from the revered saint aptly encapsulates the attitude many Christians held on the idea of unity. Between the third and fifth centuries different religious sects and secular authorities, driven by theological and political motives, attempted to lead the Catholic Church from its divisions with the Donatists and the Arians that had developed from a clash over the definition of Christian orthodoxy. However, while intended for the good of the non-conformers, this striving for unity often broke into violence. The zealous beliefs of different religious sects which sanctioned the use of coercive force made attempts at unity incredibly difficult. This compounded with the practical problems in preventing the use of force often led to violent clashes, even when the authorities never meant for violence to occur.

¹ Maijastina Kahlos, *Forbearance and Compulsion: The Rhetoric of Religious Tolerance and Intolerance in Late Antiquity*, London, 2009, p.115.

Early Christians were rooted in the idea of unity firstly on theological grounds. Christianity is a monotheistic religion, with adherents believing that there is only one god, there is only one correct way of worship, and any deviation from this is problematic.² Christian orthodoxy therefore drew a line between right and wrong beliefs, theory and practice, creating a sense amongst early Christians that they needed to defend and advocate for their version of the religion as it went to the heart of truth.³ Early Christians also believed that discovering the correct interpretation of orthodoxy was incredibly important.⁴ While recognising that the scriptures were riddled with contradictions and enigmas, early Christians continued to hold the idea that everything necessary to discover orthodoxy was in the texts; they just needed to uncover it.⁵ Therefore, there was considerable pressure on Christians to arrive at one interpretation of the scriptures, as orthodoxy was considered just as important as concepts such as asceticism.⁶ The stakes were high; Christians strove to find answers to questions about time, space, and existence.⁷ For example, in the Arian controversy, there was great anxiety throughout Christendom to discern the correct relationship between God and his Son, as failure to do so could lead to conveying the incorrect level of worship and deference, comparable to committing heresy.⁸ This anxiety within Christendom to discern the correct interpretation of scripture led to various groups claiming that their version of the faith was the correct one, and that everyone else needed to unite behind and conform with it. Donatists, for example, zealously defended their ideology and claimed that being forced into unity with the Catholic Church was as bad as being forced to deny Christ and sacrifice to idols.⁹ Various Christian groups, through this interpretation of the righteousness of their beliefs, thereby displayed a very paternalistic view of other Christians who did not conform to their ideas. Christians regarded those who did not conform with their ideas as misguided and in need of correction. For example, Augustine justified his Church's coercion of the

² H.A. Drake, 'Monotheism and Violence', *Journal of Late Antiquity*, 6, 2, 2013, p.251.

³ Averil Cameron, 'The Violence of Orthodoxy', in E. Iricinshi and H.M. Zelletin, eds, *Heresy and Identity in Late Antiquity*, Tübingen, 2008, p.111.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p.112.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Carlos R. Galvao-Sobrinho, 'Embodied Theologies: Christian Identity and Violence in Alexandria in the Early Arian Controversy', in H.A. Drake, ed., *Violence in Late Antiquity: Perceptions and Practises*, Aldershot and Burlington, Vermont, 2006, p.322.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p.328.

⁹ Michael Gaddis, *There is No Crime for Those Who Have Christ: Religious Violence in the Christian Roman Empire*, Berkeley, California, 2005, p.148.

Donatists on this ground with the statement, ‘she persecutes in the spirit of love; they in the spirit of wrath; she that she might correct, they that they might overthrow’.¹⁰ Augustine himself believed that the ‘rod of correction’ had saved him from the worst sins and had delivered him to Christianity, therefore, he believed that this could be applied to other dissenters.¹¹ Essentially, Christianity’s commandment to ‘love thy neighbour’ demanded that Christians try to convert their fellow non-conforming Christians for their own good.¹² Overall, early Christian theological ideas about monotheism and orthodoxy played a large part in the drive for unity.

Secular Christian authorities also pushed heavily for unity within the religion in a bid to quash the spill-over effects of the division which often undermined their rule. Emperors, caught up in various schisms within the Church, often found themselves vilified and condemned by several sects within the conflict. Firstly, various groups criticised secular authorities for interfering in religious affairs at all. Many Christians still remembered the days when the power of the state was used by pagan authorities to destroy their religion; hence they developed a deep distrust of secular intervention in religious affairs.¹³ For example, when a Jewish synagogue in the city of Callinicum was attacked in 388 C.E., Bishop Ambrose of Milan convinced the Roman Emperor Theodosius not to defend the citizens, as coercive secular intervention indicated a weak emperor whose ‘capacity to rule belonged to others’.¹⁴ This forced secular authorities to the side-lines while problematic religious chaos ensued. Secondly, various religious groups criticised secular authorities for not sufficiently supporting their side. Secular authorities needed to weigh up religious unity and Christian Orthodoxy against practical matters such as political reality and public order.¹⁵ However, to extremists, any compromise was a betrayal.¹⁶ For example, when Emperor Arcadius signed a treaty with the barbarian warlord Gainas, many militant Christians vilified the emperor for compromising with the ‘enemy’.¹⁷ John Chrysostom, the Archbishop of Constantinople chastised the secular authorities, declaring that it is ‘better to be deprived of empire, than to become guilty of impiety, a

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid., p.151.

¹² Ibid., p.143.

¹³ Ibid., p.92.

¹⁴ Thomas Sizgorich, *Violence and Belief in Late Antiquity: Militant Devotion in Christianity and Islam*, Philadelphia, 2009, pp.81, 94.

¹⁵ Gaddis, p.195.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

traitor to the house of God'.¹⁸ Salminius Sozomen, a historian of the Christian Church, also commented sarcastically that Gainas asked for a Church to be set aside for his Arian followers 'in order to undermine the peace of the Catholic Church'.¹⁹ These problems that the schism within the Church produced led secular authorities to try and stamp out the divisions through indirect means, summoning councils to nail down interpretations of the doctrine becoming a firm favourite.²⁰ For example, in the Arian controversy, Emperor Constantine summoned the First Council of Nicaea in order to allow bishops to debate and come to a conclusion on the nature of the relationship between God the Father and God the Son.²¹ Most of the bishops came to declare that the Son was like the Father; hence this interpretation was enforced by secular authorities.²² Overall, the side effects of the schism within the Church made the work of secular authorities very difficult; hence they pushed for a resolution of these conflicts through indirect intervention to avoid dealing with these problems.

However, while the idea of unity seems to be a peaceful notion, in early Christianity it was anything but, producing enormous bloodshed and violence due to the zealous beliefs of many Christians. Differing sects within Christianity came to justify violence through their belief that those corrected would be better off under their doctrine. For example, while Augustine had discouraged the use of violence by the Catholic Church in attaining conversions as late as 396, by 407 he had completely changed course, arguing that violence could be used to correct religious dissenters if reason was not sufficient.²³ Augustine deployed the aforementioned paternalistic argument to justify his use of violence; religious dissenters must be educated and helped even if it were against their own will, as it was for their own good.²⁴ Thereby he rejected the idea that violence could cause danger to the Christian soul, arguing that if the coercers' motives were pure, they would not be contaminated.²⁵ Donatists also justified their use of violence through a paternalistic world view. After the conversion of Constantine, Donatists began to actively invoke violence in the form of smashing idols and committing suicidal attacks to unmask

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid., p.88.

²¹ Ibid., pp.88-89.

²² Ibid.

²³ Kahlos, p.112.

²⁴ Ibid., pp.112-113.

²⁵ Ibid., p.112.

the ‘hypocrisy’ of a corrupt Christian state that tolerated pagans, Jews and heretics.²⁶ The aim was to either shame the authorities into changing their policy or to be persecuted, therefore exposing the repressive nature of the state in an attempt to educate the masses on how corrupt and hypocritical the existing “Christian” authorities were.²⁷ Overall, the zealous belief of many Christians in the benefits of their own doctrine convinced them that violence was an appropriate tool to gain conversions.

Some Christians also saw violence as a divinely-ordained tool. Saint Augustine, for example, argued that powers established by God are meant to be used for correcting religious dissenters.²⁸ Furthermore, he and other Christians interpreted the verse in the Bible, ‘whomsoever ye shall find, compel them to come in’, as sanctioning the use of violence to compel dissenters to conform.²⁹ Others pointed to examples of violent correction in the Bible as sanctioning coercion. Optatus of Milevis for example, pointed to examples such as Moses killing 3000 men as punishment for worshipping the Golden Calf as sanctioning the use of violence to correct Donatist dissent.³⁰ Overall, the zealous belief of many Christians in their own doctrine was compounded by a perception that violence was biblically sanctioned.

When violence was employed by the authorities, the distinction between appropriate corrective force and lethal violence often blurred, sometimes leading to excessive bloodshed that was not intended. Soldiers would often exceed their orders and kill indiscriminately as the paternalistic struggle to correct the misguided often slid into the demonization of the enemy.³¹ A good example of this situation are the events surrounding the bishop of Thamugadi, Gaudentius.³² When the Tribune Dulcitius advanced into southern Numidia to force the Donatists in the area into unity, Gaudentius barricaded himself in the great basilica and threatened to immolate himself and his congregation, leading to a standoff.³³ Augustine then sharply reminded Dulcitius that he did not sanction capital punishment, but rather the use of fines and confiscation.³⁴ Therefore, even though

²⁶ Gaddis, pp.194-196.

²⁷ Ibid., pp.196-197.

²⁸ Kahlos, p.113.

²⁹ Gaddis, p.140.

³⁰ Kahlos, p.114.

³¹ Ibid., pp.156, 185.

³² Ibid, p.148.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid., p.149.

Augustine deployed the state's corrective forces against the Church's enemies, he attempted to restrain their worst excesses.³⁵ However, while the outcome of the standoff is not known, it is clear that Dulcitus overstepped his authority due to his zeal for enforcement.³⁶ This showed that while coercive force was often meticulously calibrated, its operation in reality was often far messier.³⁷ Furthermore, at the level of imperial law, this confusion was most pertinent.³⁸ Constantine, for example, once instructed a group of bishops to restrain their use of violence, commenting that, 'if we reprove a fault, is not our object to admonish, not to destroy; our correction for safety, not cruelty?'³⁹ However, he then proceeded to implement a host of harsh measures to the penal code that were notable for their physical savagery.⁴⁰ Furthermore, this confusion about the appropriate level of corrective force was compounded by the fact that some authorities reluctantly accepted this excessive violence as a regrettable necessity. Augustine for example, while attempting to restrain excessive violence, also accepted that God's justice was working through imperfect human agents, therefore excessive violence was to some degree inevitable.⁴¹ Commenting to the Donatists about the coercion they were experiencing, Augustine declared that 'God himself is doing this for you, through us—whether by persuasion, or threat, or chastisement, or penalties or troubles, whether through his own hidden admonitions and visitations, or thorough the laws of the temporal powers'.⁴² This seems to indicate that Augustine viewed excessive bloodshed as a side effect of Gods' will to achieve unity. Overall, confusion about the level of appropriate corrective force to implement often led to excessive violence that was reluctantly accepted by many authorities as being inevitable.

Early Christians, driven by theological and secular motives, attempted to carve out a unified Christian orthodoxy for the good of Christendom. However, this struggle for a united religion often ended tragically in violence as zealous and paternalistic religious beliefs combined with the supposed biblical sanctioning of violence to create an atmosphere of physical coercion. In addition to this. confusion over the correct level of

³⁵ Ibid., p.145.

³⁶ Ibid., p.149.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid., p.153.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid., p.157.

⁴² Ibid.

coercive force to apply made bloodshed in some regard inevitable. This period of violent conflict may seem unimportant to us today, but it fundamentally shaped present ideas of Christian orthodoxy. Hence, we, in many ways, still live with the results of these early Christian conflicts.

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HISTORY 268 | NORMAN CONQUESTS, NORMAN VOICES, c.900 – c.1215 CE

By Hugo Carnell

Why were Norman regimes able to achieve such prominence in southern Italy and Sicily during the eleventh century? What is the value of Geoffrey Malaterra's text as a record of Norman activities?

The Norman expansion from Normandy into southern Italy and Sicily across the course of the eleventh century was the product of a complex historical paradigm. This saw militarised Norman aristocrats, after initially being invited from Normandy to Italy as mercenaries, ultimately using their military and political skill to carve out individual landholdings in a fragile political landscape. This process was based on long-term dynastic campaigning stretching across decades, culminating in the emergence of a syncretic Italo-Norman cultural and political identity. Its eventual decline in the late twelfth century was largely linked to the extinction of the direct line of the Hauteville family, revealing a fractured, fragmented society unable to transcend its internal cultural divides. The most comprehensive primary source available for the early stages of this period is the *Deeds of Count Roger*, composed by the Benedictine monk Geoffrey Malaterra around the end of the eleventh century. This narrates the various Norman campaigns in Italy, Sicily and the Balkans, centred around the ruling brothers Roger and Robert Guiscard; Geoffrey was able to draw upon a wide variety of sources, likely including Roger himself, to create this. However, this proximity to the Sicilian court lends Geoffrey's narrative a highly stylised quality likely motivated by Roger's desire to

produce a narrative able to effectively legitimize his successors, and such a stylisation must be called into question by any historical analysis.

Norman Expansionism: Cultural unity in a divided land, and the centrality of the Hauteville clan

As Geoffrey has it, the first Normans to arrive on the Italian peninsula were motivated by an increasing recognition that Normandy's increasingly large population of militarised feudal aristocrats would be forced to leave Normandy to avoid the problem of splitting individual estates into progressively smaller portions.¹ Geoffrey characterises Norman arrival in Italy as spearheaded by the Hauteville clan in the 1030s, but this is likely a simplification motivated by his desire to produce a narrative acceptable to his Hauteville masters.² Other sources describe, successively, Norman religious pilgrims returning from Jerusalem caught up in Italian internal strife, and groups of exiles fleeing persecution in Normandy and seeking employment with Lombard rebels in the 1010s.³ At any rate, what must be stressed is the highly disorganised, family-based nature of Norman arrival in Italy, operating as a progressive enterprise by relatively small groups seeking to improve their individual positions without guarantee of future political coherence or autonomy. With this in mind, it would have been all too easy for the Normans to remain a rag-tag group of disorganised mercenary units ruling over an array of petty fiefdoms.

In terms of assessing what led the Normans to coalesce beyond these individual family units and achieve large-scale political organisation in Italy, the most readily apparent factor is the striking ability of individual Norman leaders to recognise their cultural unity and act coherently to protect their shared political interests in times of crisis. The Normans were several loose collections of minor lordlings under the vague command of the rulers of Apulia-Calabria and Capua (and after 1071, Sicily), but they understood the centrality of military unity.⁴ When a huge coalition force led by Pope Leo IX menaced the Hauteville County of Apulia in 1053, the Hautevilles swiftly formed an alliance with

¹ Geoffrey Malaterra, *The Deeds of Count Roger of Calabria and Sicily and of his brother Duke Robert Guiscard*, trans. Kenneth Wolf, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, 2005, 1.3-5.

² Ibid.

³ John France, 'The Occasion of the Coming of the Normans to Southern Italy', *Journal of Medieval History*, 17, 3, 1991, pp.185-186.

⁴ Hervin Fernandez-Aceves, 'The Re-Arrangement of the Nobility Under the Hauteville Monarchy: The Creation of the South Italian Counties', *Ex Historia*, 8, 2016, pp.58-64.

the Drengots of Aversa.⁵ They formed an army and used their heavy cavalry to annihilate a papal army twice their size at Civitate, capturing the pope and using him as leverage in order to sign a variety of treaties favourable to the Normans.⁶ Eventually, the Normans occupied Rome in 1059 and installed the pro-Norman Nicholas II as Pope, granting official Church approval of the Norman states in Italy. Evidently, the Norman reputation for cunning that Geoffrey emphasizes was more than just a rhetorical device.⁷

In tandem with this Norman ability to use culture to create and enforce political and military unity came the fortuitous emergence of a unified political dynasty with the ambition and ability to exploit this quality to best effect. The Hautevilles had arrived in Italy around 1035, initially serving the Prince of Salerno as mercenaries, but had eventually achieved enough of a power base to form their own state, the Duchy of Apulia and Calabria.⁸ The Hautevilles managed to maintain a unified dynasty based on their Calabrian heartland, with authority passing smoothly between various of the twelve sons of Tancred de Hauteville in the face of challenges and political dissembling. The fourth son, Drogo, was assassinated by the Byzantines in 1051, sparking an interregnum with the potential to lead to disaster.⁹ Eventually the sixth son, Robert Guiscard, took control in 1057, spearheading almost thirty years of Norman consolidation and expansion which saw the Normans drive the Byzantines from Southern Italy by 1071; Robert's younger brother Roger, created Count of Sicily in 1071, was able to completely conquer Sicily from its Saracen overlords by 1091.¹⁰ It is important to stress how fortuitous the continuous territorial integrity and eventual consolidation of the de Hauteville possessions was, existing without major civil strife despite the existence of various internal family squabbles; while campaigning, Roger was threatened by an uprising led by his eldest son Jordan in 1083, but was able to put down the conspiracy and have Pope Urban II mediate the relevant dispute.¹¹ Eventually, Roger's youngest son Roger II was able to come to majority and peacefully unite the disparate Italo-Norman possessions under the centralised banner of the Kingdom of Sicily by 1130.¹²

⁵ Malaterra, 1.14.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Gordon S. Brown, *The Norman Conquest of Southern Italy and Sicily*, Jefferson, NC, 2002, pp.90-91.

⁸ Malaterra, 1.12.

⁹ Ibid., 1.13.

¹⁰ Paul E. Chevedden, "A Crusade from the First": The Norman Conquest of Islamic Sicily, 1060–1091', *Al-Masaq*, 22, 2, 2010, p.192.

¹¹ Malaterra, 3.36.

¹² Brown, p.198.

It is important to stress that the reliance of wider Italo-Norman culture on this impressive ruling family eventually contributed to the downfall of both. Norman rule in Italy became so closely identified with the Hautevilles that when the family line died out, the prominent and distinctive Italo-Norman political identity of the Kingdom of Sicily effectively died with it. Given the increasing distance between the Italo-Normans and their Norman origins, this led to an obvious dimming of specifically Norman identity in the face of ongoing influence from Italian and Arab culture; the Sicilian court was famous for its multiculturalism and tolerance.¹³ However, this tolerant pose masked a remarkably tense society marked by undercurrents of conflict between Sicily's separate Greek, Italian, and Arab populations; the long-term survival of Norman rule in Italy was doomed by its inability to truly reach the substrata of the society it ruled.¹⁴ After the death of the illegitimate King Tancred in 1194, Sicily was swiftly overrun by the forces of the Swabian Holy Roman Emperor Henry VI, married to a Norman princess. Although Henry's part-Hauteville descendants would rule over the kingdom until 1266, distinctively Norman rule of southern Italy and Sicily was over.¹⁵ Substantive Norman rule over southern Italy and Sicily had risen, consolidated, and fallen in little more than a century, standing effectively as the history of an exceptional family lineage unable to propagate its distinctive cultural influence beyond its own survival.

Geoffrey Malaterra: The birth of a kingdom and the issues of Norman self-definition

In terms of looking more closely at the source material for the early part of the Norman conquest, Geoffrey Malaterra stands as the most exceptional chronicler of the initial expansion of Norman influence in Italy and Sicily, and his *Deeds* provides a comprehensive narrative stretching from the initial arrival of the Hautevilles in Capua around 1035 up to the beginning stages of the First Crusade in 1098. Geoffrey was very close to the Sicilian court, explicitly identifying Roger I as his patron, and much of his work seems to rely on material facts supplied by specific Norman oral sources, likely including Roger himself.¹⁶ It is clear from the outset that Geoffrey does not aim to be

¹³ Joanna H. Drell, 'Cultural Syncretism and Ethnic Identity: The Norman "Conquest" of Southern Italy and Sicily', *Journal of Medieval History*, 25, 3, 1999, p.202.

¹⁴ Joshua C. Birk, *Norman Kings of Sicily and the Rise of the Anti-Islamic Critique*, Springer, New York, 2017, pp.151-152.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.275, 278.

¹⁶ Ewan Johnson, 'Normandy and Norman Identity in Southern Italian Chronicles', in J. Gillingham, ed., *Anglo-Norman Studies 27: Proceedings of the Battle Conference 2004*, Woodbridge, 2005, p.95.

directly critical of the status quo; we are not likely to be supplied with a source that goes out of its way to criticise concepts of Norman self-identity, and Roger's likely goal in commissioning such a work was to provide a narrative which legitimised his own fledgling state.¹⁷

However, Geoffrey is much more than a mere propagandist, and his aim in the *Deeds* is seemingly to provide a serious, self-aware ethnographical work serving to integrate the history of the Normans in Italy with existing origin myths and commentary. While the *Deeds* is written in prose, Geoffrey regularly writes more speculative or opinionated passages (such as those chastising the Romans for their many vices) in verse, drawing a clear line between what can and cannot be considered incontestable historical fact.¹⁸ His work is very clearly focussed on creating a coherent narrative of the Normans in Italy, distinguishing them from existing populations and providing clear factors behind their continued success, but such a focus never descends into sycophancy. The Norman society that he portrays is characterised by its focus on raw cunning, self-enrichment and hunger for power; such a society is likely to be highly successful, but these are hardly traits that the Normans would have particularly wanted to be noted for, and it is hard to imagine Roger being particularly overjoyed with such a characterisation.

Indeed, Geoffrey seems sometimes to be seeing how far he can push the limits of patronage in his writing, and he plays off the characterisations of ethnic groups cleverly against each other in doing so; Ewan Johnson comments that Geoffrey is more than willing to allow implicit criticisms of specific groups of Normans within a generally pro-Norman framework that depicts the Hautevilles as heroic.¹⁹ There is certainly enough here to detect at least a sneaking sympathy for the Lombards that Geoffrey describes as sycophantic and dissembling, and Geoffrey must be credited for being willing to present the full moral ambiguities of the period he deals with.²⁰ Interestingly, the other major primary source for the Norman conquest of Italy, William of Apulia's *Deeds of Robert Guiscard*, adopts a similarly nuanced approach to ethnicity-related issues, emphasising that boundaries between ethnic groups are rooted in political rather than deterministic

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Malaterra, 3.38.

¹⁹ Johnson, p.99.

²⁰ Ibid.

factors.²¹ Johnson identifies both William and Geoffrey as expressing a belief that political power in such a context remains something which is expressed by individual leaders rather than discrete collectives, and which is generally able to override constructed ethnic characterisations; the origin of the Italo-Normans is acknowledged by Geoffrey, but it is not absolutely central to their political identity in the same way that the specific leadership of the Hautevilles is.²²

Fundamentally, the Norman conquest of southern Italy and Sicily over the course of the eleventh and twelfth centuries was the result of a group of military aristocracy making effective use of their military power and cultural unity amidst a complex, fractured political context, and having the consistently unified leadership to back it up. Ultimately, however, this reliance on the leadership of the Hautevilles proved to be a major factor in the downfall of Italo-Norman political authority, and it is clear that the idea of such a defeat is contained in the way that Geoffrey's own complex, morally ambiguous narrative of victory and conquest emphasizes the importance of individual leaders. Without effective, consistent leadership, the Normans would be just another ineffective cultural formation ready to be swept aside; what Geoffrey could not have foreseen is that such a defeat would take place less than a century after the conclusion of his own narrative.

²¹ Ibid., p.90.

²² Ibid., p.100.

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HISTORY 313 | MAO ZEDONG, REVOLUTION AND CHINA

By Caitlin Thomas

How was historical memory significant to the Post-Mao Chinese Communist Party? Discuss with reference to the Patriotic Education Campaign.

Historical memory has proven to be a significant tool for both communist and democratic regimes alike.¹ In China, history being used to the benefit of administrations can be traced back to long before the Republican or Communist eras, dating to imperial rule even prior to the Qing Dynasty.² Historical memory has been especially significant to the Post-Mao Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen incident, which involved pro-democratic student protestors challenging the socialist quota clashing with military forces, foreign viewers predicted that the CCP would not survive.³ Despite this, the Party functions to this day; largely thanks to the use of memory implemented throughout the Patriotic Education Campaign. This campaign harnessed China's history in order to narrate how the CCP and socialism benefitted the country by bringing an end to the "Century of Humiliation" whilst withholding textbook coverage of failures like the

¹ Alisa Jones, 'Changing the Past to Serve the Present: History Education in Mainland China', in Edward Vickers and Alisa Jones, *History Education and National Identity in East Asia*, New York, 2005, p.65.

² Zheng Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations*, New York, 2012, p.192.

³ Zheng Wang, 'National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China', *International Studies Quarterly*, 52, 4, 2008, p.784.

“disasters” of the 1960s.⁴ Through this combination of selective memory, chosen trauma and chosen glory, the Party manipulated historical memory to save itself from what Professor Suisheng Zhao describes as ‘bankruptcy of the official ideology.’⁵ In this way, historical memory has been significant to the Post-Mao CCP in three key examples: providing legitimacy, developing nationalism, and solidifying power.

The Patriotic Education Campaign officially began following two documents published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC) in August 1991. These were the ‘Notice about Conducting Education of Patriotism and Revolutionary Tradition by Exploiting Extensively Cultural Relics’ and the ‘General Outline on Strengthening Education on Chinese Modern and Contemporary History and National Conditions.’⁶ Both documents highlighted the importance of Chinese youth understanding the humiliating history which the country had been exposed to during the Century of Humiliation, and in addition that the General Outline must be followed by all teachers and implemented within three years of it being issued.⁷ This pressure shows that the CCP understood the significance of historical memory at the time.

During the era of the Tiananmen protests, it was agreed amongst the Party’s top leaders that the incident occurred due to weak ideological control, and that such control would become a priority for the Education Campaign.⁸ The 1994 ‘Outline on Implementing Patriotic Education’ serves as the Party’s official early explanation of the Campaign, stating that the objective was:

⁴ Zheng Wang, ‘The Power of History and Memory: National Patriotic Education and China's Conflict Behavior in Crises with the United States, 1991–2001’, MA Thesis, George Mason University, 2006, p.2, accessed through ProQuest, Order No. 3194524; Lianke Yan, ‘On China's State Sponsored Amnesia’, *The New York Times*, April 1, 2013, <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/opinion/on-chinas-state-sponsored-amnesia.html>

⁵ Suisheng Zhao, ‘A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China’, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 31, 3, 1998, p.288.

⁶ CCCPC (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China), *Guanyu chongfeng liyong wenwu*, quoted in Robert Weatherley and Qiang Zhang, eds, *History and Nationalist Legitimacy in Contemporary China: A Double-Edged Sword*, London, 2017, p.97.

⁷ Zheng Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations*, New York, 2012, p.99.

⁸ Bridget Brown, ‘The Impact of Summer School Programmes on At-Risk Students’, PhD Dissertation, California State University, 2005), p.56, accessed through ProQuest, Order No. 2541562.

to boost the nation's spirit, enhance cohesion, foster national self-esteem and pride, consolidate and develop a patriot united front to the broadest extent possible, and direct and rally the masses' patriotic passions to the great cause of building socialism with Chinese characteristics.⁹

In essence, it can be understood that the Party intended to utilise history for unity and nationalism. The goal of a united, cohesive society is an ongoing theme in China which is constantly challenged by the sheer size and ethnic diversity of the country. Considering this, nationalism based on a sense of shared history would be the most plausible option to obtain such a society. In addition, the idea of 'rallying the masses' links to the Maoist roots of the CCP, who were initially legitimised 'by people's voluntary cooperation and participation in massive political and social movements.'¹⁰ However, this statement also outlines an even greater issue threatening the Party's legitimacy in the early 1990s: the call to put those masses towards 'socialism with Chinese characteristics' shows the CCP's desire to ratify leadership. In the past, the Party had no need to seek legitimacy through popular support owing to the Marxist ideology implemented by Mao.¹¹ Deng Xiaoping was relaunching his market-based economic reforms in the early 1990s along with the campaign, economic changes which are regarded as the *Gǎigé kāifàng* (1978) or 'reform and opening up.'¹²

These changes contradict traditional Marxist ideology; however, for legitimacy reasons the CCP is unable to fully reject that ideology or Mao—to this day refusing to acknowledge that the economic reforms deviated away from traditional values.¹³ The thought of Mao Zedong is, in fact, still upheld as principle today.¹⁴ In this case, historical memory was significant to the CCP's legitimacy. If, by focusing on the positive historical roots of the party—for reference of the campaign, in museums where history is described as 'the brave resistance of the people to imperialist invasions and to the oppression of feudalism, and finally of the victory ushered in through the leadership of the Chinese

⁹ Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation*, p.99.

¹⁰ Lotus Yang Ruan, 'The Chinese Communist Party and Legitimacy: What is the Chinese Communist Party's Official Discourse on Legitimacy?', *The Diplomat*, September 30, 2015, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/09/the-chinese-communist-party-and-legitimacy/>

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Author translation of common idiom (改革开放).

¹³ H. Xiao, 'Contradictory Steering Imperatives: Political Identity and Ideological Education in Institutes of Higher Learning of China, 1992-1999', PhD Dissertation, University of Southern California, 2000, p.7, accessed through ProQuest, Order No. DP30348.

¹⁴ Matteo Dian, 'Collective Memory and Foreign-Policy in China after the Cold War', in Matteo Dian, ed., *Contested Memories in Chinese and Japanese Foreign Policy*, Amsterdam, 2017, p.199.

Communist Party’—then history can be used to justify economic and ideological changes in post-Mao China.¹⁵ This was incredibly significant in order to maintain the CCP government, and especially significant at the time of the campaign’s initiation in proving legitimacy. This is once again significant in the present, in maintaining student’s understanding that the CCP is the legitimate government through being the best choice for China.

According to one issue of the People’s Daily newspaper (*Renmin Ribao*) in 1993:

Our party has paid close attention to educating party members and the masses in inheriting and developing patriotism. Patriotism, which constitutes an important component of socialist spiritual civilization, has become more important in the new period of reform and opening up . . . the Chinese people chose the CCP as their leading force because through history they understand that only the CCP can represent the people’s fundamental interests, take a correct road, and lead the people in fulfilling the grand target of making the country strong.¹⁶

This not only goes to show reliance upon education, but also how patriotism plays a significant role. Through the manipulation of historical memory, China’s sense of patriotism has been amplified by establishing sites like Patriotic Education bases—twenty of which commemorate the Sino-Japanese war, for example—as official channels calling attention to a shared history of trauma and glory and the role of the CCP within that history, people are educated and encouraged to love and share common interests with the Party.¹⁷ That memory is a shared memory, and an incredibly significant one to the CCP. One author goes as far as elaborating that this article proves it is patriotism, not communism, which forms the base of the CCP’s legitimacy.¹⁸ While history is not the only element to this sense of legitimacy, it is arguably the most significant because it is something that can be maintained and taught, controlled by media and accessibility, and paint a picture through memory. It is a common misconception, usually by Western academic speculation, that Chinese nationalism was what the party constructed to legitimise itself.¹⁹ It is true that the party did play a major role in developing nationalism

¹⁵ Kirk A. Denton, *Exhibiting the Past: Historical Memory and the Politics of Museums in Postsocialist China*, Honolulu, 2014, p.62.

¹⁶ ‘Hold High the Banner of Patriotism’, *Renmin Ribao*, November 28, 1993, quoted in Zhao, ‘A State-Led Nationalism’, p.297.

¹⁷ Weatherley and Zhang, p.97.

¹⁸ Zhao, ‘A State-Led Nationalism’, p.297.

¹⁹ Abanti Bhattacharya, ‘Chinese Nationalism And China's Assertive Foreign Policy’, *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, 21, 1, 2007, p.237.

as perceived in China today; however, it is apparent that the Party used history to create this nationalism, same as with legitimacy. Without historical memory, neither of these crucial elements would have developed the way they have. Nationalism is important to the CCP, but historical memory is most significant because it forms the baseline for creating and controlling what the Party needs, including nationalism.

In a similar way to how memory interacts with legitimacy, this patriotism and shared memory is also significant to nationalism. This revisits the idea of an ‘identity based upon shared experience.’ The idea of what defines a “nation” is flexible; in some cases, it applies to territory, to culture, religion, ethnicity, or language or history—all of these except the latter are wide and diverse in China.²⁰ In the words of Michael Apple and Linda Christian-Smith, Chinese history textbooks have constantly been used as devices for ‘glorifying the nation, consolidating its national identity, and justifying particular forms of social and political systems.’²¹ It is apparent how the Patriotic Education Campaign played a role in historical memory by looking at how textbooks changed over time.

As shown in Image One (overleaf), by 1993—as the campaign was intensifying—the topic of “nation” was being taught 1.8% more, whereas the idea of “collectivism” went from not existing within textbooks at all to becoming 4.6% of educated topics. This shows a move towards nationalism on behalf of the CCP. Moreover, the most dramatic increase and overall largest topic shown in this study is societal history. This proves several things. Firstly, a dramatic rise in the coverage of social history in educational environments in correlation with the rise of the education campaign proving the extent of the significance of history to the party; secondly, a shift in values shown by the decline in the labour and communism categories. Finally, it is worth pointing out what social history is focused upon. This holds significance to both nationalism and legitimism. Social history, while difficult to define, refers to several things: history and historical movements of the lower class (making it attractive for socialist academics), the history of “everyday life” and human activity, and finally “social history” being used in combination with “economic history”.²² Following social history, this suggests that the bulk of historical lessons

²⁰ Frank Dikötter, ‘Culture, “Race” and Nation: The Formation of National Identity in Twentieth Century China’, *Journal of International Affairs*, 1996, p.590.

²¹ Michael W. Apple and Linda K. Christian-Smith, *The Politics of the Textbook*, New York, 1991, p.10.

²² E. J. Hobsbawm, ‘From Social History to the History of Society’, *Daedalus*, 100, 1, 1971, pp.20-21.

students receive can be used to support the party by enforcing the ideas of mass movements from below, thus supporting Mao's rise to power and therefore the PRC, as well as touching upon the economy which is most useful at the time these statistics were collected (1993) following Deng's economic reforms. Ultimately, these changes show the significance of combining textbooks and history, and how history and education interweave with legitimacy and nationalism. This further proves historical memory held significance to the Post-Mao CCP, and that the party realised this significance in time to utilise it.

Image One: Table Showing Prominent Textbook Topics in Mainland China.²³

Table 4.3 Most Prominent Topics, China (1993)

Topic	Percentage of Content	
	1959	1993
Societal History	5.5%	28.4%
Socialism	0.3%	10.7%
Law	–	10.5%
Morals	15.1%	7.2%
Nation	5.3%	7.1%
Economic Issues	8.6%	6.8%
Science	2.1%	4.9%
Collectivism	–	4.6%
Labor	10.1%	4.0%
People/Masses	8.4%	3.7%
Communism	10.0%	2.9%
International Issues	4.2%	2.3%
Democracy	1.6%	2.3%
Education	2.5%	2.0%
Citizenship	–	1.7%
Family	0.3%	1.1%
Revolutionary Spirit	21.5%	–
Classes	3.7%	–
Capitalism	0.2%	–

²³ Gregory P. Fairbrother, *Toward Critical Patriotism: Student Resistance to Political Education in Hong Kong and China*, Hong Kong, 2003, p.67.

More specifically, it is also crucial to understand what aspects of this social history the government relied on. This returns to the example of the Century of Humiliation, which is a prime example of historical discourse because the official education system is constantly reminding young people of China's suffering; these memories cannot be forgotten, even by individuals who did not experience it. While historical amnesia like the lack of discourse about events like the Great Leap Forward is also important, this particular discourse is key to understanding Chinese historical narrative not as one based on amnesia, but on manipulation of memory. William A. Callahan points out that what is fascinating about China's historiography and national identity is the 'very deliberate celebration of a national insecurity.'²⁴ The idiom '*Wuwang guochi*' or 'never forget national humiliation' is crucial to this. The most significant historical memory for justifying Party decisions in foreign policy, in economics, and in power comes from the victim narrative maintained by Century of Humiliation discourse. According to Zheng Wang, modern Chinese historical consciousness is 'powerfully influenced' by the Century of Humiliation.²⁵ This influence can be seen within the lives of everyday people; for example, in Image Two (overleaf), which is not only interesting for the young age of the girl participating in the protest but also the use of the government-coined phrase demanding that the Chinese public never forget this part of their history. In addition, the phrase "national humiliation" has further significance regarding unity and nationhood: it is a humiliation carried by all Chinese people.

The official narrative in 1992 was that the Opium War, which marked the beginning of this Century of Humiliation, saw China 'degenerate from an independent country to a semi-colonial country.'²⁶ This explores two crucial parts of the historical narrative which make it significant to the Post-Mao CCP: it immediately implies the greatness of China prior to this event—also shown by some major historical sites implemented by the Education Campaign like the Great Wall, a change from the heavily critical Maoist and Republican eras; moreover, it reminds students that this historical trauma was caused by foreigners.

²⁴ William A. Callahan, 'National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, and Chinese Nationalism', *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 29, 2, 2004, p.199.

²⁵ Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation*, p.7.

²⁶ PEP (People's Education Press), *Putong gaozhong kecheng biao zhun shiyan jiaokeshu lishi* [Normal high school standard textbook history], Beijing, 1992, p. 52, quoted in Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation*, p.50.

Image Two: Nine-year-old School Girl painting the phrase “Never Forget National Humiliation” during an anti-Japanese protest (2005).²⁷



²⁷ Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation*, p.4.

It is obvious from the Century of Humiliation discourse that history plays a pivotal role in foreign relations.²⁸ However this works two ways: it is also clear that China is able to use this history to justify, make, and narrate foreign policy, relations, and decisions. After 1994, there was a rise in anti-Western works, including throughout literature and television.²⁹ Although historical memory does play a role here, it lacks notable difference to the discourse at the time: what is more distinguished, is the fact that it is so prominently well-remembered. This is not so much the significance of historical memory upon foreign relations as much as historical memory being significant to the CCP's power in general. History has been used in discourse against the West and Japan, one example being from *The Liberation Army Daily* stating that 'since the Opium War, the West has never stopped its aggression against China . . . then isolated and contained the new socialist country in order to overthrow this government.'³⁰ This is no different to using the century of humiliation to validate the economic shift. It is the significance of history in maintaining strength by making decisions validated by experience. Once again, this is the victim role, but in the same way as it works in foreign relations it impacts the theme of nationalism. For example, Jiang Zemin's letter—which played an equally significant role to the Patriotic Education Campaign's Outline—defines that even though China faced an ongoing era of war, 'Chinese people have stood up for themselves since the [May the Fourth Movement was implemented]' and that 'China also experienced several anti-aggression wars [which] demonstrated that the Chinese people cannot be bullied.'

Rather than condone anti-Western ideology, or encourage the education system to oppose foreign countries, Jiang's letter indicates historical memory's significance to the Post-Mao CCP being more nationalistic. This implies the resilience of the Chinese people as a force of resistance. Some teachers in a recent survey regarding Patriotic Education claimed that, 'without patriotic education more students would not understand China 's past, and without this understanding . . . China would be weak.' Patriotic education 'encourages students . . . to make their nation strong.'³¹ In this way, history gained through education is significant to China's strength and power, as well as the power of

²⁸ Bhattacharya, p.237.

²⁹ Christopher A. Ford, *China Looks at the West: Identity, Global Ambitions, and the Future of Sino-American Relations*, Lexington, KY, 2015, p.296.

³⁰ Robert Weatherley, *Politics in China Since 1949: Legitimising Authoritarian Rule*, New York, 2006, p.154.

³¹ Gregory P. Fairbrother, 'Patriotic Education in a Chinese Middle School', in W.O. Lee et al., eds, *Citizenship Education in Asia and the Pacific*, Hong Kong, 2004, p.162.

the CCP, on top of being useful as justification to decisions in maintaining and using that power.

While use of history is not the only element of the campaign, it is arguable that it is the most important: in the words of Gerrit Gong, a ‘nation’s history is not merely a recounting of its past. What individuals and countries remember and what they forget and why are telling indicators of current values, perceptions, even aspirations.’³² Other elements such as flag raising and routines to develop a sense of patriotism also played a role; however, the significance of history is far greater because it goes to show a society’s underlying values in the present based off the perception of history—which, when manipulated through textbooks and the education system can become a formidable tool for young people developing an understanding of their position in the world based off the government’s cookie-cutter description. We can see this significance in more recent history, when state-run Chinese newspapers compared the 1999 US bombing of a Chinese embassy to the memory of the *Yuanmingyuan*—the Old Summer Palace left in ruins from French and British troops during the Second Opium War.³³ This blatantly uses negative historical memory to elaborate the country’s modern position and hard-line a sort of “anti-Western” front by keeping trauma in mind. In addition, this particular campaign is not a stand-alone or singularity within Chinese history; there were previous campaigns launched, for example, during the Maoist era, for various propaganda purposes. Some scholars even argue that Patriotic Education has been continuous in China since the 1980s and only deepened in 1993.³⁴ However, the Patriotic Education Campaign of the 1990s is recognised for broadcasting the CCP’s philosophies, ideology, and agenda in a notably more practical and sophisticated methodology.³⁵ This had extremely broad reach, ranging all the way from the obvious government-run publishers, to theatre, and other cultural facilities.³⁶ It is doubtless that historical memory has indeed played a significant role through the Patriotic Education campaign, and clear that it was significant to the Post-Mao CCP.

³² Gerrit W. Gong, *Memory and History in East and Southeast Asia*, Washington, D.C., 2001, p.26.

³³ Weatherley and Zhang, p.4.

³⁴ Chak Kwan Chan, King Lun Ngok, and David Phillips, *Social Policy in China: Development and Well-being*, Bristol, 2008, p.149.

³⁵ Zhao, ‘A State-Led Nationalism’, p.289.

³⁶ *Zhongguo Gongchandang jianshe dazidian 1921-1991* [An Encyclopedia on the Building of the CCP], Chengdu, 1992, p.676, quoted in Weatherley and Zhang, p.4.

Mao Zedong famously stated, 'use the past to serve the present.'³⁷ Overall, it is apparent that the Post-Mao Chinese Communist Party was able to do so. Throughout the 1990s, history was especially relevant due to the Patriotic Education Campaign. Historical memory, and control over it, was significant to the Party's power and country's strength, to the development of nationalism which benefitted the CCP and formed a sense of unity and patriotism from the education system up, and most importantly for founding a sense of legitimacy when the official ideology was crumbling. This historical memory, a shared consciousness of chosen trauma and chosen glory serves as a sense of identity within China today, as well as working in individual's perspectives and justifying decisions made by the CCP. What is most interesting here is the CCP reliance upon discourse about the Century of Humiliation, which plays distinctive roles in each element of significance to the CCP, the most significant of these being the relationship between this history and the Party's legitimacy due to the success it has upheld in keeping governmental power both long-term and during the early 1990s.

³⁷ Callahan, p.199.

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HISTORY 333 | AUSTRALIAN HISTORY SINCE 1788

By Eloise Sims

In what ways does a transnational approach to the study of history help or hinder our understanding of 'White Australia'?

According to Australian historian Ian Tyrell, the term 'transnational history' refers to a method of historical writing that is focused on 'the movement of peoples, ideas, technologies and institutions across national boundaries'.¹ In other words, transnational historiographies are ones that tend to challenge older historiographies' focus on singular nation states as their subjects, in order to paint a picture of a far more interconnected world (usually within the timeframe following the birth of the United States of America).² Due to a renewed interest in studying the path of globalisation, and how it has led us to our internationalist society today, many historians have begun to utilise transnational frameworks in understanding significant historical events. One event of particular historical scrutiny is the creation of the 'White Australia' policy in 1901—a highly restrictive piece of immigration legislation, which sought to prevent those of non-European descent entering Australia right up until its effective dismantlement in 1966.³ Traditional historians have emphasised that the causes, substance, and effects of White Australia must be understood through careful examination of Australian life and domestic

¹ Ian Tyrell, 'What Is Transnational History?', 11 May 2008, <https://iantyrell.wordpress.com/what-is-transnational-history/>

² Ibid.

³ James Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera: The Story of Australian Immigration*, Melbourne, 2002, p.8.

society at the time.⁴ In response, transnational historians such as Marilyn Lake have recently argued that the very founding idea of Australia as a “white man’s nation” cannot be understood without looking at ideas, policies, and events at the time that crossed geographical boundaries in their influence.⁵ This essay aims to inquire how a transnational approach to historical writing helps our understanding of White Australia by examining how factors such as shared historic “white man’s narratives”, the United States Civil War, immigration legislation in Natal, and Australia’s relationship with Britain affected the very creation and character of Australia as a “white man’s nation”.

As Lake argues in her article, ‘The White Man Under Siege’, to understand why the very notion of an exclusively White Australia emerged in the early twentieth century, we need to examine the rise of an anxiety-ridden discourse amongst white settler countries in the late nineteenth century.⁶ This discourse, Lake explains, was kick-started by Charles Pearson’s 1893 *National Life and Character: A Forecast*—a text that challenged the ‘traditional’ notion of ‘manifest destiny’ that claimed Western expansion and supremacy were inevitable.⁷ Instead, Pearson argued that ‘the black and yellow’ races could soon overpower the ‘higher races’ in terms of population growth and land.⁸ Key to this argument was deep-rooted concerns of continuing Caucasian population decline, especially when compared to particularly high levels of Chinese population growth in areas like Singapore.⁹ Pearson’s publication, Douglas Cole notes, coincided with a global rise of nationalism around the industrialised world in the 1890s, which served to propel his book into a wider imagination of British white race patriotism.¹⁰ While Pearson, an upper class British migrant to Australia, did not see the rise of decolonization as a particularly bad thing for independent nations, his book served to construct a frightening notion of a ‘white man under siege’ throughout the colonial world.¹¹ Theodore Roosevelt, for instance, wrote to Pearson to tell him of the ‘great effect’ of his book on policy-makers

⁴ Myra Willard, *History of the White Australia Policy to 1920*, 2nd ed., Melbourne, 1967, pp.188–213.

⁵ Marilyn Lake, ‘White Man’s Country: The Trans-national History of a National Project’, *Australian Historical Studies*, 34, 122, 2003, pp.346–363.

⁶ Marilyn Lake, ‘The White Man under Siege: New Histories of Race in the Nineteenth Century and the Advent of White Australia’, *History Workshop Journal*, 58, 2004, pp.41–62.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Lake, ‘White Man’s Country’, pp.346–363.

⁹ Lake, ‘The White Man under Siege’, p.41.

¹⁰ Douglas Cole, “‘The Crimson Thread of Kinship’: Ethnic Ideas in Australia, 1870–1914’, *Historical Studies*, 14, 56, 1971, pp.511–525.

¹¹ Lake, ‘The White Man under Siege’, pp.346–363.

in the United States, inspiring many more alarmist tracts. His work was also highly praised by the *Westminster Gazette* for ‘stimulating thought’.¹² Indeed, Pearson’s work was such an inspiration for the White Australia policy—in stimulating a transnational anxious discourse on the possible ‘submersion of Anglo-Saxondom’ by other races—that Edmund Barton, Australia’s first Prime Minister, held Pearson’s book aloft in making his speech for the White Australia policy in 1901.¹³ ‘We will wake to find ourselves elbowed and hustled [by other races]’, he declared, arguing that the restrictive immigration policy was necessary to secure Australia as a ‘temperate’ nation exclusively for ‘white men’ to populate.¹⁴ Barton also cited James Bryce in his speech, a British historical writer who claimed in his 1897 book, *Impressions of South Africa*, that “kaffir” populations were also fast increasing in South Africa.¹⁵ Indeed, he claimed, this population would eventually swamp the white population entirely, in a new extension of the clearly global race anxiety.¹⁶ From the emergence of these new histories, and their influence over Australian colonial policymakers who created White Australia, we can detect a distinct need to preserve Australia from the increasing numbers of non-white populations around the world. Transnational ideas, and particular anxieties over the future of white populations, therefore, clearly both prompted and formed the substance of the White Australia policy.

However, the circulation of tracts and ideas that induced a transnational “white man’s anxiety” and a need to protect nations for the habitation of Caucasian populations were not the only transnational factors that prompted the White Australia Policy. In *The White Pacific: US Imperialism and Black Slavery In The South Seas After The Civil War*, Gerald Horne claims that events during the United States’ post-Civil War Reconstruction period served to instruct Australians on the difficulties of attempting to govern a democratic country with a significant “colored” population.¹⁷ This is not an unsubstantiated claim. *The Bulletin*, an Australian pro-labour political journal, for instance, published numerous gloomy essays on the ‘irrepressible racial war of extermination between Caucasian and

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality*, Cambridge, 2008, p.100.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Lake, ‘White Man’s Country’, pp.346-363.

¹⁶ Lake, ‘The White Man under Siege’, pp.41–62.

¹⁷ Gerald Horne, *The White Pacific: U.S. Imperialism and Black Slavery in the South Seas after the Civil War*, Hawai’i, 2007, pp.146–160.

Negro in the United States'.¹⁸ Indeed, the conclusion of James Bryce's other influential text, *American Commonwealth*, was that Radical Reconstruction failed in attempting to extend democratic rights to the black population in the United States.¹⁹ 'Emancipation found them utterly ignorant', Bryce wrote, insisting that "colored" populations were entirely unsuitable for any semblance of self-government—and as a result, white terrorist incidents perpetrated by the Ku Klux Klan had broken out in protest, fracturing the very stability of the democratic nation.²⁰ Australian policymakers swore to learn lessons from this American mistake. If "colored" populations were so unsuitable for self-government, then, truly, they concluded, the best step was to deport and exclude these populations altogether to avoid the trap the United States had fallen into.²¹ H.B. Higgins, the Liberal member for North Melbourne, summarised this exact thought process in the first Australian Parliament by declaring, 'the United States . . . is experiencing the greatest racial trouble ever known in the history of the world. We should take warning and guard ourselves against similar complications.'²² As a result of this 'warning', in forming the Australian Constitution, the assembled Australian Members of Parliament agreed to implement Section 51, which granted the Commonwealth the power to make special laws for people of any race 'other than the Aboriginal race in any state'.²³ This was seen as neatly sidestepping the problem the Americans had found themselves in with the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which promised citizenship rights for all persons born within the United States, whether they were black or white.²⁴ With this new legislative power, the Australian Commonwealth was free to implement the policies of White Australia—restricting non-European immigration with the power of a 'dictation test' in the Immigration Restriction Act (1901), and deporting all Pacific Island laborers that had previously been employed on sugar plantations in Queensland in the Pacific Island Laborers Act (1901).²⁵ In other words, Australia had clearly concluded that democracy and racial diversity were incompatible from the American experience, and therefore felt inspired to implement policies of racial expulsion in their first act as a

¹⁸ Cole, pp.511–525.

¹⁹ Lake, 'The White Man under Siege', pp.41–62.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Lake and Reynolds, p.100.

²² Lake, 'White Man's Country', pp.346–363.

²³ Lake and Reynolds, p.100.

²⁴ Lake, 'White Man's Country', pp.346–363.

²⁵ Matthew Jordan, 'Rewriting Australia's Racist Past: How Historians (Mis)Interpret the "White Australia" Policy', *History Compass*, 3, 1, 2005, p.2.

united nation-state.²⁶ ‘I say that [the US] . . . would have been ten times better off if the Negroes had not been left there,’ Higgins concluded.²⁷ Accordingly, he then voted to exclude other races from his own country.²⁸ In this way, we can see how White Australia was clearly influenced by the example of the United States in both its legislative character, and the reason for its creation in its first place—showing, again, the value of a transnational approach in understanding this policy.

As this essay has explored so far, the character of the White Australia policy was substantially affected by both the creation of a “white man’s anxiety” in texts circulated internationally at the time, and the example of the failure of Radical Reconstruction in the United States of America. However, historian Jeremy Martens has argued these two factors were not the only transnational influences on the character of White Australia.²⁹ Martens asserts that to truly understand why White Australia took the format that it did—in both creating a duplicitous dictation test to be given to prospective immigrants, and defining a “prohibited immigrant”—we must look to Section 3 of the colony of Natal’s Immigration Restriction Act of 1897.³⁰ Martens claims that this Immigration Restriction Act, which made deliberate diplomatic efforts to name no specific group of migrants to exclude, was actually the model for the White Australia policy.³¹ This assertion comes from a Colonial Conference of 1897, where Secretary of State for the Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, discussed ‘certain Imperial questions’ with premiers from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Natal, and the Cape Colony.³² In the conference, Chamberlain tried to find a compromise between Australia’s anti-immigration will, and Britain’s need to cater to nations like British India and Japan.³³ Natal’s brand-new immigration act seemed to offer a compromise between both what Australia required and what Britain would prefer—with an educational ‘dictation’ test requirement applied so Britain could claim its antipodean colony was discriminating against no specific nation in its restrictive immigration requirements.³⁴ Western Australia was the first state to adopt this

²⁶ Horne.

²⁷ Lake, ‘The White Man under Siege’, pp.41–62.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Jeremy Martens, ‘A Transnational History of Immigration Restriction: Natal and New South Wales, 1896–97’, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 34, 3, 2006, pp.323–344.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Jupp, p.8.

³⁴ Martens, pp.323–344.

immigration legislation—with a “dictation test” implemented—before the White Australia policy was adopted overall in 1901.³⁵ As this example has shown us, transnational approaches to the study of history are incredibly helpful in allowing us to understand the character of the White Australia policy, as it was so clearly influenced by the solution of another settler colony. It also highlights that the xenophobic experience of White Australia may not have been one unique to Australia at the time, if Natal was forced to implement such similar legislation, and allows us to understand that these events were ‘a complex but not unusual interplay of forces at work everywhere’ throughout the colonies, in the words of Charles Price.³⁶

If transnational approaches to history help us understand both the causes of the White Australia policy, and its legislative substance, can they also help us understand the effects of White Australia? Certainly. Traditional historians have tended to focus only on White Australia’s effects on Australia itself. For instance, James Jupp writes in *From White Australia to Woomera: The Story of Australian Immigration* that White Australia’s main effect was that by 1947, Australia’s non-European population was measured by the National Census as 0.25% of the total (it’s worth noting that Aboriginals were not permitted to take part in this census).³⁷ But, by viewing history in such a tight geopolitical vacuum, we forget the policy of White Australia actually had substantive effects around the world that would also impact on Australian life. According to Lake and Henry Reynolds in *Drawing The Global Color Line*, White Australia policies ‘reflected, and would in turn shape new racial solidarities around the world’.³⁸ Indeed, in the United States, many anti-immigrant Americans were encouraged by Australia’s pronouncement, prompting further calls for immigration restrictions that would not be implemented into law until 1924.³⁹ Prescott Hall, the Secretary of the United States Immigration Restriction League, was apparently so inspired by White Australia that he wrote to the Australian Prime Minister within a month of White Australia’s passage to obtain copies of the Dictation Test given to prospective migrants.⁴⁰ Britain, however, was displeased with this act of colonial independence—especially when they faced the Japanese government’s

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Lake, ‘White Man’s Country’, pp.346–363.

³⁷ Jupp, p.8.

³⁸ Lake and Reynolds, p.100.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

fury at being ‘placed in the same category as stateless peoples such as Kanakas and Negroes’.⁴¹ The British Government was also lobbied by British India, which developed a growing resentment as to the ambiguously restrictive policy of the Dictation Test.⁴² As a result, Australia was forced to mildly modify the policy in 1904, to exempt ‘merchants, students, and tourist travellers’ from taking the Dictation Test provided they had either Japanese or Indian passports—a modification, it’s worth noting, that the United States had pioneered after excluding the Chinese from its shores in 1882.⁴³ From this example, we can thereby see that a transnational understanding of White Australia’s effects allows us to better understand the policy overall, including its subsequent modification due to the British Crown’s desire to placate other nations.

Yet, in some instances, scholars have argued that a transnational approach to the study of history can hinder our understanding of the White Australia policy. Their concern is that, with emphasising international linkages and the circulation of shared ideas at the time, transnational historians can forget that domestic factors were crucial in creating the uniqueness of the White Australia policy. For instance, Matthew Jordan cites the rapid arrival of Chinese on the Victorian and South Australian goldfields as being a key impetus behind the White Australia policy, by creating fears among ordinary Australians that the growing presence of Chinese would ‘undermine law and order’.⁴⁴ Perhaps, in the minds of these Australians, the inclusion of these Chinese could even undermine the democratic qualities of the nation itself.⁴⁵ This is a view shared by traditionalist historian Myra Willard, who argues that the instance of Chinese laborers in Victoria being given voting privileges—and exercising their vote in accordance with their countrymen who had authority over them (instead of independently)—showed Australians that voting rights could not be extended to the “lesser races”.⁴⁶ In addition, while we can see a similar rush of Chinese immigrants happening in the Californian goldfields at the time, the United States did not feel compelled to introduce legislation as restrictive as the White Australia policy, highlighting how crucial Australian domestic factors were to the policy’s implementation, as no identical policy was implemented in the US.⁴⁷ Jordan also cites

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Willard, pp.188–213.

⁴³ Lake and Reynolds, p.100.

⁴⁴ Jordan, p.2.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Willard, pp.188-213.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

Australia's unique geopolitical anxieties due to their proximity to Asia, especially with the rise of the heavily militarised imperial power of Japan before the Russo-Japanese War in 1905.⁴⁸ Indeed, as time went on under the White Australia policy, these deep-rooted fears still existed, nearly coming to a head in a 'real manifestation of the yellow peril', as former diplomat James Dunn claims in the documentary, *Admission Impossible*.⁴⁹ Understanding this fear of "Asian invasion", as well as Australia's previous experience with Chinese on the goldfields, is certainly necessary to understand why the White Australia policy was put in place, but these domestic factors could be very well undermined in a transnational history of the White Australia policy, and hinder our understanding of the policy overall. However, it is true that national and transnational histories are not mutually exclusive, and both should be utilised to aid us in our understanding of the White Australia policy.

In conclusion, a transnational approach to the study of history certainly aids our understanding of White Australia in a number of aspects. By studying the circulation of ideas as to "white man's anxiety" after the publication of Charles Pearson's influential book, or the experience of the United States after the Civil War, we can understand factors that led to the perceived need for the White Australia policy among colonial lawmakers, for instance. Indeed, as we have examined, the very content of the White Australia policy itself was a transnational phenomenon, having been inspired by similar legislation implemented in the colony of Natal. The effects of White Australia were also felt around the world, with Japanese and British Indian embassies lobbying Britain to the extent that the policy had to be subsequently (if grudgingly) adjusted to cater for Japanese and Indian nationals, showing how a transnational view improves our overall understanding of the policy contextually. However, that is not to say that domestic influences on the White Australia policy, such as the experience of encountering Chinese nationals on the goldfields, or Australia's geographic proximity to other Asian nations, should be discounted. Instead, transnational history merely allows us to understand far more about White Australia's overall historical context and character, and question where the norms and ideas that this white colonial society held so tightly actually came from. Indeed, transnationalism's true value is highlighted in the writings of British historian Catherine

⁴⁸ Jordan, p.2.

⁴⁹ Alec Morgan, *Admission Impossible*, Film Australia Collection, 1992, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uPfJRetYP04>.

Hall: 'A focus on national histories as constructed, rather than given . . . on national identities as being brought into being through particular discursive work, requires transnational thinking.'⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Lake, 'White Man's Country', pp.346–363.

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HISTORY 357 | MAKING MODERN AMERICA

By Beth Maynard

The Birth of the Nation: Capital, Society, and the American National Imagination in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era

In 1875, American steel mills altogether produced 350,000 tons of steel. In 1920, they produced 60 million.¹ This single, almost incomprehensible, statistic speaks to interconnected upheavals in American society; to massive technological advances, sea-changes in the size, structure, origin, and location of the industrial labour force, a transformation in the organisation of business capital, the sprawl of a transcontinental railway system, and exponentially rising demand for capital goods.² Such intricately intertwined processes collectively represent part of a four-decade-long transformation in America, from the mid 1870s to the end of the Great War, which fundamentally restructured the United States economy, class and social structures, and national imagination, along undeniably *modern* lines. We can consider modernity as a project, as an historical epoch, as a set of transformative economic, social, political, and cultural conditions, and as both a contemporary and retrospective mode of historiographical organisation. The key modernising processes of rationalisation, centralisation,

¹ Robert Gallman, 'Economic Growth and Structural Change in the Long Nineteenth Century,' in Stanley Engerman and Robert Gallman, eds, *The Cambridge Economic History of the United States, Volume II: The Long Nineteenth Century*, London, 2006. p.7.

² Rosanne Currarino, *The Labor Question in America: Economic Democracy in the Gilded Age*, Urbana, 2010, pp.3-4.

bureaucratisation, and individualisation played out across American culture, politics, society, and economics, as the entrenchment of the capitalist mode of production and its vast impacts played off complex cultural, social, and national historical factors. In all of these senses, the Gilded Age and Progressive Era (*GAPE*) was *the* period in which America became both ‘modern’ and a ‘nation,’ in a vast process of consolidation, accumulation, and centralisation, which irreversibly changed how Americans worked, owned, consumed, and related to one another and their own identities. As rapid upheaval created disorder and trauma, it conversely generated a vast spectrum of reactions and responses, laying the foundation for new consensus in how America both understood and managed itself.

The primary driver of modernisation in America during the *GAPE* was the comprehensive extension and consolidation of a market capitalist economy through the second Industrial Revolution, which transferred most workers into the wage-labour system. Before the 1870s, a significant proportion of Americans had owned the means with which they made their living, and were part of the formal economy only nominally, producing a varying proportion of their food, clothing, tools, and transport, rather than accessing them through the market.³ From the 1870s, however, production, especially the production of capital goods, rose exponentially. Technological revolutions and constantly improving machinery across a range of industries created massive increases in production, whilst intertwined revolutions in communication and transportation technologies allowed for the organised movement of finished goods, raw materials, and labour.⁴ As demand for labour grew and the viability of cottage industries plummeted, the brunt of the workforce was transformed, in the space of a few decades, into the labourers of the new large industries; working in factories, mines, and railways for a *wage*.⁵ Fundamentally, the *GAPE* was a period of modernisation in that all Americans were subsumed into the market economy, that market economy grew enormously in size and scope, and all production and consumption was interlocked into this single capitalist economic system.⁶ By 1900, America was the primary industrial producer in the world.⁷

³ Melvyn Dubofsky, *Industrialism and the American Worker, 1865-1920*, Wheeling, 1996, pp.35-36.

⁴ Michael Kazin, ‘Why the Gilded Age and Progressive Era Still Matters’, in Christopher M. Nichols and Nancy C. Unger, eds, *A Companion to the Gilded Age and Progressive Era*, Chichester, 2017. p.452.

⁵ Dubofsky, pp.36-37.

⁶ Charles Postel, *The Populist Vision*, New York, 2007. pp.9-10.

⁷ Kazin, p.451.

The new social system of modern America, generated by rapid industrialisation, characterised by an ever growing class of wage labourers, a contracting band of wealthy owners of capital, and an uneasy ‘middle class’ coalition of white collar workers and managers, created new class conflicts and identities. Inequality soared during the GAPE.⁸ Propertyless unskilled wage labourers were at the mercy of their employers and the business cycle far more than was possible before economic incorporation, allowing organised collectives of business owners to control workers through competition.⁹ Broad collective industrial strike action in the late nineteenth century was frequent and peaked in times of national calamity, often around railroad labour, which had the power to undermine national trade.¹⁰ Proletarianisation was culturally as well as socially dislocative for workers removed from their traditional agrarian or craft backgrounds, generating new, divergent class identities based around nostalgia for the old “dignity” of skilled labour, collective revolutionary working class solidarity, or identification with and desire to succeed within the new system of enterprise.¹¹ And while producerist republicans and socialist organisations alike actively contested the wage system, by the end of the Progressive Era wage labour and wage labourers were conclusively embedded in the socioeconomic system. The wealthy responded by generating mythologies of class which placed individual responsibility for poorness onto the poor themselves, pathologising the industrial working class for supposed laziness, stupidity, and brutishness, as a way of obscuring the systemic inequalities of the new economic system.¹² This individualist rhetoric has remained the status quo of American political and social thought; the idealisation of freedom used to argue that the poor have failed as individuals in a meritocratic society.

New languages of class were played out on the burgeoning industrial city, as Gilded Age America underwent a massive process of urbanisation. In the space of a few decades, America was transformed from a primarily agrarian society with small urban centres into a primarily urban one with a major agricultural sector; a generational shift which wrought

⁸ Paul Boyer, *Urban Masses and Moral Order in America, 1820-1920*, Cambridge, 1978, p.123.

⁹ Dubofsky, pp.58-59.

¹⁰ Leon Fink, *The Long Gilded Age: American Capitalism and the Lessons of a New World Order*, Pittsburgh, 2015, pp.20-21.

¹¹ Currarino, p.4.

¹² Boyer, pp.130-131.

massive upheavals when accompanied by social change and immigration.¹³ This urbanisation was driven by socioeconomic push and pull factors. New urban centres arose rapidly in the heart of transport networks, using materials from the Western United States shifted by railroad; Chicago, America's "Second City," emerged as a great processing centre of Midwestern agricultural products, for instance.¹⁴ As the viability of small-scale farming plummeted and demand for industrial labour grew, massive population shifts from country to city occurred, including across borders.¹⁵ An influx of immigrants from rural Eastern and Southern Europe, interpreted as thoroughly "alien" by dominant middle class Anglo-Saxon rhetoric, formed the backbone of the industrial labour force in the new centres of the Eastern seaboard and Midwest, creating great cities with a thoroughly different cultural milieu to the countryside.¹⁶ Badly planned, poorly regulated, and often dangerous urban centres, where a multi-ethnic working class coalesced, were portrayed as unsettling threats to the social fabric; both in the potential for class upheaval, and in a more general fear of undermining the idealised American social networks of preindustrial island communities.¹⁷ Urbanisation was both a key symptom and active driver of modernity, allowing for increased production and intensive agriculture, whilst generating entirely new, fundamentally modern social relationships.

Alongside industrialisation and urbanisation, the GAPE brought the rise of new forms of organisation and management which begot both thoroughly modern institutions like the corporation, and more general shifts towards a rationalistic and bureaucratic culture which is a critical hallmark of modernity. Incredibly complex production lines, and the broader economic system of exchange, relying on well-coordinated chains of raw materials and capital goods, required management. Bureaucracies in business organisations, in finance, in new major public institutions and significantly enlarged government arose, managing the increasingly complex economic, and then social, world of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.¹⁸ The Gilded Age created the corporation, a modern mode of business management which became a vehicle for the

¹³ Ibid., p.123.

¹⁴ Carl Smith, *Urban Disorder and the Shape of Belief: The Great Chicago Fire, the Haymarket Bomb, and the Model Town of Pullman*, Chicago, 1995, pp.46-47.

¹⁵ Boyer, pp.123-124.

¹⁶ Ibid., p.126.

¹⁷ Carl Smith. p.40.

¹⁸ Richard L. McCormick, 'Progressivism: A Contemporary Assessment', in Richard L. McCormick, ed., *The Party Period and Public Policy: American Politics from the Age of Jackson to the Progressive Era*, New York, 1986, p.267.

expansion of production and exploitation.¹⁹ Placing management in the hands of a board of non-owners both limited liability, allowing for otherwise enormously risky high-capital developments, and allowed businesses to balloon in size and scope, operating across large geographical areas.²⁰ That during the GAPE, more and more facets of American life came under the organisational auspices of hierarchical, rational, objectively accountable managerial techniques, was a critical part of the nation's modernisation.

These bureaucratic structures were represented in the administration of the burgeoning federal government, which was responsible during the GAPE for a programme of consolidation, constructing America territorially, economically, and ideologically, as a coherent "nation". Prior to the Civil War, most Americans had little practical day-to-day contact with federal government, and considered their identities in the context of their local communities or state.²¹ This changed fundamentally through the GAPE, partly in response to new Progressive-Era expectations of interventionist government, but also due to the organisational demands of the new socioeconomic system.²² The incorporated national cash economy required centralised management, an effective taxation scheme, and significant standardisation to ensure that business could be run smoothly across the country, a commitment echoed in the frequent utilisation of federal law enforcement to break strikes after 1877.²³ As Federal government began to override the power of state bodies and to practically regulate the lives of more and more people, Americans came to view themselves as part of a *nation*.²⁴ The project of territorial consolidation which was taken out in the Plains Wars of the 1870s was carried on ideologically in the increasingly compulsory public school system, teaching children to identify with the newly incorporated nation, bound geographically and culturally to those who shared American soil, history, and values.²⁵

Critically, to understand both the material and ideological processes of nation building which transformed America during the GAPE, we must look to the experiences and

¹⁹ Kazin, p.452.

²⁰ Dubofsky, p.47.

²¹ Ibid., pp.36-37.

²² Michael McGerr, *A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America*, New York, 2003. p.67

²³ Dubofsky, p.45.

²⁴ McCormick, p.272.

²⁵ Shelton Stromquist, *Re-Inventing "The People": The Progressive Movement, the Class Problem, and the Origins of Modern Liberalism*, Urbana, 2006., p.136.

positioning of indigenous Americans. The last decades of the nineteenth century saw both the last frontier conflict and atrocities, and the beginning of a great consolidation of Western land, converting expropriated soil into valuable agricultural, industrial, and railroad corridors which were incorporated into the burgeoning cash economy.²⁶ For indigenous Americans, “modernisation” meant a transition to new, systemic United States policies of assimilation. Communal title to what land indigenous people retained was undermined, and rhetoric encouraged them to settle, to farm and accumulate wealth, and to reject “traditional” culture and community.²⁷ Some indigenous people managed not only to survive, but to thrive in this new world of ownership, navigating white and indigenous contexts and working with both.²⁸ But for most indigenous Americans, despite their undeniably resourceful and complex responses to this transformation, “modernity” meant an increasingly bureaucratic and expropriative form of colonisation, which was fundamentally traumatic. Indigenous children were sent to lethal, scientifically managed industrial schools, intended to dislocate them from cultural and family contexts and to provide training for subordinated places in the wage labour force.²⁹ The ascent of rationality and scientific knowledge frameworks, combined with old white mythologies of superiority, created the new field of “racial science”; classifying indigenous Americans as inherently inferior through the *modern* study of heredity.³⁰

Modernity in the GAPE was not just a new set of material conditions and cultural relationships, but a new system for organising and giving meaning to American history, a historiographical model which recast the present as the pinnacle of a constant upwards march of progress. The official closing of the Western frontier in the late nineteenth century generated a crisis in the conception of American history. The United States had arguably understood its national narrative as an interplay between the set of republican values (liberty, democracy, individualism etc.), inherited at independence, and a process of Westward expansion which allowed the nation to identify itself according to what it

²⁶ Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945*, New York, 1982. pp.39.

²⁷ Sherry Smith, ‘Comments: Native Americans and Indian Policy in the Progressive Era’, *Journal of the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era* 9, 4, 2010, pp.505-506.

²⁸ David Rich Lewis, ‘Reservation Leadership and the Progressive-Traditional Dichotomy: William Wash and the Northern Utes, 1865-1928’, in Frederick E. Hoxie, Peter C. Mancall, and James H. Merrell, eds, *American Nations: Encounters in Indian Country, 1850 to the Present*, New York, 2001. p.203.

²⁹ Sherry Smith, p.504.

³⁰ Stromquist, pp.136-137.

was not; “America” lay east of the frontier, was un-Indian, and constantly expanding.³¹ The GAPE saw this expansion and incorporation realised in finality, necessitating a new national historical myth around which identity and policy could be shaped. America’s history, and its future, was recast as a journey of progress, represented by rationalist technological and scientific achievements alongside civic and political ones, in which modernity was the constantly pursued goal.³² Modern identity was celebrated spectacularly, for instance, in turn of the century exhibitions, which invited visitors to contrast ‘savage’ Sioux, Apache, and Filipino villages with the civilised technological and artistic wonders that represented the nation’s progressive future. The reorientation of national history towards modernity and progress was diffused more generally in the everyday, however; in how Americans understood their past, and in the ways which they sought to shape their future.³³

The Progressive Era generated new political consensuses which sought to shape American society along thoroughly rational, modern lines, applying objective research methods in response to the social problems generated by industrialisation and urbanisation.³⁴ From the late 1890s, middle-class progressive reformism became the dominant political method for approaching the social problems wrought by industrialisation, forming something of a new civic consensus.³⁵ Methodically uncovering a problem, then applying a programme to fix or alleviate it, reformists from a broad range of causes implicitly argued that a new conception of liberty, which considered social conditions and civic responsibility, was necessary to catch up with the disorders of the Gilded Age.³⁶ While individual projects of progressive reform were adopted piecemeal by the federal government during the early 20th century, the broader idea that federal government ought to actively intervene to maintain social conditions as a facet of democratic liberty was added to modern American political culture by Progressivism. It is incorrect to characterise the Progressive Era as the period when politics “caught up” with the social transformation of the Gilded Age, given alternative modern worldviews and movements carried out by populist and socialist movements from

³¹ Sherry Smith., pp.504-505.

³² Postel, pp.9-10.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ McCormick, p.270.

³⁵ McGerr, p.59.

³⁶ McCormick, pp.280-281.

the 1870s.³⁷ But Progressivism, despite fundamentally failing to shift a social contract based on a theoretical ideal of free individual agents which, in practice, came down overwhelmingly on the side of the powerful, would provide the reformist base for future restructuring of the American social system through the 20th century.³⁸

Finally, beyond the social, economic, and political upheavals wrought by the Gilded Age's project of modernisation and nation-building, the period also saw changes to personhood and amusement. Industrialisation had created new virtues, habits of individual hard work, self-management, punctuality, and thrift, which Americans of every class were exhorted to emulate; these echoed both the official logic of free-market enterprise, and the practical skills needed to work within the wage system.³⁹ New conceptions of personhood contingent on intrinsic personality superseded more holistic understandings of "character," a shift wrought by the individualisation of rhetoric around the self. Arguably the most major shift in Americans' personal lives during the *GAPE*, however, was a reorientation of time and enjoyment around the commodity form, creating a modern America where consumption is a preoccupation, pleasure, and necessity. New consumer products allowed Americans to covet items they could not have accessed prior to industrialisation, and gave women, the key spenders within households, a new form of control over their environment.⁴⁰ More dramatically, aspects of American life which had rarely or never assumed commodity form, were now consumed *en masse*; this included goods traditionally made at home, like clothing or alcohol, but also leisure time and popular culture, which were commodified and sold to weary, time-poor wage labourers.⁴¹ The desire for consumer products began to shape how most Americans interacted with their world and one another for the first time, producing knock-on effects on social relationships and cultural mores.⁴²

The Gilded Age and Progressive Era together represent an astonishing transformation in American society, which can only be described as a deeply complex process of modernisation and nation-building. This process was driven by an intense transformation

³⁷ Postel, p.17.

³⁸ Fink, p.15.

³⁹ John F. Kasson, *Amusing the Million: Coney Island at the Turn of the Century*, New York, 1978. p.107.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Kathy Peiss, *Cheap Amusements: Working Women and Leisure in Turn-of-the-Century New York*, Philadelphia, 1986. pp.121-122.

⁴² Kasson., pp.107-108.

in the mode of production, as accelerating industrial capitalism generated new class structures, a primarily urban population, and conflicts and social disorders which dislocated received understandings of American civic organisation. Modern America, as an incorporated market economy constructed by wage labour, was born from this industrialisation. The United States also embarked on a programme of nation-building, which territorially and ideologically constructed a centralised American nation, destroying indigenous systems and undermining old American historiographies. New ideological and political understandings sprang up in place, irreversibly anchoring national history and federal political thought to a discourse of modernity, whilst the communities, commodities, and values of the new system created far more personal changed to the ways Americans lived their lives. Every aspect of this process was interlinked. Change was uneven, often intensely traumatic, and highly contingent on contexts of class, ethnicity, and gender, but it was also inexorable. Critically influenced by the new owners of capital, who possessed unique historical political, cultural, and social power, the Gilded Age and Progressive Era together hailed the beginning of a modernity of breathtaking scope.

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HISTORY 705 | WRITING NEW ZEALAND

By Kim Moore

Sports, Culture and Resistance: Māori Sporting Engagement in Post-WWII New Zealand

When I was fourteen years old, my parents and I made the decision for me to attend a different high school. It was in the eastern suburbs of Christchurch where a lot of my mates were and where my family had lived before, but I was still nervous. Being the new kid that hardly anyone recognised, I wasn't sure how I'd fit in. Luckily, my classmates were really welcoming and it was the kind of school that accepted you no matter who you were. But what made attending the school one of the best experiences of my life so far was the basketball team. Through sport, I was invited into a culture that meant being there for each other on and off the court. Our successes and failures were shared and we worked hard to improve, not for ourselves, but for the betterment of the team. We came from all kinds of backgrounds; the coach and I were the only ones that identified as NZ-European. There were two Pasifika players, a guy whose family was from Egypt, one who came from China, a Filipino, and two Māori. Our captain was of Ngāi Tahu descent, and his attitude towards sport transformed the whole atmosphere. The team was a support system, a safe space, and a place of trust; and it was those things beyond the game of basketball as well. I have one vivid memory of driving to a game in the school van, and our captain made a beat with his hand on the top of the van. Everyone started joining in and singing, and soon we had

a crazy mix of banging and shouting going that attracted some strange looks from other drivers. We didn't care. We were just sharing that moment together, and for me it epitomised what it meant to be part of the team. Those guys were brothers.

Having played sport all my life, I've learned that it means different things to different people. Just as I had certain beliefs about sport before joining my new basketball team, so too have there been a multitude of understandings throughout history about sportsmanship, teamwork, competition, and the place those concepts have within broader ideas and other aspects of life. The arrival of Europeans to New Zealand marked the beginning of a complex and ongoing process of interaction between Māori, Europeans and other ethnic groups in which ideas have been shared, rejected, misunderstood, and transformed. Sport has not been excluded from that process, and its history in New Zealand is consequently complicated and diverse.

This essay will focus on sport during the post-WWII years, a time which saw large numbers of Māori moving from rural areas into the more densely-populated, and predominantly Pākehā-oriented, cities. It will analyse the role which sport played for Māori during that period and ask whether it should be understood as a site of assimilation, as has been argued by some authors, or whether it may be more appropriate to conceive of sport as a social phenomenon through which aspects of Māori culture and tradition could be both maintained and transformed. In doing so, it will also seek to discern to what extent sport in New Zealand was divisive and the degree to which it could conversely be thought of as a transformative “coming together” of people. Ultimately, this essay will argue that while certain clubs, teams, and social attitudes could certainly be divisive and discriminatory, sport also created the opportunity for Māori to transform wider cultural ideas in New Zealand and maintain important aspects of tradition and Māoritanga.¹

A useful framework of analysis will be Melissa Williams' idea of 'workplace whānau', which she articulates in her ground-breaking history of Māori urban migration, *Panguru and the City*.² The essay will also engage frequently with the

¹ As defined by Te Papakupu Māori, available online at <http://maoridictionary.co.nz/word/3649>

² Melissa Williams, *Panguru and the City: Kāinga Tahī, Kāinga Rua – An Urban Migration History*, Wellington, 2015.

magazine *Te Ao Hou*. Published from 1952 to 1975, some seventy-six issues were released in English and te Reo which gave voice to Māori achievements, concerns, events, and spoke generally about issues pertaining to Māori communities. Where possible, I will attempt to allow the writing in *Te Ao Hou* and the examples which it provides to speak for themselves and tell the story of Māori and sport. However, I also acknowledge that my own positionality influences my analysis, and the kōrero at the start of the essay is intended to give the reader some insight as to where I stand in relation to the history I write.

Before examining the role of sport in the post-WWII years, it is first necessary to acknowledge that Māori and European understandings of sports, games, and physical activities were separate and distinct prior to the contact period. Those differing understandings continued to have a meaningful effect on sport in New Zealand throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and beyond. For Māori, physical activities held implications for wider understandings of life and being; they were not just *physical* activities. Games were closely tied to stories of creation and whakapapa, and thus ‘provided learners with significant cultural meanings.’³ They served purposes beyond entertainment, and existed as part of ‘a holistic conception to the world’.⁴ Arts such as whakahoro taratahi were not the leisurely pastimes that they were for Europeans. For instance, an article published by *Te Ao Hou* in 1958 noted that traditionally, tohunga would attempt to land kites in opposition pā during inter-tribal conflicts in order to lay ‘greatest misfortune [on] the inmates’.⁵ Upon the arrival of Europeans to New Zealand, some Māori games which were connected to the ‘spiritual realm’ were banned by evangelical missionaries who saw those activities as ‘barbaric’.⁶ As such, the missionary project regarded sport in the European sense as a potential tool through which Māori could be brought into a more civilised European realm and shown ‘the values of English middle-class life’.⁷

³ Brendan Hokowhitu, ‘Māori Sport: Pre-colonisation to Today’, in Chris Collins and Steve Jackson, eds, *Sport in Aotearoa/New Zealand Society*, 2nd ed., Melbourne; Auckland, 2007, p.80.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p.83.

⁵ *Te Ao Hou*, 22, 1958, p.45.

⁶ Hokowhitu, p.81.

⁷ Judith Binney, *The Legacy of Guilt: A Life of Thomas Kendall*, Wellington, 2005, p.32.

Banishing certain Māori games was not, in itself, enough to constitute effective assimilation. Previous conceptions needed to be replaced with new ones, and European sports such as cricket, tennis, rugby, horse-racing and golf—in many ways quintessential images of Britishness—were introduced to New Zealand in order to fill that role. These and several other sports were taken to with great enthusiasm by many Māori. *Te Ao Hou* discussed the 1849 example of Ngāti Toa chief Te Rauparaha, whose investment in racing was so great that reportedly upon his death ‘his last words were an enquiry as to what luck he had had with his horse at the Wellington races.’⁸ Māori not only embraced new sports, but also excelled in them. Famously, the Native Rugby Football team of 1888 became the first New Zealand team to tour beyond Australia, and it was predominantly constituted by Māori players. *Te Ao Hou* wrote enthusiastically of the tour’s winning record and the degree to which they believed the ‘history of football in New Zealand [to be] bound up with great Maori players’.⁹

The fact that traditions of European origin became a regular part of Māori lives in the nineteenth century has led some authors to argue that sport was used as a tool of domination. Brendan Hokowhitu, for example, urges his readers to ‘understand that sport served to assimilate Māori into general Pākehā society’.¹⁰ Some images published in *Te Ao Hou* certainly appear to demonstrate such a dynamic continuing into the twentieth century when viewed *prima facie*. One particularly pertinent example depicts a large gathering of Māori outside Te Pākira marae during the annual Māori Golf Tournament in 1952.¹¹ The ostensible disjuncture between the backdrop of the Māori meeting-house and the alien sport of golf suggests that the missionaries who began outlawing certain Māori activities and replacing them with British concepts may have been successful. If assimilation is understood as conformity to new ideas, or coming to resemble something else, then the image at Whakarewarewa can be read as reflecting those values.¹²

⁸ *Te Ao Hou*, 23, 1958, p.25.

⁹ *Te Ao Hou*, 4, 1953, p.61. I do not place an accent (e.g. Māori, Pākehā) in quotations or titles which did not do so.


¹⁰ Hokowhitu, p.78.

¹¹ *Te Ao Hou*, 3, 1953, p.61

¹² ‘assimilation, n.’, *OED Online*, updated June 2017, accessed October 2017.

While an initial inspection of sport based on the interaction between Māori and Christian missionaries in the nineteenth century can highlight notions of assimilation, the photo at Te Pākira tells a different story when understood within its own socio-political context. Golf was economically inaccessible for many Māori during the inter- and post-war years, and the Pākehā realm of golf was even more difficult to enter into. Jock Tua, writing for *Te Ao Hou*, suggested that the cumulative expense of '[c]lub enrolment fees, annual subscriptions, equipment and transport' turned many Māori towards other sports which were 'within the scope of the normal income'.¹³ Aroha Harris has recently argued that access to golf was restricted by more than economic boundaries. She states that '[r]ace mattered in golf, too. Some long-time members of the Maori Golf Association recall that one of the reasons it was established was because it was so hard for Māori to secure golf club membership.'¹⁴ Re-examined with Harris's observation in mind, the gathering of Māori in Rotorua paints a new picture of divisiveness and suggests that Māori were pushed towards forming new clubs in order to participate in sport.

*Caption: 'Some of the participants at the Maori Golf Tournament in Rotorua, November, 1952.'*¹⁵



¹³ *Te Ao Hou*, 27, 1959, p.72.

¹⁴ Atholl, Anderson, Judith Binney, and Aroha Harris, *Tangata Whenua: An Illustrated History*, 2014, p.319.

¹⁵ *Te Ao Hou*, 3, 1953, p.61.

The 1952 Māori Golf Tournament is one of many instances in which sport appears to have been a discriminatory part of social culture in New Zealand. Māori clubs and tournaments were established across New Zealand in the early twentieth century, and some formed even earlier. These often grew into ‘formal associations’ when Māori demographics were more concentrated in urban areas.¹⁶ In some instances, such as with the Maori Golf Association, it would appear that the existence of Māori clubs was in part a response to the trials of moving to the city. The transition from rural living to urban life could be as difficult emotionally and spiritually as it was physically, and *Te Ao Hou* regularly published articles and poems which expressed Māori experiences of urbanisation.¹⁷ Sporting engagement was not removed from those issues. When Māori athletes trialled for mixed-race teams such as the All Blacks, they sometimes faced different standards from their Pākehā competitors. In an article in a 1955 publication of *Te Ao Hou*, Paul Potiki addressed the question of why All Black teams had so few Māori players. Interestingly, he refuted the idea of a ‘colour-bar’ in New Zealand rugby, but then paradoxically suggested in the next edition that Māori needed to act more European in order to trial successfully.¹⁸ He wrote, ‘*If you cannot play like an All Black at least try to look like one*’ and then advised against an ‘untidy appearance.’¹⁹ It can be reasonably inferred that in instructing Māori to ‘look like’ All Blacks, he was suggesting they should dress more to the tastes of the Pākehā selectors, which, whether Potiki agreed with the idea or not, is certainly evidence of a ‘colour-bar’ in rugby.

Potiki’s denial of skewed racial standards in the sphere of rugby is indicative of a lack of widespread public acknowledgement which has only been partly reversed in the last few decades. There were many instances involving sport in which race was extremely divisive. Ten years later in 1963, *Te Ao Hou* noted the ‘bitterness’ George Nepia felt at his exclusion from the 1928 All Blacks team touring South Africa because he was Māori, and went on to identify similar occurrences in 1937 and in

¹⁶ Aroha Harris, ‘Persistence and Resistance’, in idem, *Tangata Whenua: An illustrated History*, Wellington, 2014, p.318.

¹⁷ One particularly compelling example is a poem by Rowley Habib titled ‘Maori in Suburbia’ in *Te Ao Hou*, 70, 1972, p.21.

¹⁸ *Te Ao Hou*, 11, 1955, p.54.

¹⁹ *Te Ao Hou*, 12, 1955, p.52. His emphasis.

1960.²⁰ Māori were particularly outspoken on the policies of apartheid in South Africa and the subsequent omission of Māori All Blacks from touring squads which continued until 1970.²¹ Golf and rugby are just two examples of Māori involvement in sport that highlight discriminatory and divisive characteristics in New Zealand. *Te Ao Hou* often praised Māori athletes who were able to achieve significant heights in sport ‘in an atmosphere not encountered by many Maoris’.²² By ‘atmosphere’, *Te Ao Hou* was referring to the difficult and unfamiliar space of urban environments as well as places outside of New Zealand. It is clear that despite myths of sport fostering amicable race-relations, Māori were, in many ways, treated as second class citizens of the sporting world in New Zealand throughout the twentieth century.

Although the existence of racial discrimination within sport in New Zealand is exceptionally important to acknowledge, and has been by several authors, it is not always useful to frame historical understandings within a binary of coloniser-colonised.²³ Painting Māori as reactors and not actors denies agency and can obscure or side-line the prevalence of Māori understandings of sport in favour of European ones. As Aroha Harris states, such analyses ‘risk assigning Pakeha (or colonisation processes) the starring role as protagonists’.²⁴ Here it is prudent to introduce the work of Melissa Williams, whose history of urban migration from Panguru to Auckland reveals new experiences for Māori moving to cities in the mid-twentieth century. She uses the kōrero of members of her whānau to argue that Māori formed unique, hybrid working conditions upon moving to otherwise unfamiliar urban environments. In predominantly manual labouring jobs like factories and freezing works, workplace conditions could become characterised by a distinctly Māori approach to practice and routine and a “work hard, play hard” attitude. Te Reo was spoken, waiata were sung, and the workplace ‘functioned as an expression of Māori values’.²⁵ These workplace-whānau could also operate as sites of ‘inter-racial unity and stability’, and Pākehā

²⁰ *Te Ao Hou*, 45, 1963, p.57.

²¹ “‘No Maoris - No Tour’ poster, 1959”, Ministry for Culture and Heritage, updated 12 June 2014, accessed September 2017, <https://nzhistory.govt.nz/media/photo/no-maoris-no-tour-poster>

²² *Te Ao Hou*, 10, 1955, p.45.

²³ See for examples Holly Raima Hippolite and Toni Bruce, ‘Speaking the Unspoken: Racism, Sport and Māori’, *Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal*, 2, 2, 2010, pp.23-45, and Holly Raima Hippolite, ‘Towards an Equal Playing Field: Racism and Māori Women in Sport’, *MAI Review*, 2008, pp.1-12.

²⁴ Aroha Harris, ‘Dancing with the State: Maori Creative Energy and Policies of Integration, 1945-1967’, PhD Thesis, University of Auckland, 2007, p.167.

²⁵ Williams, p.187.

workers were occasionally included based on shared, ‘gendered experiences’.²⁶ As such, the boundaries of the concepts of whānau and whanaungatanga were stretched ‘to include ethnic, gender and occupation-based bonds.’²⁷ Crucially, however, Pākehā were included only on Māori terms. Melissa Williams provides one example of a Pākehā woman who became close friends with Williams’ own relatives and was accepted into their workplace-whānau. The woman became ‘one of them; they were not one of her.’²⁸ Even male Pākehā bosses were forced to work around, but not within, the workplace-whānau of Panguru migrants.

Melissa Williams denies an assimilative lens which is all too easy to apply to Māori urban migration. Her work displaces otherwise assumed power dynamics which see Māori operating under an umbrella of Pākehā frameworks, and meaningfully incorporates Māori understandings as analytical tools. It also shows that Māori knowledge and tradition could change with time and could incorporate ‘old and new ideas’.²⁹ Applying Williams’ framework to the context of sport in New Zealand can shed new light on Māori engagement and reveal important instances in which sport functioned as a site of cultural continuity and persistence. It also gives rise to the question of whether Māori movement to urban areas, such as migration from Panguru to Auckland, facilitated the formation of *sporting-whānau*.

Several reports published in *Te Ao Hou* referred to a particular Māori ‘way’ of playing and being involved in sport. From the less popular activities of marching and shearing to widely-played games like rugby and tennis, Māori participated in distinct styles and with particular values. For example, Jock Tua wrote in 1959 that despite there being fewer Māori sporting organisations in existence because of a desire for ‘co-existence with the pakeha on a sporting level’, there was nevertheless a ‘Maori concept of doing things as Maoris, and in the Maori way.’³⁰ Some writers discouraged a particular Māori form of sporting participation—as mentioned above, Paul Potiki vehemently suggested that rugby players should refrain from doing anything that made them look

²⁶ Ibid., pp.181, 187

²⁷ Ibid., p.181.

²⁸ Ibid., p.187.

²⁹ Ibid., p.210.

³⁰ *Te Ao Hou*, 27, 1959, pp.72-73

different in the eyes of Pākehā selectors.³¹ However, others expressed dissatisfaction when Māori teams failed to produce performances that looked specifically Māori. One article conveyed disappointment in reference to a Māori vs British Isles rugby game, stating, ‘the New Zealand Maori team which played the Lions committed a cardinal sin: It did not play Maori rugby.’³²

Te Ao Hou cited several reasons for the phenomenon of a Māori ‘way’ across multiple publications. One article suggested that Māori understandings of land ownership as communal translated into sporting tendencies, and that Māori were thus less inclined towards individual pursuits.³³ Even kaumātua who could no longer play sport were important in continuing sporting “Māoriness”; they often ‘greeted one another in the traditional Maori manner’ at events held at venues such as Eden Park.³⁴ The enormous commitment of time and money often needed to succeed in sport could also work in opposition of holistic Māori world views. In 1955 Paul Potiki wrote that Māori were hesitant to commit the amount of time necessary in order to excel in sports in the more competitive urban context because they were interested in a wide range of other pursuits.³⁵ Similarly, Kara Puketapu highlighted the fact that broader, holistic understandings of the world led Māori to be more relaxed in terms of sport: ‘the significance of his participation depends on his feeling himself part of the social group concerned.’³⁶ Historical understandings also created a certain flare among some Māori teams. A Māori rugby team touring Australia was given team talks by their captain, Ron Bryer, who reminded his players of ‘how Rewi was prepared to die for the Maori people at Orakau’. His words reportedly moved many of the men to tears and encouraged them to ‘beat the Wallabies for the sake of Maori rugby.’³⁷ More recently, Farah Palmer has argued that notions of individualism were expressed rarely in her study of Māori female athletes. Rather, there is a sense of ‘[c]ollective Māori

³¹ *Te Ao Hou*, 12, 1955, p.52.

³² *Te Ao Hou*, 19, 1959, p.48. The text online reads ‘a cardinal s [*unclear*] n’ and I have presumed the word ‘sin’ and written it here for clarity.

³³ *Te Ao Hou*, 18, 1957, p.47

³⁴ *Te Ao Hou*, 16, 1956, p.17.

³⁵ *Te Ao Hou*, 11, 1955, p.54.

³⁶ *Te Ao Hou*, 40, 1962, p.55.

³⁷ *Te Ao Hou*, 24, 1958, p.50.

identity’ which ‘could be considered a demonstration of whakawhanaungatanga (kinship).’³⁸

While Māori often formed their own teams, *Te Ao Hou* did note that in Auckland there were ‘few Maori Sporting Clubs’ because of ‘a tendency to assimilation with the European teams.’³⁹ However, the widespread existence of all-Māori sports teams throughout the twentieth century suggests a continuation of Māori values and understandings in the sporting world. Basketball, hockey, rugby, and many other sports saw Māori participate in tournaments against Pākehā and mixed-race teams. One girls’ fencing team from Auckland won not only the national title, competing against schools from all over the nation, but every tournament they entered over the course of 1973. Their coach wrote in *Te Ao Hou*, ‘[m]y observation of Maori youngsters leads me to the conclusion that they perform much better when together in a group; in isolation they tend to hang back and to miss opportunities at which their abilities would enable them to do well.’⁴⁰ This kind of observation being made in relation to fencing, an activity that predominantly involves two individuals competing against one another, illustrates the extent to which Māori valued a sense of a group identity within sport.

The existence of all-Māori sports teams and organisations which played sports in ‘a Māori way’ that emphasised communal values and a wider sense of belonging is indicative of many of the values of Melissa Williams’ workplace-whānau. It could also suggest that, despite areas such as Auckland appearing more “assimilated” in terms of sports clubs and participation, there may have been two distinct sporting worlds in New Zealand: one Māori and the other Pākehā. This essay has demonstrated the continued and important distinctiveness of Māori understandings of sport as part of a wider conception of being, and in that sense it may be appropriate to suggest that there was a separate Māori sporting world. However, such an assertion can also be limiting for two reasons. Firstly, it might fail to recognise the various and important

³⁸ Farah Palmer, ‘Body Image, Hauora and Identity: Experiences of Māori Girls in Sport’, *Childrenz Issues: Journal of the Children’s Issues Centre*, 11, 2, 2007, p.17.

³⁹ *Te Ao Hou*, 27, 1959, p.71.

⁴⁰ *Te Ao Hou*, 71, 1973, p.30.

ways which Māori understandings impacted New Zealand sport as a whole and transformed Pākehā experiences; and secondly, it can encourage a parochial analysis which risks misplacing stories of Māori athletes that competed on an international level.

Māori engagement and participation in sport in the twentieth century did not just transform Māori lives. The particular approach of Māori towards teamwork, competition and gamesmanship seeped into experiences across New Zealand, including those of Pākehā. *Te Ao Hou* noted with particular pride the impact Māori had on various sports. One article said that Māori ‘brought a natural ebullience to the game [of Rugby League] and a variety of “Maori” tricks.’⁴¹ That same year, another feature spoke of the importance of ‘the foundations of Maori-style Rugby’ and its contribution of ‘so tremendous a portion to the glory of New Zealand Rugby’ as a whole.⁴² Māori were also regular hosts of nation-wide sporting events that were attended by non-Māori, and the approach taken to those events was particularly distinctive. In 1959 the New Zealand Māori Lawn Tennis Association ran a tournament in Whangarei in which rain affected many of the games. Prominent Ngāti Hine leader Kirihi Kawiti illustrated the importance of long-held beliefs to the event when he mentioned in his welcoming speech the risk of holding a tennis tournament ‘when the moon was dying—according to Maori tradition, this might well be the cause of rain.’⁴³ The formalities of the tournament, as well as the evening concerts for singing and dancing, were held inside a local hall which was ‘transformed into a marae for the four days of the tournament’.⁴⁴ Not only were Māori hosting a tournament for a traditionally European sport attended by Pākehā, but it was done in ways that meaningfully incorporated Māori understandings and tradition into its structure. Creating a specifically Māori space in a building otherwise culturally unimportant exhibits the same ability that Melissa Williams observed of workplace-whānau to enable ‘the processes of cultural negotiation’ in unfamiliar spaces.⁴⁵ It would be extremely limiting to talk of sport as assimilating European ideas into Māori culture

⁴¹ *Te Ao Hou*, 27, 1959, p.72.

⁴² *Te Ao Hou*, 29, 1959, p.48.

⁴³ *Te Ao Hou*, 26, 1959, p.30.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p.29.

⁴⁵ Williams, p.183.

when examples such as these demonstrate, if anything, the assimilation of Māori values into sports of European origin.

Māori could also influence the sporting realm outside of New Zealand altogether and demonstrate the values of whanaungatanga and support on an international scale. Athletes from various sporting vocations competed transnationally, sometimes in more than one sport. In 1953, *Te Ao Hou* stated that 'in the sporting world . . . it would be fair to say that our women have been considerably more successful than the men.'⁴⁶ This conclusion was likely influenced by the achievements of prominent Māori women who competed overseas. One of these athletes was Ruia Morrison, who incidentally won the Women's Final of the 1959 tennis tournament in Whangarei mentioned above. In 1957 she became the first New Zealand woman, Māori or Pākehā, to compete at Wimbledon, and achieved unprecedented success in New Zealand tournaments.⁴⁷ The Auckland Māori committee was particularly excited for her to continue competing and representing the country overseas, and helped to fund her trips.⁴⁸ Upon returning from a world tour, Morrison was received by a contingent of Māori and Pākehā:

She was greeted with the traditional challenge of the Maori followed by the haka and responded by rewarding the members of the welcoming party with a kiss. Dozens of Europeans stood by watching the enthusiastic scene amazed at the mysterious manner in which the party suddenly appeared on the tarmac and then disappeared to greet the returning heroine-again with songs and more hakas.⁴⁹

These public expressions of Māoritanga after Morrison had represented New Zealand as a whole in a number of overseas countries is indicative of the important place Māori understandings of, and attitudes towards, sport had come to hold in New Zealand. It also shows that Māori athletes who competed overseas could maintain their understandings and approaches to sport, and did not need to encapsulate European values in order to succeed on an international stage.

⁴⁶ *Te Ao Hou*, 5, 1953, p.43.

⁴⁷ Basil Keane, 'Māori and sport – hākinakina – Māori and sport from the late 20th century', in *Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand*, 5 September 2013, accessed September 2017, <http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/video/41484/ruia-morrison>

⁴⁸ *Te Ao Hou*, 20, 1957, p.61.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

Moana Whaanga (née Manley) is another example of a Māori sportsperson who achieved tremendous success outside of New Zealand in the post-WWII years. A prolific swimmer who was later awarded the title of Miss New Zealand, Manley went on to compete in Miss Universe and Miss World competitions in America and England respectively – the first contestant from New Zealand to do so. Her efforts were encouraged by New Zealanders generally, but she was supported financially by Māori Welfare Officers.⁵⁰ *Te Ao Hou* followed Manley’s career with great interest and mentioned her on several occasions. Upon her retirement from swimming, the magazine offered her ‘the best wishes of all our readers.’⁵¹ Manley could be an example of what Michael Stevens calls ‘Māori in unexpected places’, and that notion can be extended to include Māori beliefs and understandings being seen in unfamiliar places as well.⁵²

Numerous Māori athletes like Morrison and Manley competed both in New Zealand and overseas, and are evidence of the existence of Māori approaches to sport functioning in transnational settings. The assistance they were given by Māori committees and the support extended to them by their whānau and wider Māori communities highlights the fact that they did not become separated from their specific understandings and approaches to sport and competition. In that sense, sport in New Zealand could be imagined as containing two distinct conceptual worlds which interacted and transformed one another. However, it should be acknowledged that there were not always physical boundaries that caused sport to be isolated into binary realms of Māori or Pākehā. Discrimination and divisiveness certainly occurred—and still occur—in New Zealand sport, but those examples do not tell the whole story or account for the multitude of sporting experiences in the twentieth century. Equally, suggesting that sport served to assimilate Māori into Pākehā culture denies the complex experiences of whanaungatanga among Māori and sometimes mixed-race teams that allowed for a continuity and transformation of elements of Māoritanga. It also serves to obscure the very real ways in which Māori fundamentally influenced

⁵⁰ ‘Moana Whaanga (nee Manley)’, Māori Sports Awards, 23 March 2017, <http://maorisportsawards.co.nz/profiles/moana-whaanga-nee-manley/>

⁵¹ *Te Ao Hou*, 7, 1954, p.49.

⁵² Michael Stevens, ‘A “Useful” Approach to Māori History’, *New Zealand Journal of History*, 49, 1, 2015, p.70.

New Zealand sporting culture as a whole through participation in both domestic and overseas contexts.

A genuine and meaningful understanding of the specific and distinct approaches taken by Māori with regard to sport is vital not only to telling a historical story, but also in continuing to combat racism and discrimination in New Zealand sport today. Several authors have identified the continued role of sport in fostering myths surrounding race relations and the role of Māori in society. Holly Raima Hippolite and Toni Bruce argue that sport in New Zealand maintains 'ideologies of equality and fairness' which serve to obscure 'the lingering effects of colonisation on New Zealand sport.'⁵³ The myth that sport has contributed to racial assimilation and integration is self-serving, because it means that inequity is never properly addressed. Māori achievement in sport is also tied to historical ideas that Māori are "physical beings" and thus more biologically suited to physical rather than "intellectual" pursuits.⁵⁴ Brendan Hokowhitu suggests that in the past, those social-Darwinist beliefs served to discredit Māori who excelled in a sporting discipline, as they 'did not conflict with stereotypes of Māori as a physical and savage people'.⁵⁵ He terms this process the 'athleticizing of Māori' and asserts that it remains an issue today.⁵⁶ Similarly, Farah Palmer has argued that the inclusion of Māori 'cultural demonstration' as part of major sporting events 'tends towards tokenism and many Māori athletes have mentioned feeling conflicted between their Māori identity and their athletic identity'.⁵⁷ Tokenistic cultural displays perpetuate a myth of unproblematic race relations and suggest that the New Zealand sporting world is one and whole. Failing to acknowledge the important existence of specific Māori approaches to sport in this way means that analyses of sport continue to be conducted through European frameworks and 'institutional structures created by colonial ideologies'.⁵⁸ Hokowhitu thus argues that

⁵³ Hippolite and Bruce, p.26.

⁵⁴ Brendan Hokowhitu, "'Physical Beings": Stereotypes, Sport and the "Physical Education" of New Zealand Māori', *Culture, Sport, Society*, 6, 2-3, 2003, pp.192-218.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p.210.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Palmer, p.17.

⁵⁸ Brendan Hokowhitu, 'Māori Rugby and Subversion: Creativity, Domestication, Oppression and Decolonization', *The International Journal of the History of Sport*, 26, 16, 2009, p.2331.

sports should embrace ‘the deployment of whanaunga as the basic unit’ because it can displace a monopoly of European approaches to sport.

Aroha Harris states that Melissa Williams’ history of migration is ‘a distinctly Māori history that calls New Zealand history to attention.’⁵⁹ While the concept of workplace-whānau may not fit comfortably within the context of sports teams and clubs, there are certainly many instances in which the values of whanaungatanga, hybridity, and cultural persistence appear in the history of Māori sporting engagement in post-WWII New Zealand. Acknowledging those instances helps re-shape the history of twentieth century sport. While there may have been assimilative intentions with sport, Māori embracing games of European origin did not equate to a loss of culture. Furthermore, telling a story of division and discrimination is necessary, but cannot solely account for the persistence of Māori culture and the drastic influence which Māori had on the wider world of sport. By re-telling the history of sport in this way, historians could play a meaningful role in shaping sporting culture and, in doing so, might also call New Zealand history to attention.

⁵⁹ Aroha Harris, quoted on the back of Melissa Williams, *Panguru and the City*.

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