All eyes (and ears) on the gene tech bill

As the government debates a major shift in gene technology legislation, nearly 30 years after the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act of 1996 established a hardline precautionary approach, it’s worth asking what we have learned from past mistakes, and particularly relating to containment.

The proposed bill would allow genetically engineered organisms to be released into the environment, and NZ First, Labour, and the Green Party have signalled their hesitancy. It’s easy to forget that New Zealand has been here before. In the not-so-distant past we faced incidents of unintentional releases of genetically modified organisms into the environment.

Readers who remember the so-called Corngate scandal may better recall the controversial interview between Helen Clark and John Campbell in 2002 (and Clark’s characterisation of Campbell as a “sanctimonious little creep”) where details about the unintentional release of genetically modified corn seed in 2000 appeared to be deliberately obfuscated by the government during the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification.

Corngate was perhaps the most well-known incident, but it was never confirmed that genetically modified material was present in the soil at the time. DNA-based testing had mixed results: some 49,000 seeds were tested and most returned a negative result for contamination, and those that returned a potential positive result could have been showing contamination from a common soil bacterium. It was determined that if there were genetically modified seeds in the batch, the level was less than 0.05 percent. The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (now MPI) later concluded it was unlikely any genetically modified material had entered the soil.

Overshadowed by the gotcha journalism of Corngate was another incident of possibly contaminated seed being connected to New Zealand soil: the lesser known ‘Operation Pacific’ breach in 2002.

In this case there was no question: maize seeds grown in Pukekohe and Gisborne tested positive for genetically modified material. The parent line seeds had been imported from the USA to produce hybrid seeds here and as part of routine testing procedures seeds were sampled and tested for GM material.

DNA tests revealed a strong likelihood of contamination but though the hybrid seeds had been harvested, they hadn’t been distributed for sowing. Essentially, they were caught in the nick of time. The seeds were destroyed at an estimated cost of $500,000.

An independent investigation of the incident noted throughout their report that such an event was likely to occur again. In 2003 GM-positive corn products tested in Japan were traced back to fields in Gisborne. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry conducted a thorough investigation but because fields had already been harvested and cleared, no further testing was possible. It was, however, determined that no corn was distributed in the local market.

Lessons learned from Corngate

After Corngate New Zealand introduced border-testing for genetically modified material, with the requirement that it had to be rigorous enough to stand as evidence in court.

But it was openly acknowledged that border measures could never provide total assurances. At the time tests looked for genetically modified material: a foreign gene inserted into the organism. Questions now arise about the traceability of gene-edited organisms, those that have no foreign genes but have had modified gene sequences. This can be even harder, sometimes impossible, to detect, depending on a multitude of factors such as voluntary identification of modifications, what specific changes were made, and what tests are done to detect them.

Both events raise questions for today’s legislation. Is it possible to create a reliable, rigorous, and accurate enough testing protocol to ensure that any problems of cross-contamination, whether at the border or across farms, could be dealt with in a timely, cost-effective, and legally binding way?

What systems could be in place to assure the source of the seed has no contamination (for example documentation showing the supplier did not process any other gene-edited materials, imported from a country or area without gene editing)?

Lessons learned from Operation Pacific

Operation Pacific revealed gaps in regulation – mandatory testing was required for corn but not for maize, for example. The process of recalling and destroying all the GM material was costly and time consuming: the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry had to review sampling information, trace all locations where the parent lines had been grown, analyse the separation mechanisms in place (for example, isolation boundaries), review the farms’ waste material management, create a chronology of all the movements and handling of the seeds, and determine where all remaining seeds were located.

The company lost $500,000 in lost revenue and costs associated with the destruction and continued monitoring. Officials noted that the seed company was compliant and quick to respond, but that without this cooperation the ordeal would have been very challenging.

The gene technology industry is highly speculative, requiring large upfront capital investment while facing a high risk of failure, even in the most business-friendly economies.

How will new legislation balance the economic risks borne by private and public investors with the environmental risks posed by potential breaches or cross-contamination? If private companies must accept substantial liability, what incentive remains for them to operate in New Zealand? And if they are not held liable, does that burden fall instead on taxpayers?

Official reports on the breaches noted several points of confusion over the roles and responsibilities of different agencies. The Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act only covered intentional releases, and there was little alignment with the Biosecurity Act. Reports highlighted a lack of technical expertise within government agencies and the private sector and a lack of alignment between the Biosecurity Act and the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act.

Does the Gene Technology Bill adequately outline responsibilities of all agencies involved in responding to an accidental release or incident of cross-contamination?

Would an unintentional release be covered by the Gene Technology Bill? Would it be a biosecurity matter if the contamination arrived at the border? Would the Ministry for Primary Industries or the Environmental Protection Agency be the responsible enforcement officers in such an incident, and who would these officers report to?

These incidents also highlighted a lack of technical proficiency and capabilities across the seed company and within the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Environmental Risk Management Authority.

With concerns about a slowly defunded science sector, limited technical expertise, and the lack of an established genetic engineering industry, what measures can ensure that technical and scientific roles attract international talent and enhance local capabilities?

Now what?

What these incidents show us is that even with border procedures, testing availability, public buy-in, political will, and scientific knowledge, the best laid plans can still fail in the moment when they are needed the most.

Accurate detection relies on knowing what you are testing for with a level of certainty that would hold up in court, while accounting for the possibility of false positives or false negatives. But it will always be impossible to provide 100 percent assurances, a problem compounded by the growing prevalence of gene editing and modification internationally, with varying standards and regulations around what counts as engineered in the first place.

Thinking about the Gene Technology Bill needs to recognise that the door cannot be ajar, and with increasing pressures from climate change, international competition, and political motivations, it seems more likely the door might burst open. The question then is not how we can perfect containment with stricter rules, but whether we can accept, mitigate, and still risk failure?