Taking Issue: should we extend our parliamentary term?

Peter Davis: a pattern of ‘short-termism’

Last year the Justice Select Committee passed a modified version of the proposal for a four-year term of parliament, together with a public referendum. This has now been scrapped.

So, what is the case for a four-year term?

For a start, New Zealand is one of just eight jurisdictions out of 186 countries with active legislatures that provides for a term of just three years or fewer. Indeed, along with Australia, we are the only countries with a Westminster system of government to have three-year terms.

But the major argument in favour of a longer term is a constitutional and political one – that it could provide for more considered policymaking and therefore for better governance.

There are also financial considerations.

For example, if the dominant pattern becomes, say, two four-year terms rather than three three-year terms as is under the current model, this puts less pressure on the Electoral Commission, particularly if the same rules apply to local body elections.

Further, business reduces investment in election years and governments put off economic and social reforms of long-term consequence when electoral considerations are proximate, underpinning the New Zealand pattern of ‘short termism’ in policy decision-making.

Any proposal of this nature must get a 75 percent parliamentary majority or pass a referendum. The signs are not good. On both occasions that the issue has been put to the public (in 1967 and 1990) it has been roundly rejected.

The public could well be much better disposed to a four-year term if such a move was part of a wider reform of governance, including reform of parliamentary procedures to give the legislature greater power and effectiveness.

A move to a four-year term would be of value to the future good governance of New Zealand by reducing the frequency of short-term electoral change and by increasing time for consideration, negotiation and scrutiny. However, this would be particularly the case if such a move was taken as a first step in a longer-term process of reform to enhance democracy, transparency and accountability.

Peter Davis is an emeritus professor in Population Health and Social Science. 

Lucy Kilgour: slowing our democratic rhythm

The world is moving faster, but our parliamentary term should move more slowly.

It is easy to feel overwhelmed by the rapid change around us. With geopolitical tensions rising, artificial intelligence developing and trend cycles shrinking, stability is scarce. In contrast, parliament is a steady presence and an engine to manage change.

A longer parliamentary term gives Members of Parliament, our representatives, time to represent us, not campaign. With this comes more time to research, digest and respond to rapid global change.

Without an election looming, parties can collaborate without compromising political strategy.

Minor parties in coalitions need not fight for their identity and opposition parties can engage in more bipartisan work. This enhances the stability of parliament, our responsiveness to global change and the durability of such responses.

Young people care deeply about the future they will live in. Sometimes this manifests as activism and civic engagement, but those willing and able to take more decisive actions simply leave New Zealand. There are more opportunities overseas and this directly threatens New Zealand’s future. It is a domino effect we cannot afford. Instead, reliable, long-term planning is necessary.

Once plans are under way, successive governments are less likely to cancel them. A longer parliamentary term provides the time to commit and progress work, with the results making New Zealand an attractive place to live. Completion shows politicians keeping their promises, creating trust and stability. Such results demonstrate the importance of voting, which is the greatest check we have on parliament.

This begs the question of whether a longer parliamentary term would compromise our democracy. Voting less often means less feedback from voters to the government, but it equally means there is time to formulate feedback and avoid voter fatigue. With neither compulsory nor preferential voting in New Zealand, engaging voters and everyone making their own best decision are crucial for fulfilling the purposes of elections.

Likewise, with more time between elections, governments need not engage urgency so often and select committees can hear from more voters. Going slower ensures we move in the most desired direction.

When everything is accelerating, slowing our democratic rhythm may be the only way to steer our future wisely.

Lucy Kilgour is studying law and commerce at the University of Auckland and was a 2025 Youth MP. 

Marcelo Rodriguez Ferrere: resist piecemeal changes

When Justice Minister Paul Goldsmith announced in February that the government would no longer progress legislation to extend the term of parliament from three years to four, few were surprised. After all, it had been a year since the introduction of that legislation, and months since the select committee recommended its enactment in August, and the government had kept mum about its plans for the referendum the legislation would require.

For one of the most significant constitutional changes in a generation, the silence and inaction was odd, to say the least. In one sense, then, Minister Goldsmith’s scrapping of the bill was a relief: the alternative would be a rushed referendum without proper time to inform the public about the options at play.

Not that such a rushed and ramshackle approach to constitutional change in New Zealand would be out of the norm. For instance, we owe our electoral system, MMP, largely due to a gaffe by then-prime minister David Lange who, after misreading his notes in a debate, accidentally committed New Zealand to a referendum on the electoral system – a commitment that ran against his party’s own policy.

There are good arguments for a four-year term – three years is simply too short to effect meaningful policy and change – but there are much, much better arguments for keeping the status quo until we are ready as a country for broader constitutional reform. Attempts – mostly led by the indefatigable former prime minister Sir Geoffrey Palmer – to adopt a codified, supreme constitution have been met with a muted reception from a blasé public.

We seem, as a nation, content to kick the can down the road, operating on principles-based constitutional arrangements that have the benefit of extreme flexibility, but the omnipresent danger of being abused without consequence. We dislike the homework required to answer the hard questions about how we want to apportion and control public power. That maybe explains why we tinker with our constitutional arrangements, and why the four-year term question was considered by itself.

Nothing in our constitutional arrangements operates, however, in such splendid isolation. If we want to extend our term, we should also think about whether we want to restrict the government’s use of urgency to pass legislation without appropriate scrutiny. We should think about the status and power of select committees. We should think about the appropriate position and effect of Te Tiriti o Waitangi, and whether some rights are so important that parliament should not be able to overrule them. We should think about whether we are content to have King Charles III as our head of state.

Until we are content to think about all of these big questions and approach constitutional reform in a thoughtful, holistic way, we should resist the piecemeal changes that the four-year term parliamentary proposition represented. It will be a courageous government to take on that challenge, but we will be all the better for it as a society.

Marcelo Rodriguez Ferrere is an associate professor in the Faculty of Law. 

Nimish Milan Singh: more time to tackle complex issues

A three-year term encourages short-term politics at the expense of long-term solutions.

What Aotearoa lacks is sustained, strategic governance that emphasises progress and transcends party lines.

A new government’s first year is spent settling in, learning how the machinery of government works, adjusting to ministerial responsibilities, and translating campaign promises into workable policy.

By the second year, attention shifts to the ‘building phase’, which often includes undoing or reversing decisions made by the previous government. It also freezes institutions during election years when they wait to see whether the political pendulum’s about to swing.

By the third year, the focus turns almost entirely to re-election, with decisions often shaped by what appeals most to voters in the short term instead of what will deliver lasting outcomes.

A four-year term, I believe, would better support long-term thinking and provide more stability to tackle complex issues. Challenges like infrastructure planning, climate adaptation, health reform and education don’t fit squarely into a three-year cycle, and real progress requires planning for benefits over a longer timeframe.

In a four-year term, the opposition could also have more space to engage constructively, push for compromise, and scrutinise policy without every decision being framed through the lens of an imminent election.

Ultimately, the goal for long-term progress relies on political stability. Parties should be aiming for sustained tenure where they can govern for three terms or more. Regardless of your thoughts on them, Clark’s Labour Government and Key’s National Government benefitted enormously from continuity. Successive terms gave them the chance to refine policy, push for long-range strategies and give a sense of direction for the country.

Instead of a three-year cycle that allows rushed legislation changes and reversals of previous governments’ policies, Aotearoa New Zealand would benefit from a four-year term.

I would hope that an additional restriction on governments pushing through changes under urgency might help to build long-term progress, cross-party agreement and public trust.

Nimish Milan Singh is president of AUSA. 

There is a familiar saying that for every problem there is a solution that is simple, popular and usually wrong. A longer parliamentary term could be a helpful part of wider reform to ensure governments consider options beyond the simple and popular.

The challenges facing New Zealand are becoming more complex, while politics feels more polarised than it once did. Policy now operates in a world that is more volatile and less predictable, shaped by economic shocks, demographic change and an unstable climate. Change under these conditions is rarely quick or tidy. It often involves uncertainty, trade offs and transitions that unfold over years rather than months. Our current three year cycle is not well suited to that reality.

Practically, a significant share of each term is taken up getting a new government established and up to speed. Not long after that, attention inevitably drifts toward the next election. The result for any government is a too-narrow window for careful policy development and legislation, which then allows reforms enough time to show whether they are working.

The British satirical sitcom Yes Minister famously joked that a brave decision was one that lost votes, and a courageous decision was one that lost elections. Under a three year term, many of the changes we need can feel politically courageous before they even begin. Giving governments more time to develop and implement solutions could reduce the extent to which doing the right thing requires rare political heroics.

That said, extending the term is only part of the solution. Elections remain the strongest form of democratic accountability we have. Fewer of them would need to be balanced by stronger checks, clearer scrutiny and better ways for the public to participate between elections. When implementing a longer term, wider change is needed to ensure it actually creates space for more considered decision making.

Finally, any discussion about term length shouldn’t stop at Parliament. The same logic applies to local government, and there’s a strong case for keeping parliamentary and local terms aligned. Local government plays a key role in delivering central government policy, and misaligned cycles often make that task harder than it needs to be. 

Simon Randall is an alumnus and director of policy at Local Government New Zealand.

Elham Bahmanteymouri and Mohsen Mohamadzadeh: longer terms won't improve outcomes for infrastructure and regional development

Extending New Zealand’s parliamentary term from three to four years may provide governments with more time to advance projects and policy programmes. Yet the infrastructure and regional development challenges facing the country unfold over decades, far beyond any single electoral term. The question therefore is not only how much time governments have in office, but more fundamental and complicated systematic question whether governance systems support the long-term planning required for national development.

Infrastructure systems and regional development strategies operate on long time horizons. Transport networks, water systems, energy infrastructure and regional investment programmes often require planning, coordination and funding commitments that span decades rather than electoral terms. Delivering such systems depends on sustained strategic vision and institutional continuity across multiple policy cycles.

Our research on regional development in New Zealand shows that policy initiatives aimed at addressing regional inequalities have often struggled to achieve lasting impact when they are repeatedly reshaped across changing political priorities. Successive governments have introduced different programmes and regional initiatives, yet regional disparities remain persistent across the country. This reflects a broader challenge: development strategies are often implemented through fragmented policy frameworks rather than through a coherent long-term spatial vision.

One of the central challenges is therefore the absence of a consistent national spatial strategy capable of guiding infrastructure investment and regional development beyond short political cycles. Without such a framework, investment priorities can shift with political and institutional changes, making it difficult to sustain coordinated long-term strategies or align national and regional planning efforts.

A longer parliamentary term may provide governments with additional time to advance projects within a single term. However, addressing infrastructure and regional development challenges ultimately requires planning institutions that support long-term strategic thinking, cross-government coordination and policy continuity across successive administrations.

In other words, the real challenge is not simply the length of electoral cycles, but whether governance and planning systems are designed to coordinate and sustain the long-term spatial vision needed to guide infrastructure and regional development. This perspective draws on our research on regional development in New Zealand.

Elham Bahmanteymouri and Mohsen Mohamadzadeh are senior lecturers in urban planning in the Faculty of Engineering and Design.